

NOBURU NOTOMI

*The Unity of
Plato's Sophist*

Between the Sophist and
the Philosopher

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**The Unity of Plato's *Sophist*
Between the Sophist and the Philosopher**

Plato's later dialogue, the *Sophist*, is deemed one of the greatest works in the history of philosophy, but scholars have been shy of confronting the central problem of the dialogue. For Plato, defining the sophist is the basic philosophical problem: any inquirer must face the 'sophist within us' in order to secure the very possibility of dialogue, and of philosophy, against sophistic counter-attack. Examining the connection between the large and difficult philosophical issues discussed in the *Sophist* (appearance, image, falsehood, and 'what is not') in relation to the basic problem of defining the sophist, Dr Notomi shows how Plato struggles with and solves all these problems in a single line of inquiry. His new interpretation of the whole dialogue finally reveals how the philosopher should differ from the sophist.

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THE UNITY OF PLATO'S *SOPHIST*
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For my family

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PREFACE

Philosophy is said to have been born in Ancient Greece. Yet we do not know how to understand this. Does it mean that people living before, or outside, ancient Greek civilisation, such as the Egyptians, Babylonians, and Celts, lived without philosophy? Western civilisations since then have all in this respect followed Greek tradition, and still use words derivative of φιλοσοφία (*philosophia*) (with a few exceptions, such as German 'Weltweisheit' and Dutch 'wijsbegeerte'). In the 1860s, after Japan was opened up to the Occident, one Japanese thinker of the enlightenment era, Nishi Amane (西園庵) (1829–1897), introduced Western civilisation and encountered a new branch of wisdom called philosophy, which he expected to play a role in integrating a hundred disciplines of human knowledge into one. He saw the essential meaning of 'philosophy' as lying in its Greek origin, and coined a new word 'tetsu-gaku', 哲学 (originally, 'ki-tetsu-gaku', 気学, which means the science aspiring to wisdom), instead of adopting any Confucian or Buddhist vocabulary (cf. Havens 1970 and Hasunuma 1987). Now 哲学 is a common word for philosophy not only in Japanese ('tetsu-gaku') but also in Chinese ('zhé-xué') and Korean (철학). This, however, cannot mean that Eastern civilisation, before the introduction of Western civilisation, did not cultivate profound philosophical thinking or scientific thought. On the contrary, Ancient India investigated cosmology and logic, Ancient China developed highly theoretical systems of moral and political teaching, and Neo-Confucianism, after the twelfth century, systematised thinking about nature in terms of *Li* and *Chi*. Nevertheless, these studies were not unified as 'philosophy', so that Nishi Amane, who once was a Confucianist scholar, found in 'philosophy' a new and peculiarly

Western way of thinking. We still confront the question of what 'philosophy' is.

In my view, it was between Socrates and Plato that a firm basis for the Western tradition of philosophy was laid down. After Plato, philosophy came to mean 'to think in a certain Greek way', or especially, to live an examined life as had Socrates and to think universally and critically as had Plato. It is also since Plato, as we shall see, that the original meaning of philosophy has been in a way neglected and concealed under many layers of history; the question about the sophist has hardly been dealt with, although, for Plato, philosophy is not possible without serious confrontation with sophistry. The question of what philosophy is depends primarily upon examination of what Plato thought of philosophy.

Examination of Plato's notion of philosophy will answer the question of whether and, if so, how we can take philosophy as a universal intellectual activity of human beings. For to rediscover the original meaning of philosophy in Plato is to show the possibility of our doing philosophy in dialogue with him. I do not mean by this that Plato's thought alone constitutes philosophy, nor that Greek philosophy alone is universal. Rather, Plato's philosophy is just one of the great foundations, and it is incomprehensible independently of its historical context. There can be many forms and styles of universal thinking. I believe, nonetheless, that proper understanding of philosophy for Plato will reveal universality in its particular context. It is only serious concern about one's present condition that can produce universal thinking. Again, it is only when we appreciate someone's serious concern for the present that we can understand something universal in it, or something essentially common to us. If we are really to be concerned about our own present, we need, on the other hand, to be aware of its particularity or peculiarity, and must go beyond that. It is therefore only when we realise our own peculiarity that our concern for this present will become universal. There is no universality separate from the time we live in, nor is there any possibility of finding it in our own

present only. We need a mirror between the present and the past: a mirror between our predecessors' philosophy and our own.

We need dialogues over differences: dialogues between us, modern readers, and Greek philosophers of the fourth century BC; and dialogues within ourselves. For philosophical thinking, as Plato put it in the *Sophist*, is nothing other than inner dialogue. To that purpose, I try to show the possibility and the essence of philosophy, by going back to its Greek or Platonic origin. I try to elucidate the meaning of philosophy, not take it for granted. While people engage in, or believe they engage in, philosophy without asking what philosophy really is, most have lost sight of philosophy, ignorant of its peculiarity *and* universality. I focus on Plato's *Sophist* as the culmination of Greek philosophy and representative of its essence, but I hope my research will finally reveal how we can understand philosophy beyond its local Western or Greek context. This will be a dialogue between the present and the past and, therefore, contribute to how we nowadays can bring about understanding between East and West.

My first seminar in Greek philosophy was on Plato's *Statesman* given by Professor Shinro Kato at the University of Tokyo from 1985 to 1987. After that exciting but perplexing dialogue, Professor Kato chose the *Sophist* as the text of his seminar at Tokyo Metropolitan University from 1987 to 1990. These seminars were my initiation into Plato's later philosophy. Having worked on the *Sophist* for a few years, I was still struggling to see how to deal with this extremely difficult and fascinating dialogue. I had realised the philosophical importance of the question about the sophist, but I felt a completely new approach was needed. When I went to Cambridge, I had a vague idea that the concept of appearance must be the key to reading the *Sophist* as a whole. Lively and intensive discussion with my supervisor, Professor Myles Burnyeat, who has long been concentrating on the *Theaetetus* and examining the concept of appearance as one of its main themes, gradually developed and confirmed my original idea, and the wide scope of historical and philosophical research


on ancient Greek civilisation practised at the Faculty of Classics, Cambridge University, led me to believe that this concept is one of the most important in ancient philosophy, from the Presocratics to the Hellenistic philosophers. By these paths I finally reached my present position. The present work is a revised form of a Ph.D. dissertation entitled 'The Appearances of the Sophist' (submitted to Cambridge University in April 1995).

On my Ph.D. dissertation, my examiners, Professor Michael Frede and Dr Malcolm Schofield, gave several valuable comments, in the light of which I have extensively improved the argument. I must confess that of their important suggestions, there are two points I have not met. Professor Frede emphasised the triadic structure of the philosopher, sophist, and statesman, and he suggested that, without considering the relationship to the last, the first two would never become clear. It is doubtless true, but that requires another huge task of investigating Plato's notion of philosopher-ruler. Promising that I will examine it in a future work, I avoid entering into that topic at present. Dr Schofield also suggested that the concept of irony (discussed in the final chapter) would become more illuminating if I were to examine it more fully, particularly in relation to Socratic irony. Yet, that project also is postponed. The aim of this work is to clarify the topic with which the *Sophist* is mainly concerned, and I do not discuss other hotly debated topics, such as the senses of the verb 'to be', and the dialogue's relation to the theory of Forms.

My teachers and friends at Cambridge University, particularly Professor Geoffrey Lloyd, who was my supervisor in the Michaelmas Term, 1991, and Professor Myles Burnyeat, my supervisor since 1992, have always encouraged me and given generous comments and advice on my work and life. This work would never have been written without the intellectual inspiration of those devotees of ancient philosophy. My friends, Verity Harte, Mary-Hannah Jones, and Gabriel Richardson, excellent young scholars, carefully read my early draft and gave me valuable comments on both the style and

PREFACE

content of this work. Richard Mason, Tatsumi Nijima, Charles Kahn, Mary-Louise Gill, David Sedley and Kenji Tsuchiya read parts of the earlier versions of my dissertation and discussed them with me. Michael Frede, Malcolm Schofield, Job van Eck, Kim Nam Duh and Michael Reeve read my Ph.D. dissertation or the later versions, and very much helped my revision. Derek Birch corrected the style of the whole thesis. Finally, I again wholeheartedly thank Myles Burnyeat, who has always been my first, last, and best reader. Conversation with these people has tremendously improved my initially vague argument and added many important points.



NOTOMI Noburu

NOTES

The edition of Plato's text I use is the Oxford Classical Text (edited by John Burnet, 1900–1907; for the first volume, I also consult the new edition by E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan, 1995). I refer to the text by Stephanus' page numbers. The translation of Greek texts is my own, but readers may find it helpful to consult modern English translations of the *Sophist* (e.g. Cobb 1990 and White 1993). The references are given by the author's name and year (see Bibliography).

As for the third-person pronoun, I usually use 'he' for stylistic reasons, but that should be understood as neutral with regard to gender.

Abbreviations

Plato

<i>Alc. 1</i>	<i>Alcibiades 1</i>
<i>Alc. 2</i>	<i>Alcibiades 2</i>
<i>Ap.</i>	<i>Apology of Socrates</i>
<i>Crat.</i>	<i>Cratylus</i>
<i>Ep.</i>	<i>Epistles</i>
<i>Euthd.</i>	<i>Euthydemus</i>
<i>Gorg.</i>	<i>Gorgias</i>
<i>Hipp. Mj.</i>	<i>Hippias Major</i>
<i>Hipp. Mi.</i>	<i>Hippias Minor</i>
<i>Lach.</i>	<i>Laches</i>
<i>Lg.</i>	<i>Laws</i>
<i>Lys.</i>	<i>Lysis</i>
<i>Men.</i>	<i>Meno</i>
<i>Menex.</i>	<i>Menexenus</i>

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Parm.</i>	<i>Parmenides</i>
<i>Phd.</i>	<i>Phaedo</i>
<i>Phdr.</i>	<i>Phaedrus</i>
<i>Phlb.</i>	<i>Philebus</i>
<i>Plt.</i>	<i>Statesman</i>
<i>Prot.</i>	<i>Protagoras</i>
<i>Rep.</i>	<i>Republic</i>
<i>Sph.</i>	<i>Sophist</i>
<i>Symp.</i>	<i>Symposium</i>
<i>Thg.</i>	<i>(Plato), Theages</i>
<i>Tht.</i>	<i>Theaetetus</i>
<i>Tim.</i>	<i>Timaeus</i>
Xen.	Xenophon
<i>Mem.</i>	<i>Memorabilia</i>
Arist.	Aristotle
<i>Cat.</i>	<i>Categories</i>
<i>Int.</i>	<i>On Interpretation</i>
<i>Top.</i>	<i>Topics</i>
<i>SE.</i>	<i>Sophistical Refutations</i>
<i>Phys.</i>	<i>Physics</i>
<i>DA.</i>	<i>On the Soul (De Anima)</i>
<i>Meta.</i>	<i>Metaphysics</i>
<i>EN.</i>	<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>
<i>EE.</i>	<i>Eudemian Ethics</i>
<i>Rh.</i>	<i>Rhetoric</i>
<i>Po.</i>	<i>Poetics</i>
Hdt.	Herodotus
Thuc.	Thucydides
DL	Diogenes Laertius, <i>Lives of Eminent Philosophers</i>
Plotinus	
<i>Enn.</i>	<i>Enneads</i>

ABBREVIATIONS

Proclus

- In Alc. I* *Commentary on Plato's First Alcibiades* (ed. Westerink 1954)
- In Crat.* *Commentary on Plato's Cratylus* (ed. Pasquali 1908)
- In Parm.* *Commentary on Plato's Parmenides* (ed. Cousin 1864)
- In Rep.* *Commentary on Plato's Republic* (ed. Kroll 1899, 1901)
- In Tim.* *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (ed. Diehl 1903, 1904, 1906)

Hermias

- In Phdr.* *Scholia on Plato's Phaedrus* (ed. Couvreur 1901)

Olympiodorus

- In Alc. I* *Commentary on Plato's First Alcibiades* (ed. Westerink 1956)
- In Gorg.* *Commentary on Plato's Gorgias* (ed. Westerink 1970)
- In Phd.* *Commentary on Plato's Phaedo* (ed. Westerink 1976)

Damascius

- In Parm.* *Dubitationes et Solutiones, de Primis Principiis, in Platonis Parmenidem* (ed. Ruelle 1889)
- In Phd.* *Commentary on Plato's Phaedo* (ed. Westerink 1977)
- In Phlb.* *Lectures on Plato's Philebus* (ed. Westerink 1959)

Anonymous

- Anon. Prol.* *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (ed. Westerink 1962)

- DK H. Diels & W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, I-III* (Berlin, 6. Aufl. 1951–52)

ABBREVIATIONS

- LS A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers, Volume 1: translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary; Volume 2: Greek and Latin texts with notes and bibliography* (Cambridge, 1987)
- LSJ H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, & H. S. Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, with a supplement (Oxford, 1968)
- TLG *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*

DIVISION OF THE *SOPHIST*

First Outer Part (216a1–236d8)

Introduction: setting of the theme and the method (216a1–219a3)

Paradigm of the angler (219a4–221c4)

The 1st definition: hunter of the young (221c5–223b8)

The 2nd to 4th definitions: merchant of learning (223c1–224e5)

The 5th definition: eristic or verbal fighter (224e6–226a5)

The 6th definition: sophist of noble lineage (226a6–231b9)

Transitional portion: the New Attempt (231b9–233d2)

Paradigm of the image-maker (233d3–236d8)

Middle Part (236d9–264b8)

Section 1: The difficulty concerning ‘what is not’ (236d9–242b5)

The difficulties raised (236d9–237b6)

The difficulties concerning what is not (237b7–239c8)

The difficulty concerning image (239c9–240c6)

The difficulty concerning falsehood (240c7–241b4)

Interlude: three pleas (241b4–242b5)

Section 2: The difficulty concerning ‘what is’ (242b6–251a4)

Predecessors on what is (242b6–243d6)

Dialogue with dualists (243d6–244b5)

Dialogue with monists (244b6–245e5)

Battle of gods and giants (245e6–246e1)

Dialogue with materialists (246e2–248a3)

Dialogue with friends of Forms (248a4–249d5)

Parity of difficulties concerning what is and what is not (249d6–251a4)

Section 3: The combination between kinds (251a5–259d8)

- The possibility of combination between kinds
(251a5–253c5)
- Digression on dialectic and the philosopher
(253c6–254b6)
- The combination between the five greatest kinds
(254b7–257a12)
- Examination of what is not, in terms of difference
(257b1–258c5)
- Conclusion (258c6–259d8)
- Section 4: The analysis of falsehood (259d9–264b8)
 - Transition: new problem (259d9–261c5)
 - Section 4–1: Analysis of statement (*logos*)
(261c6–262e2)
 - Section 4–2: False statement explained (262e3–263d5)
 - Section 4–3: False judgement and *phantasia*
(263d6–264b8)
- Second Outer Part: The final definition of the sophist
(264b9–268d5)

CHAPTER I

HOW TO READ THE *SOPHIST*

1.1 The many appearances of the *Sophist*

What is the *Sophist*, usually deemed one of the greatest philosophical works of Plato? What philosophical problem does Plato propose and investigate in this dialogue?

The *Sophist* has many faces, each of which has attracted philosophers for two millennia. The issues discussed in the dialogue are all known to be so problematic and so important in the history of philosophy that philosophers have hardly ever asked what problem the *Sophist* really confronts, or what these issues are to be examined for. They have taken the ‘problems’ for granted. The variety of the philosophical issues it raises, however, makes us fail to see the dialogue *as a whole*. Each philosopher has taken up only a piece of the dialogue, so that the faces of the *Sophist* remain fragmentary; the *Sophist* has not shown us the whole figure nor its essence.

Let us begin our examination by considering how we can approach the dialogue, through a survey of the many faces it has shown its past readers.

With its traditional subtitle ‘On what is’ (*peri tou ontos, de ente*),¹ the dialogue was treated, from antiquity to the Renaissance, primarily as a masterpiece of Plato’s ontological thinking.

First, Plato tackles in *Sophist* 236d–242b the problem of

¹ Cf. DL 3.58. Diogenes attributes the use of the double title, the one from the name of the interlocutor and the other from the subject, to Thrasyllus (first century AD) (DL 3.57; cf. Grote 1875, Vol.I, 160, note), but the subtitles to the Platonic dialogues must have reflected the long tradition of the Academy and Alexandrian scholarship. Hoerber 1957 argues that the second titles originated in the fourth century BC (possibly in Plato himself), and were only *used* by Thrasyllus in incorporating them into his canon (see also Philip 1970, 301–302); Tarrant 1993, 16–17, argues that it must be the systematic compiler of the corpus, i.e. Thrasyllus, who attached descriptive titles to *every* dialogue.

‘what is not’ (*to mē on*), which has proved one of the most important issues in Greek philosophy since Parmenides originally raised the issue. Parmenides, in his verse, strongly opposed ‘what is not *is*’, and his successors had to prove the possibility of the being of what is not, in order to secure change and plurality in our world. In spite of Aristotle’s criticism,² Plato’s treatment of ‘what is not’ as difference (257b–259b) became a standard view for his successors, and the Neoplatonists usually assume Plato’s distinction between ‘relative not-being’ and ‘absolute not-being’.³ Following Plotinus, they also assume a third sense of ‘what is not’, namely, ‘matter’.⁴ The ontological status of ‘what is not’ continues to be one of the important issues in Western philosophy.

Plato’s full investigation into ‘what is’ (*to on*) in 242b–259d, on the other hand, reveals to his followers the essence of Platonic ontology, and each particular portion of the discussion greatly influenced later philosophers.

Interestingly enough, the criticism levelled against materialists and idealists (the friends of Forms) attracted both the materialists of the Hellenistic period and the idealists of Neoplatonism. In the criticism of the materialists, the capacity of acting and being acted upon is proposed as a hallmark (*horos*) of ‘being’ (247d–248a).⁵ Zeno the Stoic is said to reverse this proposal and use it as the hall-mark of

² Cf. *Meta.* N 2 (esp. 1088b35–1089a6, b16–20), Z 4 1030a25–27; cf. *Phys.* A 3 187a1–10 (the reference may be to the Platonists, not to Plato himself; cf. Ross 1936, 479–481, and Cherniss 1944, 84–101).

³ Proclus, *In Parm.* 999–1000, 1184–1185, and 46K. Cf. Gersh 1978, 62.

⁴ Plotinus distinguishes three senses of ‘what is not’: absolute not-being; something different from being; and Matter (cf. O’Brien 1995, *Etude I* (=O’Brien 1991), and Gerson 1994, 285, n.39). The last sense can be traced back to the Unwritten Doctrine, reported in Aristotle, since he identifies ‘what is not’ for Plato with matter, space, or ‘indefinite dyad’ (see Cherniss 1944, 86, 92–96). Proclus, *In Parm.* 999–1000, also distinguishes these three senses (cf. *Platonic Theology* II 5; Saffrey & Westerink 1974, 38–39, 99–100). On the other hand, the scholion to Proclus’ *Commentary on Plato’s Republic* (F. 148v ad p. 265, 26) distinguishes four senses of ‘what is not’: the first principle which is beyond being; difference or not being something; the sensible in contrast to the intelligible (or matter, as being nothing actual); and absolute not-being (Kroll 1901, 375).

⁵ This hallmark seems popular in the Academy; see Aristotle, *Top.* V 9 139a4–8, VI 7 146a21–32.

‘body’,⁶ and Epicurus uses the same definition for something’s being ‘body’.⁷ Both of the materialist parties, the Stoics and Epicureans, are directly or indirectly influenced by the *Sophist* passage, which originally intended to refute materialism.

Another short, but difficult, passage in the refutation of the friends of Forms (248e–249d) fascinated Plotinus and his successors: life and intelligence, as well as the Forms, must possess true being. This claim, exceptional in Plato’s corpus, is evoked as a support for the Neoplatonic triad of powers in Intelligence (*nous*): being, life, and intelligence.⁸

According to some testimony, the major Platonists, including Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, and Olympiodorus, may have written commentaries on the *Sophist*.⁹ Their commentaries have not survived, but we can imagine the dialogue’s influence from some important treatises of Plotinus and scattered comments on it in Proclus’ surviving works.¹⁰ We must remember that the discussion on ‘what is’ has

⁶ The main source of testimony about Zeno is Cicero, *Academica* I 39 (LS 45A). For the influence of the *Sophist* passage on the Stoics, see Hicks 1910, 60, Sandbach 1975, 91–92, Long 1986, 153, Long & Sedley 1987, Vol.1, 270 and 273–274 (cf. Vol.2, 269), and Dancy 1991, 72–76, 151–152, n.51. Brunschwig 1994 (esp. 115–126) fully examines the importance of the *Sophist* for the Stoics.

⁷ *Letter to Herodotus* 67 (DL 10.67; LS 14A(7)). Plato’s influence on Epicurus is not as obvious as on the Stoics; but similarity to the Stoic argument (especially, Cleanthes in LS 45C) is pointed out by Long & Sedley 1987, Vol.1, 71. In this regard, Hicks 1910, 60, and Dancy 1991, 71–72, treat Epicurus and the Stoics in a parallel way.

⁸ This triad is seen in Plotinus (e.g. *Enn.* I 6.7, V 4.2, V 6.6), but their order in his system is not fixed (cf. Wallis 1972, 67, 92). It is the later Neoplatonists, such as Proclus, who establish the triad (the *Elements of Theology* §§101–103; cf. Dodds 1963, 252–254; Wallis 1972, 125); see also Hadot 1960, Merlan 1967, 20, Allen 1989, 56–59, A. C. Lloyd 1990, 113, Heiser 1991, 51–52, and Gerson 1994, 249, n.51.

⁹ Porphyry’s commentary on the *Sophist* is mentioned in the preface of Boethius’ *On Division*. A summary of Iamblichus’ view is preserved in the scholia (cf. Dillon 1973, 15, 22; we shall examine it later). Proclus refers to his commentary in *In Parm.* 774 (cf. Morrow & Dillon 1987, 139, n.43), and Olympiodorus refers to his in *In Alc.* 1, 110.8. However, these indirect comments are far from decisive in proving that they wrote full commentaries (cf. Sodano 1966, 195, Dillon 1973, 245, and Steel 1992, 53, n.11). On the other hand, there was no medieval Latin translation of this dialogue or commentary on it, before Ficino translated it between 1464 and 1466, and wrote a brief commentary between 1494 and 1496 (cf. Allen 1989, 16, 31–34).

¹⁰ Cf. Charles-Saget 1991, Steel 1992, and the citations listed in Guérard 1991.

traditionally been treated as a main source of the theory of Forms, in contrast to the cautious or sceptical attitude of modern scholars toward the 'Forms' in this dialogue.¹¹

Regarding the *Sophist* as an exponent of the full-blown theory of Forms, Plotinus devotes *Ennead* VI 2 to an examination of the five greatest kinds presented in *Sophist* 254b–257a, namely, being, change, rest, sameness, and difference; he discusses Plato's greatest kinds as the categories of the intelligible world, which are superior to the Aristotelian or the Stoic categories.¹²

The Neoplatonists, following Plotinus, saw in the *Sophist* (244b–245e and other passages) hints as to the relation between the One (the highest principle) and Being. In accordance with the crucial passage in the simile of the Sun in the *Republic* (VI 509b), they supposed the One and Good to be beyond Being.¹³ They placed the *Sophist* next only to the *Parmenides*, which is the main text for Neoplatonism, and expected the *Sophist* to provide some supplementary but crucial arguments for elucidating that relation.¹⁴ Proclus believes that in the *Sophist* Plato does not merely refute *Parmenides*, but demonstrates in a dialectical way that the

Lloyd 1967, 323, points out the *Sophist's* influence on Proclus and Proclus' influence on Hegel; for Hegel's interpretation of the *Sophist*, see Hegel 1971, 67–77, Apelt 1895, 443–445, Gray 1941, 80–81, and Gadamer 1976, ch. 1.

¹¹ After Vlastos 1954 and Owen 1953, in particular, modern scholars tend to see the first part of the *Parmenides* as Plato's crucial self-criticism of his theory of Forms. Consequently, they hesitate to see the *Sophist* as expounding the same theory as that in the middle dialogues (cf. White 1993, xii–xiv). Some scholars still assume that Plato maintains the theory; some believe that he revises it in the *Sophist* or in the *Timaeus*; and others suggest that he discusses something different in the later dialogues.

¹² Cf. Charrie 1978, 205–229, Brisson 1991, Horié 1993, and Gerson 1994, 96–103. However, this peculiar view did not attract many supporters in Neoplatonism. For the general importance of the five greatest kinds in Neoplatonism, see Gersh 1978, 57–72.

¹³ Cf. Merlan 1967, 20–21, and Allen 1989, ch. 1. For the influence of the claim that the Good is 'beyond Being' (*epekeina tēs ousias*), see Dodds 1928, Whittaker 1969, and Dancy 1991, 94–96 (critical).

¹⁴ Proclus in *Platonic Theology* III 21 (Saffrey & Westerink 1978, 73.10–12; cf. 139, n.3) claims that 'The thoughts of the Eleatic (sc. the *Sophist*) are the preparation (*proteleia*) for the mysteries of the *Parmenides*'. The relation between the *Parmenides* (in particular, the second hypothesis) and the *Sophist* (the criticism of monism, etc.), a question rarely asked by modern scholars, was a major concern for the Neoplatonists (cf. Lloyd 1967, 303, Steel 1992, and Allen 1989, 55–56).

absolute One is not identical with Being.¹⁵ In this tradition, when the Renaissance scholar, Pico della Mirandola, attacked the leading Platonist of his age, Marsilio Ficino, in the *De Ente et Uno*, and tried to show the identity of the One and Being (along with Aristotle), the *Sophist* became the pivotal text in the controversy.¹⁶

The *Sophist* has proved influential not only in the field of ontology, but also in methodology, logic (or what we call philosophy of language), and theory of art.

In the Alexandrian tradition, the dialogue is classified as a 'logical' (*logikos*) treatise.¹⁷ For the Platonists, it was the main source of Plato's method of dialectic, especially the method of division (*diairesis*), which was first introduced in the *Phaedrus* and was explained and extensively employed in the *Sophist* and the subsequent dialogue, the *Statesman*. Also, the argument on dialectic in the middle of the *Sophist* (253c–e), along with the divine method explained in the *Philebus* (16c–18d), is usually supposed to constitute a locus classicus of exposition of this method. The method of division, or dichotomy, in particular, which is demonstrated in the first portion of the *Sophist*, became fashionable in the Academy, and Aristotle critically examined its appropriateness as a method of definition.¹⁸ The method of division influenced medieval logic through the Peripatetic school and especially Boethius' treatise *On Division*.

Modern logicians tend to look to the *Sophist* as one of the origins of Western rules of logic.¹⁹ It contains an explication of the logical status of negation, the first clear definition of

¹⁵ *Platonic Theology* III 20 (ed. Saffrey & Westerink 1978); cf. Steel 1992, 53–57.

¹⁶ For the controversy, see Allen 1989, Chapter 1. Since Pico dismissed the *Parmenides*, on which the Neoplatonic interpretation is mainly based, as an eristic exercise (rather than ontological exegesis), the *Sophist* became the main battlefield; Allen 1989, 46, however, concludes that Pico did not discuss the passage most crucial to this debate.

¹⁷ DL 3.58 and Albinus, *Isagoge*, 148 (ed. Hermann 1884). On the other hand, *Anonymous Prolegomena* 26.31, if the conjecture of Westerink 1962, xxxvii xl (usually accepted by other scholars), is correct, classifies the *Sophist* and *Statesman* as 'physical' dialogues. This view must be connected with Iamblichus' interpretation of the *Sophist*, which we shall discuss in the next section.

¹⁸ Cf. *Parts of Animals* A; cf. Cherniss 1944, 48–58.

¹⁹ Cf. Kneale & Kneale 1962, 17–22, and Ryle 1939 (esp. 141–145; cf. Soulez 1991).

statement (*logos*), that it consists of noun (*onoma*) and verb (*rhēma*), and definitions of truth and falsehood. Aristotle, on the basis of Plato's analysis of statement, constructed his own logical system, especially in *On Interpretation*, and accepted, without any critical examination, Plato's definition of true and false statements in *Sophist* 263b–d (cf. 240d–241a).²⁰ This has come to be the standard 'correspondence theory' of truth, through the Middle Ages to the present.²¹ The birth and growth of modern formal logic after Frege sheds new light on this dialogue, and commentators repeatedly ask how Plato distinguished the senses of the verb 'to be': existence, predication, and identity.

The argument on image (233d–236d, 239c–240c, 264c–266e) and especially the distinction between 'eikastic' and 'phantastic' arts (235c–236c) has greatly influenced the theory of art since antiquity. Marsilio Ficino, in his commentary on this dialogue, focused on the role of image, examined making images as a human ability, and investigated demonology.²² The distinction between 'eikastic' and 'phantastic', though often misunderstood, was extensively used by the sixteenth-century critics, such as Francesco Patrizi, Giacompo Mazzoni, and Sir Philip Sidney.²³ The word '*phantasia*', again, first introduced in Plato's dialogues, later developed into our notions of 'fantasy' and 'imagination', which have fruitfully inspired many artists and art critics.

Finally, we should not forget the dialogue's influence on contemporary philosophers. Let us take two examples, Martin Heidegger and Gilles Deleuze. Heidegger lectured on the *Sophist* in the winter semester of 1924 / 25. The climax of

²⁰ For the definition of truth and falsehood, see *Meta.* Γ 7 1011b25–28, E 4 1027b18–23, Θ 10 1051b1–6, 1051b33–1052a3; cf. *Cat.* 4 2a4–10, *Int.* I 16a12–18. See Kneale & Kneale 1962, 45–46.

²¹ This Platonic-Aristotelian definition of truth was predominant among Scholastics, like Thomas Aquinas, and is still used, for example, by Tarski 1956, 155.

²² Cf. Allen 1989, Chapters 4 and 5.

²³ For Patrizi and Mazzoni, see Hathaway 1962, 13–16 and 24–25 respectively. For Sidney, see *The Defence of Poesy* (ed. Shepherd 1973, 125; cf. 202–203; Levao 1987, 136–137). Panofsky 1960, 212–215, 242, attributes the origin of the misunderstanding of Plato's original distinction to Gregorio Comanini, the sixteenth-century churchman (cf. 165 (G. P. Bellori), 252, 253).

his lecture comes with Plato's analysis of statement as always related to something ('*logos tinos*' in 262e), which he regards as the prototype of Husserl's concept of 'intentionality', and thus he sees in the *Sophist* the essence of phenomenology.²⁴ Heidegger also began his grand work, *Sein und Zeit* (1927), with a quotation from *Sophist* 244a, which introduces the fundamental question concerning 'being',²⁵ and it is widely acknowledged that he formed the backbone of his own philosophy through examining ancient Greek thought, not least Plato's *Sophist*. Gilles Deleuze, promoting a philosophy of difference, defines the task of modern philosophy as to overturn Platonism, which subordinates difference to unity, the same, and the similar. Deleuze finds the distinction between copy and simulacra in the *Sophist* to be more profound than that between model and copy, and finds it at once to be the essence of Platonism and to provide the possibility of overturning Platonism itself.²⁶

The philosophical treasures in this dialogue seem never to be exhausted. At the same time, our survey has shown so many appearances of the *Sophist* that we may find ourselves at a loss. For nobody seems to have revealed to us what philosophical problem Plato really investigates in this dialogue *taken as a whole*. The themes in different parts look so hard to put together that most readers have given up the idea of dealing with the dialogue as a unified whole.²⁷ Consequently, most traditional interpretations split the dialogue, and, as a result, some arguments in the middle part are viewed as interesting, while other parts usually attract little notice, or are simply ignored. The dialogue is fragmented into many pieces of 'philosophical ideas'.

Contemporary scholars tend to discuss the problem of the meanings of the verb 'to be' (*einai*) as the main issue in the *Sophist*.²⁸ One of the leading discussions in our age proclaims

²⁴ Heidegger 1992, 597–598. I owe this point to Ichiro Mori.

²⁵ Heidegger 1977, 1.

²⁶ Deleuze 1994, 59–64, 66–69, 126–128, and 264–265; Deleuze 1990, 253–266, examines Plato's notion of 'Simulacrum'. Cf. Patton 1994.

²⁷ For this difficulty in interpretation, see, for example, Burnet 1914, 223.

²⁸ For a discussion of this issue, see Cornford 1935, Ackrill 1957, Taylor 1961,

that 'The *Sophist* will turn out to be primarily an essay in problems of reference and predication and in the incomplete uses of the verb associated with these'.²⁹ The tendency to focus solely on issues of logic predominates in modern scholarship. Our historical survey has shown, however, that the *Sophist* provides a much wider range of philosophical issues, and this may help us free ourselves from the specific (usually analytical) approach of modern scholarship. Issues of logic are only one aspect of the dialogue, and that aspect must be connected with all the others. In contrast to the contemporary debate on the logical issues, one may find it peculiar that few philosophers have discussed the issue of the definition of the sophist in the dialogue called the *Sophist*. They have treated the sophist merely as a historical issue, or as having nothing important to contribute to philosophy. Gilbert Ryle, for instance, boldly declares that 'Plato's *Sophist* has so artificially to safety-pin [sic] the philosophical theme of Non-Being or Negation on to the unphilosophical stretches about the Sophist'.³⁰ The sophist remains an unexamined topic in the history of interpreting the *Sophist*.

Contemporary philosophers, moreover, use Plato's arguments in the *Sophist* as his solutions or theories, instead of inquiries or questions. They often suppose that Plato's conclusive arguments have killed the problems dead; for example, that Plato cleared up the confusion concerning the meaning of negation and the senses of 'to be'.³¹ Ironically,

Gulley 1962, Moravcsik 1962, M. Frede 1967, Malcolm 1967, Sayre 1969, Owen 1971, Wiggins 1971, Bluck 1975, J. McDowell 1982, Bostock 1984, Brown 1986, de Rijk 1986, Pelletier 1990, Denyer 1991, M. Frede 1992b, Brown 1994, and van Eck 1995.

²⁹ Owen 1971, 225.

³⁰ Ryle 1966, 36; his target is the definition of the sophist *through division*, which 'presupposes no philosophical sophistication whatsoever' (see Ryle 1966, 139–140; cf. 285). Sprague 1993, 251, reports that Ryle, lecturing on the *Sophist* in Oxford in 1963, 'began the series by announcing that he would ignore everything except the section 237A–264B, which, he said, contained the "philosophical meat" of the dialogue'. I do not think that he was an exception, at least in the fifties, sixties, and seventies.

³¹ See, for instance, Kneale & Kneale 1962: 'the ambiguity of the verb "to be" gave serious trouble to Plato and his contemporaries, although to us the puzzle it presented now seems childish' (11); those troubles became after Plato even for Aristotle 'mere historical curiosities' (22).

the more successful Plato's argument looks, the more convinced they are that the problems are all solved. However good the solutions may be, however, modern philosophers never confront the questions in the same *context* as Plato when they extract them from the dialogue. Whether the conclusion is that Plato distinguished the existential use and the copula, or predication and identity, or that he saw no clear distinction at all, this is still a conclusion that will be no more than a historical fact seen retrospectively from our own framework: it simply makes Plato the first philosopher who tried to clarify the issues that had raised difficulties in earlier Greek philosophy, though his attempt was not fully successful. His argument is displayed as a historical specimen, while he himself, as a living example of a philosopher, is left unnoticed.

Most readers, ancient or modern, have thus isolated each particular part from the other; but this kind of specific approach will impoverish the philosophical riches of the *Sophist*. For to treat one part separately is to ignore the context of the issues it considers. Each issue is not an episode, but is presented within a certain dialectical process and in connection with other issues. Failure to consider the relations between them risks interpretation of an issue quite different from Plato's own. For it is only within the whole dialogue in which Plato put them that what are thought to be the 'problems' in the *Sophist* gain their philosophical significance. In this sense, the whole context alone can fix the meaning Plato originally gave to each particular issue, and present us with living problems of philosophy.

To avoid these pitfalls, I shall make a fresh start, and take a simple question seriously: what problem does Plato propose and investigate in the *Sophist* considered *as a whole*?

In asking this question, I assume two things concerning the interpretation of Plato's philosophy. First, each dialogue constitutes a unity, in which all the problems acquire their significance. In other words, when Plato deals with more than one problem in a single dialogue, I assume that he intends us to see a certain deep connection between the problems the

dialogue concerns. One problem may evoke another, but multiplicity of problems does not mean a medley of independent problems. We must look for a structure or ordering of the problems, and consider how to approach the most fundamental problem of a dialogue. Second, philosophy is in my view a perennial practice of questioning and attempting to answer certain great problems, and I think it is more important for us to examine what Plato asked and how he investigated than to see his answers, which are in most cases unlikely to be final or decisive, even for Plato himself.³² He may not have given the ultimate solution to them, but nevertheless, the dialogues are the record of his struggling with certain deep problems, and we can see him, in the very early history of philosophy, formulating important questions which still remain important today. To read Plato's dialogues, I believe, is not so much to analyse his arguments on the particular issues in which we are interested, as to confront the very problems that Plato faced. To ask, in this way, what problem Plato really addresses in a dialogue and to struggle with that problem ourselves is the only way for us to do philosophy with Plato.

Now that we have viewed many faces and appearances of the *Sophist*, we must seek the unity which is hidden behind these faces and proceed from the appearances to the essence of the dialogue. Let us examine what problem underlies the *Sophist* as a whole, and ourselves confront that problem by retracing Plato's inquiry.

1.2 The ancient search for the *skopos*

What problem does Plato propose and investigate in the *Sophist*? This is a question that modern scholars have hardly asked, but when we look back to the old tradition of the Platonist commentators, we can observe that this is exactly

³² As M. Frede 1992a shows, the dialogue form intends to ask questions (the questioner, like Socrates, of the interlocutor, and in a parallel way, the author of the reader) rather than to endorse an argument; see also Bowen 1988 and Stokes 1986, Chapter 1. In this way all Platonic dialogues are *Socratic*.

where they begin to interpret a dialogue: that is to decide the 'skopos' (aim) of a dialogue. The commentators' approach is based on their principle that each Platonic dialogue must be read as a unity, and this attitude of the commentators makes a sharp contrast to that of the philosophers.

The Platonists (after Iamblichus) usually at the beginning of a commentary asked what the *skopos* of each dialogue is.³³ The *skopos* is the aim (*telos*) or main subject of a dialogue, and the Neoplatonists believe that each dialogue aims at a single important *skopos*. Systematic investigation into the *skopos* of the Platonic dialogues seems to have begun with Iamblichus,³⁴ although older Alexandrian scholars certainly discussed the main theme.³⁵

Searching for a *skopos* is inseparable from the basic treatment of each Platonic dialogue as a unity. A Platonic dialogue is compared to a living being, on the basis of Plato's *Phaedrus* 264c2–5: 'every *logos* must be put together like a living thing, as if it has a body of its own, so as not to lack either head or feet, but to have a centre and both ends, so written as to fit each other and the whole'.³⁶ Hermias, for example, says, 'There must be one *skopos* covering all (*panta-*

³³ Most of the surviving commentaries on Plato's dialogues contain the section discussing the *skopos*: Proclus, *In Alc.* I 1 11, *In Crat.* I 1 9, *In Rep.* I 5.6 14.14, *In Tim.* I 4 4.5, and *In Parm.* 630 645; Hermias, *In Phdr.* 8.15 12.25; Damascius, *In Phlb.* §§ 1 6; Olympiodorus, *In Gorg.* proem 4 and *In Alc.* I 3.3 9.19. Cf. Morrow & Dillon 1987, 3 11. On the other hand, there is no such argument in Damascius, *In Phd.*, *In Parm.*, nor Olympiodorus, *In Phd.*

³⁴ We have some fragments of Iamblichus' arguments on *skopos*, in Dillon 1973: *In Alc.* I Fr.2, *In Phdr.* Fr.1, *In Phlb.* Fr.1, and *In Sph.* Fr.1. For Iamblichus' contribution, see Praechter 1910, 128 144, 149, Westerink 1959, 2, note, Westerink, Trouillard & Segonds 1990, lxvi, Dillon 1973, 56 57, and Dillon 1987, 877. Larsen 1972, 436, points out that the commentators before Iamblichus, such as Porphyry and Dexippus, do not use the term '*skopos*' (while Porphyry uses '*prothesis*'); Larsen 1972, 437, also suggests Peripatetic influence on Iamblichus' use of the *skopos*, and Dillon 1987, 877, suggests possible influence by Numenius.

³⁵ In the *Anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus* (late first century BC according to Tarrant 1983 and Bastianini & Sedley 1995, or second century AD according to Diels & Schubart 1905; older than the above-mentioned commentaries) there is a similar argument on the subject of the dialogue without use of the term '*skopos*' (2.11 52). It attacks some Platonists who take the *Theaetetus* to be about the criterion ('*perli kritēriou*', 2.13); for interpretation of this argument, see Sedley 1996, 89 90, 94 95.

³⁶ For *Phdr.* 264c, see de Vries 1969, 211 212. *Anonymous Prolegomena* 15.13 16 (ed. Westerink 1962) refers to this famous statement. The importance of the

chou), for the sake of which <all parts> are used, just as in a living creature all parts are united in the one thing.³⁷ A dialogue is also compared to a universe;³⁸ just as a universe has a God, a dialogue is supposed to have its *skopos* as the single aim of the whole treatise.³⁹

While some dialogues clearly show us a single *skopos*, such as 'holiness' for the *Euthyphro* and 'knowledge' for the *Theaetetus*, this is not the case for many others; the *skopos* of each dialogue must rather be an achievement of long and scrupulous research on the dialogue. Proclus puts it in this way: 'Just as we must proceed upwards from appearances to the intelligible, so we must ascend from the circumstances presupposed in the dialogue to the single purpose (*prothesis*) of the arguments and the single end of the whole treatise' (*In Parm.* 630.28–33). Thus, searching for the *skopos* is itself an important task for commentators.

The *skopos* of the *Sophist* seems to have been much discussed in antiquity, though we do not possess any extant systematic argument, mainly for the lack of surviving commentary.⁴⁰ To examine ancient views on the *skopos* of the *Sophist*, we should consult the *Anonymous Prolegomena* and some other Neoplatonic commentaries. *Anonymous Prolegomena* Chapter 9 systematically examines ten rules for establishing the *skopos* of each dialogue, rules usually supposed to have originated in Iamblichus.⁴¹ Among the ten rules, the following two are most important: according to the first, central rule, a dialogue must have only one *skopos*, not many

Phaedrus in Neoplatonism is seen in Larsen 1972, 444–446, and Clay 1988, 131–134; the comparison of a dialogue to a living body in Neoplatonism is discussed in Coulter 1976, 73–77.

³⁷ *In Phdr.* 9.7–9; cf. 11.16–19.

³⁸ *Anon. Prol.* 15.1–13 explains the first two reasons why Plato chose the dialogue form: that the dialogue is like a universe, and that the Universe is a kind of dialogue (cf. 16.1–6). Accordingly, each element of the dialogue corresponds to each component of the Universe (16.1–17.39). For this Neoplatonic comparison, see Coulter 1976, ch. IV, and Clay 1988, 132.

³⁹ Cf. *Anon. Prol.* 17.31–32; and 'to hen telos tēs holēs pragmateias tautēs', in Proclus' *In Parm.* 630.32–33. The Neoplatonic commentators sometimes applied this 'Platonic instruction' (*parangelma*) to interpreting Aristotle (cf. Olympiodorus' *Commentary on Aristotle's Meteora*, 9.5–7 (ed. Stuve 1900)).

⁴⁰ For a good summary of the arguments, see Allen 1989, 83–85.

⁴¹ Cf. Westerink 1962, xxxvi, and Larsen 1972, 438.

(21.13, 18–28); and according to the third rule, the *skopos* must cover the doctrine of the whole work, and not be confined to the content of one part (21.14, 22.1–20). We can find in their treatment five candidates for the *skopos* of the *Sophist*: the sophist, division, what is not, what is, and the Sublunar Demiurge.

The first candidate is the ‘sophist’, by which Plato himself may have referred to the work.⁴² Proclus takes this as the *skopos* of the dialogue; for he always emphasises the role of the prologues (*prooimia*) of Plato’s dialogues as indicating the overall *skopoi*,⁴³ and the definition of the sophist is the official subject proposed in the prologue to the dialogue (216a–218c). Proclus claims that:

Plato thus entitled the *Sophist*, since this, namely, the sophist, was the subject proposed for investigation in the dialogue. Although many things are said also about what is and about what is not, these are discussed for the sake of argument on the sophist.⁴⁴ (*In Rep.* I 8.23–28)

The penultimate chapter of Alcinous’ *Didaskalikos* (second century AD?) indicates that this topic has a certain significance for the Platonists.⁴⁵ However, the author of the *Anonymous Prolegomena* rejects this candidate according to the second rule that ‘we should choose the more general and comprehensive, rather than the more particular *skopos*’ (21.29–30). He has the *Sophist* exemplify this rule:

From this, we cannot agree with those who insist that the *skopos* of the *Sophist* is ‘on the sophist’, but agree with those who take it that it is ‘on what is not’. For the sophist is something which is not, but what is not in general is more general than a particular thing which is not; if more

⁴² *Statesman* 284b7 (‘*en tōi sophistēi*’) may be an exceptional reference by Plato himself to this work (cf. Campbell 1867, *Plt.* 104, and Annas & Waterfield 1995, 43). But some commentators reject this rendering and take it as ‘with the sophist’ (Rowe 1995, 207–208) or ‘when discussing the sophist’ (Skemp 1952, 172, and Clay 1988, 136–137, 149–150).

⁴³ Cf. *In Alc.* I 18.13–19.10, *In Parm.* 658.33–659.23.

⁴⁴ See also *In Parm.* 637.9–12, which we shall examine shortly.

⁴⁵ Chapter 35 (189.12–27, ed. Whittaker 1990) summarises the discussion of the *Sophist*’s distinction between the philosopher and the sophist (mainly depending on 253e–254a), and makes a ring composition corresponding with the first chapter (152.1–29) on the definition of the philosopher (cf. Dillon 1993, 209–210).

general, then also more comprehensive, so that the more general comprises the particular *skopos*.⁴⁶ (*Anon. Prol.* 21.30–35)

The sophist must also be regarded as a subject too low to be the *skopos*; with regard to the *Gorgias*, the author claims, appealing to the fifth rule, that to criticise the rhetoric of the sophists is an ugly and sophistic thing (*aischron kai sophistikon*), and is not appropriate to the higher *skopos* (22.31–35).

Secondly, the method of division, though used in a few other dialogues as well, is mainly associated with the *Sophist*.⁴⁷ This candidate, however, is also rejected according to the ninth rule that the *skopos* should not be instrumental:

We should not make the *skopos* out of instruments; for the *skopos* is not an instrument for the sake of something else, but the end itself. Thus those who insist that the *Sophist* has as its *skopos* ‘on the method of division’ put it wrongly. (*Anon. Prol.* 23.7–9)

Rather, the method of division contributes to the *skopos*, as an instrument of the art of demonstration (23.12–15). This argument shows a clear echo of Proclus’ argument in his *Commentary on the Parmenides*. In arguing that the *Parmenides* is directed towards matters of substance, whereas the logical exercise is introduced for the sake of these substantive questions, Proclus uses the *Sophist* as an illustration:

We never find Plato producing a work which principally deals with methods; but rather we find him employing different methods at different times in different places according to what each subject requires, and everywhere adopting his method for the sake of the object which he proposes for his inquiry; thus in the *Sophist* he brings in the method of division not in order to teach the method of division to his hearers (though this is an accidental result), but in order to bind the many-headed sophist. This procedure is in accordance with the nature of things, for it is nature’s way to adopt necessary means for the sake of ends, not ends for the sake of necessary means. (*In Parm.* 637.4–16)

As we saw, Proclus instead proposes the ‘sophist’ as the proper *skopos* of the dialogue, since it is something substantive.

⁴⁶ For the difference between Proclus’ view and the *Anonymous Prolegomena*, see Westerink, Trouillard & Segonds 1990, 69–70, n.182.

⁴⁷ Cf. *Anon. Prol.* 27.16–18.

Thirdly, the author of the *Anonymous Prolegomena* suggests as the substantive *skopos* 'what is not', instead of 'the sophist' (21.30–35, cited above). This is certainly one of the chief concerns of the dialogue, and the *Sophist* is always consulted as the main source of its proper treatment. The candidate may not, however, be sufficient according to the seventh rule, which says that nothing negative can be a proper object of inquiry. Hermias, moreover, points out that Plato often pairs a negative with a corresponding positive subject, as when he pairs 'what is not' with 'what is' in the *Sophist* (*In Phdr.* 9.19–22). The counterpart of 'what is not' may thus be regarded as more appropriate.

The fourth candidate is 'what is', which also appears in the traditional second title.⁴⁸ Olympiodorus seems to take this as the *skopos* of the *Sophist*,⁴⁹ and there are two good reasons in favour of this candidate. First, the Neoplatonists see in this *skopos* a connection with the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus*, which deal with the higher ontological principles, the One and the Good. The *Sophist*, dealing with Being, may be placed as supplementary to these two major dialogues. Second, it also corresponds to the subject of the preceding dialogue, the *Theaetetus*, that is, 'knowledge'. Some Platonists, whom the anonymous author of the *Commentary on the Theaetetus* opposes, take the view that the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* make a continuous project: 'But these people insist that, having proposed to investigate "on knowledge", he (sc. Plato) shows, in the *Theaetetus*, what knowledge *is not* about, and, in the *Sophist*, what knowledge *is* about' (2.32–39).⁵⁰ Later, Marsilio Ficino accepts the fourth candidate for this reason: 'After the *Theaetetus*, on knowledge, we should read

⁴⁸ See note 1 above. The *Anonymous Prolegomena* insists that the traditional second titles indicate the necessity for search for the *skopos* (21.7–12), while they are sometimes misleading because one is more general than the other (21.35–41).

⁴⁹ Cf. *In Alc.* 1 110.8.

⁵⁰ I read '*houtoi*' (Bastianini & Sedley 1995) instead of '*eniot*' (Diels & Schubart 1905) in 2.33; cf. Sedley 1996, 90, n.24. Sedley associates this 'object-related' interpretation with Cornford 1935, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (Sedley 1996, 90, and Bastianini & Sedley 1995, 484). The anonymous commentator's own view is shown in 2.39–52 (cf. Sedley 1996, 94–95; see also Tarrant 1983, 171–172).

the *Sophist*, on being itself, which is the object of knowledge.⁵¹

It was Ficino, however, in his Latin commentary, who introduced an anonymous Neoplatonist scholion which proposes the fifth candidate, 'the Sublunar Demiurge', as the real *skopos* of the *Sophist*.⁵² The scholion says at the beginning that:

Plato also calls <Eros>⁵³ and Hades and Zeus 'sophist', and he says that 'The sophistic art is wonderful (*pankalē*)'. Hence we shall assume that the dialogue clings to a more noble *skopos*. According to the great Iamblichus, the *skopos* is 'on the Sublunar Demiurge'. (Scholion to Plato's *Sophist* 40.5 9 (ed. Greene 1938))

It is obvious that the scholion follows and explains Iamblichus' view. Iamblichus saw the sophist as the apparent main subject of the dialogue, but, according to his rules, this is too particular, too low, or too negative to be the *skopos* of the dialogue. Hence, with reference to the three positive uses of the appellation 'sophist' in Plato's other dialogues, the scholion infers that Plato actually discusses something higher than a human sophist, namely, the divine sophist, who creates images in this sublunar world by imitating the Heavenly Demiurge. The three divine names mentioned at the beginning therefore play a crucial role.⁵⁴ Firstly, the god, Eros, is called 'sophist' by Diotima in the *Symposium*. Eros, the offspring of Poros and Penia, is 'a mighty hunter, always weaving plots, desiring and providing prudence, and loving wisdom (*philosophōn*) throughout life; a mighty juggler, sorcerer and *sophist*' (203d5–8). Here, as the intermediate

⁵¹ *Opera Omnia* (1576), 1284; cf. Allen 1989, 16–17. Ficino's 'Argumentum' begins: 'While in the *Sophist* Plato treats of being, upon which the philosopher reflects, at the same time he deals with not-being, to which the sophist deflects' (Allen 1989, 218–219).

⁵² For the text, translation, and interpretation, see Hermann 1884, 249–250, Greene 1938, 40, 445–446, Larsen 1972, 357–361, Dillon 1973, 90–91, 245–247, and Allen 1989, 89–91, 283–284. I refer to the text of Greene 1938. For the influence of Ficino's translation on later generations, see Allen 1989, 205–206.

⁵³ The word is missing in the manuscripts, but easily supplemented from the later context (40.18).

⁵⁴ It is noticeable that the same triplet appears in Proclus' *In Crat.* 89.1–4 (ad *Crat.* 403e).

between wise and ignorant, Eros represents a mixed image of philosopher and sophist.⁵⁵ Diotima herself is also later counted among 'the perfect sophists' by Socrates (208c1). Secondly, Socrates in the *Cratylus* explains that Hades (or Pluto), who enchants people by his eloquence, is 'a perfect sophist and a great benefactor of the inhabitants of his realm' (403e4–5). Thirdly, in the *Minos*, Socrates speaks of the Cretan king, Minos, as educated by Zeus, the sophist: 'For Zeus is a sophist and that very art is wonderful (*pankalē*)' (319c3–4; cf. c6–7).⁵⁶ These three passages all use the word 'sophist' for the gods, and unite the images of gods, sophists (true rhetoricians), and philosophers. We do not here enter into the complex argument as to who the Sublunar Demiurge is, since that would require many presuppositions of Neoplatonic theology.⁵⁷ It need only be noted that the scholion does not take the sophist to be an evil figure; but it claims that 'The philosopher is also a sophist inasmuch as he imitates both the Heavenly Demiurge and the Demiurge of Generation' (40.20–22).⁵⁸ Finally, this *skopos* connects the *Sophist* to the *Statesman*, and also to the *Timaeus*. The divine Sophist is a counterpart of the divine Statesman in the myth of the *Statesman*, and Proclus identifies this divine Statesman (Zeus, according to him) with the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*.⁵⁹ This must be the reason why the *Anonymous Prolegomena*

⁵⁵ 'Hunter' is a metaphor both for the philosopher and for the sophist; 'juggler' (*goēs*) is used for the sophist in the *Sophist*; and 'weaving' is a key notion in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*. Hermias explicates this passage in *In Phdr.* 72.3 8. Cf. Bury 1932, 103.

⁵⁶ The *Minos* is nowadays supposed by most scholars to be spurious (cf. Heidel 1896, 39–43, and Guthrie 1978, 389–390), but it had great influence as a work preliminary to the *Laws*, and some scholars still accept its authenticity (cf. Morrow 1960, 35–39).

⁵⁷ Dillon 1973, 245–246, identifies him with Poseidon, but Allen 1989, 96–108, presents a more subtle argument on this issue.

⁵⁸ Dillon 1973, 247, explains that 'He is an inevitable consequence of the descent into Matter, which is itself inevitable for the individual soul.'

⁵⁹ Cf. Westerink 1962, xxxviii. Ficino assumed that the author of the scholion was Proclus (cf. Allen 1989, 94–95), and there is certainly an echo of Proclus (cf. Dillon 1973, 246–247). It is even possible that, when Proclus thought of the 'sophist' as the *skopos* (as we saw above), he had something divine (rather than the human sophist) in mind.

treats the twin dialogues, the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, as 'physical' works.⁶⁰

From this consideration, we may conclude that among the ancient commentators there was no general agreement on what the real *skopos* of the *Sophist* is, nor does there exist a single subject which fulfils the requirements for it. One may regard each of the five candidates as a major theme, but certainly none is the *skopos*, which covers the whole dialogue.⁶¹

Searching for the *skopos* is nevertheless a useful and important procedure for understanding a Platonic dialogue as a unity. As the arguments of the ancient commentators demonstrate, the search for the *skopos* serves not only to determine the main theme of each dialogue, but also to show the character of the dialogue. For example, whereas those who take the *Parmenides* as a merely logical treatise, whether for polemic or practice, treat that dialogue as such (as did the Middle Platonists), Neoplatonic scholars seek the ontological significance of this dialogue, and consequently place it in the highest place in Plato's philosophical system.⁶² It makes a substantial difference to our reading of a dialogue what we take to be its *skopos*. In addition, the search for the *skopos* enables us to see the thematic relationship between Plato's dialogues, and places a dialogue in its proper context within the Platonic corpus.

What the Neoplatonic commentators failed to see was the structure or relationship between the parts and their subjects within the dialogue. Since they did not take the structural complexity of the *Sophist* into account, they missed the unity of the dialogue. Instead, we know that their argument often put a dialogue on a Procrustean table. Sometimes even the commentators criticise over-generalisation of the subject of a

⁶⁰ See note 17 (*Anon. Prol.* 26.31, with Westerink 1962, xxxvii xl). The scholion associates the sophist with Nature (40.17, 18, and 19).

⁶¹ However, the Neoplatonists also sought the unity of each dialogue in two other ways: unity of multiple levels (for example, physical, mathematical, and ethical), and unity as a microcosmic organism. See Coulter 1976, Chapters III and IV.

⁶² This is what Proclus shows in examining the *skopos* of the dialogue: *In Parm.* 630.37–645.8.

dialogue; both Olympiodorus and Damascius make the same criticism (under the influence of Syrianus) against Iamblichus when they discuss the aim of the argument from opposites in *Phaedo* 69e–72e. Olympiodorus comments that ‘the aim (*skopos*) of the present argument is to prove not that the soul is immortal, but that it continues to exist for some time after separation from the body, and Iamblichus is wrong in supposing that each argument proves its immortality. This is “characteristic of the ardour” of Iamblichus, who, from a vantage point, looks down in ecstasy, but it does not suit the text; for neither does the questioner define the problem that way, nor does the answerer prove that the soul is immortal’ (10 §1.11–16).⁶³ I take it that a more general objection to Iamblichus’ overall principle of reading the Platonic dialogues underlies this comment: to interpret each dialogue in terms of the *skopos* might sometimes result in over-generalisation of the dialogue or misinterpretation of particular arguments, such as Iamblichus committed in interpreting the *Phaedo*.⁶⁴ In some instances, over-generalisation leads to the failure to apprehend the structure of the whole dialogue, and this is the main reason why they could not find a single aim of the *Sophist*. The many appearances of the *Sophist* hardly converge in a single *skopos*.

1.3 The basic problem of the *Sophist*

We must now begin our own search for the philosophical problem which the *Sophist* confronts. I assume, as did the ancient Platonists, that each dialogue constitutes a single whole and that there must be a certain core which makes the unity of a dialogue.⁶⁵ On the one hand, the dramatic structure

⁶³ Damascius, *In Phd.* I §207.3 6, makes almost the same point. Westerink 1976, 138, note, supposes that, since Damascius and Olympiodorus wrote the commentaries independently, Syrianus must be their common source (for both quote the same Homeric phrase). Damascius praises Syrianus’ treatment of this argument.

⁶⁴ Neither Damascius nor Olympiodorus, in their commentaries on the *Phaedo*, discusses the *skopos* of the whole dialogue; rather they use the word ‘*skopos*’ for each particular argument (Damascius, *In Phd.* I §§183.1, 252.1, II §§1.1, 3.1, 12.1, 82.1; Olympiodorus, *In Phd.* 2 §14.2, 4 §11.3, 7 §8.2).

⁶⁵ To see a dialogue as an organic whole is not alien to modern commentators; for

allows plurality of themes to be discussed in a single dialogue; on the other hand, Plato's philosophical aim puts the problems in order to make a *philosophical* unity. Plato's philosophical aim may not always be identical with the overt theme expressed by the speakers of a dialogue,⁶⁶ but since the latter is what Plato has them express, we must look for the former through the examination of the dramatic structure and content.

Let us first ask what project the speakers of the *Sophist* profess to set out. If we determine their *project* in the whole dialogue, we can find what *problem* is posed and investigated under that project. In order to determine it, let us as a preliminary consider the dramatic setting and characters of the dialogue.

On the basis of the dramatic setting, we can assume that the *Theaetetus* immediately precedes the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*. At the very end of the *Theaetetus*, Socrates promises Theodorus to meet at the same place the next morning (210d3–4), and, at the beginning of the *Sophist*, Theodorus mentions 'yesterday's agreement' (216a1–2).⁶⁷ The *Statesman*, on the other hand, is a direct continuation of the conversation of the *Sophist* only with a change of interlocutors.⁶⁸ Accordingly, the dramatic date of these three dialogues is in 399 BC shortly before Socrates' trial; after the

the *Sophist*, see, for example, Rosen 1983, 1–3. Dialogue as unity is discussed in the introductions of Weingartner 1973 and Miller 1980, and in recent years, scholars' interest in the dialogue form is growing: see Griswold ed. 1988 (esp. Griswold 1988 and Bowen 1988), Press ed. 1993 (esp. Press 1993), Gonzalez ed. 1995, and Gill & McCabe ed. 1996; see also Stokes 1986, Chapter 1 (examining Socratic (or Platonic) questions), Arieti 1991, Chapter 1 (reading the dialogues as drama), and Rutherford 1995, Chapters 1 and 2.

⁶⁶ While Proclus tends to put great weight on the subject proposed by the main speaker, usually in the prologue to each dialogue, other Platonists abstract a *skopos* directly from the argument of the dialogue. For example, there has been controversy since antiquity over what the main theme of the *Republic* is: 'justice in the soul', the subject proposed by the main speaker, or 'the constitution' (*politeia*), which Plato himself almost certainly named the dialogue. See Proclus, *In Rep.* I 5.6–14.14, on the *skopos* of the dialogue.

⁶⁷ For continuity between the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*, see, for example, Klein 1977, 3–5, and Bostock 1988, 10–14.

⁶⁸ Cf. *Plt.* 257a1–258b3. Reference or reminder to the *Sophist* is frequent: e.g. *Plt.* 266d4–10.

dialogue of the *Theaetetus*, Socrates has to go to the King's Porch to hear the indictment brought against him by Meletus (210d1–3). From this dramatic continuity, we may also assume that the audience of the conversation is almost the same in the *Theaetetus* and the other two, namely, Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus, and the young Socrates (whose attendance is attested in *Tht.* 147d1), except for the introduction of a visitor from Elea in the *Sophist*. This new speaker, the Eleatic visitor, is doubtless a fictional figure, and intimates Plato's intention of examining Parmenides, a project mentioned but postponed in the *Theaetetus* (cf. 183d10–184b3).

On the other hand, in addition to the difference in dramatic framework (cf. *Tht.* 142a1–143c7),⁶⁹ some interval in writing is usually supposed to lie between the *Theaetetus* and the other two.⁷⁰ The *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, in modern scholarship, are usually classified in the works called 'later dialogues', which also include the *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Philebus*, and *Laws*.⁷¹ They are supposed to have certain common features both of style and of thought that are different from those of the early and middle dialogues, in addition to the usual consideration that the later are less dramatic than the earlier dialogues.⁷² The *Theaetetus*, on the other hand, is located in the transitional period, along with the *Phaedrus* and the *Parmenides*; these are closely related in philosophical content to the later dialogues.

Now let us look at the prologue to the *Sophist*. For I believe,

⁶⁹ Cf. Ryle 1966, 30, and Clay 1988, 148–149.

⁷⁰ Cf. Burnet 1914, 222.

⁷¹ I do not here enter into the controversy concerning the chronology of Plato's dialogues. But we should be content with the general scholarly consensus reached so far: that the six dialogues mentioned above constitute the group of later dialogues (including the *Timaeus*, *pace* Owen 1953, and Bostock 1988, 7–9, and 1994, 19). For the chronology of the later dialogues, see Ledger 1989, 158, 197, 205–206, 208–209; and Brandwood 1990, 249, and 1992.

⁷² The change of dramatic power between the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* is often pointed out (cf. Gomperz 1905, 167, and Bostock 1988, 12), but I take issue with this common view. M. Frede 1996 is in this regard close to the traditional view: 'the *Sophist*, in a way, is the most dogmatic of all of Plato's dialogues' (135). Miller 1980, ix–xii, discusses and criticises the 'standard view' of the later dialogues.

as did Proclus, that the prologue (*prooimion*) of a dialogue indicates its overall project. The project that the speakers in the *Sophist* are to undertake is clearly stated in the introductory conversation of the dialogue (216a1–218c1): that is, to define the sophist, in order to distinguish him from the philosopher.

When, at the beginning of the dialogue, Theodorus introduces the visitor from Elea, who is a friend of Parmenides and Zeno, as a ‘philosopher’ (216a1–4), Socrates raises the issue of the appearances of a philosopher:

[Passage 1: 216c2–d2]

Socrates: However, this type of man, perhaps, is hardly easier to discern than the genus of god. For thanks to the ignorance of others, these people – I mean, not the sham, but the genuine philosophers – appear in various disguises (*pantoioi phantazomenoi*), ‘roaming from city to city’, watching the life beneath them from their heights. They seem (*dokousin*) to some people worthless, to others above all worthy. Sometimes they appear (*phantazontai*) to be statesmen, and sometimes to be sophists; and sometimes there are some people to whom they give the impression (*doxan*) that they are completely mad (*echontes manikōs*).

Considering this fact, Socrates asks the Eleatic visitor whether or not people in Elea distinguish these three kinds (*genē*), namely, the sophist (*sophistēs*), the statesman (*politikos*), and the philosopher (*philosophos*), in accordance with these three names (*onomata*) (216d2–217a8).⁷³ His answer is that they assume (*hēgounto*) these three kinds, and he adds that it is nonetheless no easy task to determine what each of them is (217b1–3). The view that these are three kinds is presented as *an assumption* (not as fact), and remains such through the *Sophist* and *Statesman*. It really matters whether these three figures constitute independent, real kinds (*genē*).⁷⁴ Now to define each of these three kinds becomes their whole project, and the inquirers agree that the first target of inquiry

⁷³ The opinion of people in Elea is asked in contrast to that of the Athenians, who are in deep confusion about the philosopher and the sophist, before the trial of Socrates (cf. M. Frede 1996, 147).

⁷⁴ M. Frede 1996, 149, suggests that there may be only two kinds: statesmen are either real or false philosophers (the latter are sophists). But in a different sense, the triad can be doubted: how can the sophist, if he is an image or negative figure, be a real kind?

should be the sophist (218b6–c1). In this way, defining the sophist becomes the project which leads and governs the whole dialogue.

In Passage 1, the initial issue of the various appearances of the philosopher indicates that the main concern of the speakers in the *Sophist* is how to distinguish the real philosopher from his appearances, namely, the sophist and the statesman. This is the purpose for which definition of the sophist is required. The dialogue accordingly constitutes one part of the whole project: to investigate the three kinds, the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher. The *Sophist* is indeed succeeded by the *Statesman*, where in turn the speakers, the Eleatic visitor and the young Socrates, define the statesman (cf. *Plt.* 258b2–3, 311c7–8). These two dialogues are in this way closely connected, and should be treated as pursuing a single project.⁷⁵

What, then, becomes of the definition of a philosopher? Plato never wrote a dialogue named the *Philosopher*. Most scholars are inclined to suppose that the original plan of the *Philosopher*, in which the philosopher would finally have been defined, was abandoned for various reasons.⁷⁶ They usually appeal to the following passages as evidence of Plato's original intention of writing the *Philosopher*. First, in the introductory conversation in the *Sophist*, between Socrates, Theodorus, the Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus, they have agreed to investigate the three kinds, namely, the sophist, the statesman and the philosopher, beginning with the sophist (216d2–218c1), and this project is confirmed again in the opening conversation of the *Statesman* (257a1–c4). In addition, in the middle of the *Sophist*, the Eleatic visitor abruptly suggests that they may have found the philosopher in the course of inquiring into the sophist (253c6–9), and then he

⁷⁵ Thematic connection may also be detected in the preceding dialogue, the *Theaetetus*, which originally raises a question about 'philosophy' (143d3; cf. 155d1–5) and 'wisdom' (*sophia*, 145b2, d7–e7), and investigates what knowledge is; cf. M. Frede 1996, 147–148.

⁷⁶ Cf. Campbell 1867, Introduction to *Plt.* lvi–lix, Cornford 1935, 168–169, 323, Guthrie 1978, 123, Skemp 1952, 17, 20–22, Fujisawa 1976, 392–394, and Bostock 1988, 10, n.16.

states that they will soon (*tacha*) examine and reveal the philosopher, if they wish (254b3–5). Finally, Socrates says in the *Statesman* that he will converse with the young Socrates next time (*eis authis*) (258a5–6).

The textual evidence on which they depend, however, is by no means decisive, but may be ironical. First, it is not certain from their conversation whether the definition of the philosopher should be made in an independent dialogue similar to the other two. On the contrary, when Socrates criticises Theodorus' appraisal of the first task, at the beginning of the *Statesman*, he suggests that the three tasks are not equal in value (*Plt.* 257b2–4), and this disproportion of values may deny the plan of a trilogy. We must note that it is only Theodorus who clearly states that, after the statesman, the philosopher should be defined (*Plt.* 257b9–c1; cf. a3–5), while the Eleatic visitor just says that they should accomplish the project (257c2–4). As for the passage in the middle of the *Sophist*, the Eleatic visitor's comments are ambivalent and obviously hesitant (*'tacha'* means 'perhaps' as well as 'soon'), and we must rather examine the context to understand why the philosopher seems to appear in the midst of the inquiry into the sophist.⁷⁷ Lastly, a forthcoming conversation between the two Socrates, such as some commentators anticipate, is unlikely,⁷⁸ and would seem comical, even if Plato could have avoided sheer confusion between the two Socrates.⁷⁹

Although we cannot rule out the possibility that Plato

⁷⁷ Even Campbell 1867 (cf. the previous note) admits the hesitant tone of the Eleatic visitor. We shall examine this passage in Chapter 7.

⁷⁸ The phrase '*eis authis*' ('next time' or 'another time') often signifies empty promise: e.g. *Euthyphro* 15e3 4 and *Prot.* 361e5 6; in particular, the dramatic setting of the *Euthyphro* hardly allows Socrates to have another dialogue with Euthyphro.

⁷⁹ Cf. the Eleatic visitor's question, 'Socrates, did you hear Socrates?' (*Plt.* 258a7) Confusion actually occurs in modern scholarship: there is controversy concerning which Socrates the ending comment of the *Statesman* (311c7 8) should be ascribed to: the young Socrates (Burnet 1900 (old OCT), and Campbell 1867, *Plt.* 191) or the elder Socrates (Skemp 1952, 235, Miller 1980, 112 113, 135, n.52, Clay 1988, 148, n.31, Rowe 1995, 245, and D. Robinson's addition in Duke et al. 1995 (new OCT)). Even though the young Socrates seems a historical figure (cf. *Ep. XI* 358d4 e3; *Arist., Meta. Z* 11 1036b24 25), this name cannot but remind us of the great 'Socrates in youth' (e.g. in the *Parmenides*; cf. *Ep. II* 314c3 4).

once intended such a work but finally abandoned that idea, I shall advocate the view that, from the very beginning, he never meant to undertake the independent task of defining the philosopher.⁸⁰ Since the original issue was to separate the real philosopher from his appearances, that is, the sophist and the statesman (cf. Passage 1), it may well be sufficient for his purpose to define these two. In other words, to prove how the sophist and the statesman differ from the philosopher must be to show what the philosopher is by showing what he is *not*. It may be that, apart from this negative way, there is no way of defining the philosopher in his own right. This line of interpretation will place more emphasis on the project of the *Sophist*. The sophist is not a figure just to be eliminated, but plays a positive role, as a negative image, to project what the philosopher is. I shall demonstrate this view through the whole argument. If Plato abandoned the original plan of the *Philosopher*, as many scholars assume, we can merely speculate on what would have been discussed in that dialogue. If, on the other hand, Plato did not intend to compose an independent dialogue at all, we can surely expect to observe the whole project performed within the *Sophist* and *Statesman*. In the latter case, Plato's 'philosopher' will appear in the two dialogues.⁸¹

Thus, we may assume that the speakers' project in the *Sophist* is to define what the sophist is, and through that definition, to show what the philosopher is.⁸²

⁸⁰ Such a view is taken in Friedlander 1969, 273–275, 281–282, 305, 525, n.5, Klein 1977, 4–5, Miller 1980, 10 (though a different view in Miller 1988, 159–160), Kato 1988b, 9–11, and M. Frede 1996, 149–150; cf. Voegelin 1957, 142, Cobb 1990, 118–119, n.11, and Rowe 1995, 177.

⁸¹ Accordingly, we should not assume that some important problems, for example, the ontological status of the image, are not solved in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* but reserved for the unwritten dialogue (cf. Guthrie, 1978, 123, and Cornford 1935, 215, 248, 323) or the other written dialogues, such as the *Timaeus* (Cornford 1935, 323) and the *Philebus* (cf. Skemp 1952, 17, 80, and Davidson 1993, 114–115). We must rather examine the problems in the two dialogues as far as possible.

⁸² The definition of the statesman must have a different role in determining what the philosopher is. At least, the form of inquiry in the *Statesman* is quite different from that of the *Sophist*. According to the famous statement in the *Republic*, a statesman should become a philosopher or a philosopher should become a

Our next question is what philosophical problem Plato poses and investigates under this project. The apparent answer to this is the question 'What is the sophist?' Commentators usually dismiss this idea, however, for various reasons: that the sophist is discussed only in some parts of the dialogue, whereas other parts discuss more important issues; or that the discussion of the sophist is nothing but a device to introduce other more serious topics; or that defining the sophist is of no philosophical significance.⁸³ In contrast to these common attitudes, I suggest that we follow Plato's initial dramatic guidance, and assume that the proposed project indicates the *basic* problem with which Plato is concerned in composing this dialogue.⁸⁴ Our strategy is then to proceed from this basic problem towards a unitary view of the dialogue by examining the relations between the basic and the other problems discussed in the dialogue.

When we take defining the sophist as the basic problem which underlies the whole dialogue, we must confront two difficulties. One is how it can integrate different parts and arguments of the dialogue into a unity, and the other is why the sophist is an important philosophical problem at all. I shall discuss the former difficulty concerning the structure of the dialogue in the next section, and examine the latter

statesman (*Rep.* V 473b4 ff.; cf. *Ep.* VII 326a5 b4); see also the educational program for the rulers in Books VI–VII. Morrison 1958 examines the origin of this notion in Plato, and assumes Pythagorean influence after the *Gorgias*.

⁸³ Dismissing this idea, scholars usually assume as one of the features of the later dialogues in contrast to the earlier dialogues (such as the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Euthydemus*) that 'As for Plato's philosophic confrontations with his predecessors, we can discern a clear shift away from his concern with sophistic thinkers, and a greater preoccupation with the theories of the older Presocratics, especially Zeno, Parmenides and the Pythagoreans. Here as elsewhere the *Theaetetus* seems transitional – it tackles not only Protagoras' views but those of Heraclitus, which are seen as underlying or anticipating the sophist's doctrine' (Rutherford 1995, 273). It is true that in the later dialogues the sophists' thoughts are embedded in more profound philosophical doctrines (Heraclitean or Eleatic), but this does not mean that Plato's concern with the sophists diminishes or has gone away. We shall see, in Chapter 6, that the problem of the sophist is rather deepened by being connected with other philosophical doctrines.

⁸⁴ Cobb 1990 and Morgan 1995 are exceptional in taking the definition of the sophist as the 'central issue' of the dialogue. However, Cobb's suggestion remains quite general (cf. 4, 9–31), and Morgan's argument failed to persuade his commentator (cf. McPherran 1995).

difficulty concerning the notion of the sophist in the next chapter. When we solve these two difficulties, we can properly identify defining the sophist as the basic philosophical problem of the *Sophist*.

1.4 Philosophical digressions

1.4.1 *The double structure of the Sophist*

Here arises a difficulty in interpreting the dialogue as a whole. The *Sophist* consists of two apparently independent parts. Like the yolk and white of an egg, the Middle Part (236d9–264b8) is put between the first and the final parts (216a1–236d8, 264b9–268d5); the Middle Part discusses the philosophical problems of what is not, what is, and falsehood, while the first and final parts, which together I call the Outer Part, discuss the definition of the sophist.⁸⁵ For this reason, one scholar has even assumed that the two parts were composed at different times.⁸⁶ How can we integrate these two parts? If our interpretation is correct, that the basic philosophical problem of the *Sophist* is how to define the sophist, which is discussed only in the Outer Part, how should we understand the long philosophical arguments on what is not, what is, and falsehood in the Middle Part? Are not these usually taken to be the ‘main problems’ of this dialogue? Our interpretation depends on how we understand the structure of the dialogue.

Occasional comments by the Eleatic visitor in the dialogue indicate that the arguments of the Middle Part are investi-

⁸⁵ Burnet 1914, 223, says that ‘the *Sophist* appears to be made up of two wholly disparate sections bound together in an accidental way’.

⁸⁶ Billig 1920, 237–245, concludes from the statistical analysis of some types of rhythms that the digression on ‘what is not’ (that is, 236c–260a) was written much later than the Outer Part on the definition of the sophist; the rhythms in the digression are much the same as those in the *Statesman*, while the rhythms of the Outer Part are similar to those of the *Timaeus*. But his conclusion does not come solely from the statistical analysis, but is strongly influenced by his own view of Plato’s development of dialectical methods. Why could Plato not write in different styles on different topics at the same time? Cf. Cherniss 1957, 227–229, and Brandwood 1990, 184–186, 192–195.

gated with a view to solving the difficulties which have arisen in the course of defining the sophist.⁸⁷ This clearly means that defining the sophist is the basic problem of the dialogue, to which the arguments in the Middle Part are subordinate. The Middle Part is a digression, as it were, from the basic inquiry. We must consider how far we can take his comments at face value.

The Eleatic visitor's view of the structure of the dialogue is also confirmed by his later comments. The subsequent dialogue, the *Statesman*, refers twice to the argument on 'what is not' in the *Sophist*. In one passage (284b7–c7), when the Eleatic visitor insists that recognition of absolute in addition to relative measurement is necessary for the inquiry into statesmanship, he compares this with the necessity of the proof that 'what is not *is*' for the inquiry into the nature of the sophist. He says: 'Just as in the case of the sophist (*en tōi sophistēi*) we forced what is not *to be*, since the argument escaped us on this point, so also must we now force the more and less to become measurable not only in relation to each other but also in relation to the generation of what is appropriate (*tou metriou*); for if this is not agreed, neither the statesman nor anyone else who possesses knowledge of subjects relating to practices can come into being, beyond dispute' (284b7–c3). In the other passage (286b4–c4), the Eleatic visitor asks his interlocutor's pardon for the length of the explanation of the weaving art; he points out that an argument should be judged not according to its length, but by the appropriateness of the length. There, he takes two other examples of lengthy discussion (*makrologia*): one is the discourse on the reversal of the motion of the Universe in the *Statesman* (268d5–274e4), and the other is the argument on 'what is not' in the *Sophist*. Generally speaking, arguments on particular subjects (for instance, the definition of the weaving art) are important for the sake of acquiring ability in dialectic on all subjects, rather than for their own sake.

⁸⁷ After the first introduction of the difficulties in 236d9, the Eleatic visitor repeats this point: 239c9 d4, 240d1 4, 241e1 5, 260b10 261a3, and 264c10 d5; I shall examine these passages in Chapter 6.

In this way, the Eleatic visitor treats the argument in the Middle Part of the *Sophist* as a kind of 'digression', about which people may feel uncomfortable because of its length and apparent obscurity of purpose. But his first comment in the *Statesman* suggests that it nevertheless turns out to be a necessary precursor to the basic investigation of the dialogue, just as the explanation of the art of weaving, though seemingly a tediously long digression, is necessary for the inquiry into statesmanship, as is revealed in the last part of the dialogue. Also, the argument of the Middle Part may contribute to a higher purpose, namely, acquiring dialectical skill on all subjects, as the second comment indicates. By having the Eleatic visitor make these comments, Plato indicates the double structure of the *Sophist*: basic inquiry in the Outer Part, digression in the Middle Part.

Here we confront the difficulty of interpreting Plato's use of digressions. He often has the main speaker of a dialogue (Socrates, the Eleatic or the Athenian visitor) divert the course of argument into discussion of issues apparently irrelevant to the main argument, although he does not have a technical term for 'digression',⁸⁸ and that is exactly what happens both in the *Sophist* and in the *Statesman*. The use of digressions in Plato has not been paid due attention by scholars, whereas the so-called 'Homeric digressions' in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are famous as a significant literary device,⁸⁹ and the use of digressions later becomes a rhetorical skill.⁹⁰ I

⁸⁸ Two expressions, 'ektropē' and 'parergon', signify digression: 'ektropē' appears in *Plt.* 267a2 and its verb 'ektrepomai' is used in *Rep.* VIII 543c5 and *Lg.* III 682e8; 'parergon' means an argument subordinate to the main subject in *Tht.* 177b8, 184a7, and *Tim.* 38e1.

⁸⁹ For a list of Homeric digressions, see Gaisser 1969, 6–7. Austin 1966 argues that, contrary to our common notion, the digressions in Homer do not add information; he concludes that the digressions are not 'a release from tension', but 'occur where the dramatic and psychological concentration is the most intense' (311–312).

⁹⁰ Isocrates has four famous digressions in his rhetorical works: *Panathenaicus* 74–90, *To Philip* 109–115, *Helen* 29–37, and *Antidosis* 107–139 (cf. Race 1978 and Too 1995, 129–140). The term 'ektropē' is used by later authors: for example, Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon* 206 (as a rhetorical method), Polybius 4.21.12, and Dio Chrysostom 7.128 (who justifies his use of digressions by reference to Plato's argument on the state in the *Republic*; cf. 7.127–132).

here take 'digression' to be argument which temporarily departs from the main subject of a discourse.⁹¹

In order to examine the role of digressions in Plato's dialogues, I select four dialogues, the *Theaetetus*, *Republic*, *Statesman*, and *Philebus*. The *Theaetetus* introduces a good example of digression, and the *Republic*, one of the middle dialogues, has a general structure comparable with the *Sophist*; the *Statesman* and *Philebus*, chronologically close to the *Sophist*, reveal Plato's technical use of digressions. These four dialogues can be characterised as having the common structural feature of digression.⁹² We shall observe how Plato consciously uses digression as a method of philosophical discourse.

1.4.2 *The philosopher's digression in the Theaetetus*

The *Theaetetus*, the forerunner of the *Sophist*, has in its midst a most conspicuous digression (172c3–177c5). In the course of refuting the Protagorean position that sense-perception is knowledge, Socrates abruptly diverts the course of argument and discusses the life of the philosopher in contrast to the life of the man of the law-courts. The latter is completely occupied with, therefore accustomed to, everyday affairs, whereas the philosopher is free and devotes himself to contemplation, without knowing this-worldly things. At first glance, this is a perfect digression, which has nothing to do with the main argument and changes nothing in it once

⁹¹ As we saw above, the Eleatic visitor includes the myth of the reverse motion of the Universe in the *Statesman* in digressions. Myth is often contrasted with argumentative conversation, but within argumentative conversation there are many strata; also Plato's later use of myths seems somewhat different from his earlier use. The philosophical meaning of the myths is examined in Stewart 1960 and Friedlander 1958, Chapter IX. Levy (in Stewart 1960, 6) explains the role of myth as 'to introduce a new dimension into the sphere of action'.

⁹² Some other arguments may be counted as digressions in the Platonic dialogues; notably, the argument on the impossibility of falsehood in the Second Part of the *Theaetetus* and the long argument on music and drinking in the *Laws* (638d–682e), both of which are explicitly said to be 'digressions' (*Thl.* 187d6–e4, 200d5, and *Lg.* 682e8–11). Brumbaugh 1988 examines the digression in the *Seventh Letter* as representing Plato's typical use of 'digression' (for digression in general, see 84–86). My purpose is not to make a systematic survey, but to clarify the role of digression in the Platonic dialogues by focusing on several important instances.

finished, and indeed, this conversation is recognised by the speaker, Socrates, as a digression (*'parerga'* at 177b8). On the other hand, Socrates shows the intention of placing this conversation within the framework of the main argument: he introduces it as 'a greater discussion' (172b8), and says that they are embarking on 'the third discussion' (172d5–6).⁹³ Some commentators, despite its apparent irrelevance to the main argument, try to embed this digression in the dialogue's context and to see a certain deep meaning in it: for the claim that the philosopher should become as like god as possible certainly indicates something contrary to Protagorean relativism.⁹⁴

This digression provides us with some important insights into what digression means in Plato's dialogues. The difference in tone and content in the digression is so obvious that a few scholars even assume its later insertion.⁹⁵ It is playful and enjoyable as a dramatic interlude.⁹⁶ On the other hand, the abruptness of its introduction brings us, the readers, into perplexity, since no explicit explanation is given of why it is necessary. One may feel completely at a loss facing a different sort of conversation, and it makes us pause and reflect on the whole argument, seeing it from a different point of view.

In discussing the life of the philosopher, the use of digression itself is justified. It begins with the conversation about leisure (*scholē*), which the philosopher, as a free person, alone can enjoy and which the man of the law-courts does not possess (172c2–173c5, 175d7–176a2).⁹⁷ Socrates says: 'What you mentioned just now, namely, leisure, is always present with these people (sc. philosophers), and they enjoy discourse

⁹³ For the meanings of 'a greater discussion' and 'the third discussion', see Burnyeat 1990, 300, n.27.

⁹⁴ Cornford 1935, 81–89, Friedlander 1969, 167–172, Barker 1976, Berger 1982, Waymack 1985, Burnyeat 1990, 31–39, and Rue 1993 examine the digression in this way. Contrast them with the less sympathetic views of McDowell 1973, 173–177, and Bostock 1988, 98–99.

⁹⁵ Cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1920, Vol. I, 524–533, and Ryle 1966, 278–280.

⁹⁶ See Theodorus' reaction in 177c3–5. Rue 1993, 92–100, focuses on Theodorus' role in the digression.

⁹⁷ For the meaning of leisure, see Guthrie 1978, 89, n.2. That a philosopher is free has an echo in *Sph.* 253c7–d4.

in peace and at leisure. Just as we are now taking up the third discussion after the last one, they do the same, if they, like us, prefer the new-comer to the one in hand. And they would not care whether they talk for long or short, if only they can hit upon that which is the case' (172d4–9). The speakers, Socrates and Theodorus, can spend as much time as they like on discourse, since they are free (cf. 173b6–7).⁹⁸ The man of the law-courts, on the other hand, would not be able to do such a thing owing to the restriction of time (the 'water-clock' in the law-courts, at 172e1). In this way, digression, as free people's discourse, is associated with philosophy. This implies that only philosophers can afford digression.

We should not miss a hint of irony in this whole conversation. As commentators point out, in several regards the description of the philosopher in the digression does not fit Socrates, whom Plato regards as a chief philosopher.⁹⁹ Although the philosopher should never be concerned about time, Socrates' actual case calls him to the King's Porch after the dialogue (210d1–3), and he is later expected to be condemned to death.¹⁰⁰ Nor is such conversation totally free from constraint; it must seek the truth (172d9), and in this sense the speakers are constrained by the argument itself.¹⁰¹ It was Theodorus, we must notice, who insisted that they are completely free, even from argument. But after the digression, the speakers have to come back to the main argument (177b7–c2).¹⁰²

This digression makes us pause for a while and wonder what real wisdom or philosophy is. Those who see the significance of this digression in the context of the dialogue

⁹⁸ This is attested in 154e7 155a2 and 187d9 11. The relation between philosophical discourse and leisure is also seen in the impressive passage of *Phdr.* 258e6–259d9, and in the myth of the time of Cronus in *Plt.* 272b8–c5.

⁹⁹ For example, the philosopher is said to be totally unaware of this-worldly things, or even not to know that he does not know. In this regard, the strong claim of Rue 1993 goes too far, and the moderate view in Friedlander 1969 is preferable; cf. Jaeger 1948, 15–16.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Burnyeat 1990, 34.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Friedlander 1969, 171 (with reference to *Prot.* 314c and *Gorg.* 505c–d).

¹⁰² Also, Socrates refuses to discuss Parmenides so as to stick to the main argument concerning what knowledge is (183d10–184b2); that is too great to be examined in a digression (*parergon*, 184a7).

agree that it provides us with a freer and higher consideration on the main subject, if not a direct contribution to the argument;¹⁰³ and in this way, the digression on the life of the philosopher, as free but necessary discourse, represents what philosophical discourse should be.

1.4.3 *The great digression on the philosopher-ruler in the Republic*

Next we shall look at the most famous digression in the Platonic corpus, namely, Books V-VII of the *Republic*. For the double structure of the dialogue (the outer part and the middle part) is common to the *Sophist* and the *Republic*.¹⁰⁴

The speakers' overt theme in the dialogue, from Book I, is justice. Socrates in Book II suggests that in order to see justice in the soul they examine justice in the state. He describes the ideal State and defines the four cardinal virtues, namely, courage, wisdom, temperance, and justice, first in the state and then in the soul. When Socrates tries to discuss the four degenerate forms of constitution and of the soul, the interlocutors interrupt and ask Socrates to add some details to his description of the ideal State (V 449b1 ff.), and from this point the argument digresses. Socrates overcomes the first and second waves (namely, equality of the sexes and communality of property), and when Glaucon makes a further demand to explain the possibility of the ideal State (471c4–e5), he hesitantly proposes the smallest possible change in the present constitution to realise the best state: the philosopher should be a ruler, or the ruler should be a philosopher (473c2–e5). This third wave causes a great shock, as is expected, and Socrates needs to define what a philosopher is by using the theory of Forms, in the rest of Book V, with a view to persuading his interlocutors of this extraordinary claim. Subsequently in Books VI and VII, Socrates examines the current view on the philosopher and

¹⁰³ Cf. Burnyeat 1990, 35–37.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Rutherford 1995, 208–212. Not only the central books but also the first and the last should be integrated into the whole structure.

next proceeds to the education of the philosopher-ruler. The greatest object of learning, namely, the Form of the Good, is illustrated in the three similes, the Sun, Line, and Cave, and the last part of the digression is dedicated to the detailed training of the guardians to be philosophers with the mathematical curriculum culminating in the highest subject, dialectic.

This whole argument from the beginning of Book V to the end of Book VII is regarded by Socrates as a digression,¹⁰⁵ and the argument in Book VIII resumes the argument on which he initially tried to set out at the beginning of Book V. Some scholars assume a gap of writing periods and later insertion of the argument.¹⁰⁶ The continuity, however, between the main argument and the digression is evident, and the gradual shift from the former to the latter is well devised; the first and second waves (which supplement the construction of the ideal State) free us from our ordinary presuppositions, and accustom us to new perspectives through imagination, while the third wave, on the fundamental question of the possibility of realisation of the ideal State, evokes the philosophical climax of the dialogue. This digression is designed as conversion to a new perspective; it leads us to the non-perspectival outer world, finally to reach the Form of the Good. Book VIII then goes back to examination of bad constitutions.

The digression completes the picture of the ideal State by discussing the educational program of the rulers and its object, namely, the Form of the Good. Without this digression, it would be almost impossible to appreciate the main argument on the ideal State and justice investigated in the other part of the dialogue.¹⁰⁷ We should regard the great digression, whose weight is equal to that of the main argument, as necessary and contributing substantially to the main

¹⁰⁵ *'exetrapometha'* in VIII, 543c5-6. See Shorey 1930, vol. I, xvii, and 424, n.c., which compares this with the transition in *Phd.* 84c.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Lutoslawski 1897, 322-324, and Andersson 1971, 121-123. Nettleship 1901, 162-163, thinks that, although later insertion is possible, 'it is quite possible also that Plato intended from the first to compose the work in its present form'.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Clay 1988, 142-143.

subject, though its philosophical connotation is essentially superabundant.

1.4.4 *The digression on digressions in the Statesman*

The *Statesman*, the work subsequent to the *Sophist*, is a dialogue full of digressions. The structure of its argument is not at first sight obvious, but it gradually turns out that the author consciously makes use of this complex structure.¹⁰⁸

The professed subject of this dialogue is to define the statesman, and the task of interpreters is to find how digressions are related to the main argument and to each other. We can outline the *Statesman*'s main arguments (MA) and digressions (D) as follows.¹⁰⁹

- [MA1] The main argument in the first portion attempts to define the statesman by the method of division, but at the end the Eleatic visitor finds their definition defective (258b2–268d4).
- [D1] Suggesting that they take another route, he introduces the myth of the reverse motion of the Universe (268d5–274e4).¹¹⁰
- [MA2] The myth has revealed the necessity of the distinction between the divine and human statesman, and definition is resumed (274e5–277a2).
- [D2] To see the argument clearly, he introduces the model (*paradeigma*) of the model to illustrate why the method of using models is necessary (277a3–278e11).
- [D3] To define the statesman in a new way, the definition of weaving is given (279a1–283a9).
- [D4] The detailed examination of this trifling art evokes another

¹⁰⁸ Even the 'shorter way' of defining the statesman (266d11–e11) is called 'digression' (*ektropē*) at 267a2. Friedlander 1969, 294, puts it nicely: 'It seems as if this dialogue is as devoid of "measure" as it is full of digressions. Yet, what is characteristic of Plato's late style is precisely this – that a coherent conceptual structure is visible behind what looks, if viewed from the outside, like an incoherent juxtaposition of parts.'


¹⁰⁹ Miller 1980 sees the structure of the dialogue differently. He treats the myth as the first digression (267c–277a), and puts the arguments on paradigm and on the mean together as the second digression (277a–287b); those two digressions (267c–287b) make 'the interruptive digressions (reflections on substance and method)' (cf. Miller 1980, 34–35, 137).

¹¹⁰ The myth is introduced as play (*paidia*) in 268d8 (cf. e4–6).

digression, and this time, the Eleatic visitor gives two reasons why such digressions are necessary:

- [D4 1] First, we should not judge the length of an argument by its mere length but according to its absolute importance; we must admit two kinds of measurement, relative and absolute (283b1–285c3);
- [D4 2] Second, such a discussion as defining the art of weaving is important, not in itself, but for the sake of becoming more able in dialectical argument concerning all subjects (285c4–287a6).
- [MA3] After these, the dialogue proceeds to the final argument of the definition of the statesman (287a6–311c8).

There are three levels of argument. First, the main argument of defining the statesman is investigated in MA1, 2, and 3. Second, the myth (D1) and the definition of weaving (D3) supplement the main argument. Third, the higher and methodological reflections on the second-level digressions are made in D2 and D4.



Let us examine the relations between these three levels. First, both results of MA1 and MA2 are found to be insufficient (267c8–268d4, and 277a1–c6, respectively), and the divine herdsman and the art of weaving are introduced as two models (*paradeigma*, 277b4 and 279a1–b6) with a view to revising or completing the definitions. D1 and D3, therefore, directly contribute to the main argument. On the other hand, the very method of using models in D1 and D3 needs examination in D2, in which another model, namely, children’s learning letters, is taken as illustrating the necessity of using models.¹¹¹ The final digression, D4, also reflects on the two previous digressions, D1 and D3. First, they should not

¹¹¹ Cf. Kato 1995.

be regarded as unduly long (277b6 on myth, and 283b1–c1 on weaving), but judged according to absolute measurement (D4–1). Besides, these arguments are given not for their own sake, but to promote competence in dialectical argument in *all things* (D4–2), and it is in this way that the definition of the art of weaving by the method of division (D3) is justified. Next, the digressions of the third level contribute not only to the arguments of the second level, but also directly to the main argument. First, the distinction between two kinds of measurement is said in D4–1 to be necessary for the possibility of all arts, including statesmanship and weaving (284a1–e1). This digression, therefore, provides theoretical grounds for the possibility of the art of statesmanship, and thus advances definition of the statesman. Second, the importance of practising dialectical argument in D4–2 is also applied to the main argument of defining the statesman (285d4–7), which performs the method of division by the kinds (cf. 286d9). Besides, D4–2, in a sense, reflects on D2 by using the same example of learning letters (285c8–d3).

This multilevel structure shows that digressions provide higher reflection on what is discussed in the main argument. We would not appreciate the significance of the arguments on weaving or other arguments without those digressive comments on them. The higher the reflection goes, the more abstract the argument becomes, and it finally reveals the ultimate significance of dialectic. Practice in dialectical arguments enables us to detect the simple elements in the objects investigated, and the role of digressions is to demonstrate those common elements in different levels of argument.

In the *Statesman*, arguments and digressions are interwoven to make up a single dialogue, as if it were the product of weaving. Defining the statesman constitutes the main argument, and methodological reflections in the digressions fix its meaning. The two themes, defining the statesman and practising dialectic, are thus intertwined in the *Statesman*.

1.4.5 *Methodological and ontological arguments in the Philebus*

The structure of another later dialogue, the *Philebus*, is as complicated as that of the *Statesman*. The main argument is concerned with the competing claims of pleasure and intellect to be the good, and Socrates gives first prize to the mixed life of both, and next tries to decide which of the two comes second. In the course of the main argument, two seemingly independent and self-contained arguments are inserted: the first one provides a divine method of solving the one-and-many problem, and the second plunges into analysis of the four kinds of all beings. These two arguments are not called digressions, but the first argument at least looks to the interlocutors as if it is irrelevant to the main argument and needs justification. Naturally some commentators again treat them as insertions.¹¹²

Let us examine the context of the arguments. In discussing which of the two is the good, pleasure or intelligence, the debaters confront the difficulty over how one thing can be many. For trying to undermine the basic assumption of the hedonists, namely, the unitary nature of pleasures, Socrates has to show how one thing can be many. To solve this old problem, Socrates introduces the argument of the divine gift (16b5–20a8): ‘whatever is ever said to be consists of one and many, having in its nature limit and unlimitedness’ (16c9–10). According to this method, one must seek a certain number between one and infinity. The interlocutors are totally at a loss why such an argument is necessary at this stage.¹¹³ After coming back to the main argument for a while, Socrates again introduces a difficult argument which is concerned with the four kinds of beings: the unlimited, the limit, the mixed, and the cause (23b5–27c2).

Both of these digressive arguments, one methodological and the other ontological, look so rich and important in

¹¹² Eg. Striker 1970, 9–10.

¹¹³ See *Philebus*’ reaction in 18a1–2 and d3–8, Socrates’ response in 18d9–19a2, and Protarchus’ comment in 20a1–8.

Plato's late philosophy that commentators often suspect that these are the true aim of the dialogue. Socrates insists, however, that they aim to contribute to the main argument by providing some philosophical devices (cf. *mēchanē*, 23b7). The first argument may intend to seek a certain number of classes of pleasure as well as of intelligence, though the direct application of this method is often doubted (cf. 20c4–6), and the second clarifies the question to which kind of beings the three subjects, pleasure, intelligence, and the mixed life, belong. Socrates also indicates that there is a certain essential connection between the two arguments (23b6–9).

The task of interpreters must therefore be to show, firstly, how these two arguments relate to the main argument, and secondly, how each can be interpreted coherently, and thirdly, how the two arguments are interconnected.¹¹⁴ On the other hand, the philosophical implication of the digressive arguments is obviously far richer than is necessary for the main argument, and they may well contain something extra which is irreducible to the main argument. An important feature of this dialogue is that the methodological argument concerning the art of dialectic (cf. 17a3–5) is followed by the ontological argument. Methodological reflection and ontological consideration should go hand in hand. It must be essential to see the unity and relationship between the many arguments in the dialogue, which discusses unity, plurality, and the infinite.¹¹⁵

1.4.6 *Conclusion: unity and digression in the Sophist*

Our survey of the four dialogues has revealed some striking features of Plato's use of digressions. His multi-faceted use of digression to structure argument is carefully directed. Although we cannot generalise 'the method' of using digressions (for digressions play different roles in different contexts, nor, as we have seen, does Plato give a single name to what we call 'digression'), the examples examined above illuminate

¹¹⁴ Cf. Gosling 1975, ix x, xix xx.


¹¹⁵ Cf. Sayre 1987.

the argument in the Middle Part of the *Sophist* as digression. The difficulty was how we could integrate the Outer and Middle Parts and see both as contributing to the basic problem of defining the sophist.

Our examination suggests that no digression should be interpreted in isolation from the whole context of the dialogue; digression and main argument are complementary, nor can we understand one without the other (even though each may stand independently rich in content). This principle must also be applied to the *Sophist*. Although the Middle Part does not discuss the definition of the sophist (which is the theme of the Outer Part) in a straightforward way, we should bear in mind that a digression is usually summoned when the speakers confront a certain difficulty in the course of inquiry, and need argument of another dimension or new perspective, in order to solve that difficulty. In other words, a digression is introduced whenever shift of levels in argument is necessary. Accordingly, examining what difficulty precedes the digression is crucial in interpreting the structure of a dialogue. As for the *Sophist*, the inquiry into definition of the sophist in the first Outer Part certainly raises a series of difficulties presented at the beginning of the Middle Part and discussed through that part. I shall examine this view in Chapters 6 and 7.

In order to have a clear view of the structure of the *Sophist*, I suggest that there is a certain chain of questions which schematically connects the arguments. One question evokes another, but the basic question underlies the whole inquiry. The primary question, for the sake of which all the other questions are asked, must be the basic problem of the dialogue. The sets of question and answer may seem independent, but the answers to the questions taken as a whole contribute to inquiry into the basic problem. We may, then, find how the basic problem connects all the other questions to make a philosophical unity.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ I will substantiate this view in Chapter 6. Q1: the basic problem of defining the sophist; Q2: the issue of appearance; Q3: the difficulty concerning image; Q4: the difficulty concerning falsehood; and Q5: the difficulty concerning what is not.



This structure may be regarded as a kind of ‘ring-composition’, which is a traditional structural device in Greek literature, or as a ‘pedimental’ composition with the brief argument on dialectic (253c–254b) at its top.¹¹⁷

The double structure of the dialogue must reflect a certain methodology of philosophical investigation, and this seems to be what Plato intended in choosing this structure. The Middle Part introduces a new dimension of inquiry and plays the role of a higher reflection on the Outer Part, just as do the digressions in the *Republic*, *Statesman*, and *Philebus*.¹¹⁸ We shall find, moreover, that an argument on dialectic (253c–254b) appears in the midst of the Middle Part as if it is another digression within the digression, which reflects both the previous investigation into the sophist by means of division and the ontological argument on the combination between kinds. The three dialogues, the *Republic*, *Statesman*, and *Philebus*, all are concerned, in their digressions, with philosophy or dialectic as the philosophical method. For the digression is a philosophical reflection on a whole dialogue,

¹¹⁷ Cf. Thesleff 1967, 34–35, 167, and 1993, 19: the pedimentality is ‘an arrangement of things so as to put the most important or intrinsically interesting ones in the centre, as the figures are arranged in the triangular pediment (*tympanum*) of a Greek temple’ (Thesleff 1993, 19). However, Thesleff does not see this structure in the *Sophist* (owing to his peculiar view on the later dialogues) (cf. Thesleff 1993, 28, 34). See also his explanation of ‘*peripeteia*’ in Thesleff 1967, 167–168; but he regards *Sph.* 241c–243D (not 253c–254b) as *peripeteia* or central culmination (146–147).

¹¹⁸ The brief examination on the role of digression in Brumbaugh 1988, 85–86, also concludes that ‘a digression may digress to a higher dialectical level, from which one better understands the original lower level’.

and is itself associated with the philosopher's task in the *Theaetetus*. The argument in the Middle Part of the *Sophist* is also expected to show something about philosophy, and we shall see that it represents the essential conflict between the sophist and the philosopher, which is the central theme of the dialogue.¹¹⁹ Definition of the sophist is performed as a philosophical task, as is defining the statesman's and other arts, for the acquisition of dialectical ability (cf. *Plt.* 285c4–287a6), and therefore for making and revealing a philosopher. We must remember that in this whole enterprise the philosopher is to be displayed and distinguished from the sophist.

It is conspicuous that the Middle Part (about 27 Stephanus pages long) outweighs the Outer Part (about 25 pages long, of which the first Outer Part contains 21 pages, and the second 4 pages). The length of an argument should be judged by how important its topics are, according to the *Statesman*, and in this sense, the extraordinary length of the digression in the Middle Part must represent the importance of the issues discussed. Consequently, the complex structure of the *Sophist* indicates that the issue of defining the sophist is not so simple or easy as might at first appear. It raises the whole string of problematic issues in the Middle Part, and the possibility of philosophy itself is at stake here.

Our conclusion is thus that defining the sophist should be taken as Plato's basic problem, underlying the whole dialogue and uniting all the issues discussed there. Without a full investigation into this basic problem, the Middle Part cannot be adequately interpreted, either. But why is it so important to define the sophist? Let us turn to this question.

¹¹⁹ Plato often uses the 'self-illustrating' method (Brumbaugh 1988): 'when there is a key passage central to a dialogue discussing some method abstractly (dialectic, philosophical, rhetoric, the technique of division), the contextual dialogue itself often uses and illustrates the method in question' (84). I think this method is closely related to the other device, the use of digression, as we saw in the *Republic*, *Statesman*, and *Philebus*.

CHAPTER 2

THE SOPHIST AND THE PHILOSOPHER

2.1 The question of what the sophist is

Chapter 1 has suggested that the basic problem of the *Sophist*, taken as a whole, is to define what the sophist is, and has examined the structure of the dialogue to get rid of one great obstacle to interpretation. Next, we must ask why the question about the sophist matters for philosophy. What did the question 'What is a sophist?' mean to Plato, and what does it mean to us?

In Plato's day, the influence of the professional intellectuals or teachers called 'sophists' was so great on his society that it seems reasonable for Plato to examine the nature of the sophists. We modern readers, on the other hand, might think that this question is merely of historical importance, since the 'sophists' are historical figures that no longer exist. We tend, furthermore, to imagine that, even if the historical situation of his day forced Plato to examine the sophists, he could never have taken such a trivial issue as criticism of the sophists seriously, or at any rate more seriously than many other important philosophical issues. To this view, I respond in the following way. What Plato saw in the essence of the sophists is not so much a historical problem only for his time as a philosophical problem which is of great significance for establishing philosophy itself. Since the sophist is without doubt a historical figure for us, we must first examine the meaning of the 'sophist' in the historical context. Our historical examination will eventually reveal what *philosophical* importance the sophists have for Plato, and for us.

2.1.1 *Historical and Platonic sophists*

The so-called sophists appeared in the middle of the fifth century BC as professional teachers and rhetoricians. The word 'sophist' (*sophistēs*) originally had a positive, or at least a neutral, connotation, having the same meaning as 'the wise' (*sophos*),¹ but it gradually acquired a new, often derogatory, connotation.² And by the time of Aristotle their bad reputation seems to have been firmly established; in the first chapter of his *Sophistical Refutations*, Aristotle defines the sophist as 'one who makes money from apparent but not real wisdom' (*chrēmatisistēs apo phainomenēs sophias all' ouk ousēs*, 165a22–23).³ This common view of the sophists, however, originated mainly in Plato's criticism of the sophists, and Aristotle's definition reflects exactly what Plato's *Sophist* has alleged. In this sense, the meaning of the sophists cannot be understood independently of the definitional attempts by Plato.⁴

Who were the sophists? We know the activities and thoughts of the sophists mostly from the vivid descriptions of them in Plato's dialogues. The list of the so-called sophists varies, but according to the way Plato represented Protagoras

¹ For the general history of the word 'sophistēs', see Thompson 1868, 145–146, Kerferd 1950, Guthrie 1969, 27–34, Kerferd 1981a, ch. 4, Lloyd 1987, 92–94, nn.152–153, Schiappa 1991, 3–19, and Rutherford 1995, 102–103. The positive use of this word is seen, for instance, in Hdt. 4.95 (about Pythagoras) and 1.29 (about Solon); *Men.* 85b4 also uses the word in a positive way, meaning a person of technical knowledge.

² We can see a derogatory use in Thuc. 3.38.7 and Demosthenes, *De Corona* 276. In *Prot.* 316d3 e5, Protagoras, who was the first to call himself a sophist and exceptional in doing so, explained that, although before him there had been many sophists, they were disguised as poets or painters. This means that by Plato's time the word was usually an unfavourable label. If so, as Guthrie 1969, 33–34, rightly argues against Grote, we do not have to assume that Plato is 'solely responsible for casting discredit on the word'. In Plato's dialogues, people's contempt for the sophists can be seen in Anytus' reaction in *Men.* 91c1–5 (he maintains that the sophists corrupt the young); in the doorman's attitude in *Prot.* 314c7 e2; in Callicles' comment in *Gorg.* 520a1–2; and in Phaedrus' comment in *Phdr.* 257d4–8.

³ For Aristotle's treatment of the sophists, see Classen 1981.

⁴ Of course, there is a great difficulty in reconstructing the historical figure of the sophists: the main source of their activities and thoughts is the report of Plato, their severest opponent; cf. Guthrie 1969, 9–13, 51–54.

in the dialogue named after him, the first professional sophist was Protagoras of Abdera.⁵ Plato's dialogues also depict or mention several other sophists: Hippias of Elis, Gorgias of Leontini,⁶ Prodicus of Ceos,⁷ Euthydemus and Dionysodorus of Thurii, Thrasyarchus of Chalcedon, and Euenus of Paros. These sophists were active from the middle of the fifth to the beginning of the fourth century BC, but sophists continued to be active after this flourishing period.⁸ Although Plato's dialogues deal with the fifth-century sophists, some scholars assume that he actually had some contemporary sophists in mind when he criticised this movement.⁹ In fact, Aristotle, when he wrote the *Sophistical Refutations*, the treatise on

⁵ *Prot.* 317b3 c1, 348e4 349a4; Protagoras is reported as the first to charge a fee for lectures (*Hipp. Mj.* 282d4 5, *DL* 9.52, and Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 494).

⁶ In Plato's *Gorgias*, Gorgias calls himself a rhetorician, not a sophist, and accordingly, some commentators suppose that he is not a sophist; in that dialogue, first, Gorgias does not claim to teach virtue (*Men.* 95c1 4, etc.; cf. Dodds 1959, 6 8, and Guthrie 1969, 271), and second, sophistry is clearly distinguished from rhetoric, in which Gorgias is a specialist (465b1 c1). However, as for the first reason, Harrison 1964, 188 190, undermines the grounds of this argument, and concludes that 'Gorgias' profession not to teach *aretē* seems to have lacked any real substance'. Concerning the second reason, as Harrison 1964, 186 188, again rightly points out, Gorgias' notion of rhetoric includes not only forensic speeches in the law court but also deliberative speeches in the council and assembly (452e1 4); this does not fit the dialogue's later formal definition of rhetoric, as distinct from sophistry, but his art of rhetoric covers both. On the other hand, some other passages, such as *Hipp. Mj.* 282b4 5 (which calls Gorgias 'the sophist from Leontini') and *Ap.* 19d8 20c3 (which includes Gorgias in the list of the sophists), strongly indicate (*pace* Dodds) that Gorgias was usually treated as one of the sophists along with Prodicus, Protagoras, and Hippias (see also Isocrates, *Antidosis* 155). Moreover, Schiappa 1991, 39 63, argues that the term 'rhetoric' (*rhētorikē*) may not have been used by Gorgias himself, but may be Plato's coinage in the *Gorgias*. Therefore, I include Gorgias among the sophists (as do Harrison 1964 and Kerferd 1981a, 45). For the later view, see Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 492: 'Sicily produced Gorgias of Leontini, and we must consider that the art of the sophists carries back to him as if he were its father.'

⁷ Socrates sometimes describes himself as a pupil of Prodicus (*Prot.* 341a4, *Men.* 96d6 7, *Crat.* 384b2 c1), but this description is of course ironical (cf. Burnyeat 1977, 15, n.9).

⁸ In the Roman period, the sophistic movement had its second peak (cf. Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*). But this was not a direct continuation of the older movement. For the 'Second Sophistic', see Bowersock 1969, Stanton 1973, Bowersock ed. 1974, and Anderson 1993.

⁹ Gomperz 1905, 170, 178 179, assumes that Plato in the *Sophist* (particularly the Middle Part) actually aims at Antisthenes as the 'sophistic opponent'. Similarly, Hawtrey 1981, 15 16, 23 30, assumes that the real targets in the *Euthydemus* are at least Antisthenes, some Megarics, and Isocrates. We may ask, however, whether

sophistic fallacies, gathered some material from contemporary, mid-fourth-century sophists, such as Bryson and Lycophron, as well as from the older sophists of the fifth century.

It is well known that Plato attacked the sophists contemporary with Socrates mostly in his earlier dialogues. The *Protagoras* represents a spectacular assembly of sophists, Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus. After the exhibition of their speeches, Socrates discusses the unity of virtue with Protagoras. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates examines the notion of rhetoric with Gorgias and his fellow sophist, Polus; and the *Hippias Major* and *Hippias Minor* describe vivid conversations between Hippias and Socrates. The *Euthydemus* presents a comical treatment of the sophistical discussion held by the brother sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. Apart from these dialogues, Socrates often mentions or criticises the profession of the sophists as teachers of virtue (e.g. in the *Meno*). For in the *Apology*, Socrates had to defend himself in the law-court against the old charge that he was the most formidable sophist. Scholars usually suppose that Plato is interested in criticism of the sophists only in the earlier dialogues, and consequently most of them ignore in this context the later important dialogue, the *Sophist*, in which Plato presents a highly theoretical and substantial view of the sophist.¹⁰ It is in this dialogue that Plato tries to grasp the essence of the sophist, whereas the earlier dialogues represent each particular sophist and his performance in the dramatic context.¹¹

The inquiry in the *Sophist* presents several definitions of the sophist:

these people (apart from Isocrates) are sophists in any real sense. For general consideration of Plato's attitude toward his own time, see Field 1930, chs. IX and XIV.

¹⁰ Cf. note 82 of Chapter 1.

¹¹ It must be noted that the *Sophist* does not mention any particular sophists except in Theaetetus' one passing reference to Protagoras (232d9-e1). Some commentators (typically, Oscanyan 1972-73) are inclined to see particular sophists in each of the definitions, but what is sought in this dialogue is rather universal features of the sophists.

- [The first definition] A hunter for rich young men (221c5–223b8);
 [The second to fourth definitions] A merchant, a retail dealer, and a manufacturing trader of learning¹² (223c1–224e5);
 [The fifth definition] An eristic, who fights and earns money in private arguments (224e6–226a5);
 [The sixth definition] A purifier of wrong opinions in the soul by means of refutation (*elenchos*), although it is doubtful whether this is a genuine definition of the sophist, or rather a definition of the philosopher (226a6–231b9).¹³
 [The final definition] After these six definitions are presented, the sophist is further investigated and finally defined as ‘an imitator of the wise’ (*mimetes tou sophou*, 268c1), who appears to be wise but is not really so (232b1–236d8, 264b9–268d5).

We can see in these definitions most of the alleged features of the sophists’ activity:¹⁴

- (1) The sophists profess to teach virtue.¹⁵
- (2) They capture rich young people as their pupils.¹⁶
- (3) They charge fees for their teaching.¹⁷

¹² Socrates describes a sophist as a merchant or a retail dealer of learning in *Prot.* 313c4–7. For the significance of this characterisation in its social and political context, see Nightingale 1995, 22–25.

¹³ I shall discuss the problem concerning the sixth definition in 2.3.

¹⁴ For the general features of the sophists, see Guthrie 1969 (repr. 1971 Part1) and Kerferd 1981a.

¹⁵ 223a3–6, b5 (the first definition); 224b9–d3 (the second definition); 229a8 ff., 231b4–5 (the sixth definition); and 232b8–10, 267c2–7 (the final definition). For Gorgias and teaching virtue, see note 6.

¹⁶ 223b5–6, 231d3 (the first definition); 233b1–d2 (the final definition). For private discussion, see 222d3 ff. (the first definition) and 225b8–11, e1–2 (the fifth definition). Cf. Xenophon, *Cynēgeticus* 13.9 (we shall examine this work shortly).

¹⁷ The merchant, dealer, and trader in the second to fourth definitions generally represent the feature of getting money for teaching; see also 222d7–223a6, b4–5 (the first definition); 225d1–3, e1–2, 226a1 (the fifth definition); and 233b5–8 (the final definition). Blank 1985 examines this feature in detail by providing ample documentation. He concludes that taking fees means teaching whoever wants to pay, while Socrates refused this for the sake of freedom of selection of his associates (in an elitist way) (Blank 1985, 10 ff.). The best evidence for his view is in Xenophon’s *Mem.* 1.2.6, 1.6.5, and 1.6.13 (cf. Aristotle, *EN.* IX 1 1164a22–32). Nightingale 1995, 47–50, on the other hand, examines this feature in terms of the ‘incommensurability of wisdom and money’. However, we should bear in mind that this is not a sufficient condition for a sophist because Zeno the Eleatic is said to have taken fees (*Alc.* 1 119a5–6) but is not called a sophist. See also Kerferd 1981a, 26–28, Guthrie 1969, 35–40, and Harrison 1964, 190–191.

- (4) They usually travel around Greek cities, without being settled in one place.¹⁸
- (5) They show skill at speaking, which involves deception.¹⁹
- (6) They claim to know many subjects ('polymathy'), and do not confine their topics to some specialty.²⁰

There is no doubt that Plato's thorough examination and severe criticism in this dialogue and others is one of the main sources of our understanding of the sophist, just as it was in later Antiquity. On the other hand, we must bear in mind that what we receive in the seven definitions in the *Sophist* is a variety of features or images of the sophist. Plato's endeavour to deal with these images is to be discussed later.

2.1.2 *Xenophon's view*

In spite of the clear pictures given by Plato, it was not generally agreed among the Greeks who was to be counted as a sophist. Aristophanes represented Socrates as a sophist in the *Clouds*,²¹ and Isocrates, a contemporary rival of Plato, may have implied that Plato himself, as well as Socrates, was a sophist.²² To understand the meaning of 'sophist' in the historical context, I shall consider two contemporaries of Plato's, namely, Xenophon, the Athenian author, and Isocrates, the Athenian educator and orator.

Xenophon, in three passages of the *Memorabilia*, the defence of Socrates, mentions the 'sophists' to contrast them with Socrates. First, in defending Socrates' piety, Xenophon claims that Socrates did not even discuss the nature of all

¹⁸ The second definition, in particular, represents this feature (223d9 11, 224a1 3, b1 2); cf. *Prot.* 315a7 8, *Tim.* 19e2 8, etc. Cf. Nightingale 1995, 21 26.

¹⁹ The *Sophist* seems to suggest that public and forensic oratory should be distinguished from sophistry or the art of private controversy (222c9 d6, 225b5 7, 268b1 9).

²⁰ I shall focus on the last two features in the next chapter. A typical 'polymath' among the sophists is Hippias of Elis (cf. *Xen. Mem.* 4.4.6), whose topics extend from the history of Olympic winners to mathematics.

²¹ I disagree with Vander Waerdt 1994b, who takes the Socrates of the *Clouds* as a later Ionian natural philosopher, but dismisses all the sophistic elements. Also, Aeschines, a half century later, calls Socrates a sophist in *Against Timarchus* 173. But this testimony should be treated with caution (see Guthrie 1969, 34, n.2).

²² *Against the Sophists* 7 ff. is usually referred to as the evidence for this (Jaeger 1945, 55 ff.), but Hawtrey 1981, 27, casts doubt on this view.

things, as many others did, nor what the 'sophists' call the 'Universe' (*kosmos*) (I.I.I.II), but rather always conversed about human affairs (I.I.I.I6). This comment aims at disclaiming the old common charge against the inquirers into nature, the professional teachers, and Socrates. Here, sophists are understood as those who investigate things under the earth and in the heavens (cf. *Ap.* 19b4–5), activities which Aristophanes mockingly attributes to Socrates in the *Clouds*.²³

Xenophon reports an episode in the conversation between Antiphon, the sophist, and Socrates. Antiphon tries to devalue the 'philosophy' of Socrates by contrasting his plain and coarse way of life with the rich and luxurious lives of the sophists, who take fees from their pupils. Objecting to Antiphon's view, Socrates explains why he lives such a simple life: he is free from any want (I.6.I–10). In another conversation with the same Antiphon, Socrates insists that the sophists are, as it were, 'the prostitutes of wisdom', because they offer wisdom to any comers for money (I.6.I3).

Compared with the frequent and severe criticism of the sophists in the Platonic dialogues, however, it is surprising that the last passage (I.6.I3) is the only direct attack by Socrates on the sophists in the *Memorabilia*. These passages, nevertheless, allow us a glimpse of the relationship between Socrates and the sophists, which in principle corresponds to Plato's view. Socrates' philosophy is contrasted with the activity of the sophists; only the former leads people to happiness and virtue, while the latter does not (I.6.I3–14).

A more straightforward attack on the sophists is seen in Xenophon's treatise on hunting, the *Cynēgeticus*. To the technical exposition of hunting two chapters are added (whose genuineness is sometimes doubted). Xenophon makes general comments on the advantages of hunting, particularly for the education of the young in Chapter 12, and abruptly turns to the criticism of the sophists in Chapter 13. The

²³ The 'sophists' in *Mem.* I.I.I.II probably means thinkers in general (cf. Smith 1903, 8: 'philosophers, without unfavorable added meaning'), or natural philosophers (cf. Gigon 1953, 160–162). We can find a similar usage of the word 'sophist' in Diogenes of Apollonia, who calls *physiologoi* 'sophists' (DK 64 A4).

author probably had Aristippus, a pupil of Socrates,²⁴ in mind both in the defence of the educational value of hunting and in the criticism of the sophists.²⁵ The main points of the criticism of 'the sophists of the present day' (*hoi nyn sophistai*, 13.1, 13.6) are as follows. Firstly, they never lead the young to virtue in spite of their professing to do so, either through their teaching or by their books. Secondly, their art is deceptive, which makes them appear wise, while Xenophon himself aims at truth and virtue. In other words, the sophists deal only with words but, by contrast, Xenophon concerns himself with thought (13.5–6). The conclusion of this criticism is that the sophists hunt the young and rich, while the philosophers are friends to all (13.9).²⁶

We may be inclined to take this criticism as reflecting some common, negative view of sophists among fourth-century Athenians, but it is also possible that this is the view shared mainly by the Socratic circle (those who have intellectual intercourse with Socrates, including Plato and Xenophon). For example, Antisthenes is reported to have written a work entitled 'On the sophists: a work on physiognomy' (DL 6.16), in which he may have criticised sophists in the same way as Plato and Xenophon.²⁷

2.1.3 *Isocrates' view*

Next, I examine the works of Isocrates, another Athenian writer of the fourth century. Isocrates' view of the sophists is

²⁴ Aristippus of Cyrene is called by Aristotle 'sophist' in *Meta.* B 2 996a32, and said to be the first pupil of Socrates to take a fee from pupils (DL 2.65). For his relationship with Socrates, see O'Connor 1994, 159–163.

²⁵ This conjecture of Marchant 1925, xli xlii, is plausible. For the educational function of hunting is implicitly contrasted with the sham education of the sophists (12.7), and Xenophon criticises those who emphasise pleasure instead of toil through hunting (12.12, 12.13, 12.15, and 13.2). Therefore, it is probably Aristippus, the hedonist, who is the target of these chapters. Xenophon's antagonism against Aristippus is pointed out in DL 2.65 (cf. *Mem.* 2.1.1 ff.).

²⁶ Grant 1885, Vol. I, 111, conjectures from the similarity of this passage to Plato's *Sophist* that Xenophon's work comes after the *Sophist*. It is certainly possible, but direct influence may not be necessary, if 'hunt for the young and rich' is a popular image for the sophist in ancient Greece (cf. Aeschines, *Against Timarchus* 170).

²⁷ Giannatoni 1990, Vol. 4, 281–283, introduces the views of this lost work; the only extant fragment is in Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* XIV 656F (in Giannatoni 1990, Vol. 2, 163–164, VA. VII 62).

quite different both from the common-sense view of Xenophon and from the critical view of Plato.

First, the word 'sophist' still signified in his works the man of wisdom in general, as Isocrates enumerated Empedocles, Ion, Alcmaeon, Parmenides, Melissus, and Gorgias as sophists, though in a somewhat contemptuous way (*Antidosis* 268); and sometimes the word had a positive connotation.²⁸ This seems to indicate that, even in the fourth century, the original meaning of 'sophist' was retained and that the word could be used in a positive, or at least neutral, way. On the other hand, Isocrates recognised the change in connotation of the word 'sophist' between earlier times and his day.²⁹ He explained that 'Solon was named one of the Seven Sophists and had this appellation, which is at present dishonoured and criticised by you' (235); here the 'Seven Sophists' means the Seven Wise Men, among whom Solon was always counted.³⁰ He also claimed that 'Our ancestors admired the so-called sophists and sought companionship with them' (313).

As in Plato and Xenophon, the 'sophists' had come to represent the professional teachers of his day, such as Gorgias,³¹ and Isocrates regarded himself as one of them, since he was the founder of a school of rhetoric and a professional teacher.³² On the other hand, he admitted that 'the common prejudice (*diabolē*) against the sophists' was strong among the people (168).³³ Two common charges were said to be directed against him: some criticise the profession of the sophists as nonsense and quackery, since their education is useless, while those who acknowledge their educational effect condemn the sophists as corrupting their pupils and

²⁸ For example, *To Demonicus* 51 and *To Nicocles* 13. See Norlin 1928, General Introduction, xii, note a.

²⁹ For the change of meaning at Athens, see *Antidosis* 285.

³⁰ *Antidosis* 313 says that Solon was the first Athenian to receive this appellation. In a similar way, the word 'sophist' is used for Socrates by Androtion, the fourth-century historian (Jacoby 1950, 324F69).

³¹ *Panegyricus* 3, *Helen* 9, *Against the Sophists* 14, 19, *Antidosis* 2, 155, 157, 203, 220, and *Panathenaicus* 18.

³² *Panegyricus* 3, *Against the Sophists* 11, and *Antidosis* 158, 162, 197 ff., 220.

³³ *To Philip* 29, *Busiris* 43, *Against the Sophists* 1 ff., *Antidosis* 4, 168, 203, 215, 235, 237, and *Panathenaicus* 5.

making them worse (197–198). Consequently, Isocrates' main concern was to emphasise the difference between himself and other sophists, and to defend his profession as sophist by criticising other sophists as not real educators. In his early career as teacher (about 390 BC), he published a pamphlet entitled '*Against the Sophists*' ('*Kata tōn sophistōn*'), in which he criticised a few types of contemporary sophist.³⁴ In his later writing, *Antidosis*, he turned to the people who 'instead of despising philosophy, accuse it much more bitterly, since they attribute the iniquities of those who profess to be sophists, but do something far different, to those who pursue nothing in common with them' (215).³⁵

In summary, the true sophist for Isocrates means a real educator of the young, and he never felt ashamed of himself for being or for being called a sophist. As a professional teacher himself, he did not feel ashamed of taking fees from his pupils, either.³⁶ All he had to do was sharply to distinguish himself from the other sham sophists, who, though professing to be teachers, failed to do proper work, and that had been his life-long task. For Isocrates, a real sophist is a real philosopher.

2.1.4 *Plato's criticism of the sophist*

Plato, unlike Isocrates, never uses the word 'sophist' in a positive way (except in a few cases where the word is used in the older sense),³⁷ whereas 'rhetoric', which is closely con-

³⁴ *Antidosis* (after 194) cites the passage from *Against the Sophists* (14–18) some forty years later. *Against the Sophists* is usually dated around 390 BC (cf. Eucken 1983, 5). As to his kinds of target, there are different views: eristic teachers and forensic orators (Norlin 1929), or four kinds (Too 1995, ch. 5).

³⁵ See also 148, 193, 221, 237, and *Panathenaicus* 18.

³⁶ We find much testimony to Isocrates' charging fees (at least from foreigners) both in his own works and in later writings: e.g. *Antidosis* 39, 146, 241; and some episodes are introduced in Ps-Plutarch, *Vitae Decem Oratorum*, Isocrates 837B C, D E, 838A, E, F, 839A. In *Against the Sophists* 3–4 Isocrates criticises the way other sophists charge fees.

³⁷ They are *Men.* 85b4 ('experts'), *Prot.* 312c5–6 ('man of wisdom'), and *Rep.* X 596d1 ('man of wisdom', but ironical); the last two examples are spoken by the interlocutors, not Socrates. I also discussed in 1.2 the three important examples used for gods in *Symp.* 203d8, *Crat.* 403e4, and *Minos* 319c3, 6.

nected with the art of the sophist, could acquire a positive role, as we can see in the *Phaedrus*. To Plato, 'sophist' always means one who is opposed to philosophy, or the antithesis of the philosopher.

Plato's criticism is sometimes directed towards the methods of the sophists, such as the devastating argumentation of eristics, and sometimes towards the particular contents of their teaching, such as Protagoras' 'Human measure' doctrine and Thrasymachus' view of justice. Plato's antagonism toward the sophists, however, seems to be rooted in a more fundamental reason. He does not criticise the sophists because each particular theory or method is wrong, but he seems rather to reproach them for being sophists. What is wrong with someone's being a sophist? Is there any essential feature common to the sophists? One of the crucial issues in the controversy between Plato and the sophists is without doubt their attitudes towards appearance in relation to reality, which will be our main topic.³⁸

As we saw through the examination of the views of Plato, Xenophon, and Isocrates, the sophists do not show a fixed nature or substance, but to each observer they appear differently. It is even uncertain who are sophists; they are shadowy figures. Like the ancient Greeks, moreover, we have nothing more than a variety of images of them. On the other hand, there really does exist a certain conflict or tension between philosophers and sophists. In order to comprehend this conflict and interaction between the two parties, we must rather see how Plato reacted against the sophists. In my view, attacking the sophist as the antithesis of the philosopher is for Plato the only way to make

³⁸ One may be inclined to see this disagreement as a recurring contrast in the history of philosophy: relativism versus absolutism, empiricism versus idealism, phenomenalism versus transcendentalism, and individualism versus universalism. It is usually thought that Plato is a representative of the latter trend, and the sophists opposed him by taking the former line (cf. Havelock 1957, ch. 7, Guthrie 1969, 3–9, and Schiappa 1991, 15). On the other hand, Bett 1989 closely examines the doctrines of the historical sophists and concludes that most of them have nothing to do with the strong form of relativism, except possibly Plato's representation of Protagoras' position in the *Theaetetus*.

philosophy possible.³⁹ Plato's severe attack on the sophist reminds us of the ambivalent position of philosophy in Plato's day. For if philosophy as Plato understood it had already been firmly established and admitted as such (that is to say, as clearly distinct from sophistry and beneficial in society), Plato would probably not have had to take his opponents so seriously. To consider this point, we shall next ask a question about the nature of the philosopher.

2.2 The question of what the philosopher is

If it is in order to secure a proper place for philosophy that Plato examines and severely criticises the sophist, and if the sophist is always to be regarded as a non-philosopher, then what is the philosopher in Plato's view, and what is the activity of philosophy which Plato aims to secure through the criticism of the sophist? This question was crucial for Plato, and in his early and middle dialogues he repeatedly tried to answer it. The question is nevertheless so difficult to answer that he had to ask the same question in his later dialogue, the *Sophist*, and examine it once again from a different angle. Now I shall discuss why this question was so difficult for Plato.

2.2.1 *Plato's novel concept of the philosopher*

One of the reasons why Plato had to ask and struggle with the question of what the philosopher is must be that 'philosopher' (*philosophos*) was a relatively new word, and obtained a new meaning in the time of Socrates and Plato. The new meaning is 'one who loves and pursues wisdom', and it is in fact Plato who pinned down this meaning of the word 'philosopher'.⁴⁰

³⁹ This is parallel to the ancient controversy between science and non-science (i.e. magic), discussed in G. E. R. Lloyd 1979, 1987, and 1990. For the sophists, see Lloyd 1979, 98–102, and 1987, 91–98.

⁴⁰ Nightingale 1995 (especially ch. 1) discusses Plato's creation of 'philosophy' from a different angle: his intertextual engagements in the dialogues mark off 'philosophy' from other authoritative genres in Athenian society, such as poetry and rhetoric. She approaches Plato's 'philosophy' from its form, not from its content.

Before discussing Plato's notion of a philosopher, I must mention the doxographical tradition which attributes the invention of this new meaning to Pythagoras.⁴¹ In this tradition, priority in calling himself 'philosopher' is attributed to Pythagoras, and both Diogenes Laertius and Cicero depend for their reports on Heraclides of Pontus, who studied in the Academy and was influenced by the Pythagoreans.⁴² Diogenes' clear explanation in Book One that the philosopher should be distinguished from a man of wisdom (*sophos*) exactly corresponds to Plato's notion of the philosopher.⁴³ However, this story is historically doubtful, and is usually thought to be a free invention, like other episodes in the career of Pythagoras.⁴⁴ On the other hand, we cannot deny that the word 'philosopher' was strongly associated with the Pythagoreans,⁴⁵ and that such association probably originated in the Academy while Plato was still alive.⁴⁶ In any

⁴¹ DL 1.12 and Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 5.8–9; cf. Diodorus Siculus, 10.10, and Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis* 1.61.4.

⁴² Jaeger 1948, 97–98, discusses a similar view found in Aristotle's *Protrepticus* and draws a conclusion that Heraclides, who was also a pupil of Aristotle, had been influenced by the *Protrepticus*.

⁴³ This account, however, is found only in DL 1.12, and does not appear in DL 8.8 (from Sosicrates) nor in Cicero. There are some important differences between the accounts of Cicero and of Diogenes (cf. Gottschalk 1980, 23–27). Chroust 1964, 432–433, points out a conflict between this account and Pythagorean thought.

⁴⁴ See Burkert 1960, Guthrie 1962, 164–166, and Kato 1996, 13–14. In a reconstruction of Heraclides' thought, Gottschalk 1980, 13–36, puts this episode in Heraclides' dialogue 'On the woman without breath' ('*Peri tēs apnou*') (cf. DL 1.12), which is supposed to deal with a fictional conversation held on the last day of Empedocles, the resurrection of a woman who stopped breathing, and Empedocles' miraculous end. If his reconstruction is correct, we should not take the Pythagoras story, told in that fictional conversation, as a historical fact (cf. Chroust 1947, 22, Guthrie 1978, 484). Morrison 1958, 207–209, defends the genuineness of Heraclides' story with reference to Isocrates' *Busiris* 28, which claims that Pythagoras was the first to bring philosophy from Egypt to Greece, but his argument is criticised by Burkert 1960, 170. For another argument, see de Vogel 1970, 7–8.

⁴⁵ Cf. Guthrie 1962, 417, and Morrison 1958, 208–209. Guthrie 1969, 39–40, suggests that the philosopher's accusation of the sophist's taking fees comes from the Pythagorean-Platonic ideal of sharing wisdom.

⁴⁶ Plato's use of the word 'philosopher' may have been influenced by Pythagorean tradition. For example, Socrates in the *Phaedo* converses with Simmias and Cebes, the two Pythagoreans from Thebes, and associates a philosopher's willingness to die with Philolaus, their master and a contemporary Pythagorean (cf. *Phd.* 61d6–e9).

case, we should assume that Plato was most responsible for developing the new meaning of the word 'philosopher'.

Now let us consider Plato's notion of the philosopher. It is demarcated in two ways.

First, although before Socrates the word 'philosopher' seems to have been equivalent to 'the wise' (*sophos*), it is the Socrates of Plato's dialogues, so far as reliable evidence goes, who for the first time used 'philosopher' as clearly distinct from 'the wise'. In the early history of Greek philosophy, inquirers into nature were called men of wisdom (*sophoi*).⁴⁷ Like Thales, one of the Seven Wise Men, who possessed both speculative and practical wisdom, they were praised as having wisdom about the Universe and the human world, and like the great poets, such as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, who showed how to live life well, they were praised as guides for the good life. In contrast to this ordinary view, Socrates insisted, as a result of his inquiries spurred on by the Delphic oracle's proclamation 'Socrates is the wisest', that the god is the only one to whom we can attribute wisdom, so that, compared with divine wisdom, human wisdom is equal to nothing (*Ap.* 20c4–23c1).⁴⁸ This strong awareness of human ignorance characterises the 'philosopher',⁴⁹ and this characterisation is maintained throughout Plato's dialogues. For instance, at the end of the *Phaedrus*, Socrates calls dialecticians 'philosophers', but not 'the wise', which is suitable only for the gods (278d2–6). In the *Symposium*, Diotima explains that Love (*Erōs*) is a philosopher (lover of wisdom) who stands somewhere between ignorance and wisdom, and always aspires after wisdom (204a8–b5). Also the *Lysis*

⁴⁷ The original meaning of 'expert in a particular art' developed into the general meaning of 'the wise' (cf. Guthrie 1969, 27–28).

⁴⁸ We may find a philosophical predecessor of this idea in the fragments of Heraclitus. Fr. CXVIII (Kahn 1979 = DK 22 B32): 'The wise is one alone, unwilling and willing to be spoken of by the name of Zeus'; see Fr. LIV–LVIII, and Kahn 1979, 170–174, 267–271). In particular, Fr. LVI (DK 22 B82–83) is introduced by Socrates himself in *Hipp. Mj.* 289b3–5: 'the wisest of human beings, if compared with the god, appears an ape both in wisdom and in beauty and in everything else'.

⁴⁹ The *Apology* does not use the word '*philosophos*'; the verb '*philosophēin*' is used instead in 28e5, 29c8, and d5 (cf. 23d4–5).

argues that neither wise nor ignorant people love wisdom, while those who are still aware of not knowing the things they do not know are philosophers (218a2–b6).

Second, in spite of the denial of perfect wisdom, Socrates maintains that we must not give up the pursuit of wisdom, but must continue the inquiry into the greatest things, such as the good and the beautiful. The paradox of inquiry in the *Meno* occurs when the cross-examination ends with a complete aporia, which appears to leave no hope or possibility of further inquiry (80d5–e5). Despite the aporia, inquiry should be continued, Socrates insists, in order to live well, with the hope of our having the possibility of attaining knowledge held out by the theory of Recollection (86b6–c2). Likewise, the theory of Forms is introduced as a hypothesis in the *Phaedo*, and the Form of the Good is anticipated as the greatest object of the philosopher's learning in the *Republic*. This is the second characteristic of philosophy.

To criticise the sophist and distinguish the philosopher from the sophist is essential for these two characteristics of philosophy: on the one hand, the sophist is a person who claims to know everything, although omniscience should be ascribed only to god. Whereas the philosopher must be aware of his own ignorance, sophists do not admit their radical ignorance, and in this sense their 'wisdom' should be criticised as well as that of the poets and others.⁵⁰ On the other hand, the sophists, by using verbal conflicts or contradictions, entrap people in scepticism or agnosticism. Their use of controversy destroys sound arguments and may cause distrust or hatred of argument (*misologia*), which leads to abandonment of inquiry by means of argument (*Phd.* 89c11–91b7). The sophist presents these two negative faces, and in this way his activity constitutes the antithesis of philosophy. The Socratic missionary has to thread his way through these two extremes and secure philosophical inquiry by means of human discourse, or dialogue, and for that

⁵⁰ I shall examine the relationship between sophist and poet in Chapter 5.

purpose, criticism of the sophist becomes necessary and essential to philosophy.⁵¹

2.2.2 *The views of Xenophon and Isocrates*

Plato's revolutionary use of 'philosopher' is confirmed by comparison with the view of Xenophon, a man of common sense, and that of Isocrates, Plato's rival.

Xenophon did not use the words 'philosophy', 'philosopher', and 'to philosophise' very much.⁵² As we saw in the previous section, the life and activity of Socrates is called philosophy, and contrasted with that of the sophist, Antiphon (*Mem.* 1.6.2–3). Similarly, in Xenophon's *Symposium*, philosophy is contrasted with the activity of the so-called sophists, such as Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus (*Symp.* 1.5, 4.62). But generally speaking, philosophy means to Xenophon nothing more than general education, without any special connotation, just as Euthydemus, the young associate of Socrates, initially thought that through philosophy one could be educated on the things appropriate to a gentleman (*kalo-k'agathia*) (*Mem.* 4.2.23).⁵³

Isocrates' general usage of these words indicates similar points: that philosophy means cultivation or study.⁵⁴ Here philosophy for the mind is compared to physical training for the body (*Antidosis* 181), and it is also called 'care for the soul' (*hē tēs psychēs epimeleia*) (304). At the same time, Isocrates tends to confine the word 'philosopher' to a teacher of the art of speech, and teachers of philosophy sometimes

⁵¹ Another essential feature of being a philosopher is to play a political role as ruler in the state, as is declared in the *Republic* and the *Seventh Letter*. To examine this feature becomes the main theme of the subsequent dialogue, the *Statesman*.

⁵² According to *TLG*, there are only 16 examples in his whole works. Nightingale 1995, 16–17, examines Xenophon's use of these words.

⁵³ The concept of philosophy is sometimes used in an ironical way: *Anabasis* 2.1.13 and *Cyropaedia* 6.1.41.

⁵⁴ For philosophy as just study or culture, see *To Nicocles* 35, *Panegyricus* 6, 10, 47ff., 186, *Areopagiticus* 45, *On the Peace* 5, 116, 145, *Against the Sophists* 1, 21, *Panathenaicus* 209, *Ep. VII* 3, *Ep. IX* 15, etc. And it is used as a complimentary word in *Ep. V* 2.

include eristics, sophists, or orators.⁵⁵ Isocrates often defends philosophy against people's contempt, but this indicates that philosophers and sophists are deeply confused as teachers of rhetoric in Athenian society.⁵⁶

More importantly, Isocrates identifies himself as a philosopher, as well as a sophist.⁵⁷ For his activity of education, particularly rhetoric, is thought to be real philosophy.⁵⁸ Hence Isocrates has to defend his 'philosophy', and to 'prove that philosophy has been unjustly slandered by many people and that it deserves much more to be liked than hated' (*Antidosis* 170). He encourages young people to engage in philosophy or care for the soul, which is the noblest pursuit (304–305).

What Isocrates thinks of his philosophy is expounded in the *Antidosis*, in which he distinguishes theoretical sciences, such as geometry and astronomy, from philosophy, and takes the former to be only a gymnastic and preparation for the latter (266); speculators (including ancient 'sophists') are not real philosophers, but rather it is those who pursue and practise the studies which will enable us to govern household and commonwealth wisely that should be called philosophers (285). The emphasis on the practical role of philosophy and the contempt for theoretical studies, together with the contrast between the importance of sound judgement (*doxa*) and the impracticability of exact knowledge (*epistēmē*), are characteristic of Isocrates.⁵⁹ Unlike Plato, he does not make a substantial distinction between the wise (*sophos*) and the

⁵⁵ For eristics, see *To Nicocles* 51 and *Helen* 6; for sophists (professionals), see *Antidosis* 41; and for orators, see *Panegyricus* 10, *Evagoras* 8, *Busiris* 49, *Antidosis* 48 (political orators), and *Ep.* VI 8.

⁵⁶ *Nicocles or The Cyprians* 1, 9, *Antidosis* 170, 175, 209, 215 (cited above), 243, 304, *Panathenaicus* 9, *Helen* 6, and *Busiris* 49. Cf. Wilcox 1943.

⁵⁷ Morgan 1995, 89–92, suggests that it may be this conflation of philosopher and sophist by Isocrates which is the target of Plato's *Sophist*.

⁵⁸ *Panegyricus* 6, 10, *To Demonicus* 3, *Busiris* 1, *Against the Sophists* 14, 18, *Antidosis* 41, 162, 176, 181 ff., 195, 205, 266, 271, 285, 292, *Panathenaicus* 9, and *Ep.* VI 8.

⁵⁹ Cf. *Antidosis* 184–185, etc. Morrison 1958, 216–218, points out the similarity of Isocrates' view to Protagoras' emphasis on practical wisdom. The clever composer of speeches whom Crito met and whom Socrates includes in the 'borderers between the philosopher and the statesman' in the epilogue of the *Euthydemus* (304d2–306d1) is often supposed to be Isocrates (Gifford 1905, 18–19), but since

philosopher (*philosophos*): wise men are those who are able to arrive for the most part at the best by means of sound judgement (*doxai*), and the philosopher engages in the studies from which he will most quickly gain such prudence (*Antidosis* 271). Here, we should bear in mind that Isocrates developed his own notion of philosophy not without reference to the efforts of Plato and other contemporaries; for the *Antidosis* (written around 354–353 BC) clearly responds to Plato's *Apology*, *Republic* and other works.⁶⁰

In conclusion, the word 'philosophy' usually means general education among fourth-century Athenians and covers a wide range of intellectual activities. This survey has also shown that 'philosophy' was still contestable at the time of Isocrates, who no less than Plato added to it a special connotation. Greek thinkers developed the notion of philosophy in their intellectual interaction.

2.2.3 *Plato's strategy and its problem*

Plato's strategy for promoting his notion of philosophy was to display Socrates as *the* philosopher. For it is Socrates, Plato's teacher and the main speaker in most of his dialogues, who for Plato is the model philosopher and perhaps the only philosopher, and it is by interpreting Socrates' way of life that Plato forms the concept of philosophy. He shows Socrates as a real philosopher in three ways: first, by depicting the words and deeds of Socrates; second, by contrasting him with the sophists; and third, by explaining philosophy in terms of the theory of Forms. In these ways, Plato provides a fundamental and vivid notion of philosophy, but at the same time, this strategy might undermine his very attempt to secure philosophy. For too much stress on the figure of Socrates as *the* example of the philosopher might

that man, unlike Isocrates, boldly declares that philosophy is unworthy (304e7–305a1; cf. b6), he may well 'represent a type' rather than a particular person (cf. Bluck 1961, 115, n.4).

⁶⁰ Cf. Hirokawa 1984, 179–194, Cooper 1986, Batstone 1986, and Nightingale 1995, ch. 1.

have endangered the very project of showing what a philosopher is, since people often took Socrates for a major sophist.

In the *Apology of Socrates*, Socrates defends his philosophical life and the practice he has been engaged in. By cross-examining people who considered themselves to be wise, he has shown that they were not wise, and urged them to take care of their souls. This was the philosophical mission of Socrates.⁶¹ The subsequent dialogues, the *Crito* and *Phaedo*, portray Socrates' attitude toward death, and represent him as the model philosopher who obeys the laws, always practises for death, and accepts it with composure and without fear. Besides, the impressive speech of Alcibiades in the *Symposium* illustrates the Socratic way of life as a lover of wisdom.

Other earlier dialogues make full use of the contrast between Socrates and others, mostly contemporary sophists. The *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Euthydemus*, and *Hippias Major* and *Minor* confront Socrates with the eponymous sophists, in addition to Prodicus (in the *Protagoras*), Polus (in the *Gorgias*), and Dionysodorus (in the *Euthydemus*). Also the first book of the *Republic* has Thrasymachus as his opponent. To contrast, in this way, Socrates' dialectic with the methods of the sophists is one of the most effective ways of showing what philosophy is. A typical example is the *Euthydemus*, which demonstrates that Socratic philosophy encourages the young to inquire into a good life, while eristic sophistry misleads and embarrasses them.

Finally, in the middle dialogues, Plato came to relate the theory of Forms directly to the concept of philosophy. When Socrates insists in the *Republic* that a philosopher should also be a ruler of the ideal State, and Glaucon asks for a clear definition of a philosopher, Socrates defines the philosopher as the lover of the sight of truth (V 475e4), or one who reaches the Forms or reality, such as Beauty itself. A philosopher's ultimate object of sight is the Form of the Good.

Of these three ways of explaining the philosopher, obviously the first two heavily depend on the character of a real

⁶¹ Hackforth 1933, 46, n.1, remarks on the *Apology* that 'To show what Socrates was is to show what the true philosopher ought to be'.

person, Socrates, and even the third is closely associated with him, just as in Book Seven of the *Republic* the description of the philosopher (who goes up to see the Forms in the real world and comes back into the cave) strongly echoes the destiny of Socrates (cf. 516e3–517a7).

This way of showing the philosopher is endangered, however, when serious doubt is cast on Socrates himself, the model philosopher. If Socrates *is* a sophist, the whole explanation of philosophy will collapse, and we remember that it is Socrates who first occurs to Athenians when they think of sophists, as is depicted in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. Not only is Socrates deemed to be a sophist by his fellow-citizens, but actually his method of discourse, namely, refutation (*elenchos*), is often very difficult to distinguish from eristic or sophistical refutation. Question and short answer is the predominant method of Socrates as well as the sophists (particularly eristics like Euthydemus and Dionysodorus),⁶² and the powers of Socratic refutation and aporia are so devastating that people cannot help regarding him as the most formidable arguer (*deinotatos*), or the one who 'makes the weaker arguments appear the stronger'.⁶³ Moreover, some of the pupils or associates of Socrates, namely, Critias, Charmides, and Alcibiades, became the enemies of Athenian democracy. We should remember that the charge brought against Socrates at his trial must have had something to do with his personal connections with these people.⁶⁴ This may indicate that Socratic education, in fact, did not always result in the moral improvement of his pupils or associates (despite his good intentions), whatever reasons there might be. On the contrary, Socrates might be more dangerous than other sophists in respect of his strong influence on the young.

⁶² While the earlier dialogues contrast Socrates with rhetoricians (who use long speeches), Plato later focuses more on a contrast between Socratic and eristic refutation. But Protagoras, Gorgias, and Hippias also boast of their ability in short question and answer.

⁶³ The word '*deinos*' is strongly associated with sophists (cf. Guthrie 1969, 32–34).

⁶⁴ This charge was discussed in Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12 ff. Aeschines half a century later said that Socrates the sophist had been sentenced to death because he was the teacher of Critias (*Against Timarchus* 173).

The *Sophist* seems to make a fresh start on this issue. It continues the task of explaining what a philosopher is, but this time Socrates is not the leading figure. The visitor from Elea, who is free from any historical image (except for his origin and his relationship with the Eleatic thinkers),⁶⁵ leads the dialogue in a more constructive manner. Here, although Socrates is present and observing the dialogue, the model philosopher is no longer Socrates.⁶⁶ On the contrary, we have good reason to suspect that the *Sophist* casts serious doubt on the figure of Socrates as a philosopher. The problematic sixth definition of the sophist (226a6–231b9), the purifier of the soul, looks as though it refers to Socrates himself rather than the sophist.⁶⁷

We should remember that one of the most impressive images of Socrates, namely, his midwifery, was depicted in the preceding dialogue, the *Theaetetus*, which marks the climax of Socratic philosophy.⁶⁸ On the other hand, the passage on midwifery is highly methodological and has much echo in the *Sophist*: in particular, to distinguish between a true or genuine opinion and a false or fake opinion is said to be a task of philosophy. It is important that this ‘Back to Socrates’ move precedes the re-examination of Socratic method in the *Sophist*, since it is at this point that the old question of how to distinguish a philosopher from a sophist comes in the dialogue, and the sophist

⁶⁵ Though this characterisation is critically examined by Cordero 1991.

⁶⁶ An interesting comparison can be made with another later dialogue, the *Philebus*: when in the *Philebus* Plato returned to the issue of the nature of pleasure, which had been one of the main topics in his earlier dialogues (the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*), he resumed the form of a Socratic dialogue and had Socrates lead the dialogue. See D. Frede 1992, 432–433, 437, 455–456, D. Frede 1993, lxvii–lxxi, D. Frede 1996, and Davidson 1993, 114.

⁶⁷ Some commentators also see the figure of Socrates in one branch of the fifth division, namely, the controversialist for pleasure (225d7–10) (Campbell 1867, 40, Guthrie 1978, 127–128, and Cobb 1990, 14). Moreover, the sophist later asks the inquirers the Socratic question of ‘what is an image?’ (239e5–240a6) (cf. Guthrie 1978, 135–136).

⁶⁸ Burnyeat 1977 proves that the comparison of Socrates’ method to midwifery was not historical; and that the exposition of Socrates’ midwifery represents earlier aporetic philosophy, rather than the proclamation of positive methods in the *Meno* and *Symposium*.

of noble lineage appears.⁶⁹ Now let us examine the sixth definition.

2.3 The sophist of noble lineage

After completing the fifth definition of the sophist as an eristic, the Eleatic visitor begins another definition from a new branch of art: the art of separation (*diakritikē*, 226b2–c9).⁷⁰ Separating the bad from the good is called purification (*katharmos*), which is concerned with the body or the soul (226c10–227e12). Purification of the soul has two kinds: one is to get rid of vices (which are like sickness of the body), and the other is to get rid of deformity of the soul, namely, ignorance, which is the art of teaching (*didaskalikē*) (227e13–229a10). One important kind of ignorance, called the inability to learn (*amathia*), is to think that one knows what one does not know well, and to get rid of this ignorance is a task of education (*paideia*) (229b1–d7). Education in discourse (*en tois logos*) takes the forms of admonition or refutation (*elenchos*, 230d7, 231b6). The latter is to question and cross-examine someone's opinions and show that they are contradictory (*enantiai*, 230b8) with each other, so that he may feel ashamed and then be freed from his own ignorance. Just as a doctor purifies the body and makes it easy to absorb nutrition from food, so a purifier of the soul takes away wrong opinions which become obstacles to the acquisition of learning (229d8–230e4). The practitioner of this purification is called the sophist of noble lineage. However, no sooner had the definition been completed than the Eleatic visitor ex-

⁶⁹ Morgan 1995, 85–92, tries to explain Plato's motivation for tackling the question about the sophist again by referring to the historical and political context of the 360s, during which the *Sophist* was probably written, and in which, he insists, Plato found it necessary to defend his philosophy 'by clarifying how it differs from sophistry' (92). But his historical explanation is speculative and neither convincing nor satisfactory; it is severely criticised in McPherran 1995, 113–114.

⁷⁰ The art of separation does not belong to the original division of art into acquiring and making (219a8–c8). This may indicate a defect in the method of dichotomous division (or the dubiousness of this definition), but we cannot infer from the oddity of division that the sixth definition is not of the sophist, as Cornford 1935, 178, 181–182, insists. For an illuminating approach, see Benardete 1960, 134–136.

pressed a doubt about this definition: they might be granting too much honour to the sophist (230e5–231a3).⁷¹ The sophist and the purifier of the soul are alike, but only as a wolf is like a dog. We must be cautious about similarities and dissimilarities (231a4–b2).

Since this evaluation of the sophist seems too positive in contrast to the previous five descriptions of the sophist, most commentators attribute this definition not to the sophist, but to Socrates or those who use his method.⁷² At the same time, however, commentators who take this view are at a loss to explain why the description of Socrates is inserted here as the sixth definition of the sophist. We must rather start from the obvious fact that this definition is presented as part of the series of definitions of the sophist.

We can see some continuity from the previous definitions. The first definition has suggested, with slight irony, that the sophist is concerned with education ('a seeming education' *doxopaideutikē*, 223b5); this factor corresponds to teaching or education in the sixth definition.⁷³ Moreover, it was laid down in the second to fourth definitions that the sophist's art concerns the soul (223e1–224b3) and deals with branches of learning (*mathēmata*, 224b1, 6, d1, 6, e3), while the purifier of the soul helps people to absorb learning (230c7–d4). Finally, the purification of the soul is pursued by means of discourse (*logoi*, 229e1, 230b6), and this reminds us of the fifth definition of the sophist as an eristic or fighter in discourse. These points clearly indicate that the sixth definition is the successor of the previous definitions and develops some positive features in them. In this sense, the sophist of noble lineage is

⁷¹ I take 'autois' at 231a3 to be the sophists (cf. Kerferd 1954, 84–85, Trevaskis 1955 56, 37, and Bluck 1975, 42), not the practitioners of this art (cf. Cornford 1935, 180, n.2).

⁷² Those who assume that Socrates is represented here are: Cornford 1935, 177–182, Trevaskis 1955 56, Benardete 1960, 138–139, Friedlander 1969, 256–257, Sayre 1969, 148–157, Starr 1973 74, Fujisawa 1976, 47, n.2, 177–180, Klein 1977, 26, Cobb 1990, 16, and Vlastos 1991, 23. Robinson 1953, 12–13, uses this passage as an example of Plato's method of elenchus. On the other hand, Burnet 1914, 224, and Taylor 1949, 381, suppose that the inferior imitators of the Socratic method are implied here.

⁷³ Cornford 1935, 179, takes it for granted that these two kinds of education are contrary, but nothing like that has been established.

nothing but the sophist whom the inquirers have been seeking.⁷⁴

The sixth definition inevitably makes us aware that this sophist resembles Socrates. To think one knows what one does not know is a kind of ignorance which Socrates strongly opposes,⁷⁵ and the method of refutation, namely, to question and cross-examine the opinions of others and get rid of wrong ones, may well represent Socratic refutation, expressed, for example, in the last passage of the *Theaetetus* (210b11–d1).

The resemblance between Socrates and the sophist of noble lineage is obvious, but can we say that Socrates is the practitioner of this art? At one important point the sophist of noble lineage may differ from Socrates: this sophist is explicitly called an educator (*didaskalos*), whereas Socrates definitely did not accept that appellation.⁷⁶ This is not a small difference, since the profession of education (including taking a fee) is one of the main points that demarcate the sophists from Socrates. In this sense, the sixth definition does not exclude the professionalism of the sophists. What is more important, Socrates is always willing no less to be refuted and cross-examined than to cross-examine and refute others (*Gorg.* 458a2–b1).⁷⁷ Without this aspect of self-examination, Socratic refutation cannot be properly understood, and if only one side is taken, it is easily mistaken for mere eristic. In particular, the method of refutation (*elenchos*) is often misused or abused by young imitators of Socrates. Is refutation employed by the sophist of noble lineage genuine? It will

⁷⁴ This line of interpretation is represented by Kerferd 1954; but his view is the other extreme: 'Plato was aware that one aspect of their activities was not only extremely valuable but was a necessary preliminary to his own philosophy' (84). His view is severely criticised by Trevaskis 1955–56 and Booth 1956. Bluck 1975, 40–46, in a way defends Kerferd's line, and sees a kind of sophist in the sixth definition, 'in which the Sophist does resemble Socrates (or the true philosopher), though only to the extent to which a counterfeit imitation resembles a genuine article'.

⁷⁵ Cf. Campbell 1867, 54.

⁷⁶ For example, *Ap.* 33a5–6. On this point, Kerferd 1954, 88–89, is quite right, and the objection by Trevaskis 1955–56, 40–42, misses the point.

⁷⁷ A reason for this is given in *Ap.* 21b1–23c1.

turn out that how to refute others by showing that their opinions contradict each other is the key to this issue.

Although this dubious definition is included in the subsequent list of definitions of the sophist (231e4–7), it is no longer mentioned in the review provided in the final Outer Part (265a4–9). This means that after a long argument in the Middle Part, the sophist of noble lineage will eventually turn out *not* to be a sophist at all (I shall prove this point in 8.1).

How, then, do we take this definition, which is presented as a definition of the sophist, but seems to refer to Socrates, though not exactly? We must bear in mind that in the first five definitions nothing definitely negative has been established so far about the sophist's art, although many ironical or implicitly negative elements have appeared. We have not yet detected what is wrong with the sophist's art.⁷⁸ It is therefore highly plausible that Plato deliberately blurs the difference between the sophist and Socrates, who is usually taken to be a real philosopher. We may notice that, in the initial conversation, Socrates described the Eleatic visitor as an elenctic god, but Theodorus denied that he was eristic; a clear distinction between elenctic and eristic should be made.⁷⁹

The sixth definition, however, forces us to reconsider how Socratic method can be distinguished from the sophist's art. In so far as this dubious definition of the sophist of noble lineage has something to do with the method of Socrates, we have good reason to suspect that Plato discards, or at least casts doubt on, his previous way of showing what the philosopher is: that is, by displaying Socrates as the model philosopher. The *Sophist* as a whole is an attempt at showing the philosopher in a fresh way, apart from the vivid image of Socrates. The sixth definition seems to suggest that we should not without question assume Socrates as the model philosopher, but must undertake a new, objective inquiry into the

⁷⁸ Above all, division has started from the agreement that the sophist is a man of certain wisdom (221d1–4).

⁷⁹ Contrast Socrates' remark (216b3–6) and Theodorus' reply (b7–8); Rosen 1983, 64, takes it that Theodorus is confused about these two.

nature of the philosopher; this is why the definition of the sophist is required. Besides, the sixth definition raises the serious question of whether the definitional inquiry so far is sound enough, and this is why the inquirers have to launch a new attempt at defining the sophist after the six definitions.

In the sixth definition, the appearances of the sophist and philosopher overlap in the figure of Socrates, and we seem to be in ultimate confusion. Socrates exists as he appears to each of his associates, such as Aristippus, Antisthenes, Aeschines, Plato and Xenophon, and also to his Hellenistic heirs, such as Zeno the Stoic and Arcesilaus the Sceptic, and finally to us; he appears to each of us and them in accordance with our interests and our understanding of what human life is.⁸⁰ We have encountered the sophist who appears to be Socrates, and here the appearances of the sophist and philosopher become the real issue in the *Sophist*.

2.4 The images of the sophist and philosopher

Plato tries to dissociate the words '*sophos*', '*sophistēs*', and '*philosophos*', which were previously used almost as synonyms, into the ideal model of divine wisdom, the negative concept of non-philosopher, and the positive notion of philosopher as a lover of wisdom.⁸¹ But, as we have seen, the dissociation is far from easy or straightforward.

Let us return to the beginning of the *Sophist*, and reconsider the basic problem concerning the philosopher and the sophist. In accordance with the agreement of yesterday, Theodorus and others turn up accompanied by a visitor from

⁸⁰ For the various appearances of Socrates, see the articles collected in Vander Waerdt ed. 1994 (esp. Vander Waerdt 1994a and O'Connor 1994).

⁸¹ 'Dissociation' is a rhetorical term which means breaking the original unity of elements and bringing them into a new structure (cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 411–459). Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 415–416, use the 'Appearance-Reality' pair as 'the prototype of all conceptual dissociation': to determine reality as distinct from appearance makes it possible to dissociate 'those appearances that are deceptive from those that correspond to reality'. When the philosopher and the sophist are dissociated, the third element, namely the wise, becomes necessary as the norm or criterion to distinguish the two (cf. 416–417).

Elea, whom Theodorus introduces as ‘a fellow of the circle of Parmenides and Zeno, and above all, a philosopher’ (216a2–4). Socrates compares the visitor to a god fond of refutation (*theos tis elenktikos*) who comes to supervise human beings in discourse (a5–b6). Theodorus immediately denies that he is an *eristic*, and suggests that a philosopher should be called not god (*theos*) but godlike (*theios*) (b7–c1). Socrates replies to Theodorus’ remark in the following way:

[Passage I: 216c2–d2]

Socrates: However, this type of man (sc. philosopher), perhaps, is hardly easier to discern than the genus of god. For thanks to the ignorance of others, these people – I mean, not the sham, but the genuine philosophers – appear in various guises (*pantoioi phantazomenoi*), ‘roaming from city to city’, watching the life beneath them from their heights. They seem (*dokousin*) to some people worthless, to others of supreme worth. Sometimes they appear (*phantazontai*) to be statesmen, and sometimes to be sophists; and sometimes there are some people to whom they give the impression (*doxan*) that they are completely mad (*echontes manikōs*).

The Homeric image of a god brings the three characters, the philosopher, statesman, and sophist, together in a single image.⁸² A god appears to human beings in many guises (216c4–5). A god is, firstly, akin to a philosopher (216a5–6, b8–c4), and secondly, in the role of supervising human beings, is thought to be a statesman (216a6–b3), and finally, by showing his great competence in argument, he is associated with a sophist (216b3–8).⁸³ In addition, a philosopher sometimes appears to be totally mad. This is a typical image of a philosopher among ordinary people, but people ignore the fact that the philosopher appears to be out of his senses because he is inspired by god (*enthousiazōn*; cf. *Phdr.* 249c4–d3); love is a kind of divine madness which is a release

⁸² Two passages are referred to: *Odyssey* IX 270–271 (Zeus as the god of visitors) and XVII 483–487. The latter passage was criticised in *Rep.* II 381d1–5, which I shall discuss in relation to the concept of *phantasia* in Chapter 7. For a different interpretation of the quotations from Homer, see Benardete 1963, 176–177, and Rosen 1983, 62–66.

⁸³ The association of the gods with the sophists is seen in the playful expositions of etymology in the *Cratylus*: Hades is called ‘a perfect sophist’ because of his power of speech (403d7–e7); and heroes are also said to be rhetoricians, dialecticians, and sophists (398d5–e3).

from all human conventions (265a9–11).⁸⁴ Here, the double image of god and philosopher plays a crucial role in raising the basic issue of appearance. Just as a god appears in different guises to ignorant human beings, so a genuine philosopher is supposed to appear in many forms *because of the ignorance of others* (216c4–d2). We may see in this comparison the original problem of the appearances of the philosopher, and note that such appearances presuppose a sharp contrast between divine wisdom and human ignorance;⁸⁵ on the one hand, it is in virtue of his wisdom that a god appears in many guises, but on the other hand, it is the ignorant audience who are responsible for having such appearances and incorrect opinions. Knowledge and ignorance, which underlie the appearances of a philosopher, will also become an important issue in the appearances of the sophist.

The three images of the philosopher, sophist, and statesman often overlap in Plato's dialogues. The overlap of the images of the philosopher and sophist is seen, for example, in the metaphors of hunting and fighting: philosophical inquiry is repeatedly compared to hunting (*Sph.* 218d2–9, 226a6–b2, 231c3–6, 235a10–c7, etc.) and fighting (231c6, 261a6–8), which were, of course, the images used for the first and fifth definitions of the sophist.⁸⁶ The images of the philosopher and statesman are conflated in the requirement of the philosopher-ruler in the ideal State in the *Republic*, and Socrates

⁸⁴ The situation in which a philosopher appears ridiculous to ordinary people is explained in the simile of the Cave (*Rep.* VII 516e3–517a7) and in the portrait of the philosopher (*Tht.* 173c7–175e5). The Eleatic visitor, when embarking on the inquiry, warns the interlocutor not to take him for mad (*Sph.* 242a5–b5). On the other hand, we must remember that antilogic also causes madness (*Rep.* VII 539b1–d7).

⁸⁵ The distinction between divine and human has to be made in the course of the investigation both in the *Sophist* and in the *Statesman*. In the final definition of the sophist, the art of making is divided into divine and human (265b4–266d7), and, according to this distinction, images are also divided into natural and artificial. In the *Statesman*, on the other hand, it is by distinguishing divine from human in the magnificent myth that the concept of the shepherd of the human flock is criticised as improper (274e10–275a2, b8–c4, 276d5–6). In both dialogues human activities must thus be separated from divine.

⁸⁶ For fighting, see also *Euthd.* 288a4, 303a4, 305a4, and for hunting, see *Euthd.* 294d6–7, 295d2, 302b5–7. I shall examine these metaphors in 6.1.

once declares that he may be the only true statesman (*Gorg.* 521d6–8).⁸⁷ Again, the images of the statesman and sophist converge when they are closely examined (*Gorg.* 519b2–521a1). We should also remember that young people full of political ambition go to the sophists to learn how to be rulers by speaking well in public.⁸⁸ Finally, the image of Eros in the *Symposium* should be recalled: Eros (along with Diotima) embodies both images, of the philosopher as lover of wisdom and the sophist as cunning orator.

Where these images are fused, Plato's attempt to dissociate the sophist from the philosopher faces two serious problems, one theoretical, the other ethical.

The theoretical problem concerns circularity of definition. Plato's contention that the sophist is a *non-philosopher* means two opposite things. It is only if the philosopher is already determined that the sophist can be defined, but at the same time, it is only through the definition of his opponent, the sophist, that the philosopher is to be characterised. The sophist cannot be defined independently of the definition of the philosopher, while the definition of the philosopher cannot be fixed without a firm grasp of the sophist. Thus the definitions of the sophist and of the philosopher become circular. This parity of definition of the philosopher and the sophist corresponds to the parity of difficulties concerning what is and what is not, stated in the Middle Part. Facing the difficulties both of what is and what is not, the Eleatic visitor declares that it is only when one of them is made clear that the other also becomes clear (250e5–251a3).⁸⁹ My suggestion that this parity of difficulties reflects the basic problem concerning the sophist and the philosopher can be confirmed in the later passage concerning dialectic: it says that the philosopher is hard to see because of the brightness of the

⁸⁷ Dodds 1959, 369, suggests that this is what Plato saw in his master, rather than the claim the historical Socrates had made.

⁸⁸ Historically speaking, some sophists played important political roles. For instance, Gorgias persuaded the Athenians as leader of a delegation from Leontini (Diodorus Siculus 12.53.2–54.1), and Protagoras is said to have written the constitution for Thurii (cf. Guthrie 1969, 264, and Kerferd 1981a, 18, 43).

⁸⁹ This is called 'Parity Assumption' by Owen 1971.

realm of what is, where he resides, while the sophist is also supposed to be difficult to detect because of the darkness of what is not, to which he attaches himself (253e8–254b2).⁹⁰ At stake is the concept of negation, or how to consider the sophist as a *non*-philosopher. I think this is one of the reasons why negation has to be discussed in terms of difference in the Middle Part.

Next, the theoretical difficulty concerning the fusion of the images of the philosopher and sophist naturally leads us to an ethical difficulty. Who is a sophist, and who is a philosopher? The earlier dialogues replied with confidence that it is Socrates who is a real philosopher, while the sophists are Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus and others. However, the sixth definition of the sophist raises a serious difficulty in regarding Socrates as model philosopher, since it may be he who presents the appearance of a sophist. Whom should we here regard as philosopher, and whom sophist? What about the Eleatic visitor? Is it clear that the Eleatic visitor, whom Socrates compares to an elenctic god coming down to the human world and ‘roaming from city to city’ (cf. 216a5–b6, c2–d2), is really a philosopher, and never a sophist?⁹¹ It was Theodorus the mathematician, we should remember, who introduced and regarded him as a philosopher.⁹² Nor are we sure that Parmenides and Zeno, compatriots of the Eleatic visitor, are philosophers. Zeno might be an eristic god; he is said to take fees from his pupils, like sophists (cf. *Alc. I* 119a5–6). What is more, no one can be neutral in the inquiry into the definition of the sophist, since we have no guarantee yet that the inquirers are philosophers and not sophists. Without showing themselves as philosophers rather than sophists, the inquirers will be unable to define the sophist. Finally, what are you and I, who read the *Sophist*? We readers may be asked whether or not we are sophists, if we participate in the inquiry; we are not ourselves exempt from

⁹⁰ We shall discuss this passage in Chapter 7.

⁹¹ Cherubin 1993 discusses this question (in a peculiar way, though).

⁹² For the character of Theodorus, see Miller 1980, 3–5; see also Rue 1993, 92–99, for Theodorus in the *Theaetetus*.

this serious question. This is the ethical problem concerning the definition of the sophist.

In conclusion, the sophist appears in many guises, as does the philosopher. We have a series of images or appearances both of the philosopher and the sophist. In particular, as the philosopher is said to appear as a sophist (in Passage 1), a sophist in fact appears like Socrates, the model philosopher, in the sixth definition. This is not merely a historical problem, but one of the most important universal problems in philosophy. We still lack a definite grasp of the distinction between the philosopher and the sophist, and may be in the darkness of total confusion, like the Athenians. The *Sophist* is the dialogue which attempts to secure the possibility of a philosopher, and its basic problem turns out to be the definition of the sophist, which is the pre-eminent task of philosophy, though neglected for a long time as merely a historical issue. The philosopher and the sophist are, as it were, two sides of the same coin. We must accordingly seek the definitions of the two in one and the same inquiry, together with Plato.

CHAPTER 3

HOW THE SOPHIST APPEARS

3.1 Defining the sophist

I have shown in the first two chapters that the basic philosophical problem in the *Sophist* is how to distinguish the sophist from the philosopher. Now let us begin to discuss how the *Sophist* investigates the basic problem.

The Eleatic visitor sets out to define the sophist by pointing out an indeterminacy in our understanding of the sophist. The dialogue starts the inquiry with an agreement that people share a common name:

[Passage 2: 218c1–5]

The Eleatic visitor: At present, what you and I possess in common concerning this (sc. sophist) is the name (*onoma*) alone, but each of us may perhaps understand privately the thing (or the activity, *ergon*) to which we give the name. Yet it is always necessary concerning everything to come to an agreement on the thing itself by means of definitions (or statements, *dia logōn*), rather than about names alone without definition.

In order to understand the meaning and the procedure of defining the sophist, we should look, to begin with, at the three methods employed in the dialogue: definition, use of models, and division.

The aim of definition is stated in Passage 2: that a definition (*logos*) should fix our understanding of an object to which a certain name (*onoma*) refers. Let us consider what role the three elements, that is, name (or word), object, and definition, play when we inquire into a definition of something. First, we must start an inquiry from our ordinary use of names. We have names in common and use them in everyday situations. That does not guarantee, however, that each of us understands by those common names the same

objects in the same way. We may, rather, use them differently and our understanding may be private. To reach a common understanding of an object itself, we need to agree on a definition, which signifies the essence of the object.

In the process of defining the sophist, names play a central role. It should be remembered that the initial assumption and agreement among the speakers is that the three names, ‘sophist’, ‘statesman’, and ‘philosopher’, correspond to three kinds (*eidē*) (216d2–217b3). The way that people in Elea use names indicates how they think of these three, while the Eleatic visitor warns that it is not an easy task to understand what each of them really is (217b2–3). The inquiry begins with our ordinary grasp of the sophist by the common name, ‘sophist’ (*sophistēs*); for the original name meaning ‘wise person’ must in some way signify his nature. Based on this name, inquiry is carried on in the field of arts (*technai*) and those who possess arts (221d1–6). Division of arts also proceeds by using names in three ways. First, our ordinary use of names is often recalled to get an overview of the relevant things.¹ Second, to collect many things and grasp one kind (*eidos*) over those many things is one of the important processes of division, and collection (*synagōgē*) is made by means of names.² Third, to grasp a kind in the process of division is to give it a proper name; for example, the Eleatic visitor asks: ‘Is this altogether indivisible, or does this possess a division worth naming (*diairesin axian epōnymias*)?’ (229d5–6)³ In these ways, names play an important role in definition. Sometimes, however, our ordinary language does not provide an appropriate name which covers a class or field investigated,⁴ and some names might be misleading for genuine division according to kinds.⁵ On such

¹ E.g. 226b2 10, 228d7, 10; cf. 219a11 b1, 220a8 9.

² A typical case of collection is seen in 226b2 c9 (*diakritikē*); see also 219a10 c1 (*poiētikē*), 219c2 8 (*ktētikē*), and 226e5 227c10 (*katharsis*).

³ Cf. 220c1 2, d1 2.

⁴ Cf. 220a1 4, 225b12 c6, and 226d5; 267d4 e2 provides a full account of why we often do not have proper names.

⁵ The *Statesman* warns us that ‘barbarian’ is not a proper name that constitutes a genuine kind (262c10 263a1).

occasions, the inquirers feel free to create new names out of a given vocabulary.⁶ This is why Plato coins so many new semi-technical terms (most of which signify specific arts and end in *-ikē*) in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*.⁷ The Eleatic visitor warns, after all, that we should not pay too much attention to names, since division and grasp of kinds, not of names, is our true aim.⁸ At the end of each inquiry, a chain of names, which represents a relation and combination of kinds, is declared to be a definition (*logos*) of the object; the object discovered in the inquiry is then 'properly called a sophist'.⁹ In this sense, the whole process of definition brings about both understanding of the object and rectification of names.¹⁰ Rectified names signify true kinds, and locate things in the network or relationship between kinds. A definition, 'the sophist is such and such', is a statement which shows the relation between kinds (especially, of genus and species) that constitutes the nature of the object.¹¹ Thus, at the end of the final definition, the name 'sophist' is now understood, no longer as 'wise person', as was supposed at the beginning of the inquiry, but as a name derivative from it, which means 'imitator of the wise' (268c1–2).

Next, the method of using models is introduced. Since it is not an easy task to grasp what the sophist, a great object, is, the inquirers should first practise definition on a small model (218c5–e1); they take up the angler as a model

⁶ E.g. 222c9 d2 (*pithanourgikē*), 223d5 8 (*kapēlikē*), 225a8 11 (*biastikon*). A new name, 'trading of learning' (*mathēmatopōlikē*), is supplied from 'learning' (*mathē mata*) in 224b5 c3.

⁷ Chantraine 1956, 97–100, 132–143, examines vocabulary ending with *ikē* in Plato: 'the authentic dialogues of Plato present more than 350 examples and among the 350 examples more than 250 are not found to be attested in the literature before Plato' (98). See also Campbell 1867, Introduction to *Sph.* xxiv xxxi.

⁸ Cf. 220a1 4, 220d4, 267a11 b3, and *Plt.* 261e1 4.

⁹ In 223a3 10 (1st definition), 224c4 8 (2nd), 224d4 7 (3rd and 4th), 225e1 5 (5th), 230e5 231a1 (6th), and 268b10 c4 (final).

¹⁰ For instance, the notion of trade (*emporikē*) is extended to include that concerning the soul (223e1 224b3).

¹¹ In 221b2 c3 (angler), 223b1 7 (1st definition; for an excellent reading of the text, see Benardete 1960, 129 131), 224c9 d3 (2nd), 224e1 4 (3rd and 4th), 226a1 4 (5th), 231b3 8 (6th), and 268c5 d4 (final). For the summaries, see Benardete 1960.

(218e2–219a3). The contrast between a small and easy and a great and difficult object may correspond to that between the visible and the invisible. Only by analogy and using visible images are invisible things comprehended (cf. *Plt.* 285c4–286b3). Accordingly, the sophist is investigated by appealing to similarities to other more familiar things:¹² the angler is first taken up as a model and the painter is later chosen as another (233d3 ff.), but actually all the other images, namely, hunter, trader, fighter, purifier (a kind of medical doctor), painter, juggler, and mimic actor, are concrete images which illustrate the difficult object, the sophist. We need imagination to integrate these images and go beyond them to grasp the essence of the sophist. The inquiry will locate him in a tree or network of arts in our ordinary understanding.

Finally, the method of division (*diairesis*) is demonstrated, rather than explained, in the model of the angler. Using the model, the Eleatic visitor demonstrates the way to define an object by the method of division: to divide art from general to specific and finally fix the species of a particular art (219a4–221c4). Practice is important to dialectic, and through practice we can acquire the method of inquiry (*methodos*; cf. 218d5, 219a1). It needs noting that division is not necessarily confined to dichotomy (as some commentators assume), either in the *Sophist* or the *Statesman*. A genus must be divided into two species (or more than two when appropriate).¹³ This method of division is next applied to the definition of the sophist's art.

In the first Outer Part the inquirers depict six definitions of the sophist (221c5–232a7; for the list, see 2.1.1). When another definition is examined, some difficulties suddenly arise and interrupt the inquiry (236d9 ff.). It is at this point that the inquirers are driven to the long argument of the

¹² Similarities are the thread of inquiry; cf. 221d8 13, 224b1 2, and 224e6 7.

¹³ See *Sph.* 265b4 266d7 (the four-fold division of the art of making) and *Plt.* 287b10 289b7 (the division of contributory causes into seven kinds). The latter passage (esp. 287b10 c5) reminds us of the original explanation of the method of division in *Phdr.* 265e1 266b1. For the general account of division, see Philip 1966 (esp. 345 348, 352 353, for dichotomy).

Middle Part. In order to understand the inquiry into the sophist, it is crucial to see what happens in the transitional portion (231b9–236d8), which lies between the earlier six definitions and the introduction of the difficulties in the Middle Part. The question is what is at stake when the inquiry into the sophist gets entangled with those difficulties. In this chapter we shall examine this transitional portion and prove that the concept of appearance is the key term in distinguishing the sophist from the philosopher.

3.2 From various appearances to the essence

3.2.1 *The failure to define the sophist*

First, we shall look at the point where the six definitions are completed (231b9 ff.), and see what happens there. The inquiry so far into the definition of the sophist turns out to be a failure, and the inquirers have to embark on a new attempt.

In the first Outer Part, several definitions of the sophist appear one after another, each of which seems to show a certain feature of his activity.¹⁴ When the last definition is completed, however, the inquirers realise that the sophist has shown himself in a number of disguises, but may have escaped clear definition. Theaetetus, a young interlocutor, expresses his feeling of doubt about the results of the inquiry:

[Passage 3: 231b9 c2]

Theaetetus: But the sophist has appeared in so many guises (*dia to polla pephanthai*) that I am at a loss what I should say to state truly and affirm confidently what a sophist really is.

They reckon up ‘in how many guises the sophist has appeared’ (*hoposa hēmin ho sophistēs pephanthai*, 231d1–2), and the six definitions are laid side by side (231d2–e7). They are [1] a paid hunter of rich young men (221c5–223b8); [2] a merchant, [3] a retail dealer, and [4] a manufacturing trader of learning for the soul (223c1–224e5); [5] an eristic, or

¹⁴ I take it that these definitions represent particular features or aspects of the sophist’s art, rather than individual figures of historical sophists (*pace* Oscanyan 1972 73).

athlete in argument (224e6–226a5); and finally [6] a purifier of the soul from opinions that obstruct learning (226a6–231b9). Faced with this result, the Eleatic visitor confesses that their inquiry so far fails to satisfy its primary purpose. He declares:

[Passage 4: 232a1–6]

EV: Now [I] do you realise that, when a man appears (*phainētai*) to be an expert in many subjects while he is called by the name of a single art, such an appearance (*to phantasma touto*) cannot be sound? But [II] clearly whoever receives (*paschōn*) such an appearance lacks the ability to detect the very point in the art on which all these kinds of learning converge, and so he calls their possessor by many names instead of one.

In this passage, appearance is for the first time explicitly taken up as an issue. Although the Eleatic visitor previously noted that the diversity of a sophist entailed the issue of appearance when the second definition was advanced (223c1–4), that issue was left unexamined until the six definitions were enumerated. We should also remember that the initial issue of the dialogue was the various appearances (*pantoioi phantazomenoi*) of the real philosopher (Passage 1: 216c2–d2).

It must be noted in Passage 4 that that issue is directed in two different ways. [I] On the one hand, it is the *sophist* who appears in many guises, and his appearance (*phantasma*) as an expert on many subjects is regarded as unsound; [II] on the other hand, it is the *inquirers*, namely, the Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus, who have received such appearances, and therefore are blamed for their inability to detect the sophist, a man of a single art. In this way, Passage 4 indicates two sides of the issue of appearance, namely, the various appearances which the sophist displays and which the inquirers receive. We shall examine this passage in more detail shortly (in 3.3), but we need here to understand why the six definitions of a sophist are thought to be *appearances*, and also why the inquiry as a whole must be regarded as a failure. There are two reasons:

First, the inquiry into the definition of a sophist fails to satisfy the initial requirement for definition. It begins with

two assumptions: the one is that each of the three types, the sophist, statesman, and philosopher, has its own nature corresponding to these three names (216d2–217b3), and the other is that each of them should be comprehended through its definition (*logos*), not merely through its name (*onoma*) (Passage 2: 218c1–5). However, the result of the inquiry, which has uncovered *many* definitions (*logoi*) of a sophist, shakes the basis of the inquiry, for it obviously violates the second assumption that a sophist should be defined by a single decisive statement, as is illustrated in the model of the angler.¹⁵ The result that the sophist is called by *many* names, namely, hunter, trader, and so on, implies that he has not been grasped as a man of one *single* art. In other words, the variety of descriptions of the sophist cannot be said to represent his essence, and therefore the six definitions are regarded as *appearances*, not the real being of the sophist (Passages 3 and 4). Therefore, the inquiry so far is a failure.¹⁶

Second, the inquiry presents, as the sixth in the series of definitions, the problematic sophist of noble lineage, which we discussed in the previous chapter with respect to the doubt surrounding the figure of Socrates. This dubious definition, not derived from the initial division of art between acquiring and making, casts strong doubt on the entire process of inquiry, since this sophist, as a purifier of the soul by means of refutation (*elenchos*), looks like Socrates; he may not be a real sophist, but a philosopher. In this sense also, the definitional inquiry is suspect as depicting not the real being, but *appearances* of the sophist. If not all of the appearances represent the sophist, the result indicates that the inquiry fails to discern genuine and false appearances of the sophist, and consequently, all the appearances are to be doubted as unreliable.

Concerning the six definitions, we must remember that

¹⁵ The singular form '*logos*' is used at 219a1 and 221b1.

¹⁶ Ryle 1939, 141–142, introduces this result as showing the defects of the method of dichotomous division, which can never, according to Ryle, be employed 'for the resolution of any serious philosophical problem'. But I shall defend the philosophical significance of the method of division in the *Sophist*.

each of them takes the form of a proposition (*logos*) that the sophist is such and such, which fulfils the formal conditions of definition. Nevertheless, its status has to be characterised as *appearance* (cf. 231b6–7). On the other hand, in the previous inquiry, the transition from one definition to another is not accompanied by a denial or modification of the preceding definition, which finally raises the problem of the variety of appearances.

Although the inquiry has shown many appearances of the sophist and is therefore regarded as a failure, the variety of activities is nevertheless intrinsic to the sophist, since sophists themselves profess to have various skills and kinds of knowledge. The defect of the previous inquiry must lie, as the Eleatic visitor points out in Passage 4, in the inquirers' having failed to grasp the *essential* point of his art which makes that variety possible. Yet the inquiry has also revealed the nature of the sophist's art, namely, the variety itself. Here the concept of appearance becomes the key to true understanding of the sophist.

3.2.2 *The focal point of the sophist's art*

At the end of the six definitions of the sophist the inquirers face the issue of appearance, that the inquirers have depicted various appearances of the sophist, but failed to grasp his art in its unity. Is there any single essence of the sophist's art that underlies these manifold appearances? If so, what is it? Answering these questions becomes the next task of inquiry.

By reviewing the results of the previous inquiry, the inquirers realise that they have received many appearances of the sophist's art. This is the starting point from which they set out on a new attempt at true definition of the sophist (I call the argument from 232b1 to 233d2 the New Attempt). As soon as he raises the issue of appearance in Passage 4, the Eleatic visitor urges Theaetetus to continue the inquiry:

[Passage 5: 232b1–4]

EV: Let us not receive such a thing in our inquiry because of our laziness.

Rather, let us first take up again something among the things which

were told about the sophist.¹⁷ For there was one thing in particular which turned out to be revealing his character.

The ‘one revealing thing’ is searched for next, in order to grasp ‘that very point in the art on which all these kinds of learning converge’, which the Eleatic visitor said he and Theaetetus must have failed to detect (Passage 4: 232a3–6). The following conversation explains what the most ‘revealing thing’ is:

[Passage 6: 232b6–10]

EV: We said that the sophist is a controversialist (*antilogikon*).

Tht: Yes.

EV: And further, don’t we say that he becomes a teacher of others in the very thing he performs (sc. controverting)?

Tht: Certainly.

Here, the Eleatic visitor suggests that controverting, which the sophist himself engages in and teaches to others, is the ‘one thing’ which will particularly reveal the essence of the sophist’s art. First of all, we must examine how this relates to the previous inquiries, so as to see clearly what is going on in the New Attempt.

The notion of controverting (*antilegein*) originally appeared in the fifth definition: the sophist is placed among controversialists who argue against (*amphibētein*) others by using short questions and answers (225b8–11), and eristic is a species of this art of controverting (225c7–10). One may therefore assume that the ‘one thing’ refers to that particular definition.¹⁸ However, this does not mean the New Attempt takes over solely the fifth definition, discarding the other five. On the contrary, there are some points in which the fifth definition does not exactly correspond to the controversialist here.¹⁹ On the other hand, the new focus of the sophist as a

¹⁷ We do not have to insert ‘*hen*’ after ‘*analabōmen*’ in b2 (*pace* Heindorf and Burnet); see Campbell 1867, 64, and Trevaskis 1955–56, 45, n.4.

¹⁸ For example, Trevaskis 1955–56, 46–47, assumes that ‘*antilogikos*’ is intended by Plato to apply to none of the first six divisions other than the fifth’.

¹⁹ First, ‘controversy’ in the fifth definition is a general concept in which the sophist’s art is included, but not specific to a sophist (225b8–10, b12, 226a2); so is another term, ‘arguing against’ (*amphibētēsis*), which is also used in both places (225a12–b3, b12–c1, c8, 226a2; cf. 232d2, e4, 233b5). And, as Cornford 1935, 190, n.2, assumes, these two terms seem to be synonymous in the New Attempt.

controversialist contains another important element, that is, teaching his art to others (232b8–c2, c9–10), which is not explicitly stated in the fifth definition,²⁰ but this element seems rather to refer to the other five definitions. It reminds us of the hunt for rich young people in the first definition (222a9–11, 223b5–6; cf. 233b1, c6), and of the trade of learning (*mathēmata*) in the second to fourth (224b1, 6, 9, d1; cf. 233b6, c6); and also it is obviously connected with teaching (*didaskalikē*) in the sixth definition (229a8–9, b8–9, c11, e1; cf. 232b8–9).²¹ We should therefore conclude that the New Attempt at definition of the sophist takes up ‘one thing’ not exclusively from the fifth definition, but from all the six definitions.

Why, then, does the Eleatic visitor focus on controverting and its teaching as the thing most revealing of the sophist’s art? If we admit that controverting (*antilegein*) is a certain kind of activity of speaking (*legein*), we can observe again that this element is common to all the six definitions. In the first definition, the sophist captures the young by persuasion (222c9–d2), and by professing to form acquaintance for the sake of virtue (223a3–4).²² We should also remember that from the initial division of art, the art of acquiring to which the sophist’s hunting belongs is described as done by speech (*logoi*, in contrast with *praxeis* or *erga*: in 219c5, d6; cf. 222c5–d2). In the second to fourth, the sophist deals in speech (*logoi*) and learning materials (224d1). And in the fifth definition, speech plays the central role, since fighting is done by argument against argument (225a12–b1). Finally, the figure in the sixth definition teaches and cross-examines

Second, the subjects of the sophist’s controverting are limited to those about rights and wrongs in the fifth definition (225c7–10), while in the New Attempt the range of subject is extended to all things (232b11–e5; cf. *Phdr.* 261c10–e4).

²⁰ For such a claim, see *Gorg.* 449b1–3, c9–d1, 458e5–6; cf. Irwin 1979, 113.

²¹ I disagree with Cornford 1935, 190: ‘Nothing that is said here has any relevance to Cathartic’; contrast this with my view set out in 2.3 (cf. Bluck 1975, 44, and Benardete 1960, 139).

²² The word ‘*epangellesthai*’ (‘profess’, 223a3) is often used as a term for a sophist’s profession: *Prot.* 319a6–7, *Gorg.* 447c2, d7, *Euthd.* 273e5, *Lach.* 186c4, *Thg.* 127e7, and Arist., *EN* X 9 1180b35.

opinions of others by means of argument (229e1, 230a5; cf. *elenchos*, 230d1, 6–7, 8).

Focusing on the speaking activity of the sophist, however, differentiates the New Attempt from the previous inquiry. For, although each of the six arts depicted before is performed by means of speech, the use of speech itself has not been recognised as the main activity of the sophist. By contrast, once this central feature comes to light, this activity of speaking turns out to be the very thing that has made all his other activities possible. It is the art of controverting, a kind of speaking, which produces the variety of his arts and makes all his appearances in the previous inquiry possible.

3.2.3 *Appearing as the essence of the sophist's art*

Having taken up the activity of controverting and its teaching as the focal point of the sophist's art, the Eleatic visitor next asks *about what* (*peri tinos*) the sophist professes to controvert and make others skilled in that activity (232b11–12).²³ The Eleatic visitor enumerates the subjects on which the sophist argues: (a) divine and invisible things (c1–3); (b) visible things, such as the earth and heaven (c4–6); (c) private affairs, such as becoming and being (or birth and property)²⁴ (c7–11); (d) public affairs, namely, laws and political issues (d1–4); and (e) each and every art, for example, wrestling (d5–e2). The Eleatic visitor concludes:

[Passage 7: 232e2 5]

EV: But what the art of controverting concerns seems, in sum, to be an ability capable of arguing against *on all things* (*peri pantōn*).

Tht: It certainly seems that nothing is left out.

²³ It has been a crucial question what the sophist's art is *about*: Socrates asks 'What is it *about* which the sophist himself possesses knowledge and makes his pupils (knowledgeable)?' (*Prot.* 312e4 5; cf. 310d4 312e6, *Euthd.* 272d5 6); to the question of what the art of rhetoric is *about* (*Gorg.* 449c9 d9; cf. 447c1 3), Gorgias answers that the art of rhetoric is concerned with speech *about* just and unjust things (454b5 7).

²⁴ The phrase '*genesis kai ousia*' may have a double meaning: commentators tend to see only the metaphysical meaning, 'becoming and being', while it also means 'birth and property': Campbell 1867, 65, says that 'When any general statement is made respecting the world of transitional or of absolute Being' (see also Cornford 1935, 191).

This conclusion, that the sophist's art concerns *all things* (*panta*), becomes crucial in considering the issue of appearance.²⁵

It is the *speaking* of the sophist which makes it possible to deal with *all things* as its subjects. We can observe the connection between the art of speaking and all subjects in, for example, the sophistic treatise, the *Dissoi Logoi*: 'The man who knows the arts of speaking will also know how to speak rightly *about all things*' (DK 90 8(3); cf. 8(1, 2)). On this point, the art of speaking differs from any other particular art that deals with a specified field.

The Eleatic visitor next directs a question to this characterisation:

[Passage 8: 233a3–7]

EV: I wonder if it is possible for any human being to know all things.

Tht: Our species would be blessed if it were so, Visitor!

EV: How, then, could a man without knowledge on a subject say sound things, and argue against one who has that knowledge?

Tht: That is impossible.

While Passage 7 concludes that the sophist controverts about all things, Passage 8 concludes that it is impossible to know all things. These conflicting conclusions are combined into a single conclusion which reveals the wonder of the sophist's art:

[Passage 9: 233c6–11]

EV: Therefore the sophists appear (*phainontai*) to their pupils to be wise about all things.

Tht: Certainly.

EV: In fact they are not wise; for that has turned out (*ephanē*) to be impossible.

Tht: Yes, that is impossible.

EV: Therefore, the sophist has turned out (*anapephantai*) to us to be a possessor of a kind of seeming knowledge (*doxastikēn epistēmēn*) about all things, but not of the truth.

By focusing on controverting, the New Attempt has revealed

²⁵ The learning of many things, namely, 'polymathy', is characteristic of the sophists (especially Hippias), and the sophists in the *Euthydemus* actually claim to know *all things* (294b3–c6; cf. 271c5–7). We shall consider this point in the next chapter.

the essential feature of the sophist's art: not just that the sophist happens to appear to the inquirers to be wise in many fields, but he himself creates such appearances in others by his art. Now we grasp the unifying point of the various definitions of the sophist: his essence lies in the art of appearing. This shift of focus from the many appearances to the art which makes such appearances is pivotal. For through the New Attempt it is denied for the first time that the sophist possesses real knowledge (232e6–233a7; confirmed at 234e7–235a5). Since the beginning of the inquiry he has been assumed to have knowledge, as suggested by his name 'sophist' (i.e. wise man) (221d1–4; cf. *Prot.* 312c5–6), but on the ground that it is impossible for any human being to know all things, the inquirers conclude that the sophist, his claims notwithstanding, only *appears* to be wise, but *is not* really wise (233a8–c11). Focusing on his art of controverting has thus revealed that the sophist is not really wise, or does not really know the things about which he professes to have an art.

This conclusion raises one important question: is the sophist's art really an *art* of a single essence? In Passage 9, 'seeming knowledge' (*doxastikē epistēmē*) can mean both the knowledge which concerns appearance or opinion and apparent or seeming knowledge, which is not real knowledge. Although commentators usually take the latter meaning,²⁶ doubt as to the status of the sophist's art, seen in the double meaning, remains through the rest of the investigation. Even though the sophist is denied real knowledge, a certain art must still be presupposed for unifying various appearances. We must bear in mind that Plato keeps trying to define the sophist within the sphere of art (*technē*) from the beginning of the first division (221c8–d7) to the end of the dialogue.

²⁶ Campbell 1867, 69, translates this as 'A knowledge which is in appearance only', and comments that *doxa* is both appearance in contrast to reality (*alētheia*) and opinion in contrast to knowledge (*epistēmē*); 'a sort of universal knowledge which is a mere appearance but no true reality' (Taylor 1961, 119); 'a sort of reputed and apparent knowledge on all subjects, but not the reality' (Cornford 1935, 193).

There remains, nevertheless, a tension concerning the sophist's appearing between being an art and not being an art (or being a non-art), and we shall discuss this question in the next chapter.

Thus, we have obtained the clue to the essence of the sophist's art, namely, appearing. The inquiry in the New Attempt proceeds from depicting various appearances of the sophist to grasping the essence of the art which makes such appearances: the sophist is a person who *appears* to be wise about all things by means of controverting, while he is not wise really.

3.3 The investigatory use of appearance

We have seen in Passage 4 that the issue of appearance is concerned not only with the sophist, but also with the inquirers. Since appearance was focused on as the key to the sophist's art, we should now specify how it relates to the other side of the issue, namely, philosophical inquiry.

Let us observe how appearances occur at the earlier stage of inquiry into the definition of the sophist. First, the inquiry aims to examine and clarify (*emphanizonti*) what the sophist is through definition (*logos*) (218b5–c1). The first clue to pursuing the sophist in the process of division is the appearance that the sophist and the angler (who was chosen as a model) are *apparently* both hunters (*kataphainesthon*, 221d13), and this intuitive grasp directs the whole inquiry.²⁷ Furthermore, when the sophist is defined in the six ways, the transition from one definition to another is not accompanied by a denial or modification of the preceding definition, but in each transition, another form of the sophist *appears* to the inquirers. For instance, as soon as the first definition is completed, another, second definition is introduced in the following way:

²⁷ Such intuitive grasp is seen in '*katephaneē*' at the beginning of the New Attempt (Passage 5: 232b3) and '*phainomai*' in the seventh division (235d1): in the latter, the Eleatic visitor *appears* to see two kinds of image-making art. For intuitive grasp in division, see Philip 1966 (esp. 340) and Kato 1988b, 15–21, and 1995.

[Passage 10: 223c1–4]

EV: Moreover, we shall see it also in this way. For the person who is investigated now is of no easy art, but of a very colourful one. For even what has already been said may provide the *appearance* (*phantasma*) that he is not what we are now saying but of a different sort.

In addition to this first shift, the sophist *appears* as a man of such and such art, at the end of each definition.²⁸ Interestingly enough, it is a definition (*logos*) which appears and reveals the sophist's new face, just as the sophist is found 'in the definition which now *appears*'.²⁹ In this way, the figures of the sophist (presented as the definitions of the sophist) *appear* through the inquiry, and as a result, the sophist has appeared (*pephantai*) to the inquirers in as many as six forms (231b9–d2).³⁰

We remember that the earlier inquiry ends with a serious doubt about the variety of appearances of the sophist. By the end of the sixth definition the sophist has appeared in so many guises that he seems to have escaped true definition through inquiry (Passage 3: 231b9–c2). It is at that point that appearance becomes a problematic concept, and the Eleatic visitor gives the verdict concerning these appearances in Passage 4:

[Passage 4: 232a1–6]

EV: Now [I] do you realise that, when a man appears (*phainētai*) to be an expert in many subjects while he is called by the name of a single art, such an appearance (*to phantasma touto*) cannot be sound? But [II] clearly whoever receives (*paschōn*) such an appearance lacks the ability to detect the very point in the art on which all these kinds of learning converge, and so he calls their possessor by many names instead of one.

This verdict is directed, as we saw, toward two sides of the issue of appearance: [I] the sophist, the object of the inquiry, who has unsoundly shown many appearances, and [II] the inquirers, the subject of the inquiry, who have received such varied appearances. Each of the appearances in the inquiry

²⁸ Cf. *phainesthai*, 224e4; *anaphainesthai*, 224d2, 231d8. In the course of each definition, appearance is also used: *phainesthai*, 219d8, 226d4, 228d6, 229a2; *kataphanes*, 229b11.

²⁹ 'en tōi nyn *logōi paraphanenti*', 231b6–7.

³⁰ Cf. 'pephanthai', 231c1; 'pephantai', d2; 'anephanē', d8.

showed these two sides: when the sophist *appears* to the inquirers to be such and such, each appearance of the sophist is both what the sophist deceptively appears *and* what the inquirers revealingly make him appear. Here the inquirers are, as it were, at once those to whom the sophist appears and those who reveal the appearances of the sophist.

The crucial passage concerning the issue of appearance comes at the conclusion of the New Attempt, in which the two sides of the issue of appearance are clearly contrasted. Look at Passage 9 once again:

[Passage 9: 233c6–11]

EV: Therefore, the sophists *appear* (**a**, *phainontai*) to their pupils to be wise about all things.

Tht: Certainly.

EV: In fact they are not wise; for that *has turned out* (**b**, *ephanē*) to be impossible.

Tht: Yes, that is impossible.

EV: Therefore the sophist *has turned out* (**c**, *anapephantai*) to us to be a possessor of a kind of *seeming* knowledge (**d**, *doxastikēn epistēmēn*) about all things, but not of the truth.

In this passage, the sophist is characterised as one who *appears* to his audience to be wise without really being wise (**a** and **d**).³¹ That appearance is what the sophist presents as the product of his art, and it is a kind of appearance which does not represent reality. On the other hand, the inquirers *have revealed* the essential feature of the sophist: the sophist's claim to being wise is now found to be without reality (**b** and **c**). Here, the word that holds the key to the sophist's art, namely 'to appear', is juxtaposed with the same verb 'to appear' used in the sense of philosophical revelation (let us call the latter the 'investigatory use' of appearance): it turns out (*phainetai*) that the sophist merely appears (*phainetai*) to be wise. Although the two uses of appearance, one presented by the sophist and the other by the inquirers, are contrary, we can observe that the conclusion that the sophist *appears* to be wise without being so is at once what the sophist presents and

³¹ 'Appearing' (*phainesthai*, 233b3, 4, c6) is here equivalent to 'seeming' (*dokein*, 233b4, c1, 234c6; cf. *doxa*, 233b1, and *doxastikē*, 233c10).

what the philosophical inquiry reveals. The two sides of the issue of appearance are interwoven in the following way: receiving many appearances of a sophist in the earlier inquiry becomes a problem for the inquirers, while it is only thus that they can eventually grasp the sophist's art as concerned with appearances, in the New Attempt; for it is through such thorough inquiry that the sophist displays and the inquirers reveal his many appearances.³² Since this conclusion becomes a cause of difficulty later (we shall discuss it in Chapter 6), it is only when we can properly distinguish between the two sides of 'appearance', between creation of false appearances by the sophist's art and revelation of true appearances in philosophical investigation, that we shall be able to define the sophist in terms of mere appearance, by means of the investigatory use of appearance.

Our survey of the examples of appearance indicates the importance of the investigatory use of appearance in the first Outer Part.³³ There are two methodological features of this use. First, although these six forms are doubted to be the true definition of the sophist, each appearance has at least contributed to the inquiry as revealing certain features of the sophist's art. Hence, each appearance in the earlier definitions has a certain ambivalence: it reveals some important features of the sophist, while it is certainly not the definite truth which reaches his essence. Furthermore, the preceding appearances may be rejected as insufficient or unsatisfactory as the investigation proceeds.³⁴ It is only the movement of appearances that makes each appearance meaningful, and the context of each appearance is crucial. These two points, namely, ambivalence and movement, are the methodological features of the investigatory use of appearance.

³² From this, we can understand why the Eleatic visitor says to Theaetetus (who is at a loss seeing many appearances) that 'You may well be perplexed. But we must think that now the sophist is also at a loss how to escape the *logos*' (231c3–5; after Passage 3).

³³ See also the examples in the New Attempt: 232b3, d9, e5, 233c8, 11.

³⁴ The first five definitions of the sophist are later reviewed but regarded as *appearances*, while the doubtful sixth definition is not even mentioned there (265a4–9). I shall examine the significance of this review in 8.1.

The word ‘to appear’ (*phainesthai*) is here used in the same way as ‘to seem’ (*dokein*),³⁵ so that appearance signifies opinion which the inquirer obtains through inquiry. This point indicates that ‘to appear’ has no more to do with sense perception than ‘to seem’. It is true that the metaphor of seeing is sometimes used in the course of inquiry,³⁶ and appearance is illustrated by a visual image later,³⁷ but no other examples of ‘to appear’ in the first Outer Part indicate seeing or perceiving by sense organs (other than metaphorically).

The Eleatic visitor also suggests the pragmatic significance of the investigatory use of appearance. Many of the audience who have been deceived by appearances, after a long time and through hard experience, are forced to touch the truth and change old opinions; what appeared great now appears small, so that all appearances in discourse are upset by facing the facts (234d2–e2). Through the process of investigation, we must change our appearances, and all appearances will be turned over and upset, so that we can reach the truth.

One may wonder why it is necessary for the *Sophist* to discuss the investigatory use of appearance, if indeed any dialectical investigation must make use of such appearances. To this question, I would suggest that other dialogues do actually involve the investigatory use of appearance, but do not take up this use as a subject of argument; in the *Sophist*, on the other hand, owing to the basic problem concerning the sophist, the philosophical significance of this use of appearance is now at stake and has to be defended. It is to determine the sophistic use of appearance that we must focus on and cross-examine the investigatory use of appearance.

3.4 How to deal with appearances

Since the basic problem of the inquiry is to distinguish between the sophist and the philosopher, we must accordingly

³⁵ Cf. note 31 above; see also *dokein*, 229d8, etc.; *hōs eoike*, 221d5, etc.

³⁶ For example, the metaphor of ‘see the kind’ (*horan / kathoran eidos*) is used in 229c2 and 235d1. This may be related to the intuitive grasp by appearance (cf. note 27 above).

³⁷ Cf. 236a1, b4, 7 (we shall discuss it in Chapter 5).

separate two ways of dealing with appearances: one is sophistic and deceptive, and the other investigatory and revealing. The two ways of using appearances, which the inquiry reveals and employs in the first Outer Part, are expected to correspond to the activities of the two kinds, the sophist and the philosopher. Let us first consider whether grammatical analysis helps us distinguish the two uses, for Plato consciously uses this word as many as fifty-two times in the *Sophist* (and no fewer than twenty prefixed verbs).

One might suppose that the two uses of appearance correspond to the two distinct meanings of the verb 'to appear' (*phainesthai*) in the Greek language, so that we may distinguish between them on grammatical grounds. The standard explanation says that *phainesthai* with the participle means 'to be manifestly so' ('erscheinen' in German) and that *phainesthai* with the infinitive means 'to appear to be so' or 'to seem to be so' ('scheinen').³⁸ This is usually taken to be a general rule, although some grammarians warn us that the distinction in sense is sometimes difficult to make solely according to grammatical construction.³⁹ This grammatical rule is important to our argument in two ways. First, it provides us with some linguistic grounds for the difference between positive and negative uses of appearance: the word 'to appear' in some cases itself signifies a manifest fact about the world, and in other cases, signifies a doubtful outlook. Second, the point has often been neglected that Plato's dialogues also use both of these positive and negative meanings of 'to appear'; he discusses not only unreliable or deceptive appearances (for instance, 'a large thing appears to be small'), but also some apparent and manifest facts. In the latter, the verb 'to appear' bears the meaning of 'to turn out

³⁸ Cf. Rost 1856, 709 710, Goodwin 1889, 362 363 §914.5, Jannaris 1897, 497 §2137, Thompson 1902, 346, Kuhner 1904, II 2, 71 §484.13, Smyth 1956, 476 §2143, and Schwyzler 1950, 395.

³⁹ Among the grammarians mentioned above, only Goodwin 1889 and Smyth 1956 give us this warning; Goodwin gives two counter-examples (Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 593 and Hdt. 7.137). It is a matter of fact, however, that this general rule does not always work, as Owen 1961, 240, n.4, points out (cf. 242 244). For instance, see *Crito* 54b5 8.

to be' or 'to reveal itself'. The reason for the neglect of the positive usage is that commentators usually take Plato's concept of appearance to have a completely negative meaning in sharp contrast to reality.⁴⁰ It is true that, in the *Sophist* also, the word 'appearance' contains a negative connotation particularly in connection with the activity of the sophist, but we must notice that Plato in many crucial passages also uses 'to appear' and cognate terms in a positive way.⁴¹

Here the question arises as to how much our distinction between the two uses of appearances can be explained in terms of ordinary Greek usage. Unfortunately, grammatical evidence does not support our argument as much as one might expect. First of all, the infinitive construction does not necessarily imply that an appearance *is not* real (like the appearance of the sophist in Passage 9), but rather it means that it *may not be* real. This construction indicates the uncertainty of appearances, but does not necessarily imply deception or falsehood. There are accordingly three senses of appearance: the neutral sense, 'something appears to be so, but it may not be so' (or 'without necessarily being so'); the negative sense, 'something appears to be so, but it is not so' (or 'without being so'); and the positive sense, 'something appears to be so, and it turns out to be so'. Grammar alone does not distinguish all these senses. Rather, it is only through philosophical argument that we can decide which sense of *phainesthai* is appropriate in each case.

Another grammatical explanation is that *phainesthai* with the participle indicates judgement grounded on an objective basis while *phainesthai* with the infinitive means a subjective

⁴⁰ We shall examine this negative view on appearances and show that the *Sophist* provides a new perspective on this issue in 5.5.

⁴¹ In some cases *phainesthai* with the infinitive is used in a context which clearly signifies a manifest fact: e.g. 232d9, e5, 235d1, 249b1, 257b7, c7. Its derivative words are: *anaphainesthai* (224d2, 231d8, 233c11, 250d3, e8, 251a1, 260b8); *apophainesthai* (258e7, 259d3, 268b7); *kataphainesthai* (217e6, 221d13, 232b3, 268b1); *kataphanes* (229b11); *paraphainesthai* (231b7); *hypophainesthai* (245e3); and *emphanizein* (218c1, 244a5). These prefixed verbs (emphasising the original verb) tend to have the meaning of 'to turn out to be' (but not always: cf. 259d3). Also, *phainesthai* with the adjective (without the participle or infinitive) usually signifies 'to turn out'.

judgement.⁴² This explanation seems more suitable for our argument. For as a matter of fact, the investigatory use of appearance takes the infinitive more often than the participle for its grammatical construction.⁴³ This is probably because each appearance in philosophical inquiry is a matter of the interlocutors' agreement, rather than of objective proof or external evidence. Yet this grammatical explanation is not decisive, either.

In conclusion, although ordinary Greek usage partially supports our project, we must rather consider the use of appearance in its philosophical context. The meaning of appearance changes as inquiry and dialogue proceed; process and context are essential to the investigatory use of appearance, but grammar does not take them into account. Distinction between the uses of appearance is therefore a task of philosophy.

One philosophical difficulty which complicates the issue is that the inquirers also depicted a dubious appearance of the sophist, that is, the sophist of noble lineage in the sixth definition. If this definition does not represent the genuine sophist, it means that not all appearances the inquirers present are true and revealing, and the sixth definition in this way casts strong doubt on the investigatory use of appearance. The inquirers' task should therefore be first to distinguish between true and false appearances in their own products. Only when they are able to make this distinction can they truly ascribe falsehood to the sophist's use of appearances. The aim of the inquiry is thus to establish the distinction between the two uses of appearances, the sophist's and the inquirers'. It is for that purpose that it must be shown how to distinguish true and false appearances.

⁴² Cf. Kruger 1875, 209 §§56. 4-5 4.8, and Rost 1856, 709 710.

⁴³ Infinitive: 232d9, e5, 235d1, 242c8, 249b1, d6, e3, 257b7, c7, 261a6, 268b7 (*apo-*); participle: 233c11 (239e1, *phaneros*), 245b8, 258a8, 260b8, d5, 264d3, 266e1.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF APPEARANCE

4.1 Analysing the appearance of the sophist

Now that appearing to be wise proves to be the essential feature of the sophist's art, our next task should be to analyse and explicate, philosophically and systematically, the appearance with which the sophist is concerned. The question is what makes his appearing possible. Since the appearance is at once what the sophist displays by his art and what the inquiry has revealed, to analyse the mechanism of the appearing of the sophist and to reveal the secret of his power, which lies between being an art and non-art, will indicate how the inquiry can deal with the appearance. The inquiry in the first Outer Part has two stages of analysis. First, the New Attempt (232b1–233d2), in the course of focusing on the sophist's appearing, reveals some central features of appearing; second, the division of image-making (233d3–236d8), which follows the New Attempt, illustrates how the two ways of dealing with appearances are to be distinguished. This chapter examines the first stage and the next chapter will discuss the second.

To interpret the conclusion of the New Attempt (Passage 9), we must elucidate the complex phenomenon of the sophist's appearing to be wise. To grasp its exact meaning, we shall consider three distinctions, which the inquiry has illuminated through the New Attempt.

First, so far we have been focusing on the speaking activity of the sophist, but in order to observe his art precisely, the complex nature of controverting (*antilegein*) should be examined instead of the simple activity of speaking (*legein*).

Second, there are two other factors that play important roles in the sophist's appearing: one is the presence of an

opponent, particularly an expert, whom the sophist controverts; and the other is the presence of an audience, especially the young, to whom the sophist appears to be wise. The latter is obviously related to the sophist's teaching of his own art ('teaching the same thing to others', in Passage 6: 232b8–9), and the relationship of the sophist to these people must be intrinsic to his appearing. We shall examine these factors in the general situation in which the sophist appears to be wise, namely, his exhibition or display of argument.

Third, it is also important to distinguish two kinds of the sophist's appearing: one is his appearing to argue rightly, and the other is his appearing to be wise. The former is the appearance of his activity, or of *what he does*, while the latter is the appearance of his nature, or of *what he is*. This final point will illuminate the main concern of Socrates and Plato: what life do sophistry and philosophy provide for those who engage in either of them?

All three points are suggested in the New Attempt, and we shall use some external materials as well. In the course of examining the sophist's art, we can also expect to see some hints about the activity of the philosopher, as the antithesis of the sophist.

4.2 The activity of controverting

Since the New Attempt examines the sophist as a performer and teacher of controverting (Passage 6: 232b6–10), we must specify the features of controverting as the core of the sophist's art.¹

The word 'to controvert' (*antilegein*) literally means 'to speak against' someone or some opinion.² It sometimes refers

¹ To ascribe controverting to the sophists might look strange, since some sophists (e.g. Protagoras and Dionysodorus) are supposed to deny the possibility of controverting ('*ouk estin antilegein*'); cf. *Euthd.* 285d7–286b6. But Protagoras, for example, is said to have written two works on controverting arguments, '*Antilogiōn α' β*' (DL 9.55, 3.37 (=DK 80 A1, B5)). I shall discuss this issue in Chapter 6.

² Controverting is originally connected with the art of rhetoric used in the law court (*Phdr.* 261c4–5), but the art of controverting (*antilogikē*) is said to cover a more general context (261d10–e4).

to contentious debate, or eristic argument, and the name 'controversialists' usually has a pejorative connotation in Plato's dialogues: it means those who manipulate arguments verbally without having a proper art of argument.³ The activity of controverting is accordingly contrasted with philosophy or dialectic.⁴ However, the word generally covers a quite wide range of discourse. To examine the nature of this verb, let me ask the following question:

(Q1) Without having knowledge, does a sophist really controvert? Or does he not controvert at all?

The answer to this tricky question differs in accordance with the different aspects or meanings of the word 'to controvert'. Let us consider three general meanings of 'to controvert'.

First, the basic meaning of 'to controvert' is to state something opposite to someone else's opinion, or 'to contradict': if the opponent states a certain proposition (that P), the person who controverts that proposition states its contradictory proposition (that not-P).⁵ Hence, in an ordinary situation, it means 'to disapprove' or 'to gainsay'. Of course, there must be some reason to controvert others, and the usual contrast between 'to controvert' and 'to accept' (*synchōrein*) indicates that one controverts when for some reason one cannot or does not want to accept the other's opinion (*Crat.* 406c7–d2).⁶ In this basic sense, however, as far as the situation allows, anyone can controvert if he likes, and this speaking activity cannot be an object of an art.

Second, when someone controverts others, he not only wants to express his disagreement or disapproval, but also persuades opponents to admit his opinion. Controverting must therefore result in the opponents' being persuaded and obeying. It entails successful persuasion (cf. *Crito* 48d8–e3).

³ They are called, or think themselves to be, the wise or wisest; cf. *Lys.* 216a7, *Phd.* 90b9–c6.

⁴ Cf. *Tht.* 164c7–d2, 197a1, *Rep.* V 454a1–b2, 455a9–b1, VII 539b2–7. As we see below, however, this comes from one specific meaning of the verb 'to controvert'.

⁵ It is in this basic sense, namely 'to contradict', that the sophists deny the possibility of 'to controvert' (*Euthd.* 285d7–286b6); cf. 6.4.2.

⁶ As far as it means 'to oppose' or 'to protest', the situation often does not allow one to controvert: *Gorg.* 481d7, *Ep.* VII 347d5–6, *Tht.* 169c4, and *Crito* 50e9–51a2.

That is why it is difficult or impossible to controvert what is well spoken (*Alc.* 2 143a6–7) or the truth (*Symp.* 201c6–9).⁷ In order to controvert, one must provide good and reasonable argument against the opponents' argument, and for that purpose, it becomes necessary to provide evidence from authority (cf. *Hipp. Mj.* 289a1–2), or a counter-proof against the other argument. Zeno of Elea, with a view to supporting Parmenidean monism, wrote a treatise which controverted (*antilegein*) his opponents who insisted on plurality (*Parm.* 128c5–d6); in the refutation of pluralism Zeno provided a strong counter-argument against his opponents.

If in this way we take the central meaning of 'to controvert' to be 'to refute' or 'to prove against',⁸ you will find it absurd to say that someone proves something but incorrectly. For it is not appropriate to say that someone has proved incorrectly, but he should be said to have vainly tried to prove, or to have failed to prove.⁹ Accordingly, as long as we treat the verb 'to controvert' as a kind of proving, the answer to Q1 must be negative, since the sophist does not produce genuine arguments in controverting those who have knowledge.

Third, one might suspect, however, that the main purpose of controverting lies not so much in giving a genuine proof as in defeating or knocking down the opponent's argument. Controverting is sometimes described as just a verbal fight, and compared to the game of draughts (*Eryxias* 395a6–c5). In fact, the sophist's art of controverting was characterised as a kind of fighting and winning in the fifth definition of the *Sophist* (224e6–226a5).¹⁰ We must bear in mind that this

⁷ Cf. *Ion* 533c4, *Symp.* 216b3 4.

⁸ In Aristotle's terminology, 'refutation' (*elenchos*) is a valid inference (*sylogismos*) leading to the contradiction of a given conclusion (*SE.* 1 165a2 3).

⁹ According to Gilbert Ryle's terminology of two types of verb, the verb 'to prove' belongs to achievement verbs, such as 'to win', 'to find', 'to deceive', and 'to persuade', in contrast with performance verbs, for example, 'to run' (Ryle 1949, 130 131, 149 153, 278 279, 302 303). Ryle insists that an achievement verb has certain results, and that therefore such adverbs as 'incorrectly', 'unsuccessfully', and 'in vain', cannot properly be attached to it (cf. Ryle 1949, 131, 151; see the example of 'to prove', in 152 153).

¹⁰ The metaphor of fighting predominates in the *Euthydemus* (271c6 272b1, et al.). In *Protagoras* 335a4 8 Protagoras insists on his skill in winning an argument (*agōn logōn*).

meaning is not independent of the second meaning, since to prove against opponents and persuade them implies to win at argument and defeat opponents. For example, Zeno's treatise, though serious, is said to have come from the spirit of love of victory (*philonikia*) (*Parm.* 128d6–7). In this meaning, in so far as the sophist defeats his opponents by argument, he can rightly be described as controverting, whether his argument may be valid or invalid. Thus, those who have the art of making the weaker argument appear stronger can controvert, and in this sense the answer to Q1 must be affirmative.

So far we have seen both answers 'Yes' and 'No' to Q1. We can observe that the conversation between the Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus in Passage 8 suggests the affirmative answer to Q1, but in a problematic manner. When the Eleatic visitor asks 'How, then, could a man without knowledge on a subject say sound things, and argue against (*anteipein*) one who has that knowledge?', Theaetetus answers in the negative without hesitation (233a5–7). However, Theaetetus denies in his answer that the sophist says *sound things* (*hygies ti legōn*), and the subsequent conversation shows that they admit that the sophist does indeed controvert (233c2, 235a2; cf. 233b3, d9). In this way the phrase 'to controvert without saying sound things' raises the question of how it is possible.

The ambiguity in the meaning of controverting between proving and winning can be traced in the *Sophist*. The fighter in argument in the fifth definition implies winning in argument, and as far as this meaning is concerned, there seems to be little doubt that the sophist really controverts, for he wins an argument. However, when his activity of speaking is focused on, the other meaning, 'to prove' or 'to tell the truth', comes to the surface, and raises a problem which we shall discuss in the next section.¹¹ Thus it is by interpreting 'to controvert' as 'to prove' or 'to tell the truth' that the problematic feature of the sophist's art becomes evident. The

¹¹ The problem is that 'to controvert without saying sound things' entails a paradox, since 'to prove incorrectly' seems a self-contradictory expression (cf. Ryle 1949, 131).

important question is what is the essence of the sophist's art of speaking: to win or to prove the truth?

4.3 The sophist, experts and audience

4.3.1 *Argument as exhibition*

In order to elucidate the structure of the sophist's appearing, we should first look at the general situation in which the sophist controverts his opponents in front of an audience.

A controversy is given in courts of law: a prosecutor and a defendant argue against each other, and opposing arguments are presented concerning what is just and unjust on a single issue (cf. *Phdr.* 261c4–9, *Gorg.* 452e1–2, 454b5–7). Controversy also takes place in the public assembly (cf. *Phdr.* 261d3–5, *Gorg.* 452e2–4). The important thing in both cases is that an audience must be present to whom each argument appears right or wrong. In the law court, the jury gives judgement in each case, and in the assembly, citizens vote for or against a proposal. This seems to be the original context of the art of controverting performed by rhetoricians (cf. *Phdr.* 261b3–5).

One of the prominent ways of engaging in this art is to exhibit one's argument to an audience, and this exhibition or display of argument (*epideixis*) is supposed to be a characteristic activity of the sophist.¹² The sophists usually exhibit argument in public to demonstrate their skills in argument. For instance, Hippias is said to have given exhibitions regularly at Olympic games (*Hipp. Mi.* 363c7–d4); and at the beginning of the *Gorgias* (447a5–c4), Gorgias is said to have put on many fine exhibitions. They also exhibit their argu-

¹² Exhibition (*epideixis*) was originally a typical method of rhetoricians: cf. Thuc. 3.42.3; *Phdr.* 235a3–8; Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 17 and *To Philip* 17; Demosthenes, *De Corona* 280. According to Aristotle's terminology, epideictic is a branch of rhetoric (*Rh.* I 3 1358b8 ff.). This method is also used by sophists; the sophists in the *Euthydemus* say, 'For that very purpose we are here, Socrates, to give an exhibition and to teach, if anyone wants to learn' (274a10–b1; cf. *Hipp. Mj.* 282c6–d5). The ordinary meaning of exhibition is seen in *Sph.* 224a1–8; it includes the arts of painting and juggling (both of which later become metaphors for the sophist's art).

ments in private: for instance, it is suggested that Gorgias will do this if his friend, Chaerephon, or his host, Callicles, asks him (*Gorg.* 447b1–8). In general, the sophists, lodging in the houses of their rich patrons like Callias, give speeches in their presence, as the scene of the *Protagoras* depicts.

The sophists' practising and teaching their art must also have produced some reflections on their own skills, which form the *art* (*technē*) of controverting.¹³ Their skills in argument are sometimes shown in their published books. Some epideictic speeches published in books are extant: for example, Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* and *Defence of Palamedes*, and Isocrates' *Encomium of Helen* and *Busiris*.¹⁴ A published book is not only a draft of real argument or a text book of rhetoric used for practice,¹⁵ but it also serves as a theoretical treatise in which the sophists persuade potential pupils of their ability in argument.¹⁶

Ordinary exhibition consists of a long speech given on a particular topic (cf. *Gorg.* 448a7–8). Socrates often contrasts this with dialogue that consists of short questions and answers (*Gorg.* 448d8–10, 449b4–8, etc.), but this method of question and answer is also employed by the sophists (or eristics) in the *Euthydemus*. Besides, Gorgias claims that he is also good at speaking in a brief style (*Gorg.* 449b9–c8), and Hippias, who has just finished his exhibition, says that his exhibition is open to question and answer (*Hipp. Mi.* 363c7–d4).

In such exhibition, the opponent whom the sophist controverts can be anyone (for example, ordinary young men like Cleinias and Ctesippus in the *Euthydemus*), but it will be most impressive to an audience if the sophist controverts and

¹³ Some recent researches into the early history of rhetoric, however, call into question the characterisation that rhetoricians in the fifth century had 'the art of rhetoric' (*rhētorikē*) in the Platonic or Aristotelian sense; cf. Cole 1991, Schiappa 1991, ch. 3, and Too 1995, 164–171 (see also Russell 1992).

¹⁴ The Hippocratic treatise, *On Art*, might be included.

¹⁵ We should remember that Phaedrus was trying to learn a piece of Lysias' speech by heart (*Phdr.* 228a6–b5, d1–e4).

¹⁶ Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* is an obvious example; we see there the author's self-consciousness in using argument or the power of persuasion by means of speech (*logos*).

refutes experts in each art.¹⁷ Here we do not have to assume the actual presence of experts at the argument. The sophist may take up the opinions of experts, as if arguing against them, whether in actual speeches or in books.

Exhibition by itself does not, however, constitute appearance of the sophist's wisdom; for to those who have knowledge and clearly discern arguments, the sophist may hardly appear to argue well or to be wise. The sophist needs an audience who lack knowledge and are unable to judge arguments properly; for it is in an audience that the sophist's art generates an appearance of his being wise. We shall examine these two factors in detail, namely, the opponents and the audience.

4.3.2 *The sophist and experts*

Focusing on the relationship between the sophist and his opponents, I shall point out in this section some essential features of the sophist's art. It is suggested that the opponents of the sophist are experts on each subject: 'the expert' (*ho dēmiourgos*) in *Sph.* 232d6, and 'a person who has scientific knowledge' (*ho epistamenos*) in 233a5.¹⁸

In examining the concept of controverting before, a tricky question arose as to whether the sophist really controverts without knowledge or not (Q1, discussed in 4.2). This time, let us take experts in each subject into account, and transform that question into the following:

(Q2) Are experts refuted when the sophist controverts them?

As we have seen in the previous argument, the answer to Q1 was ambiguous. We have concluded that, if we take controverting as proving something, the sophist cannot controvert without having particular knowledge; if, on the other hand, controverting means defeating someone in argument,

¹⁷ See the striking claim of Gorgias in *Gorg.* 456b6–c6, which I shall examine in the next subsection.

¹⁸ See also *Gorg.* 456b6–c6, 459a1–c2, d6–e1. Protagoras calls his opponent in controversy 'antilegōn' (*Prot.* 335a6; cf. *Eryxias* 399b3).

the sophist can be said to controvert his opponents. Our previous argument on controverting did not take the opponents whom the sophist controverts into account, but once experts on each subject are supposed to be the opponents of the sophist's controverting, the issue becomes more controversial.

A model of the sophist's controverting can be sketched in the following way. The sophist controverts the expert on a subject concerning a certain issue in that particular subject. By definition experts have knowledge of a particular subject, whether that knowledge is acquired mainly through experience or intellectual training. Although in such controversial topics as divine things (cf. *Sph.* 232c1–2), virtues, and political issues (cf. 232d1–2) the existence of experts can be doubted,¹⁹ we take as a model for expertise the case where an art is established as a systematic activity, for example, shoe-making and medicine.²⁰ In fact, the Eleatic visitor seems to have these particular arts in mind when he talks about each 'expert' (*dēmiourgos*, 232d6).²¹ In contrast to the expert, the sophist turns out to have no genuine knowledge of any particular subject when he controverts (Passage 8: 233a3–7).

Is it possible in this model that experts who have knowledge of each subject are refuted by the sophist who controverts on the issue without that particular knowledge? As we have shown, Plato denies the sophist's saying *sound things* in controverting, but does not seem to exclude his capacity to controvert (cf. Passage 8). The suggestion in the text is so compressed, however, that this question must be investigated in its own right.

To refute the expert in controverting is what the sophist claims to be able to do by his art. When Gorgias advocates

¹⁹ For the 'experts' in politics, see Bambrough 1956.

²⁰ I mainly have in mind the arts which are referred to in the so-called craft-analogy. For the importance of medicine as an exemplary art, see Dodds 1959, 228–229.

²¹ According to LSJ, '*dēmiourgos*' basically means one who works for the public, skilled workman, and handicraftsman (*Plt.* 298c4, *Prot.* 327c7, *Ion* 531c6), including medical practitioners (*Symp.* 186d5), cooks, and sculptors (*Rep.* VII 529e1). See also Dodds 1959, 208: 'A *dēmiourgos* is the possessor of any sort of professional or trade skill, manual or intellectual, in contrast with the *idiōtēs*.'

his art of rhetoric, he first gives an example that not doctors, but Gorgias, the rhetorician, could persuade patients to take a medicine or a treatment (456b1–5). Then, he claims:

Gorg: I maintain that, if a rhetorician and a doctor go into any city and have to compete in speech (*logōi diagōnizesthai*), in the assembly or in any other gathering, over which of them should be appointed doctor, the doctor would go nowhere,²² but the person able to speak would be appointed if he wished. And if he competed (*agōnizoito*) against any other expert, a rhetorician more than anyone else would persuade people to appoint him. For there is nothing on which a rhetorician would not speak more persuasively than any other expert among a mass of people. (*Gorgias* 456b6 c6)

His claim is that, since choice of state doctors is made through public argument, the person with the power of persuasion will win, and can hold the expert (i.e. the doctor) as his slave (452e4–8).²³

It seems, furthermore, to have been a common experience for Greek citizens to see experts refuted in public arguments or in published books. This is suggested in Aristotle's comments on experts in the *Sophistical Refutations*. When Aristotle explains that an argument depending on an accident is not a real refutation, he adds:

It is just in this, however, that the experts and men of knowledge generally are refuted by those without such knowledge (*hoi technitai kai holōs hoi epistēmones hypo tōn anepistēmonōn elenchontai*); for the latter make deductions depending on accidents against those who know, and the men of knowledge, being unable to draw distinctions, either give in when questioned or else are thought to do so, although they have not. (Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 6 168b6–10)

Elsewhere, he points out that the reason why the sophist avoids revealing his ignorance is that even experts are deceived by him (*SE*. 8 169b27–29). Thus experts are said to be refuted when their argument is finally forced into contradiction and suffers actual defeat in controverting, mainly because what was wrong in the argument escapes their notice.

²² 'The doctor would be left at the post' (Dodds 1959, 211); the metaphor is from racing.

²³ This is opposite to Socrates' view that people will heed the advice of experts and choose the experts as state doctors (455b2–c2).

In this sense, we must say that their ability was not great enough to show their knowledge through argument, but this conclusion gives rise to a crucial problem for experts in each art.

So far we have reviewed the positive answer to Q2. Next, let us take up the example of medicine and consider the negative answer to Q2.

Suppose the sophist tries to refute a medical theory which a doctor maintains, and finally knocks the doctor's argument down. The doctor might still insist, regardless of the results of the controverting, that his theory is true and invulnerable because he can cure his patients using that theory. This denial of defeat in argument could be justified by actual treatment of the patients, and in this way experts are supposed never to be refuted by the sophist.²⁴ Often the argument in favour of experts is based on the experience of experts.²⁵ According to this argument, since experience of each art provides experts with a firm basis for their art, they do not have to give an explanation or reasoning about what is wrong with the

²⁴ In favour of this negative answer, Sextus Empiricus provides us with a strong argument concerning sophism and experts. Sextus compares the dialectician, who claims that the exposure of sophisms is the object of dialectic (cf. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* II 94, 229), with experts on each subject, and ascribes the ability to expose them to experts (II 236–238).

He gives two examples. The first example of the exposure of sophism is concerned with the ambiguity of the medical term 'abatement'. He argues that the sophism concerning abatement will be exposed by the doctor, who, knowing that the term 'abatement' is used in two senses, can correctly detect the discordant premises (II 236–238). In another passage, Sextus explains how it is possible to discern different senses of ambiguous terms: 'Those ambiguities (of a word or a phrase) which are to be usefully cleared up – that is, those which occur in the course of some experiences – will be cleared up by experts trained in each art, who have experience of the conventional way adopted by themselves of using the terms to denote the things signified, but certainly not by the dialectician' (II 256).

²⁵ When the doctor is represented as the master of medical argument, his ability to discern the ambiguous terms is thought to come from his experience and practice of medicine, and not from his knowledge of argument. For the basis for this ability, as the first example shows, is that they 'grasp the connection of the facts' (II 236); and that 'they have experience of the conventional way adopted by themselves of using the terms' (II 256). Sextus' second example confirms this: 'The doctor will declare that the argument (i.e. that opposites are cures of opposites) does not apply to the symptoms of morbid states, since he knows what morbid states are fundamentally persistent and what the symptoms are of such states' (II 239–240).

argument, but have only to show their particular knowledge on each case.²⁶ This consideration will draw a more general conclusion that, even if experts do not propose a strong argument against their opponents, they can deny defeat in argument by their experience and knowledge of particular cases.

In summary, experts at once *are* and *are not* refuted; while their art rests on a firm basis (experience or acquaintance with particular cases), they often lack the ability to prove in argument what they should know. This seemingly contradictory answer to Q2 will finally lead to a single formula of the sophist's art:

(F) The sophist *appears* to refute experts, but does not really refute them.

The paradox is clearly expressed in the *Gorgias*. If the rhetorician is more persuasive than the expert (for example, the doctor), as Gorgias insists, it will follow that the man who does not know (i.e. the rhetorician) is more persuasive than the man who knows (i.e. the expert) among those who do not know (i.e. the audience) (459b3–6). From this Socrates concludes that the rhetorician only appears (*phainesthai*) or seems (*dokein*) to know more than those who know (459c1–2, d6–e1).²⁷ Also, this formula F corresponds to the definition of sophistical refutation by Aristotle: the sophistical refutation is that which *appears* to be a refutation, but is only a paralogism and not really a refutation (*SE*. I 164a20–21).

The sophist does not have knowledge of particular subjects, but he shows at least the ability to controvert and make himself appear to refute experts. This ability should come from a certain art. If so, we must next ask what kind of art he has, and how different it is from the ordinary arts of experts.

²⁶ What the doctor denies in Sextus' second example (in the last note) is not the *general principle*, 'opposites are cures of opposites', but its application to a *particular case*, which is confirmed by his experience, and not by reasoning.

²⁷ The inference from the first formula to the second is drawn by Socrates, not by Gorgias; see a critical comment by Irwin 1979, 123–124.

The Eleatic visitor asks: 'What is the wonder (*thauma*) of the sophist's ability?' (233a8–9)²⁸

Before examining the sophist's art itself, let us observe what results from the affirmative answer to Q2, that experts are refuted. For if an expert is refuted (or even appears to be refuted), a serious doubt about his expertise arises, since it seems to violate a necessary condition of someone's being an expert. If an expert cannot give good argument on his subject-matter, is he properly called expert at all?

To consider this question, let us clarify the necessary conditions for being an expert by using the examples of expertise in Plato's earlier dialogues. When Socrates discusses virtue, he often appeals to examples of experts and their arts, and regards them as analogous to virtuous people and virtues. This so-called craft-analogy depends on a clear picture of what makes an art what it is:²⁹

- E1 An expert has knowledge of his subject.
- E2 That knowledge is confined to just one subject, and not applied to any other subjects.³⁰
- E3 The expert can give an account of his subject-matter. This ability to give an account (*logon didonai*) is the criterion for expertise, which distinguishes art from pseudo-art.³¹
- E4 The ability to give an account warrants the systematic structure of the knowledge and its objectivity as an art.³²
- E5 It also warrants the teachability of that art.³³

Obviously, E3 indicates the necessary condition of having knowledge in E1, and is therefore thought to be the basis of

²⁸ The 'wonder' means the secret of a juggling trick (Campbell 1867, 67); cf. '*thaumatopoiios*' in 235b5 and '*goēs*' in 235a1, 8.

²⁹ For the so-called craft-analogy, see Irwin 1977, 71–77; cf. 90–97, 140–144. He argues that in the middle dialogues, after the *Meno*, Plato denies this analogy, but this point does not affect my using the analogy, since disanalogy also presumes the same notion of what art is.

³⁰ Cf. *Ion* 537c5–538b1 and *Ap.* 22c9–e1.

³¹ Cf. *Gorg.* 465a2–7, 500e4–501b1; also *Rep.* VII 531e4–6, *Symp.* 202a5–7, *Gorg.* 449e6–450b3, 451a4–7, 455c3–5. For the examples of 'to give an account', see Hicken 1957, 48–49. In the conversation with Gorgias, however, Socrates admits that some arts need little speech (*logos*) and some, such as painting and sculpting, need none (*Gorg.* 450c3–10).

³² Cf. *Men.* 98a3–4 (cf. Irwin 1979, 111).

³³ Cf. *Men.* 90c11–e9; *Gorg.* 453d9–10 shows that teaching needs persuasion about what one teaches.

someone's being an expert in a particular art. To give an account must be not merely to say what they are doing, but to explain and reason about what they know and what they can do by their art. It is in this sense that to give an account (E3) becomes the basis of the system of knowledge (E4) which enables experts to teach their art to others (E5). Nevertheless, the experts who fail to win the argument on their subject-matter are thought to fail to fulfil this fundamental condition, E3. It raises a dilemma:

The first horn is that, if someone cannot provide a good argument (*logos*), and in this sense fails to give an account (*logon didonai*), he is no longer an expert.³⁴ This may sound paradoxical, for many experts are refuted by the sophist, as is reported by Aristotle. This paradoxical consequence can be avoided if the negative answer to Q2 is taken into account: even if someone fails to give a good argument and an account of his subject-matter, he is an expert as long as he practises his art without difficulty. However, this raises the second horn of the dilemma: according to this answer, the basis of one's having an art depends on practice or experience and not on the ability to give an account. To give an account becomes unnecessary to his being an expert. This obviously violates E3.

Now that we have seen the problem concerning experts when they are (or appear to be) refuted, the features of the sophist's art should next be examined in contrast with expertise:

- S1 The subject which the sophist's art concerns is not restricted to one. Rather, his art is supposed to deal with *all things* (contrasted with E2). What does this 'all' mean? The next feature illuminates this point.
- S2 It is denied that the sophist has any knowledge of particular subjects. In the *Sophist*, this conclusion is drawn from the negation of S1, namely, his claim to know all things (Passages 8 and 9).
- S3 But logically speaking, the negation of the sentence 'one knows all things' does not exclude the possibility that 'one

³⁴ *Phdr.* 268a8–c4 argues that the doctor must explain his medical art and say to whom, when, and to what extent each treatment should be given; if he cannot, he is not a doctor. No doubt Plato would reject the empiricist argument of Sextus.

knows something', and is not equivalent to 'one does not know anything at all'.³⁵ On the other hand, S2 is such a strong basis for Plato's argument that we cannot dispense with it. One possible interpretation, to save the argument, is to take 'all' somewhat collectively, not distributively. If to know all things means to know the core of all knowledge or a certain universal knowledge, not having this knowledge amounts to not knowing at all in a strict sense, and the reasoning from S1 to S2 can be justified.

- S4 If our interpretation is correct, knowledge of all things, which the sophist claims to have, is not just the accumulation of particular pieces or branches of knowledge, but must deal with a certain common feature of all knowledge. The knowledge claimed by the sophist must therefore belong to a different level from the particular knowledge of experts.
- S5 What is the common feature that makes it possible for the sophist to claim to know all things? We should remember that his knowledge is concerned with controverting, which is a kind of speaking. It must therefore be the art of controverting, and not a particular kind of knowledge, that makes the sophist appear to argue well on all subjects (cf. *Phdr.* 261d10–e4).
- S6 The sophist seems to argue well and to give an account of each kind of subject-matter. He appears, therefore, to know about each subject (as E3 is the basis of E1), and consequently, he appears to be wise about all things.

This contrast between the art of the expert and that of the sophist reveals that the sophist is concerned with knowledge of a different level from that of experts, since the former mainly concerns argument and reasoning, while the latter deals with each subject-matter. It is probably that different kind of knowledge which takes away the limit of having one particular subject from the sophist's art, and allows him to have the ability to argue generally.

We can now summarise the conflict between the sophist's art and the art of each expert. First of all, the conflict concerns the range of subject: the knowledge of the expert is limited to a particular subject, while the sophist's art has no limitation on its subject, but deals with all subjects. The sophist's art, which is concerned with the common feature of

³⁵ For example, Rosen 1983, 163, calls this 'an illegitimate inference'.

argument, enables him to argue well against experts on any subject. Experts try to argue and give an account of subject-matter in their own field, but the sophist who is a master of argument can refute (or appear to refute) their argument and make experts fail to argue properly.

As a result of this conflict between the sophist and the expert in argument, the expert has to make a difficult choice. Either he admits his defeat because he could not give an account, and abandons his claim to superiority on his subject (the first horn of the dilemma), or he insists, none the less, depending on his own experience, that his art is still reliable without any supporting argument. He would suppose that inability to give an account does not affect the authenticity of his expertise, but this second option ignores E3, a necessary condition of being an expert (the second horn of the dilemma). Thus, both choices will violate the basis of each art as knowledge. This conflict between the sophist and experts is reflected in the contradictory answers to Q2, that experts *are* and *are not* refuted.

The only way to avoid the dilemma concerning the conflict between the sophist's art and each particular art may well be to postulate another general art: the art which deals with argument and reasoning, and does not refute each particular art but rather lays the basis for its giving an account of a subject-matter. This postulated art of argument and reasoning must be the antithesis of sophistry, and the latter the counterfeit of the former. We expect as the genuine art of argument and reasoning the art of dialectic (*dialektikē*), which would make our whole knowledge possible. It is only when we acknowledge this art in the system and whole structure of knowledge that the sophist's art will be fixed as its false shadow. We shall soon develop this point.

4.3.3 *The sophist and audience*

Coming back to the question of what makes the sophist's art possible, we shall next examine the other factor of the sophist's appearing, namely, the presence of an audience.

The sophist controverts experts, but experts are probably not convinced by sophistic argument because they have knowledge and experience of their subject, which guarantee their ability in their art, as the example of the doctor shows. However, it matters little whether experts are actually convinced or not, for it is not to experts but to an audience that an argument should appear to have a certain plausibility. That the presence of an audience is necessary to the sophist's exhibition is confirmed by many passages.³⁶ At an eristic argument, the audience are judges of which side wins and which loses the controversy.³⁷ We know this from the words of Hippias to Socrates:

Hippias: If you like, you can place your argument side by side with my argument, maintaining that the other (sc. Odysseus) is better. And these people here will determine which of us speaks better. (*Hippias Minor* 369c6–8)

One anonymous commentary on Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations* explains the role of the audience as follows: 'the audience sits at the arguments as the judges of victory for contenders'.³⁸ An audience is a third party who is expected to observe and judge an argument in the contest.

On what condition does the audience of an argument form an opinion that the sophist argues well? It is obvious that, if an audience has enough knowledge and is able to judge the argument according to its own knowledge, the sophist will

³⁶ Thuc. 3.38.7, *Phdr.* 261d7, *Hipp. Mi.* 364b5–8, *Gorg.* 459a3, Arist., *SE.* I 165a17, 8 169b31, 15 174a36, etc. We should also remember that the rhetoricians make a speech at the law court or assembly; cf. *Gorg.* 454b6, etc.

³⁷ In the drama contests at ancient Athens, the judges were separated from the audience and made a verdict with strict procedure (I follow the general accounts of Pickard-Cambridge 1968, 95–99, and Haigh 1907, 31–38, 336). Ten persons were selected out of ten tribes, and were probably assigned special seats. At the end of the contest each of the ten persons wrote his judgement on a tablet and the archon drew out five of them at random (therefore, the judges are said to be five in number). However, the audience is supposed to have influenced the judges. For example, in the *Birds*, Aristophanes appeals to the whole audience as well as the judges for victory in the contest (445–447). See also *Clouds* 1115–1130, *Birds* 1101–1117, *Ecclesiazusae* 1154–1162; cf. *Acharnians* 1224–1225. Plato also discusses the attitudes of the judges and of the audience in *Lg.* II 659a1–c7 and III 700d1–701b3.

³⁸ 23.9–10 (ed. Hayduck 1884).

hardly appear to refute experts, or to be wise.³⁹ If, on the other hand, an audience does not have knowledge, the sophist may succeed in appearing to argue well. Hence, the sophist's appearing depends on the lack or shortage of knowledge on the audience's part.⁴⁰

What kind of knowledge must an audience lack if the sophist is to appear to argue well? Obviously, they are not experts, so they must be ignorant of the particular subject-matter. Yet this is not sufficient, since some may still be able to detect wrong points in argument. Considering this, we should suppose that it is both the knowledge of each particular art and the general knowledge of argument claimed by the sophist that the audience lacks in judging argument.

Now that the condition of the audience has been made clear, the relationship between the sophist and his audience is next to be examined. There are four general points that illuminate their essential relationship.

First, as we have seen, exhibition (*epideixis*) of argument to an audience is a characteristic activity of the sophist: the sophist exhibits his ability in controverting to the audience that comes to listen to the argument, whether it is done in public, in private, or in a book.

Second, in exhibiting his argument, the sophist claims to teach his art to the audience. Here, the exhibition of argument and the teaching of that skill are supposed to belong to the same activity. For the audience learns the sophist's art from his exhibition. The teaching of the sophist is explained by the Eleatic visitor as to 'make others able to do what they are able to do (sc. controvert)' (232c9–10; cf. b11–12, d1–2). If the sophist's activity is to *appear* to argue well, but not really to argue well, the ability his pupils acquire is no doubt the same, that is, an ability to make them *appear* to argue well without having particular knowledge.

³⁹ When Socrates says 'Presumably the rhetorician won't be more persuasive than the doctor *among those who know*?' Gorgias agrees (*Gorg.* 459a4–6).

⁴⁰ An audience is taken to be those who do not know (*Gorg.* 459a3–4, b4, c1, d6); it is also said that in front of an audience of children, or adults as foolish as children, the expert in a real art (e.g. the doctor) will lose the competition with the flatterer (e.g. the cook) (464d5–e2).

Third, while teaching is the sophist's exhibition of his argument, learning is his pupils' imitating their teacher's activity. For example, in the *Euthydemus*, Ctesippus, overhearing the sophists' arguments, eventually becomes able to contrive similar eristic arguments (300d7–9); he has imitated (*mimeisthai*) and very quickly mastered the art of the sophists from their exhibition (303e7–8).⁴¹ When, in this way, an audience imitates the performance and the performer, this imitation results in imitation of what he is.⁴² In other words, the pupils of the sophist become those who *appear* to be wise without really being wise. The sophist's teaching is thus not the mere deception of his audience, but, what is more essential, changing their nature and making them what they are.⁴³ We must regard the relationship between the sophist and his audience not as one-sided deception, but as the mutual relationship of exhibiting and imitating.

Fourth, we can notice that it is an audience, mostly rich young men, who are keen on acquiring that art (with a contract by paying a fee). For they expect it to make them able to argue well on any issue against anybody without any experience or serious effort. They tend to avoid the harder and longer way of searching for the truth, and instead they are willing to follow the sophist. In this sense, the sophist is not the only person responsible for corrupting the young, but just appeals to the desire and weakness of their young minds. The sophist presents a speech in such a way that the audience

⁴¹ Socrates mockingly tries to imitate the manner of the sophists' argument (301b1–2); cf. Sprague 1977, 56–57. Aristotle comments on the sophist's art in the conclusion of both the *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*: 'The training given by the paid teachers of eristic arguments was like the practice of Gorgias. For some of them gave their pupils speeches, either rhetorical or consisting of questions and answers, to learn by heart, in which both sides thought that the rival arguments were for the most part included. Hence, the teaching which they gave to their pupils was rapid but unsystematic (*atechnos*). For they conceived that they could train their pupils by imparting to them not an art but the products of an art' (*SE*. 34 183b36–184a4).

⁴² Cf. *Rep.* III 392c6–398b9.

⁴³ According to Gorgias, the art of rhetoric is the power to produce persuasion in the soul of the audience (*Gorg.* 453a4–5). Then, Socrates defines rhetoric as 'a kind of leading of the soul by means of arguments' (*psychagōgia tis dia logōn*, *Phdr.* 261a7–8).

is pleased (*Gorg.* 513b8–c2),⁴⁴ and he is rather a flatterer who curries favour with the public and conforms with public opinion (*Rep.* VI 493a4–e1). On the other hand, the audience does not pay attention to the truth of the argument so much as to the character of the speaker (*Eryxias* 399a6–c6). We may therefore conclude that, while the sophist is a tempter of the young into an easy way of life, it is these young who are ready to follow his way and yield to the art of apparent argument. Sophistic inclination lies not outside but within us, the audience.

4.3.4 *Dialectic as the antithesis of the sophist's art*

In the course of examining the sophist's appearing, we have expected that dialectic should be a missing link as the antithesis of the sophist's art (cf. 4.3.2). We shall here consider what the art of dialectic is in contrast to the sophist's art, by asking two questions. First, what is the relationship between dialectic and each expertise? Second, does a person who engages in dialectic have an audience?

The conflict between the sophist and experts, which we have observed above, indicates that each of them is concerned with only one of the two levels of knowledge, either speaking or a particular subject, and the link between the two is missing. If giving an account (*logon didonai*) is a necessary condition of having knowledge of each subject, experts must also have something to do with the art of speaking. On the other hand, the art of speaking should not be entirely separated from each particular form of knowledge; otherwise, that art will be empty in content, and deal only with the verbal side of the issues. To avoid such barren conflict, we need some principle which unifies each particular form of knowledge and the art of speaking in a proper way. This unifying principle is expected to belong to the art of dialectic.

Dialectic is the antithesis of sophistry, and can be understood in contrast to it. Since we do not find the terms

⁴⁴ Cf. Irwin 1979, 232–233.

‘dialectic’ (*dialektikē*) and ‘dialectician’ (*dialektikos*) before Plato, we may assume that he invented this term.⁴⁵ We can formulate this ideal art by contrasting its features with those of the sophist’s art, and present a theoretical reconstruction of dialectic from the hints scattered all over the Platonic corpus:⁴⁶

- D1 The concern of dialectic is not confined to a particular subject, but covers *all things*.⁴⁷ On this point, the sophist’s art and dialectic stand on the same footing (cf. S1). But how are they different?
- D2 Dialectic concerns all things, not one by one (for that is impossible), but by grasping the core of them. It possesses a certain method of discerning the essential relations of all things, and thereby it lays hold of the whole view and sees all things in a system or structure.⁴⁸
- D3 In order to lay hold of the whole view, dialectic investigates some key concepts that enable us to grasp the relations between all things. Such key concepts include one, many, number, sameness, difference (or negation), and being.⁴⁹ Dialectic is the art which mainly deals with these concepts, and the method of division and collection, in particular, is used.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Xenophon, Plato’s contemporary, seems to be the only one that uses this term (in *Mem.* 4.5.12 4.6.1), but I suspect that his usage was influenced by Plato. I agree with Robinson 1953, 88–92, who rejects Aristotle’s claim in his (lost) *Sophist*, that Zeno of Elea discovered ‘dialectic’ (DL 8.57, 9.25).

⁴⁶ However, we must keep in mind that Plato never gives us a full and clear account of this art (cf. *Rep.* VII 533a1–11). See Robinson 1953, ch. VI: ‘the word “dialectic” had a strong tendency in Plato to mean “the ideal method, whatever that may be”’ (70).

⁴⁷ *Plt.* 285c8–d9 insists that the inquiry is for the sake of becoming more dialectical concerning *all things*. Also, the philosopher is said to desire *all wisdom* in *Rep.* V 475b8–10 (cf. VI 486a4–7), and to take a view of *the whole (to pan)* in the digression of the *Theaetetus* (174e4–5, 175a1).

⁴⁸ Cf. *Rep.* VII 537c6–8: ‘a person who is synoptic (*synoptikos*) is dialectical’. Dialectic sees the relations of all learning; cf. *Rep.* VII 531c9 e1, 533b1–3.

⁴⁹ In *Parmenides* 128e5–130a2 Socrates mentions the Forms of similarity, dissimilarity, one, many, rest, and change; *Parmenides* in *Parm.* 136a4–c5 mentions one, many, similarity, dissimilarity, change, rest, generation, corruption, being and not-being; also, *Theaetetus* 185c4–186b1 enumerates the ‘common’ concepts, such as being, not-being, similarity, dissimilarity, sameness, difference, one, many, odd, and even, as well as beautiful, ugly, good, and bad; the greatest kinds discussed in *Sophist* 254b7–255e7 are being, change, rest, sameness, and difference; *Philebus* 16c5–17a5 discusses one, many, a certain number (*hoposa*), limit, unlimitedness; on the other hand, *Rep.* VII emphasises the importance of mathematics (including number). Ryle 1968, 76–78, discusses the ‘common’ concepts as the subject matter of dialectic in both later Plato and Aristotle.

⁵⁰ Someone able to divide and collect one and many in a proper way is called a

- D4 To see the relations between these key concepts provides one with a proper art of speaking. For those who know these concepts can discern arguments and issues in a proper way. Therefore, dialectic must be the genuine art of speaking,⁵¹ and in a proper sense only dialectic can give an account (*logon didonai*) of the things that really are.⁵²
- D5 A dialectician is as it were a user of the products of all other arts, and in this way co-operates with, and supervises, each art.⁵³ Dialectic lays the basis of each art, and integrates all arts into a grand system of knowledge. In this sense, dialectic is called real knowledge.⁵⁴
- D6 It does not aim to refute others verbally, but concerns the things that really are and investigates what the good is. For the high purpose of dialectic is to lead us to a good life.⁵⁵ Therefore, dialectic is the art of the philosopher, as the Eleatic visitor puts it: 'But you won't assign dialectic, I suppose, to anybody other than the one who purely and justly does philosophy (*toi katharos te kai dikaios philosophounti*)' (*Sph.* 253e4-6).

In contrast to these features of dialectic, the sophist's art, notwithstanding its claim to concern all things, is actually unable to do that task properly. For the sophist does not properly distinguish concepts but instead hastily mixes up everything.⁵⁶ Consequently, he does not grasp the essential relations of the key concepts, and therefore cannot see all things in a systematic view. His art only provides pieces of

dialectician (*Phdr.* 265d3-266c1). Besides, the explanation of dialectic in the *Sophist* shows that dialectic concerns *all* things in that it must have knowledge about the causes of mixture *through all* and division *through wholes* (*dia pantōn, di' holōn*) (253b8-e7). For interpretation of this passage, see Chapter 7.

⁵¹ Cf. *Men.* 75d2-7, *Phlb.* 16c5-17a5.

⁵² For giving an account, see *Rep.* VII 534b3-d2; cf. VI 510c1-511e5, VII 531d9-532b5, 533b1-e3. It is concerned with unchanging reality (cf. *Phlb.* 57e6 ff.).

⁵³ Geometers, astronomers, and calculators hand over their discoveries to the dialectician, who knows how to use them properly (*Euthd.* 288d5-290d8). Similarly, just as a lyre-player supervises a lyre-maker, a dialectician who knows how to ask and answer questions supervises a lawgiver (*Crat.* 390c2-d6). Further, the relationship between dialectic and other arts and studies is suggested in *Rep.* VII 533d1-4 and *Phlb.* 16c2-3.

⁵⁴ Strictly speaking, what is usually called knowledge should be called thought (*dianoia*) (*Rep.* VII 533d4-7; cf. VI 511d2-e5).

⁵⁵ Cf. *Phdr.* 276e4-277a4.

⁵⁶ Cf. *Phd.* 90b4-c6, *Phlb.* 16e4-17a5, *Sph.* 259b8-d8 (to be discussed in Chapter 7).

information that are not integrated.⁵⁷ Hence, the sophist's art of speaking produces merely verbal contention, and contrary to his claim, it is not a genuine art of speaking.⁵⁸

In conclusion, the sophist has neither knowledge of each particular subject nor the proper art of speaking. If the philosopher, by contrast, possesses the art of dialectic, he must be able to deal with these two levels of knowledge, since dialectic is the genuine art of speaking and is properly concerned with each particular kind of knowledge.⁵⁹ Dialectic, however, is introduced here as a postulated art or a possibility, and we must make every effort to realise and fix this art.

Second, our analysis of the audience of the sophist leads to one important consideration: the role of an audience differentiates the epideictic or eristic argument of the sophist from the dialectical argument of the philosopher.

It is obvious that, while the sophist argues against his opponents, he does not really care about those to whom he is speaking. Rather his intention is always directed towards an audience, and his aim is to attract his audience by exhibiting to them his skills in argument. The attitude of the sophists in the *Euthydemus* particularly reveals this point. In the middle of the argument between Euthydemus and Cleinias, the other sophist, Dionysodorus, whispers to Socrates, who is listening to them, that 'I can tell you in advance, Socrates, that

⁵⁷ What the sophist usually provides for his pupils is not the art itself but particular arguments, but this is by no means accidental. See *SE*. 34 183b36–184a4, cited in n.41.

⁵⁸ Eristic is therefore often contrasted with dialectic: *Men.* 75c8–d7, *Rep.* V 454a1 ff., *Phlb.* 16e4–17a5.

⁵⁹ This issue seems to be investigated in a negative (Socratic) way in the Platonic dialogue, *Erastae*. It asks the question of what philosophy is, and cross-examines and finally rejects the answer that philosophy is to learn as many things as possible (i.e. polymathy) (133c1–11). First, if that is the case, the philosopher takes the place next to experts in every subject (135c5–136a4). Moreover, it follows that the philosopher is useless in contrast to experts (136b3–137a7). The conclusion is that philosophy is far from polymathy (137a8–b6, 139a4–5).

This dialogue is usually supposed to be spurious (e.g. Heidel 1896, 49–53), but I take it to show in a negative way the difference between the real philosopher and others who are concerned with all subjects (mainly, sophists, but lovers of sight and other thinkers might be included); for the dialogue's genuineness, see Grote 1875, Vol.I, 452–453, and Crombie 1962, 225; cf. Guthrie 1978, 390–392.

whichever the lad answers he will be refuted' (275e3–6; again in 276d9–e2).

Dialectical discussion, by contrast, is concerned only with the opinions of the interlocutors, and its aim is to lead them into a good life. A person who argues dialectically does not seem to take the audience into account, and it is agreement between people engaging in dialogue that really matters.⁶⁰ The dialogue between Socrates and the young is clearly contrasted with the argument between the sophists and the young in the *Euthydemus*. For this reason, Theodorus in the *Theaetetus* characterises the argument of the philosopher as follows: we are the masters of our discussions, and 'we have no jury, and no audience as the dramatic poets have, sitting in control over us, ready to criticise and give orders' (173b8–c5). But in what sense does a philosopher not have an audience?

In the case of sophistic exhibition, the audience is those who watch from the outside and *imitate* the sophistic argument, whereas the audience of Socrates must themselves be *either* absorbed in his cross-examination, *or* standing away from the dialogue. There seems no way of properly imitating Socratic refutation as a third person. We can remember that in the *Apology*, Socrates says that rich youngsters imitate him and try to examine others by means of refutation (23c2–d2); this explains why Socrates was often thought to corrupt the young. Youngsters' misuse of refutation is also described in the *Republic* and the *Philebus*. In the educational program of the ideal State, young people are not allowed to engage in dialectic before they complete other preliminary studies, mainly mathematical sciences; for the young, when they taste contentious arguments for the first time, tend to misuse arguments and treat them as a kind of game of contradiction, by imitating those who refute others. This brings discredit on philosophy (*Rep.* VII 539a8–c4; cf. *Phlb.* 15d8–16a3).⁶¹

The dialectical refutation or cross-examination of Socrates

⁶⁰ In particular, the *Gorgias* emphasises this point.

⁶¹ By contrast, older people will imitate (*mimēsetai*) those who properly engage in dialogue and seek the truth, rather than those who play a game of controversy (VII 539c5 d1); I take this to mean that they themselves properly engage in

turns out to be quite different from sophistical refutation with respect to an audience: the former is basically a matter between you and me and takes the issue discussed as our own, while the latter is for a third party, who has no sense of responsibility for what is discussed.⁶² We, the readers of Plato's dialogues, are no exception. We cannot look at dialectical argument from outside as an audience, since it requires us to participate in the dialectical inquiry and take the issues seriously and as our own. Otherwise, we will become like youngsters who enjoy using formidable devices of argument in a destructive way. It is therefore we who are cross-examined by Socrates, the Eleatic visitor, and others in reading the dialogues.

4.4 The structure of appearance

Finally, we shall examine what kind of appearance the sophist presents. The Eleatic visitor seems to distinguish between two kinds of the sophist's appearing. When the sophist's omniscience is denied (Passage 8: 233a5–7), a question arises as to whether he appears to argue rightly. On the other hand, we can see that the chief concern of the dialogue is what he appears to be, namely, wise. The relation between the two kinds of appearing is explained in the comment between Passages 8 and 9:

[Passage 11: 233b1–8]

EV: I wonder in what way they can ever produce in young people the opinion (*doxan paraskeuazein*) that they are the wisest of all about all things. Obviously, if [A] the sophists neither controverted rightly nor appeared to these people to do so, or if, [B] when they appeared to do so, they didn't appear rather to be wise as a result of their argument, then, to quote your own words, it would be unlikely that anyone should be willing to pay the fees and to become their pupil.

Tht: Certainly.

dialectic and do not take pleasure in looking from the outside or just imitate others. For the other contexts of the philosopher's imitation, see VI 500b8–501c3, VII 540a8–9; cf. VI 484c6–d3.

⁶² This conclusion does not entail that philosophy is not concerned with appearance. On the contrary, as I shall show in Chapter 7, philosophical inquiry is a matter of appearance, but appearance to those who engage in inquiry.

This statement reveals the structure of the appearing of the sophist.

In the first conditional clause, [A] 'if the sophists neither controverted rightly nor appeared to these people to do so', the former possibility, that the sophist controverts rightly (*orthōs*), has already been denied in the previous argument (Passage 8: 233a5–7). Then, the substantial question is whether he *appears* to argue rightly to the audience or not. The next conditional clause, [B] 'if, when they appeared to do so, they didn't appear rather to be wise as a result of their argument', suggests that, even if the sophist succeeds in appearing to argue rightly, he could possibly fail to appear to be wise. In conclusion, in each case, if the sophist fails to *appear*, his art would become impossible. In this sequence of conditions, the appearance of his *activity*, namely, 'appearing to argue rightly', is supposed to be a necessary condition of the other appearance of his *nature*, namely, 'appearing to be wise'. The sophist's art is therefore achieved only when by arguing he appears to argue rightly, and by appearing to do so, appears to be wise.

The distinction between appearing to argue rightly and appearing to be wise corresponds in a sense to Aristotle's distinction between eristic and sophist. He first defines the sophist as 'a man who appears to be wise' (*SE. I* 165a19–24), and explains the distinction between eristic and sophistry as follows: those whose final motive is victory are called eristics, while those whose aim is professional reputation and lucre are called sophists; the eristic and the sophist use the same kind of arguments, but not from the same motive or intention (*SE. II* 171b22–34). In a similar way, the same person can be described from one aspect as someone who appears to argue rightly and from another as someone who appears to be wise. The former is called eristic, and the latter sophist (therefore, it is possible for someone to be an eristic without being a sophist).

In summary, the sophist's appearing can be analysed into three stages. In the first stage, the sophist argues against experts on all subjects, but does not say sound things.

Although arguing without saying sound things is problematic, producing unsound arguments alone does not constitute the appearance of the sophist. In the second stage, the sophist shows his argument to a young, ignorant audience, and appears to them to argue rightly. This constitutes the appearance of the sophist's activity or of *what he does*. Finally, in the third stage, by appearing to argue rightly, he convinces the young that he is wise in all subjects on which he argues. Appearing to be wise without being so is the sophist's appearance of his nature or of *what he is*. This last appearance will turn out to be the conclusion in the final definition: the sophist is 'an imitator of the wise' (*Sph.* 268c1). If, then, someone in the sophist's audience imitates and learns the sophist's art, he will himself, as Socrates in the *Protagoras* says, become a sophist, but never wise (311e6–312a4).

CHAPTER 5

APPEARANCE AND IMAGE

5.1 Introduction of the concept of an image

In the previous two chapters, we saw how inquiry focused on the concept of appearance in the course of defining the sophist. Through the New Attempt the sophist is characterised as one who appears to be wise but is not (cf. Passage 9: 233c1–11). In examining the sophist's appearing, we have also found out the significant role that appearance plays in philosophical inquiry. The inquirers have received many appearances of the sophist in the earlier inquiry; that, on the one hand, signifies their failure to define the sophist, but on the other, provides a clue to further investigation in the New Attempt. Facing this double role of appearance, it is necessary to distinguish between two ways of dealing with appearances: the sophist's use of appearance for deceiving others, and the inquirers' use of appearance in their philosophical inquiry (cf. 3.3 and 3.4).

It is at this point that Plato introduces the concept of 'image' (*eidōlon*). Just after the New Attempt, making images is introduced as a model for the sophist's appearing. This introduction of the concept of image has two main purposes. One is to illustrate and clarify some basic features of the concept of appearance. We shall examine in what respects the concept of image illustrates the concept of appearance. The other purpose is to show how the two ways of dealing with appearances can be distinguished. The final aim of the argument is to divide the image-making art into two kinds, namely, likeness-making and apparition-making, and in that division we can expect to find some hints as to how to distinguish the sophist's and the inquirers' uses of appearance. Our task in this chapter is to examine the key

concept of ‘appearance’ in the light of the concept of ‘image’.¹

As soon as the Eleatic visitor draws the conclusion of the New Attempt that the sophist is a person who has seeming knowledge about *all* things without having the truth (Passage 9: 233c10–11), he suggests that a model (*paradeigma*) should be adopted to illustrate the sophist’s art:

[Passage 12: 233d3–4]

EV: Let’s then take a clearer model for these people (sc. the sophists).

The model chosen is an imitative artist who can make images of *all* things; just as a painter imitates real objects and produces images of them, so the sophist, as it were, makes spoken images by means of which he can deceive young people. Here, making images is carefully introduced as a model (*paradeigma*) or an analogy for explaining the sophist’s art. The concept of image is accordingly investigated not in its own right, but only to the extent that the basic inquiry into the definition of the sophist requires. The method of using a model (*paradeigma*), originally introduced for the model of an angler (218c5–219a3), is here used again for the model of an imitative artist.²

Every analogy contains both common features and differences between the model and what it illustrates. We should therefore examine carefully both similarities and dissimilarities, or sameness and difference, in the analogy between the imitative artist, such as a painter and a sculptor, and the sophist. In this chapter I shall focus on six aspects of the imitative art (here equivalent to the image-making art) which illuminate the problematic concept of appearance:

¹ The concept of image also plays a central role in Plato’s theory of Forms. But the present argument concerning image in the *Sophist* has nothing to do with the theory of Forms (cf. Gulley 1962, 150), and the concept of image in Plato’s dialogues is generally much richer than the particular use in that theory. For the concept of image in the theory of Forms, see Gallop 1965, Lee 1966, and Patterson 1985.

² The method of using models has great philosophical significance in Plato’s later dialogues. The *Sophist* makes full use of it (cf. Notomi 1991b), and the *Statesman* develops its methodology (277d1–279a6); cf. Goldschmidt 1947 and Kato 1995.

- (1) the imitative artist, which illustrates the sophist;
- (2) the art of making, the maker, and the product;
- (3) the activity of showing, the viewer, and the viewpoint in seeing an image;
- (4) the notion of imitation, and the relation between an image and its original;
- (5) the distinction between correct and incorrect images;
- (6) the definition of image.

Each section of this chapter will discuss one of these aspects. We must bear in mind that the main purpose of the argument is to capture the sophist in one of the two kinds of the image-making art.

The *Sophist* discusses the concept of image in four stages. The first stage introduces the model of a painter in order to illustrate the sophist's art (233d3–235a9). At the second stage, in order to capture the sophist in the field of image-making, the image-making art is elaborately divided into two kinds, namely, likeness-making and apparition-making (235a10–236d8). The third stage in the Middle Part gives a definition of image, and in so doing, reveals a difficulty in that the concept of image is shown to be deeply entangled with the problem of what is not (239c9–240c6). The long argument in the Middle Part tackles this difficulty of the image's connection to the problem of what is not, along with other difficulties (to be examined in the subsequent two chapters). Finally, at the fourth stage, the model of the image-making art is applied to the final definition of the sophist (265a10–268d5). In this chapter, we shall mainly focus on the first three stages. The last stage will be discussed in the final chapter.

5.2 The sophist as imitative artist

The argument concerning image begins by taking up one of the essential factors of the sophist's art, namely, controverting (*antilegein*). For it was controverting which the New Attempt focused on as the most revealing aspect of the sophist's art:

[Passage 13: 233d9–10]

EV: What if someone insists on knowing, not how to speak (*legein*) or to controvert (*antilegein*), but how to make (*poiein*) or to do (*dran*) all things by a single art?

Here an analogy between controverting or speaking and making or doing is introduced. The person who insists on knowing how to make all things turns out to be a painter: the painter makes images of all things by the art of painting (234b5–10).

Obviously, the essential feature common to the sophist who controverts and the painter who makes images is that both their activities are concerned with ‘all things’ (*panta*; cf. 233d9–234a10, b5–6, c2–7). In the subsequent conversation, Theaetetus contrasts the painter with the farmer and implies that any activity that is concerned with *all* things cannot be serious, since each expert has to deal with his own specific field.³ The activity of making all things must be a kind of playfulness (*paidia*, 234a6–b4, 235a5–7), and imitation (*mimētikon*) is that kind of activity. In this way, the art of imitation (cf. *mimētikon*, 234b2; *mimētēs*, 235a1, 8) embraces the arts of both the painter and the sophist, and the notion of imitation becomes a key to understanding how a single art can deal with all things.

We can see how the image of the painter illustrates the speech of the sophist in the following contrast:

[Passage 14: 234b5–c7]

EV: Therefore, we know this about the man who professes to be able to make all things by a single art, that when he produces imitations bearing the same names as the real things by the painting art, he will be able to deceive mindless young children, by showing these paintings from afar, into thinking that he is most capable of achieving whatever he intends to do.

Tht: Of course.

EV: Then can't we expect to find another art concerning speech (*peri tous*

³ For the farmer, see 234a1–2 and 219a10 (the initial division of art). I analysed this feature of the expert as E2 in 4.3.2. The status of painting is ambiguous: painting as an example of expertise is contrasted with sophistry in the earlier dialogues (*Prot.* 312c6–d3, 318b4–c4, *Gorg.* 448b11–c1, 453c4–d6; cf. *Ion* 532e4–533b5, *Gorg.* 503e4–504a1), but as an imitative art it is treated in *Republic* X and the *Sophist* as akin to poetry or sophistry.

logous), through which one can deceive the young who still stand far from reality (*tōn pragmatōn tēs alētheias*) through the ears by speech, I mean, by showing spoken images (*eidōla legomena*) of all things, so as to make them believe what is spoken is the truth, and the speaker is the wisest of all about all things?

The sophist produces and shows the image, which corresponds to the picture of the painter. The imitative artist is one who makes images, and in this argument the imitative art is equivalent to the image-making art (*eidōlopoiikē*, 235b8, 236c6).⁴ It is in this illustration that the sophist comes to be regarded as a kind of image-maker or imitative artist.

We should bear in mind, however, that to define the sophist's art as imitative is original in this dialogue. The imitative artist usually means an actor or a poet, and later includes painters or sculptors, but no other dialogue nor any other writer's work describes the sophist as an imitative artist before the *Sophist*.⁵ Although the description of the sophist as an imitative artist is unique to this dialogue, we may detect some hints of this original idea in the criticism of the poet as an imitative artist in *Republic X*. For it is probably in his similarity and relationship to the poet that the sophist is regarded as an imitator.

Book X of the *Republic* complements the preceding discussion about justice in the ideal State and in the soul, and takes up again the criticism of poets, who were previously discussed in the course of examining the education of the guardians in Books II–III. At the beginning of Book X, Socrates confirms the treatment of poets in the previous argument, and pro-

⁴ *mimētikē*, 235c2, d1, 236b1, c1; cf. *mimēma*, 235e2, *mimoumenoi*, 235e3 (cf. Campbell 1867, 76). The meaning of 'imitation' changes from 'artistic representation' in this argument to 'mimicking' in the final definition. I will discuss this change in Chapter 8.

⁵ The explanation of rhetoric and sophistry in contrast with justice and legislation in *Gorg.* 462b8 ff. may be a precursor of the definition in the *Sophist*. According to the *Gorgias*, rhetoric, along with sophistry, seems (*dokei*) to be an art, but is not an art (463b3–4; cf. 464a3–b1). It is rather experience or flattery (cf. *kolakikē* in *Sph.* 222e5–223a2), or as it were, an image of a part of politics (*eidōlon*, 463d1–2; cf. e3–4). For without knowledge but only by guessing, it produces not a really good but a seemingly good condition of the soul; therefore, it pretends (*prospoieitai*) to be real art, and deceives people (464c7–d3; cf. d4–5). In the *Gorgias*, however, 'imitation' is not yet discussed.

claims that poetry as imitative art should not be admitted in the ideal State (595a1–b1). When we focus on the relation between this argument against the poet and the argument concerning the sophist as an imitative artist in the *Sophist*, we can see several similar patterns of argument that reveal the peculiar nature of both imitative artists, and some exact, even word for word, correspondences between the two arguments.

The similarities between the two arguments on imitation, namely, the criticism of poetry (CP) and the definitional examination of the sophist's art (DS), may surprise us:⁶

- (1) Examination of imitation in general
CP begins with the question of what imitation in general (*mimesis holos*) is, while DS tries to grasp the sophist within the range of the imitative art, and divides it into species.⁷
- (2) The model of painting
CP argues about poetry from the illustration of painting, while in DS the model of painting introduces the notion of imitation.⁸ In both cases, the imitator is contrasted with the craftsman.⁹
- (3) 'Making *all* things'
Just as the painter can make *all* things (*panta*) by his art quickly (*tachy*) and easily, the poet composes and recites about *all* things, and the sophist claims to controvert about *all* things easily and quickly.¹⁰ In particular, both of them are concerned with *all arts*.¹¹ Yet the imitative art is said to be far removed from the truth; for it can make *all* things because it touches only a small part of each object, namely, an image (CP: 598b6–8).
- (4) 'Supposed to be wise but actually not knowing'
Although both the poet and the sophist are supposed by their audience or pupils to be wise about *all* things,¹² the poet

⁶ Of course, there are several differences between the two treatments of imitation (particularly, CP's dependence on the theory of Forms), but those differences are not due to the difference between the poet and the sophist.

⁷ CP: 595c7 ('Could you tell me what imitation in general is?'); cf. 597b2–3; DS: 235c2 ff., 265a10–b3.

⁸ CP: 596e5 ff.; DS: 233d3 ff. For the painter, see Havelock 1963, 32, n.28.

⁹ CP: 596c2 ff.; DS: *autopoietikon*, 266a9; cf. 265b1–2; for an architect and a painter, see 266c7–9. The point is crucial in the *Republic*, since the imitator may violate the one-person-one-role principle in the ideal State.

¹⁰ CP: 596c2–e4 (using mirror-image); DS: 233d9 ff. For quickness in practising the art, see CP: 596d9, e1–2 (mirror) and DS: 234a4.

¹¹ CP: 598e1–2; DS: 232d5–e2.

¹² CP: 598c8–9, d3–4 ('*passophos*'); DS: 232e2–5, 233c6, 10–11, 234c6–7.

proves to be ignorant of what he speaks about, and the sophist cannot be omniscient, either.¹³

(5) Appearance

Both arguments refer to the difference of appearances depending on one's point of view.¹⁴ Imitation is therefore called 'colourful' (*poikilon*).¹⁵

(6) An audience

As the painter displays a painting to 'children and foolish adults' or 'ignorant young children',¹⁶ the poet and the sophist speak to their audience, namely, young and ignorant people.¹⁷

(7) Deception by images

CP discusses imitation as if deception is essential to it. DS shows, by illustration of the painter's deception, that the sophist's art deceives his ignorant audience.¹⁸ Both the poet and the sophist are called 'juggler' (*goes*),¹⁹ and their imitative arts are called 'childish play' (*paidia*)²⁰ and 'conjuring' (*thaumatopoiia*).²¹

With a view to comparing the *Sophist* with *Republic X*, we should ask why Plato employs such similar arguments against both the poet and the sophist. What is the relation between these two arguments?

The strategy common to these arguments is to examine the imitative art in general by using painting as the chief example, and thereby to specify and criticise the arts in question. So far the lines of these arguments seem parallel, but this must be due not to the parallelism between the two independent arguments, but to a certain projection of the criticism of the poet onto the definition of the sophist.

By the time of Plato, the concept of imitation (*mimēsis*)

¹³ CP: 600e4 6, 601a6, b9 c2, 602b1 2, 7; DS: 233a3 4, c8, 10 11, 267b7 ff.

¹⁴ CP: 598a7 10, 602c7 d5 (both passages are to be examined in 5.5); DS: 235e5 236a2 (to be discussed in 5.6.1).

¹⁵ CP: 604e1, 605a5; DS: 234b4.

¹⁶ CP: 598c1 4; DS: 234b5 10 (in Passage 14).

¹⁷ CP: 598c6 d6; cf. 595b5 7, 601a6 b1; DS: 234c2 7 (Passage 14). The sophist's pupils are mentioned in 233b1, 6, and c6.

¹⁸ CP: 598b6 d6, e5 599a3; DS: 234b5 c7 (Passage 14), 240d1 5.

¹⁹ CP: 598d3, 602d2; DS: 235a1, 8.

²⁰ CP: 602b8; DS: 234a6, 9, b1, 235a6. The *Statesman* classifies painting and other imitative arts as 'playthings' (*paignion*), which are done only for the sake of play (*paidia*) (288c1 d1).

²¹ CP: 602d3; cf. *thaumastos*, 596d1; DS: 235b5; cf. *thauma*, 233a9, *thaumastos*, 236d1.

seems to have acquired the new meaning of artistic imitation in general,²² which includes music, drama, poetry, painting, and sculpture, and Plato's *Republic* is one of the earliest sources to attribute imitation to professional, artistic activities. In Book II, the enlarged State is said to include 'imitators, many of whom work with shapes and colours, many with music, – poets and their assistants, rhapsodists, actors, choral dancers, contractors –' (373b5–8).²³ It is therefore natural for Plato to examine the role of the poet by focusing on the imitative art in general, and to take up painting as the chief example of it in Book X, since poetry is usually counted as one of the imitative arts.²⁴

On the other hand, the sophist is never held to be an imitator in the proper sense of the word.²⁵ Instead, the inclusion of the sophist among imitative artists must be a new way of revealing his essence, just as he was regarded in the earlier definitions as a hunter, a merchant, a fighter, or a purifier. The sophist is examined as an imitative artist not because sophistry is usually regarded as a branch of the imitative art, in the sense that painting is an imitative art, but because he is a person who *imitates* the wise.

To explain the apparently abrupt introduction of the imitative art into the inquiry in the *Sophist* (233d3 and 235b8), I propose the following line of interpretation. On the one hand, it is because poetry is widely recognised as a kind of imitative art that Plato criticises poetry by examining the imitative art in general in *Republic* X. On the other, if sophistry is somewhat akin to poetry in relation to philo-

²² I shall discuss the development of the meanings of 'imitation' in the final chapter.

²³ The imitators 'with shapes and colours' are painters and sculptors, but not architects, which Jowett & Campbell 1894, Vol.3, 89, include; for they make *real* houses in an ordinary sense, and are not imitators (cf. *Sph.* 266c7–8). The phrase '*poiētai te . . .*' does not represent an independent group (*pace* Cornford 1941, Lee 1955, and Grube-Reeve 1992), but should be read as explanatory or additional to the imitators with music; Jowett 1953, 216, and Shorey 1930, 161–163, put this in parenthesis, and Sorbom 1966, 101–102, follows Shorey's translation and explains with relevant references why the contractors are included in imitators.

²⁴ Poets as imitators are mentioned in *Phdr.* 248e1–2 and *Tim.* 19d3–e2, but no example is found in Plato's dialogues earlier than *Republic* II.

²⁵ On the contrary, the earlier dialogues sometimes contrast the painter, an expert, with the sophist, who has no art. See note 3 above.

sophy, and if the inquiry into the sophist's art in the *Sophist* presupposes, and expects us to remember, the criticism of the poet as an imitator in *Republic* X, then we can easily understand why a similar argument is used against the sophist. Since it is generally accepted that the *Republic* precedes the *Sophist* chronologically, the first supposition, namely, of a relationship between the poet and the sophist, should next be examined.

We shall look at the general relationship between the poet and the sophist. Since the sophist is a historically new character in the fifth century, the long tradition of poetry and drama (since Homer) is clearly distinct from the sophistic movement. However, Protagoras, as an outspoken protagonist of this movement, declares that the poets, such as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, were actually ancient sophists, though they concealed their skill out of fear or resentment (*Prot.* 316d3–e5; cf. 342b1–4).²⁶ The list of the disguised sophists goes as far as musicians and physical trainers and is not confined to the poets, but Protagoras chiefly regards those poets as employing sophistry, along with composing and reciting poems.

In addition, the sophist in his teaching makes much use of poems, just as Protagoras begins to examine the poem of Simonides in this way:

Prot: I think, Socrates, that to master poetry is the most important part of a man's education. That is, to be able to apprehend whether the words of the poets are well composed or not, and to learn to distinguish them and give an account in reply to questions. (*Protagoras* 338e6–339a3)

This is a good illustration of the fact that interpretation of poetry is an important skill that the sophist professes to have, though it is not confined to him.²⁷ By citing poems of the famous poets, the sophist appeals to their authority, and from the interpretation of poems he draws his intended

²⁶ Remember that the poets were originally called 'sophists' (in the old good sense) (cf. Guthrie 1969, 29–30).

²⁷ Cf. Guthrie 1969, 45. The educators of children, or grammarians, are also supposed to be interpreters of poems, who teach how to learn morality from the poems (*Prot.* 325d7–326a4; cf. *Menex.* 236e3–237a1, where children imitate heroes).

conclusions. As long as the poets, such as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, are believed by people to be men of wisdom, the sophist can be supported by such authority. As an able interpreter of old wisdom, he is also deemed wise.

Both the poet and the sophist play an important role in moral education in ancient Greek society, although the ways they play this role are different.²⁸ As a matter of fact, the poems of these poets are often cited and used as authorities on moral action (and even on all skills), but poets speak from divine inspiration rather than from their understanding of what they say (cf. *Ap.* 22a8–c8).²⁹ In this sense, their ‘wisdom’ needs interpreters (beyond rhapsodists, such as Ion). If a sophist’s claim to give moral education is at least in part to do this job, the problem of wisdom must be common to these two: how can wisdom in interpreting poems be genuine knowledge, when poets create them without any knowledge? For example, when a poem of Simonides is presented in *Republic* I to show what justice is, it is interpreted in different ways (331d4–336a8); a poem at one time appears to mean this, and at another that, and a definite interpretation can hardly be obtained. So far as the sophist’s interpretation of poems depends on this indeterminacy and arbitrariness, it is doubtful whether he can reach the truth. In this sense, both the poet and the sophist are to be contrasted with the philosopher, who seeks the truth in its own right.

Throughout the *Republic*, far less attention seems to be paid to sophists than to poets.³⁰ In Book X, though, the

²⁸ Another common feature is that sophists went round from city to city (*Prot.* 315a7–8; *Tim.* 19e4–5), just as poets did reciting their poems (cf. *Rep.* X 600d5–e2).

²⁹ Tragic poets also admit themselves to be educators (cf. Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1008–1012; cf. 1054–1055). The poets’ role in education is taken seriously when Plato criticises them as imitators in *Republic* X (e.g. 599c6 ff.): Homer was usually regarded as the authority about the greatest things, such as war, politics, and education. Havelock 1963, chapters II–IV, convincingly argues that poetry is not just inspirational or imaginative activity, but, as it were, the social encyclopaedia of all knowledge; the poets had an institutional status as educators.

³⁰ In *Republic* VI, sophists are said to be those who curry favour with the public and tailor their opinions to the public (493a4–e1), or educators who do not know the truth (493b5–c6). This passage reminds us of *Gorg.* 513b6–c2, which compares the Athenian people to the audience at a dramatic theatre. What sophists teach is nothing but what is believed by the public (*ta tōn pollōn dogmata*), ‘ha

sophists, Protagoras, Prodicus, and many others, are actually mentioned in contrast to the poets, such as Homer and Hesiod, with a view to proving that the latter are not competent to educate people (600c2–e3); if Homer had really been able to endow people with knowledge, he would have been admired and loved by many, just as Protagoras and Prodicus were by claiming to give education. We cannot miss the tone of irony in this argument; for even though it is true that some sophists are admired and followed by many young people, that does not prove that they have knowledge. On the contrary, they lack real knowledge, just like poets. It seems clear that Plato has in mind sophists too when he criticises poets for their ignorance and false education. The irony intimates his intention to criticise sophists for the same fault: they are imitators who teach without knowledge. When Socrates introduced an imitative artist able to make *all* things, on earth, in heaven, and in Hades, Glaucon exclaimed, ‘What an amazing sophist you are talking about!’ (596d1) This may also be an intimation of his real intention.³¹ On the other hand, sophists might surpass poets in that the former manage a higher deception than the latter. For sophists at least succeed in getting admiration from people. If we can detect a certain difference between these two here, that may be found in the final definition in the *Sophist*: the sophist is classified as the ironical imitator who has awareness of his own ignorance, but pretends to have knowledge (267e10–268a8); in this division, the other species constitutes the simple-minded imitator who is characterised by sheer ignorance. If we identify the latter with the poet, we may say

doxazousin, 493a8–9; cf. Guthrie 1969, 20–21). Although sophists are probably alluded to in *Rep.* VI 489d1–5, 490e4–491a5, 496a8 (*sophismata*), and 500b1–7, the public, called ‘greatest sophists’ (492a8–b1), are much more emphasised (492a5–493a3). And there the basic distinction between philosophers and lovers of sight in Book V dominates the framework (cf. VI 493e2–494a5).

³¹ This use of ‘sophist’ is often thought to retain the original sense of the word, namely, ‘wise man’ (cf. Jowett & Campbell 1894, Vol.3, 441–442: ‘in the vernacular sense for “the master of an art or mystery”’), but it certainly reminds us of the sophist, who claims to make all things (cf. Adam 1902, Vol.II, 389, and Halliwell 1988, 111–112).

that the ironical passage in *Republic X* indicates the ironical feature of the sophist's imitation.

In summary, the definition of the sophist as an imitative artist in the *Sophist* is brand new, and originally comes from his similarity and relationship with the poet, an imitative artist, who is generally assumed by people to be wise. The criticism of the imitative artist in *Republic X* anticipates, and is proleptic to, the full treatment of the sophist in the *Sophist*.

5.3 Making, the maker and the product

Since imitation belongs to the art of making (*poiētikē*) according to the division of art (cf. 219b1), the sophist's art is now regarded as a kind of making and to be investigated as such. The adoption of the model of the image-making art therefore implies that the genus of the sophist's art has changed from the art of acquiring (in the first to fifth definitions) to that of making; acquiring and making were the two main genera of art (*technē*, 219a8–c8).³² According to the definition of the art of making, the sophist's art is now thought to 'bring what was not before (*mē proteron on*) into being (*ousia*)' (219b4–7, 265b8–11; cf. *Symp.* 205b8–c1), instead of acquiring something which is or has already come into existence (cf. 219c4–6). What is the 'making' of the sophist's art?

There are two important factors in the art of image-making that illuminate the sophist's art: the product, or *what* one makes, and the agent, or *who* makes. First, we shall consider what the 'image' is which the sophist makes by his art.

In Passage 13 an analogy is drawn between speaking and making. It is in so far as the sophist speaks about all things that his art is compared to making images, and accordingly, what the sophist makes by his art is 'speech' (*logos*). Now the 'speech' of the sophist is characterised as the 'image'. Yet the

³² As we saw in 2.3, the art of separation, to which the sophist of noble lineage belongs in the sixth definition, is independent of these two main genera of art (226b2–c9).

'making' of the sophist's art means more than that, for the sophist was supposed to present the appearances of his activity and of his own nature to his audience. In this sense as well, then, his art can be understood as *making*: namely, making appearances. In particular, the sophist's art is characterised in the final definition as imitating the wise, or *making himself appear* to be wise (cf. '*poiein phainesthai*', 267c5). From this we can conclude that the sophist's activity of making images firstly corresponds to his producing *speech*, and also corresponds to the sophist's producing his own *appearance* later.

This can be explained in accordance with the three stages of the sophist's appearing, which we analysed in the previous chapter (4.4). First, the sophist does not argue rightly, and he makes *invalid arguments* or *false statements*. Here the *invalid argument* or *false statement* (*logos*) must correspond to the 'image' that the sophist makes, and this analogy enables us to analyse the 'argument' or 'statement' (*logos*) as the product of the sophist's art. Second, when the sophist appears to argue well (though he does not actually do so), he produces the *appearance* of a good and valid argument, or the *apparent argument*. At this stage, the 'image' produced by the sophist's art corresponds to his *argument* (*logos*) and its *appearance* of being valid. Third, when the sophist appears to be wise, he produces the *appearance* of his own nature, of what he is. That is, he creates the *appearance* of being wise, by means of argument. This *appearance* of being wise must also be an 'image' made by his art (I shall examine this stage in the final chapter). In this way, the content of the 'image' ranges from speech (*logos*, including both statement and argument) to appearance, depending on which stage of the sophist's appearing we focus on.

We have just seen that the sophist's 'appearing' can be paraphrased in terms of 'making': when the sophist *appears* to be wise, he *makes himself appear* to be wise. We should notice, however, the peculiarity of this paraphrase. For not every subject of 'to appear' can be the subject of 'to make to appear', since 'to make' indicates agency on the part of the

subject, while ‘to appear’ does not. For example, when a stick appears to be bent in water, that stick does not *make* itself appear to be bent (nor does anyone else, perhaps).³³ By contrast, when the sophist’s appearing is formulated as his making his own appearances, this formulation indicates that the sophist is the agent of this intentional activity of appearing. The sophist is now regarded as the agent or cause of appearances; he is a maker of his own appearances.

Next, let us consider speech as a product of the sophist’s art. In Passage 14, the phrase ‘spoken images’ (*eidōla legomena*, 234c6) clearly indicates that the picture of the painter is analogous to the sophist’s speech (statement or argument), in making images of all things, showing them, and deceiving the young by them.³⁴ Speech (or language) is often compared to an image, especially to a picture: what speech is to the state of affairs (or reality), the picture is to the original. Plato often uses the model of a picture in explaining the role and essence of our speech (cf. *Rep.* X).³⁵ For example, Critias explains the nature of our speech concerning human affairs as follows: ‘what is spoken by us all must be imitation and representation (*mimēsin kai apeikasian*)’ (*Critias* 107b5–7; cf. 107b4–108a4, *Phd.* 99d4–100a3). Passage 14 is also thought to be one such example.³⁶

Since I have not found any evidence showing that anyone before Plato held such a view, it seems likely that he was the first person to develop this analogy between language and

³³ Plato thinks that reflection or optical illusion is made by the god (*Sph.* 266b9–c4; *Tim.* 45d3–46a2 (dreaming) and 46a2–c6 (a mirror image)); for ‘what comes to be’ (*gignomenon*) in general is equated with ‘what is made’ (*poioumenon*) in the cosmological context (*Phlb.* 27a1–4).

³⁴ Campbell 1867, 72–73, takes the expression ‘spoken images’ as equivalent to ‘the appearances in speech’ (*ta en tois logois phantasmata*) at 234e1.

³⁵ Cf. *Crat.* 422d11 ff. etc. Of course, language (*logos*) for Plato is primarily spoken, rather than written (cf. *Tht.* 206d1–6).

³⁶ Considering these examples, one might suppose that Plato holds the so-called ‘picture-theory of language’, the basic idea of which has had a strong influence on the history of philosophy: the idea is that the relation of language to reality is like the relation of a picture to what it represents. In particular, we can see the modern version of this theory in one of the most important philosophical works of this century, namely, Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

pictorial representation.³⁷ However, we must be cautious about this issue. It is true that Plato uses the model of painting in many places, but in each case the picture-model is intended to explain different things in different contexts. For instance, the *Cratylus*, which is usually thought to provide a clear example of this view, is mainly interested in the correctness of names, and takes the picture-model under the assumption of the naturalistic view of language, according to which the essence of language lies in bodily, or vocal, imitation (422d11–423b12). In that dialogue, however, it remains an open question whether the naturalistic view of language, rather than the conventional view, is correct. Besides, this special concern of the dialogue confines the language model to the one-to-one relationship between words and things, which we may call the referential relation. On the other hand, the model of image-making used in the argument of the *Sophist* is far richer than the simple picture-model of language. The argument in this dialogue is concerned not only with how to make images, but also with how to show them to viewers. This model illustrates the whole structure of speaking activity, including such factors as how, from where, and to whom one speaks, and hence, the image-making model stands not for standard logic, but for speaking in general, which includes falsehood and deception.³⁸ To assume the simple picture-model of language in the *Sophist* might misrepresent Plato's argument.

5.4 Showing, the viewer and the viewpoint

The painter's activity lies not only in making images (that is, painting pictures), but also in showing them to the viewer, as is clearly stated in Passage 14: the painter 'will be able to deceive mindless young children, by showing (*epideiknys*)

³⁷ An earlier example of this kind of thinking, though not a sophisticated one, may be a remark attributed to a poet: 'Simonides calls painting silent poetry, and poetry articulate painting' (Plutarch, *Moralia* 346F; cf. 17E 18A, 748A).

³⁸ This kind of speaking activity was investigated as 'dialectic' and 'rhetoric' by Aristotle (in the *Topics*, *Sophistical Refutations*, and *Rhetoric*), and is nowadays studied in the field of 'informal logic'; cf. Hamblin 1970 and Walton 1989.

these paintings from afar, into thinking that he is most capable of achieving whatever he intends to do' (234b8–10). The painter's showing evidently illustrates the sophist's exhibiting his arguments (*epideixis*; cf. 4.3.1).³⁹ This activity of showing implies two essential factors: the viewer and his viewpoint. This section considers what these factors illustrate.

First, in the analogy of Passage 14, the viewer of the painter's image corresponds to the audience to whom the sophist speaks and to whom he appears to be wise. Just as the painter's activity of showing a picture deceives the viewer, so the sophist's speaking deceives his audience. Here, as the painter employs both painting a picture and showing it, the sophist's activity includes both making and showing his speech. The viewer and the audience are the people who are deceived by the arts of the painter and of the sophist.

Deception depends on the viewer, since obviously not all people will be deceived by their arts. Viewers who are deceived by the painter are said to be 'mindless young children' (Passage 14: 234b8), and the audience deceived by the sophist are also 'young people' (Passage 14: 234c4). This point reminds us of one feature of the sophist's art, namely, hunting the young.

Next, the viewpoint of the viewer represents where he stands and from where he sees the image. In the painter's showing, there must be a distance between the viewer and the image which the painter shows to him; in order to deceive the viewer, the painter has to show his works *from afar* (Passage 14: 234b8–9). This element of distance in the sophist's art is introduced as a metaphor: the young still *stand far from* the truth of things (234c4–5; cf. d2–e6). In this analogy, the place where the viewer stands seems to represent what kind of person the viewer is, or in what cognitive state he is. For example, viewers *standing far from* the original are designated *ignorant* young people.

Since the viewpoint of the viewer later plays a crucial role in distinguishing between two kinds of images (235e6–236a2,

³⁹ The painter's activity of showing has been mentioned as a kind of mercantile art in the second definition (224a3; cf. *epideiktikē*, 224b4–5).

b4-7), let us consider this factor further. Any viewpoint confines the viewer's view to partiality, and each view from a particular viewpoint is called a perspective. The viewer always sees an image from a certain perspective. Plato seems in the subsequent argument to assume that there is a *good* viewpoint which presents a correct view of the object, in contrast with *bad* viewpoints which give wrong appearances. To see a thing clearly, one should not stand too far away from or too close to the thing. In this sense, not all perspectives are equal (we shall observe this point in 5.6). By analogy, it is the viewpoint of the audience which determines how the sophist appears to them, and accordingly a change of viewpoints alters appearance.

If the viewpoint represents the cognitive stage of the viewer, it must change according to his progress in understanding. The Eleatic visitor explains that when those standing far from the truth come closer to reality through experience, all appearances change and make them upset (234d2-e2).⁴⁰ Theaetetus says that he himself is one of the young who stand far from reality (e3-4), and to this comment, the Eleatic visitor answers that 'That is why all of us here will try, and are now trying, to lead you as close (to the realities) as possible without hard experience' (e5-6). Investigation through dialogue will lead the young who still stand far from the truth closer to reality. The inquirers' viewpoint thus proceeds towards a good one through dialogue.

Finally, I shall point out one important disanalogy. The analogy between the sophist and the painter is drawn in terms of seeing and hearing: pictures are seen, and speech heard. Concerning deception by the painter and sophist, however, a chiasmic relation can be seen with respect to the audience or the viewers and their distance from images. In the case of seeing a picture, while viewers, the young, are supposed to possess knowledge of the original, they can

⁴⁰ Cornford 1935, 195, sees some allusion to the simile of the Cave in the *Republic*. Although we cannot expect the same argument here, that simile certainly illustrates the point about viewpoint and perspective.

hardly recognise the picture as such, but they take it for real, because the image is shown in the distance. In other words, the original is familiar to the viewers, but they make a mistake because the image is far from them (Passage 14: 234b5–10). In the case of the sophist's argument, however, the audience, also the young, stand far removed (though in the metaphorical sense) not from the image, but from the reality which is imitated, because they do not yet have the necessary knowledge of reality. The spoken image, on the other hand, is immediately presented before them (Passage 14: 234c2–7). In other words, here, the original lies afar, while the image is presented close up to the audience. Thus, the relation between the viewers and the image presented by the painter is the reverse of that between the audience of the sophist and the spoken image.⁴¹

This chiasmus can be interpreted in the following way. The distance in seeing a picture illustrates metaphorically the epistemological distance from the audience to the object, or the degree of familiarity, in the case of the sophist's deception. Since the image, generally speaking, has to be judged with reference to the original, the viewer of the picture must conjecture about an unfamiliar thing, namely, an image, from his familiarity with the original. On the other hand, the audience of the sophist's speech must also trace back from a thing familiar to them to an unfamiliar thing; in this case, from the spoken image to the unknown original, namely, truth and reality. However, since knowledge of an image entirely depends on that of the original, the direction goes from posteriority or ignorance to priority or knowledge. Here, a general question arises: how is it possible to trace the original from the image, or to move from ignorance to knowledge? This question allows the sophist to raise a difficulty concerning image (cf. 6.5), and our subsequent investigation of the possibility of philosophical inquiry (in Chapter 7) will give some clue, I hope, to this question.

⁴¹ This chiasmic relation is illustrated in Figure 2 of Benardete 1986, 106.

5.5 The imitation model and the appearance-reality contrast

Making all things by a single art is nothing but playfulness, and imitation (*mimēsis*) is that kind of playfulness (234a6–b4, 235a5–9). In this section we shall examine the notion of imitation and see how it illustrates the concept of appearance. It may indicate Plato's departure from his earlier view on appearance.

The essence of the notion of imitation lies in the relation between the image and the original. The original and the image are not two independent objects, but there is a certain essential relation between the two. The image is modelled on the original, and is always an image *of* something else, namely, the original. This means that the image is ontologically dependent on the original: the image exists only in the imitative or representational relation to the original, and therefore, the original is ontologically prior to the image. The image is also epistemologically dependent on the original: the image can be understood only by reference to the original because the content of the image comes from the original. In this sense, knowledge of the original is prior to that of the image.⁴²

Here, we shall look at the argument in *Cratylus* 432b1–433a6, in which Socrates explains the nature of the image in order to distinguish correct and incorrect names.⁴³ His explanation reveals the essential features of being an image:

- I. Difference: The image must not reproduce all the qualities of the thing (i.e. the original) of which it is an image. If *all* qualities are imitated, it is no longer an image, but another original, just as there come to be two Cratyluses if a god reproduces in the image of Cratylus all qualities that Cratylus has (inner qualities, such as flexibility, temperature,

⁴² Cf. *Rep.* III 402b5–c9.

⁴³ This argument presumes a naturalistic view that a name is a reproduction of a thing in syllables and letters (433b2–3), and Socrates presents this argument as a criticism of Cratylus' position that there is no incorrect name; cf. Baxter 1992, 167–171. To look at the basic theory of imitation, however, we do not have to take this special concern of the argument into account.

- motion, life, and intellect, as well as outer) (432b2 d4; cf. e1 3).
- II. Similarity: Although the image lacks some qualities which the original possesses, it is an image as far as it retains the outline (*typos*) (cf. 432e5 7).⁴⁴
 - III. Two kinds of imitation: We should admit that the image may employ some improper qualities, and that there are correct and incorrect imitations (cf. 432d11 e3):
 - III 1. Correct imitation: Correct image represents *all* the proper qualities;
 - III 2. Incorrect imitation: Incorrect image is that which does not have *all* the proper qualities, but has some inappropriate qualities as well (cf. 432e5 433a6).

This argument shows two fundamental conditions of being an image. Firstly, while the image must retain the outline, or certain intrinsic features, of the original, the difference from the original is essential to something's being an image. The image is both like and unlike the original.⁴⁵ Secondly, there are correct and incorrect images, which are distinguished in terms of what qualities they possess. These are the features which the notion of imitation explains.

The relation between image and original, which I call the imitation model, is often introduced to illustrate the relation between appearance and reality, especially in the theory of Forms.⁴⁶ However, we must keep in mind that the two relations, between image and original and between appearance and reality, are not exactly the same. When the imitation model illustrates the relation between appearance and reality, the latter can be interpreted differently, depending on which aspect of imitation is emphasised.


It is often supposed by scholars that in Plato's philosophy the concept of appearance is mostly treated in a negative

⁴⁴ The 'outline' (*typos*) at 432e6 means the 'crude form, or rough shape' of a moulded work. For the meaning of the term '*typos*', see Pollitt 1974, 272–293. On the other hand, the 'shape and colour' mentioned as intrinsic qualities at 432b6–7 characterise the likeness in *Sph.* 235d7–e2 (to be seen below).

⁴⁵ Cf. Proclus, *In Parm.* 743.11–21.

⁴⁶ In the theory of Forms, the Forms are reality, and appearance characterises sensible things. We can see the most impressive examples of such illustration in the similes of the Sun, Line, and Cave in the *Republic*; see also *Rep.* V 476c2–d4 and *Parm.* 132c12–133a7.

way.⁴⁷ In ontology, appearance is contrasted with, or deemed contrary to, reality; appearances are varied, always changing, and unreliable, whereas reality is always the same and true. For example, *Republic* V 478e7–479d6, discusses in terms of appearance many sensible things in contrast to the Forms: as beautiful things also *appear* (*phainesthai*) ugly, each of many things *appears* its opposite, while the Forms never appear opposite. Sensible things, therefore, belong to what both is and is not, or oscillate between what is and what is not.⁴⁸ In epistemology, also, having appearances as a cognitive faculty is thought to be far inferior to the faculty of reasoning; appearances confuse and often deceive us, and they can hardly be the object of knowledge. Appearance and reality are, as it were, two independent fields of entity, and this may lead to the so-called two-world view.



If, however, the relation between appearance and reality is taken in such a way that the image represents and depends on the original, the essential dependence of appearance on reality should also be emphasised.⁴⁹ Correspondingly, the

⁴⁷ One may contrast Plato's negative with Aristotle's positive attitude towards appearance. For instance, Nussbaum 1986, 241, characterises the pre-Aristotelian tradition as follows: 'The appearances by which Plato and his predecessors usually mean the world as perceived, demarcated, interpreted by human beings and their beliefs are taken to be insufficient "witness" of truth.'

⁴⁸ See also *Phd.* 74b7 c3. To understand this usage of appearance, we need to supply certain qualifications to appearance, such as, in a certain respect, at one time, in a certain relation, at one point, and for someone who sees from a certain point of view. These qualifications are referred to in the *Symposium* as those which the Form itself never suffers (211a2–5).

⁴⁹ It is quite rare that appearances are treated in this way in the theory of Forms (a possible example is *Rep.* V 476a4–7). In this respect, the concept of appearance is more elaborately treated in the second part of the *Timaeus* (cf. Notomi 1998).

epistemological role of appearance should not be entirely negative, for it can be a route to understanding reality. In this way, the shift of emphasis on different aspects of the imitation model changes our understanding of the concept of appearance. Here, the notion of imitation, on the one hand, implies a difference or contrast between image and original, and may support the negative attitude towards image and appearance. The image is indeed regarded as false in contrast with the original, which is true.⁵⁰ On the other hand, it can also illuminate an image's ontological and epistemological dependence on the original. We can understand how, seen from this angle, appearance depends on reality. What is more important, the imitation model makes it possible to distinguish between two ways of dealing with appearances, in terms of correct and incorrect images.

To consider this point further, let us look at Plato's earlier view on appearance in three passages: two arguments in *Republic* X and one passage in the *Protagoras*, which clearly show Plato's negative attitude towards appearance and which seem to support the common view of scholars.

Book X of the *Republic*, in criticising poetry, characterises it as a kind of imitative art which is concerned not with reality but only with appearance. Appearance turns out to be the key term for the essence of imitation in this argument, since a poet is compared with a painter who imitates the works of other craftsmen, and makes images as they *appear* to be such and such, not as they *really are*

Soc: A bed, if someone sees it from the side or the front or in any way, doesn't differ from itself. Or is it that, while nothing is different, it appears (*phainetai*) different? Is that also the case with other things?

Gl: Yes, it appears different, but nothing is different. (*Republic* X 598a7–10)

Our ordinary experience reveals that something *appears* different when seen from different viewpoints, while it *is* the same. This may seem to have nothing unsound in it, but the sharp contrast between 'as it appears' and 'as it really is'

⁵⁰ This aspect seems to be retained in the *Sophist*; cf. 241e1–5 and 260c8–10.

brings about a negative connotation of the former.⁵¹ By contrasting appearance with reality or truth, the argument concludes that the image constitutes the third in the ontological triad: first, the Form is perfect reality, and second, the product of a craftsman is something like true reality but is not, and third, the image made by an imitative artist is only appearance (*phainomenon* or *phantasma*), not reality.⁵² Imitation is thus characterised as representing only *appearances* of artefacts.

This ontological argument indicates the two predominant implications in *Republic* X. The first implication is that appearance and falsehood are said to be *far from* reality and truth.⁵³ The second is a tacit implication that, because appearance is *not* truth, it is false and always deceptive.⁵⁴ Our soul is in confusion and disorder about various appearances of the same thing at the same time.⁵⁵ The imitative artist relying on such a variety of appearances deceives ignorant people by means of appearances,⁵⁶ and thereby makes them think he knows about all arts.⁵⁷ This is how the concept of appearance is connected with deception. We should bear in mind that, while a sharp contrast is made between reality and appearance, the difference among appearances (i.e. true and false ones) is not considered.

The same view is clearly seen in the argument concerning the psychological effects of the imitative art (602c7–e7). Socrates explains how imitation consorts with the inferior part of the soul with reference to appearance:

⁵¹ Halliwell 1988, 117–118, rightly points out that there is an ambiguity in 'appears different', between (a) 'appears as if it *were* different' (optical illusions), and (b) 'shows a different aspect of its appearance'. This ambiguity must be at the core of Plato's notion of unreliable or deceptive appearance.

⁵² Cf. 596e4 11, 598b2 8, 599a2 3, 601b10, 602b2 4.

⁵³ Such expressions as 'the third remove from' and 'far from' are used in 598b6, 599d2, 600e6, 602c1 2, 603a11, 605a9 10, and c3 4.

⁵⁴ As Halliwell 1988, 112, remarks on 596e9, 'not the true reality' insinuates falsehood and deception. The conclusion driven from the analogy of painting that all imitation is deceptive is thought by many commentators to be unjustifiable (cf. Halliwell 1988, 133).

⁵⁵ Cf. 602c10 d4, 603d1 2, 5 7.

⁵⁶ Cf. 598c1 d6, 601a1 2, 602b2 5.

⁵⁷ Cf. 598b8 d6; *Sph.* 234b5 c7.

Soc: Things of the same size do not appear (*phainetai*) to us to be equal through sight close at hand and at a distance.

Gl: No.

Soc: And the same things appear both curved and straight to observers in and outside water, and concave and convex because our sight wanders concerning colours, and all kinds of disorder are clearly in our soul. On this condition of our nature, shadow painting (*skiagraphia*), conjuring (*thaumatopoiia*), and all other tricks of this kind operate, with no lack of juggling (*goēteias*).

Gl: True. (*Republic* X 602c7–d5)

In these two examples of appearances which come from our experience of optical illusions and delusions (that is, the apparent size of an object and the appearance of a thing's (e.g. a stick's) being bent in water),⁵⁸ the wandering of our sight is contrasted with the stability of measurement and calculation, which belongs to the reasoning part of our soul (*logistikon*). The argument says that 'it is not the appearance of greater and smaller, or more, or heavier, but the calculation, measurement, and weighting, that should have control over us' (602d7–9). Appearance is in conflict with reality, and the faculty of having appearances contradicts the faculty of measurement or reasoning.⁵⁹ Correspondingly, the reasoning part and the inferior part of the soul are also said to be in conflict (604b3–4). The imitative poet destroys the reasoning part of the soul and nourishes the irrational part, 'by gratifying the thoughtless part of the soul, which cannot judge greater from smaller, but takes the same things as being large at one time and small at another, and by making images (*eidōla eidōlopoiounta*) which stand far from the truth' (605b8–c4).

Finally, the *Protagoras*, one of the early dialogues, also uses the examples of optical illusion, and draws a similar

⁵⁸ This is a locus classicus of the argument for the unreliability of our sense perceptions and appearances. Such an example as a stick's appearing to be bent is discussed even in contemporary philosophy (Austin 1962 vs. Ayer 1967; Burnyeat 1979).

⁵⁹ Because of this conflict between measuring and having appearances, we must assume two separate parts in the soul which deal with these two faculties; otherwise, this conflict would violate the law of contradiction (X 602e8–9; cf. IV 436b8–c1).

conclusion about the unreliability of appearance in contrast with our power of reasoning (*logismos*):

Soc: 'Do things of the same size appear to our sight (*phainetai tēi opsei*) larger seen from near by, and smaller at a distance, or not?' They will say yes. 'And similarly with thickness and multitude? And the same sound is louder near and softer at a distance?' 'Yes'. 'Then, if happiness for us lies in doing and choosing large quantities, and in not doing and avoiding small ones, what seems to us to be the thing that saves our lives? The art of measurement or the power of appearing (*hē tou phainomenou dynamis*)? The latter confuses us and makes us often change our minds about the same things and vacillate up and down (*anō te kai katō*) in our actions and decisions about large and small things. On the other hand, the art of measurement would have made the appearance powerless, and have given us peace of mind by showing us the truth and letting us get a firm grasp on it, and so would have saved our lives.' (*Protagoras* 356c5–e2)

The line of argument is common to the *Protagoras* and the *Republic*. First, Socrates introduces our familiar experience of illusory appearances in order to illustrate the unreliability of appearance: the same thing appears large seen close at hand and small seen at a distance.⁶⁰ This kind of experience is then generalised to demonstrate the unreliable nature of having appearances in contrast with the reliability of calculation or the power of reasoning. The upshot of this argument is that the power of having appearances *in general* is unreliable, whereas our reasoning faculty is reliable.

In these three arguments, the *contrast* and *difference* between appearance and reality, or between their related faculties, is much emphasised, and consequently the concept of appearance is treated in an entirely negative way.

Now let us return to the *Sophist*. When the sophist is said to 'appear to be wise, but is not really so' (233c1–11; cf. 236e1–2), appearance seems again to be contrasted with reality and to bear a negative connotation. However, to regard appearance as contrary to reality, or as *non-reality*, raises two problems. Firstly, can we treat all appearances as negative and deceptive? Since our argument has shown that

⁶⁰ The same example of appearances differing according to the distance is used in *Rep.* X 602c7–8, d6–9, (cf. VII 523b5–6), *Sph.* 235e7–236a2, and *Phlb.* 41e9–42a1.

philosophical inquiry is also concerned with appearances, we must save some appearances as positive and revealing. Secondly, what is the ontological status of appearance, if we think of it as contrary to reality or as *non-reality*? Do we regard it as absolute non-being?

The notion of imitation is of fundamental significance in our argument, since it implies two essential relations between image and original, namely, difference and similarity (or dependence), as is explained in the *Cratylus*. As long as we focus on the image's similarity or dependence in relation to the original, we can interpret appearance, in a similar way, as depending on reality both ontologically and epistemologically. We shall then find that appearances should be understood not as always misleading or deceiving our judgement, but as in some respects revealing the truth and reality. Besides, it is with the aid of the illustration of the distinction between correct and incorrect images that we can distinguish between the two ways of dealing with appearances. Thus, to put emphasis on this aspect of the imitation model will change our view of what is illustrated by that model, particularly, the concept of appearance. Let us now turn to the distinction between correct and incorrect images.

5.6 Two kinds of image

5.6.1 *A division in the image-making art*

After the sophist is compared to the painter, the image-making art (*eidōlopoiikē*) is divided into two kinds, namely, likeness-making (*eikastikē*) and apparition-making (*phantastikē*), for the purpose of defining the sophist within the category of image-making (235a10–236d8).⁶¹ In distinguishing the two kinds of image, both the relation between

⁶¹ Though the semi-technical terms of '*eikōn*', '*eikastikē*', '*phantasma*', and '*phantastikē*' are translated in various ways, I translate '*eikōn*' as 'likeness' and '*phantasma*' as 'apparition'. For the noun '*eikōn*' comes from the verb '*eoika*' ('be like'), and '*phantasma*' is a noun form of '*phantazesthai*' ('make an appearance'). As we shall see, *phantasma* is not the same as appearance in general (or as *phantasia*), so I choose a different word of the same origin.

original and image, and the viewpoint become crucial factors. I examine four passages concerning the distinction:

[Passage 15: 235d6 e2]

EV: [I1] In this (sc. image-making art) I see the art of likeness-making: this is mainly the case when, according to the proportions of the original (*kata tas tou paradeigmatos symmetrias*) in length, width, and depth, and by adding appropriate colours to each part, one accomplishes the creation of an imitation.

[Passage 16: 235e5 236a2]

EV: [I2] This is certainly not the case for those who sculpt or paint large works. For if they reproduce the true proportions of beautiful things, you know, the upper parts appear (*phainoit' an*) smaller and the lower larger than they should be; for the one is seen by us in the distance, and the other close at hand.

[Passage 17: 236a4 6]

EV: [I3] Then, is it not these artists who neglect the truth and in point of fact put not the real proportions, but the proportions which seem to be beautiful (*tas dokousas einai kalas*) into images (*tois eidōlois*)?

[Passage 18: 236b4 7]

EV: [I4] Now, what do we call the thing which appears to be like (*to phainomenon eoikenai*) a beautiful thing, because it is not seen from a beautiful viewpoint, but is not like what it is said to be like, for those who can see such a large thing properly? Since, while appearing to be like it, it is not really like it, don't we call it an apparition (*phantasma*)?

I1 and I4 are definitions of likeness-making and apparition-making respectively, and I2 and I3 explain how they are different.

There are two criteria for the distinction between likeness (*eikōn*) and apparition (*phantasma*). The first criterion is whether an image reproduces the true proportions of the original. While a likeness is a reproduction of the original in all its proportions,⁶² an apparition neglects and distorts the true proportions of the original (I1 and I3). The second

⁶² The likeness reproduces all the essential outer qualities (the proportions and colour) of the original, but does not reproduce its essential inner qualities (*Crat.* 432b5 c5; cf. the previous section). Cornford 1935, 198 199, who mainly depends on *Republic* X, regards the likeness as 'a reproduction or replica, such as the making of a second actual bed, reproducing exactly the first bed made by the carpenter', and concludes that there is no difference between the likeness and the original. This conclusion violates Plato's intention in the whole argument.

criterion is concerned with viewpoint. An apparition is essentially dependent on a certain viewpoint of the viewer, as defined in I4. A likeness, on the other hand, is defined in I1 in terms of the proportions and colours of the original without any reference to the viewpoint from which it is seen.

Does this imply that likeness has nothing to do with viewpoint or the viewer? There might be another suggestion in I2 and I4 that likeness does not necessarily neglect viewpoint. I4 explains that an apparition produces an appearance when it is 'not seen from a beautiful viewpoint' (*dia tēn ouk ek kalou thean*, 236b4–5).⁶³ This explanation seems to suggest the opposite possibility that, *seen from a beautiful viewpoint*, an apparition must appear to be unlike the original, while a likeness appears to be like it. I2 can also be interpreted in the same way: *seen from a good position*, a likeness shows its likeness to the original, while it may appear to be unlike the original because it is seen badly.

The two ways of interpreting likeness are not incompatible, but illuminate two aspects of its nature. First, likeness is defined as a correct representation of the original, and therefore it is in this sense independent of the viewer and the viewpoint from which it is seen. For the viewpoint from which the viewer sees a likeness does not affect the essence of the likeness, which always retains the correct proportions of the original. If the original is well proportioned and accordingly beautiful, the likeness is also beautiful because it has the same good proportions as the original.⁶⁴ Since viewpoints do not affect this quality of the likeness, the likeness *is* always beautiful. The second aspect of the likeness is that when seen from the good viewpoint it *appears* to be like the original, and beautiful to the viewer. In other words, the likeness

⁶³ This phrase looks awkward. Following Campbell 1867, 78–79, I retain the transmitted text and take 'ek' to refer to the viewpoint. For example, *Lg.* II 663c3–5 uses the phrase, 'ek ... adikou kai kakou', which means 'from the viewpoint of the unjust and wrong person'; the context shows that the distance causes the confusion about appearances (as in the case of shadow-painting) (663b6–c5). Recent translators follow Campbell's interpretation.

⁶⁴ The 'proportion' (*symmetria*), which means the 'commensurability of parts', is a necessary condition for the beauty of a work of art; Pollitt 1974, chapters 1 and 2, argues that this idea may have Pythagorean origin.

reveals its own nature to the viewer who stands in a good position.

In a similar way, an apparition can be characterised in two aspects. It distorts the original proportions, and therefore *is not* beautiful, while it *appears* to be beautiful to the viewer standing at a certain bad viewpoint. On the other hand, it will appear not to be beautiful when seen from a good viewpoint. Thus, the essential feature of an apparition is that its apparent beauty entirely depends on the viewpoint from which the viewer sees it.

Concerning this, we should note two important points. First, it should be remembered that even a correct image (i.e. likeness) suffers wrong appearances, or gives us a kind of illusory experience. For the explanation in I₂ and I₄ appeals to the same sort of example of illusion as that used in the *Protagoras* and *Republic X* (which I examined in the previous section). We cannot, however, infer from this that all appearances are unreliable; for whether one gets a right or a wrong appearance depends on one's viewpoint. We should not reject all appearances as merely deceptive, as in the earlier works.

Second, the viewpoint from which an image is seen has turned out to be one of the two essential factors that differentiate apparition from likeness. When Plato distinguishes between a good and a bad viewpoint in seeing an image, what are these 'viewpoints'? The appearance of an image depends entirely upon the viewpoint from which it is seen, and according to different viewpoints, a statue or a picture appears differently. But it should be noted that this standing position of the viewer is usually not chosen freely; for the position where a statue is placed in a chamber is fixed, so that the planning of the statue must take its appearance to viewers into account. For example, the twelfth-century Byzantine scholar, John Tzetzes, tells us how Phidias, the famous sculptor contemporary with Socrates, gained victory over Alcamenes in making the statue of Athena which was to be placed on a base on high pillars:

Phidias was master of optics and geometry /
And understanding that things on high appear very small /

made the statue open its lips / and pucker up its nostrils /
 and gave other parts the proportion fitting to the height of the pillars ...
 But once the statue was fitted and erected /
 the statue by Phidias seemed noble by his art.⁶⁵
 (Tzetzes, *Historiarum Variarum Chiliades* 359 363, 366 377)

By deliberately giving incorrect proportions to the statue which was to be put in a high place, Phidias produced a beautiful appearance in the goddess. The episode shows that a large statue has a fixed viewpoint to be seen from, and therefore, sculptors try to make the image appear to be beautiful to the viewer from that viewpoint. This seems to be what Plato has in mind when he explains the appearance of an image, and defines the apparition in I2, I3, and I4. It also explains why the Eleatic visitor soon adds that this art of apparition-making prevails in painting and all imitation (236b9–c1). His comment describes our ordinary world, but that does not deny the possibility of likeness-making itself.⁶⁶

5.6.2 *Apparition as appearance of likeness*

Now that we have seen the distinction between the two kinds of image, likeness and apparition, we shall next examine the relationship between the two. There are four important points to bear in mind:

- (1) In the division of the image-making art, likeness-making and apparition-making constitute the two species of the genus of image-making (235b8–236c8, esp. 236c6–8).
- (2) The apparition, which appears to be like the original but is not like it, must be the kind of image in terms of which the sophist is to be defined. In the final definition, the apparition-making art is actually ascribed to the sophist without hesitation (266d8–267a1). Our anticipation is also confirmed by the fact that through the Middle Part the terms ‘apparition’ and ‘apparition-making’ are evidently used to represent the sophist’s art (239c9–d1, 260d9; cf. *to phantasma*, 240d1).

⁶⁵ Overbeck 1868, Nr. 772; Panofsky 1960, 5–6, and Gombrich 1960, 161–162, connect this story with Plato’s explanation of likeness and apparition.

⁶⁶ Cornford 1935, 198–199, insists that, as in *Republic* X, here the whole of fine art falls under the art of apparition-making, and the likeness-making art ‘lies outside the scope of fine art and of Sophistry’. But this extreme view ruins Plato’s intention in this argument (cf. Bluck 1975, 59–60).

- (3) However, it is not the apparition, but its genus, the image (*eidolon*), which is later said to be entangled with the difficulty of what is not (239c9–240c6; cf. 241e3, 260c8–9, 264c12).
- (4) In showing the difficulty concerning image, the Eleatic visitor initially asks what image is (*eidolon*) (239c9–240a6), but likeness (*eikon*), which is a species of image, is substituted for image in the course of definition, and finally defined instead (240b11–13).⁶⁷

The first two points seem inconsistent with the latter two. For the first and second points fit the whole argument of the dialogue very well, but the third and fourth seem to destroy the natural process of argument. Commentators tend, accordingly, to think that the argument in the Middle Part, which advocates the third and fourth points, neglects the results of the division of the image-making art, namely, the first and second points. However, to explain the third and fourth in accordance with the first and second will reveal some important features of the argument.

Concerning the third point, we know the general principle that a difficulty in any generic concept necessarily involves its species. If the concept of image in general has something to do with the difficulty concerning what is not, its specific concept, apparition, cannot avoid the same difficulty. We shall discuss in the next chapter why the concept of image, rather than apparition, comes to be at stake.

The fourth point, on the other hand, seems so hard to justify that commentators blame Plato for loose or careless use of these concepts. I suspect that this point rather indicates an unusual genus-species relation between the image and its two species, the likeness and apparition. In the course of defining an image, it is described as that which 'is like' the original (*eoikos*, 240b2, 7), a word also used in the definition of likeness (*eikos*, 236a8).⁶⁸ Without doubt, this key word leads to the assimilation of image to likeness, and that means the essence of likeness is the same as that of image. At first glance this might seem strange, but we can understand this

⁶⁷ Cf. *eidōlon*, 239d4, 7, 240a5, 7 (cf. *eidōlopoios*, 239d3); *eikōn*, 240b11, 13.


⁶⁸ Both '*eikos*' and '*eikōn*' have the same etymological origin as the verb '*eoika*' ('to be like'), of which '*eoikos*' is the participle.

relation if we take up a similar example: when a musician plays a piece of music, a good and correct performance is properly called a performance, while a bad and incorrect performance, though a kind of performance, must be explained in relation to a correct performance. In this example, the definition of performance is that of correct performance. Likewise we can understand that likeness (correct image) is a normative kind of image, and its definition is the same as the definition of image, while image also plays the role of the generic concept of likeness and apparition (correct and incorrect images).

Now let us summarise what likeness and apparition really are. A likeness is a correct image of the original, and therefore, what is properly called an image. Not only does the likeness have the same proportions as the original, but also it *appears* to have those proportions when seen from a good viewpoint. In other words, for those who stand at a good viewpoint, the likeness reveals itself. Moreover, since it has the true proportions of the original, the likeness provides us with access to the original. In this sense, the likeness must be a true appearance of the original. We should keep in mind here that appearance still implies an essential difference from the original.

Apparition, on the other hand, is dependent, in its definition, on the other species, likeness. For while the essence of likeness is to have true proportions (I1: 235d6–e2), apparition is described as *not* having the true proportions of the original (I3: 236a4–6); and the definition of apparition, namely, that which *appears to be like* the original but *is not like* it (I4: 236b4–7), refers to the definition of likeness, that which *is like* the original (*eikos*, 236a8). Hence, an apparition is a deviation from a likeness, and is in definition posterior to it. An apparition is an incorrect image of the original. On the other hand, it *appears* to be like the original when seen from a certain bad viewpoint. Since ‘to be like the original’ is the essence of a likeness, an apparition pretends to be a likeness, or *appears* to be a likeness. The apparition shows the appearance of a likeness, and in this sense an apparition is

thought to be a double appearance of the original. This double involvement of appearance will be the key to understanding the sophist's art.⁶⁹



Since a likeness presents a right appearance to those who see it in its true perspective, they can apprehend the proportions of the original through the appearance. Also, those who can make likenesses are concerned with the truth of the original, and are therefore able to distinguish apparition from likeness. On the other hand, an apparition does not represent the truth of the original but only appears to be a likeness to those who are ignorant and unable to judge it properly. Since those who make apparitions ignore the truth of the original and rely solely on appearances, an apparition is a double appearance of the original and often confuses the viewer. Such appearances are false and deceptive.

Considering this result, let us examine in what way this distinction is expected to answer our basic question of how to distinguish the sophist from the philosopher; for both are thought to be concerned with appearances, though in different ways. In this chapter, we have seen that the concept of image illustrates the concept of appearance, and we may well expect that the two kinds of image-making, likeness-making and apparition-making, in some sense correspond to the two

⁶⁹ The relation between original and image is applied to the relation between truth and falsehood: 'image and falsehood' (*eidōlon kai pseudos*) is contrasted with 'truth' in *Tht.* 150c2-3 (cf. b1, e6-7, 151c3-4); false pleasures imitate (*memimē menai*) true ones in a ridiculous way (*Phlb.* 40c4-6). Hence we can say that falsehood is the image of truth. The Neoplatonic view is seen in Damascius, *In Phd.* I §293 (Westerink 1977, 170-171): falsehood is the image (*eidōlon*) of truth.

ways of dealing with appearances, of the philosopher and of the sophist. If so, we can infer that since apparition-making corresponds to the sophist's art (cf. the second point above), likeness-making should represent the philosopher's activity. In other words, in so far as both the sophist and the philosopher create appearances, they are compared to makers of images, and the philosopher should be regarded as a maker of likenesses.⁷⁰ My view that the philosopher is a likeness-maker may at first sound extraordinary, but I will show in Chapter 8 how the philosopher imitates, and makes himself *be like*, a god. We should also keep in mind that the philosopher must be not only a good *maker* of images, but also a good *viewer* of them.

As a viewer of appearances, the philosopher stands at a good viewpoint and can properly distinguish apparition from likeness, whereas the ignorant cannot discern appearances in a proper way. Furthermore, in explaining apparition, the Eleatic visitor says that if someone has enough power of sight (*dynamis*) to see a large thing, he will observe that an apparition is not like the original (in I4: 236b4–7). This might suggest that the power of sight can work beyond the actual viewpoint.⁷¹ We can imagine that the philosopher who has gained good sight is able to see images correctly, even from a bad viewpoint.⁷² Thus, the philosopher is not only a likeness-maker but also a likeness-viewer.

5.7 The definition of image

Finally, we shall examine the passage concerning the definition of image. In the Middle Part, after facing the difficulty concerning what is not, the Eleatic visitor asks what image is,

⁷⁰ Usually commentators neglect this likeness-making art; for instance, Cornford 1935, 199.

⁷¹ Sight is also mentioned in the context of the power of philosophical inquiry (232e6–8).

⁷² As inside the cave in *Rep.* VII 520c3–6: those who come back from the outside of the cave can see far better than those staying in the cave, and discern images in accordance with their originals.

in terms of which the inquirers are trying to define the sophist (239c9–240c6). The argument in this context requires definition of image so as to display how the concept of image is entangled with the difficulty concerning what is not.

First, the sophist is supposed to ask the inquirers to give a definition of image (239c9–d5). When Theaetetus gives a list of examples of images, such as reflections in water and mirror, paintings and sculptures (d6–8), the Eleatic visitor says that the sophist will pretend not to have eyes and ask them to answer in words only (239e1–240a6). We should notice here that the sophist's way of asking 'what is X?' looks like a Socratic question. This is important because the apparently Socratic method of asking questions and refuting answers was at stake in the sixth definition of the sophist (cf. 2.3). The sophist does not question our experience of visual images, but focuses on verbal difficulty in the definition of image. A definition of image is eventually given, but the sophist is waiting to attack it by pointing out that that definition contains the strange combination of 'what is not' and 'what is', and that such a combination cannot be admitted (240c1–6).

The whole argument in this part is not, as some scholars suppose, tricky or just aporetic,⁷³ but is intended to draw a conclusion that the genuine definition of image raises a difficulty. The phraseology may look very perplexing, but to reveal that perplexing outlook is the aim of the argument. Accordingly, although the conclusion is negative and aporetic, the definition itself will be sustained, once the difficulty concerning what is not is properly resolved.

Two points which I have discussed in the previous section should be remembered: what the sophist casts doubt upon is image in general (not apparition only); and the object of definition shifts from image (*eidōlon*) to likeness (*eikōn*) in the course of definition, but the substantial equation can be justified by seeing the argument.

Let us analyse the argument line by line. Theaetetus' first

⁷³ E.g. Peck 1952, 36–41.

answer shows, though not clearly, the general features of an image:

[Passage 19: 240a7 8]

Tht: What can we say an image is, Visitor, except 'another thing of the same sort' (*heteron toiouton*) made similar to the genuine thing?

This statement suggests three main points about the nature of image:

- (1) Similarity to the original: 'of the same sort' (*toiouton*), 'made similar' (*aphomoioimenon*);
- (2) Difference from the original: 'another' (different, *heteron*);
- (3) Agency of making an image similar to its original, or the causal relation between the two: signified by the passive participle 'made similar' (*aphomoioimenon*).

The Eleatic visitor takes up the phrase in Passage 19 'another thing of the same sort', and asks Theaetetus to make it clearer. This first answer is gradually refined into the true definition. The next step is as follows:

[Passage 20: 240a9 b6]

EV: (P₁) Do you mean by 'another thing of the same sort' a genuine thing (*alēthinon*), or what are you talking about?

Tht: Never genuine, but what is like it (*eoikos*).

EV: (P₂) By the genuine thing do you mean it 'really is it' (*ontōs on*)?

Tht: Yes.

EV: (P₃) Then is the not-genuine thing contrary (*enantion*) to the genuine one?

Tht: Of course.

The Eleatic visitor here asks three questions, and Theaetetus agrees on the three premises. However, although the first two premises, P₁ and P₂, are true, the third premise is problematic. For the word 'contrary' (*enantion*), which the Eleatic visitor uses as signifying negation at P₃ (240b5), will later turn out to be inappropriate.⁷⁴ By equating negation with 'contrary', instead of using the right word 'different'

⁷⁴ In the solution to the difficulty concerning what is not, it is said that whenever we use a negative particle 'not', we should understand it as signifying not 'contrary' (*enantion*) but 'different' (*heteron*) (257b1 c4). If this indicates the cause of the difficulty concerning what is not, it may well be that the wrong concept 'contrary' (*enantion*) is deliberately employed in the argument concerning image, since this argument belongs to a series of difficulties based on the same problem.

(*heteron*) in Theaetetus' first answer (Passage 19: 240a8), the Eleatic visitor seems intentionally to induce Theaetetus to adopt the next, wrong conclusion:⁷⁵

[Passage 21: 240b7–9]

EV: Don't you say, then, that what is like it (*to eoikos*) 'really *is not* it' (*ontōs ouk on*), since you insist that this is a not-genuine thing?

Tht: But nevertheless, it *is it* in a certain way (*esti pōs*).

Here are several textual problems, and interpretations of Passages 21–23 (240b7–13) differ widely among commentators.⁷⁶ First, I take the first line as a question.⁷⁷ Since Theaetetus agreed on the previous three premises, it follows from them that the image 'really *is-not* F' ('F' signifies the

⁷⁵ This line of interpretation is proposed by M. Frede 1962: since the first two premises P1 and P2 are enough to draw a right conclusion (that the image 'not really is F'), the insertion of the third, wrong premise P3 must be intentional. Notice that the same device is used in the argument on falsehood in 240d6.

⁷⁶ The text of 240b7–13 has been much discussed and often emended; for the interpretations, see Campbell 1867, 94–95, Apelt 1897, 124–125, Burnet 1900 (old OCT), Ritter 1910, 14, Burnet 1920, 137, Cornford 1935, 211, Kohnke 1957, Taylor 1961, 131, M. Frede 1962, 133–136, Runciman 1962, 67–70, Apelt 1967, 76–77, 184–185, n.58, Diès 1969, 341, Bluck 1975, 65–66, Cordero 1993, 132–133, 237–238, nn.165–169, and Annexe II, and D. B. Robinson (in Duke et al. 1995, new OCT) (hereafter I refer to these interpretations by the author's name). I interpret the text with least emendation of the manuscripts B (or β) and W, which are usually deemed stronger than others, and in a philosophically satisfactory way. Here is the text I read:

240b7 ΕΕ. Οὐκ ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἄρα λεγεις τὸ εἰκος, εἴπερ αὐτο
γε μὴ ὀληθινὸν ἔρεῖς;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἔστι γε μὴν πῶς.

b10 JE. Οὐκκοῖν ἀλληυῖν γε, φῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν· πλὴν γ' εἰκὼν ὄντως.

b12 ΕΕ. Οὐκ ὄν ἄρα οὐκ ὄντως, ἔστιν ὄντως ἦν λεγομεν
εἰκόνα;

⁷⁷ I retain the second '*ouk*' with B (β) and W, which is well attested by Proclus and others (cf. Kohnke); following Ritter, Burnet 1920, Frede, Runciman, Diès, and Bluck; and against Badham's emendation followed by Campbell, Apelt 1897, Burnet 1900 (OCT), Cornford, Apelt 1967, Cordero (esp. Annexe II) and Robinson (new OCT), which puts this '*ouk*' in the apparatus, while old OCT puts it in square brackets). Then, I take the first '*ouk*' as *nonne* (the original suggestion of Ritter, followed by Burnet 1920 and Frede). Those who retain the second '*ouk*' and take the first one as negation (Diès and Bluck) construe the phrase '*ouk ontōs ouk on*' here as a complete negation 'un irréel non-être' (Diès) or an emphasised negation '*is not, having no reality*' (Bluck). On the other hand, Runciman takes this double negative to mean 'not really non-existent', which is close to my interpretation of b12–13, but not of this passage; his interpretation admits no progress between b7–8 and b12–13.

predicate of the original);⁷⁸ this is the contrary (*enantion*) (P₃) of 'really is F' (*ontōs on*) (P₂), and a complete negation (as opposed to 'not-really is F'). Now image is taken to be what *is not F at all*.⁷⁹

The important point in this passage is that the conclusion is drawn from Theaetetus' agreement on the three premises in Passage 20, and is itself wrong, since P₃ is wrong. Although Theaetetus is not aware of what is wrong yet, the conclusion that image is what *is not F at all*, is so obviously wrong that Theaetetus immediately, at b9 (Passage 21), objects to his own conclusion which the Eleatic visitor presented just now (b7–8).⁸⁰ His answer is that the image *is* F in a certain way; for example, the portrait of Socrates *is* Socrates in a sense.⁸¹ Here we should remember that the image is said to bear the same name (*homōnymon*) as the original (cf. 234b7 in Passage 14). Then the Eleatic visitor continues:

[Passage 22: 240b10–11]

EV: Not genuinely (*alēthōs*), you say.

Tht: No, but the image really is a likeness (*eikōn*).

Next, the Eleatic visitor replies to Theaetetus' own objection

⁷⁸ This interpretation is suggested by M. Frede 1962. Burnet 1920 suggests the same translation (which follows Ritter and completely differs from his OCT edition of 1900), but his interpretation of b12–13 reveals a great difference from my interpretation of the whole argument. The commentators who omit the second 'ouk' usually translate the phrase 'ouk ontōs on' as 'not really is' (Campbell, Cornford, and Apelt 1967). However, if this phrase is correctly understood, one will find it not incompatible with Theaetetus' answer 'esti pōs' and see no problem in it (cf. Frede).

⁷⁹ We should remember that in the preceding difficulty, 'what is not' (*mē on*) is understood as what *in no way is* ('to mēdamōs on', at 237b7–8; 'to mē on auto kath' hauto', at 238c9). That seems to have caused the problem.

⁸⁰ The manuscripts attribute the first four words of b9 (in Passage 21) to the Eleatic visitor and the last word 'πῶς' (as a question 'How?') to Theaetetus (cf. Frede and Cordero 1993, 238, n.166). Hermann changes this traditional attribution into the above form, and most commentators follow him. Although Frede tries to retain the original attribution, and takes the first part as the Eleatic visitor's objection to Theaetetus' conclusion, this reading seems unnecessary if we take it as Theaetetus' objection to his own conclusion (given by the Eleatic visitor), and it leaves Theaetetus' question 'How?' isolated (which most commentators find uncomfortable). On the other hand, 'πῶς' as an enclitic ('in a certain way') appears soon after at c5 and seems more natural as Theaetetus' tentative response.

⁸¹ 'esti' in Theaetetus' answer is not existential (as Frede, Runciman and others take it), but predicative.

and reconfirms his original position that the image is not genuine (P1);⁸² Theaetetus admits this, and adds that the image really is a likeness. Here the concept of image is in essence equated with that of likeness (cf. 5.6.2). We should notice that throughout the argument the Eleatic visitor does not give his own opinion, but asks questions and draws a conclusion from Theaetetus' answers (see the frequent use of 'you say'⁸³).

Since Theaetetus is still unaware of the wrong premise which equates negation with contrariety (P3), his objection to the conclusion in Passage 21 suggests two ways of avoiding that wrong description of image. First, the true negation of 'really is F' (the genuine thing F: P2) should be not 'really *is-not* F' in Passage 21, but '*not-really* is F'. The latter description rightly points to the essence of image, and therefore, if negation is correctly understood (and the wrong premise P3 is rejected), this argument will give us a true answer. Second, Theaetetus does not acknowledge that the use of 'contrary' causes a problem, so what can be done at this stage to get a right answer is simply to deny the wrong conclusion presented by the Eleatic visitor in b7–8 (Passage 21); for evidently it does *not* state the true nature of image. The final answer is given in the second way:⁸⁴

[Passage 23: 240b12–13]

EV: Not *really not being* it (*ouk on ouk ontōs*), it is really what we call a likeness.

This description of image (here likeness) contains a double negation,⁸⁵ which means that the image '*not really-is-not* F';

⁸² I take the reading of T '*ge phēis*', instead of '*g' ephēn*' in B (β) and W (*pace* Frede).

⁸³ *legeis*, 240a9, b7; *legōn*, b3; *eipes*, b1; *ereis*, b8; *phēis* (T), b10.

⁸⁴ Therefore, the intentional use of 'contrary' has a double role here: on the one hand, it indicates what is wrong with this argument, and on the other, it implies that a true answer can be obtained by denial of contrariety.

⁸⁵ I retain the second '*ouk*' with all the major manuscripts (cf. Campbell, Frede, Runciman, Diès, and Bluck), while Apelt 1897, Cornford, Cordero, and Robinson (new OCT) omit it by following Badham's emendation. Also, I read '*Ouk on*' for the first words, not '*Oukoun*' ('Therefore') as Ritter and Burnet 1920 suggest (the reading of T).

the image is *not* a thing that is *not* F *at all*'.⁸⁶ This denies the wrong conclusion in b7–8 (Passage 21) and the second way of obtaining the right answer.

I propose that the argument from Passage 21 to Passage 23 as a whole presents the true description of image. First, an image (or likeness) not really is F (that is, not the original); it is different from the original. Second, however, it is false to say that an image really is-not F; it is not completely different from the original, either.⁸⁷ Third, we can say that an image *is* F in a certain way. For example, the statue of Socrates is not Socrates, is not non-Socrates, and is Socrates. Not only a statue but also a description of Socrates can be said to *be Socrates*: Socrates in the *Phaedo* is Socrates, which is a correct image, whereas Socrates in Aristophanes' *Clouds* is a distorted one. This is *how* the essence of the image is determined. At this stage, this description may sound puzzling, but it will turn out to be a true definition retrospectively.

Here, I shall consider two more points. First, some commentators take the argument as referring to degrees of reality which Plato maintains in the *Republic*.⁸⁸ As the Form of the bed is called 'really real' (*ontōs ousa*) in *Republic* X 597d1–2,

⁸⁶ Those who take this last formula to mean that the image is an unreal thing are simply wrong (Campbell, Taylor, Diès, and Bluck); for the image is neither unreal nor completely different from the original (for otherwise, how could we distinguish an image from a thing which is not an image at all?). According to them, the conclusion of Passage 23 must be presenting only a paradox and not a genuine definition of image. On the other hand, Burnet 1920 and Cornford (who do not take a double negation) interpret this as 'not really real' (Burnet). This is not wrong in itself as a definition of image, but they do not explain the line of argument. Frede and Runciman rightly read this phrase as a double negation: 'a likeness is neither a real thing (240b2) nor a really unreal thing', and 'in some sense both real (*on*) and unreal (*mē on*)' (Runciman 1962, 68; though, as I pointed out before, he interprets b7–8 in the same way as here, which differs from my interpretation); 'das Bild, etwas Nichtseiendes, tatsächlich etwas Nichtseiendes sei, aber nichtseiend in einem anderen Sinne als das schlechthin Nichtseiende' (Frede 1962, 136).

⁸⁷ Proclus read '*ouk ontōs ouk on*' in 240b12, but the three passages which mention the argument on the image in Plato's *Sophist* (*In Parm.* 744.32–34, 816.18–20, 842.7–8) do not suggest that he holds a special view of this strange phrase (cf. Kohnke 1957). Proclus distinguishes 'what is not' between the negation of something and the absolute non-being (999).

⁸⁸ Cornford 1935, 209–210, 212, and Runciman 1962, 68–70, take the view of degrees of reality, and Bluck 1975, 66, n.2, rightly criticises their view.

the use of 'really' (*ontōs*) may seem to represent a higher degree of reality, but some uses in the same argument ('*ontōs*' in b11 and the second '*ontōs*' in b12) do not designate such degrees, and therefore their interpretation does not fit the argument. The meaning of 'real' should be interpreted here not as 'existent' but as 'genuine'.⁸⁹

Second, others see some confusion in the uses of the verb 'to be' in this argument: according to them, when it is said that the image '*is-not*', the negation of the verb 'to be' must mean non-identity ('it is not identical with the original'), while the other affirmative use signifies predication ('it really is an image') or existence ('it really exists').⁹⁰ However, we do not have to assume such an argument here. We can simply admit that the image 'not really is F', 'not really is-not F', and 'is F'. This is not a matter of different uses of the verb 'to be', but how the essence of the image is described in terms of 'is' and 'is not'.⁹¹

Although this argument, if correctly interpreted, gives a true definition of image (and likeness), image now turns out to be embroiled in the queer complexity of what is not and what is (240c1–6), and this conclusion requires a further investigation into these difficult concepts. In this argument Plato may be employing repetition and perplexing use of the words 'not', 'really', and 'is', deliberately. However puzzling this definition of image may sound, it exactly indicates ontological features of the concept of appearance. We shall now turn to the difficulties raised in the Middle Part.

⁸⁹ As proposed by Austin 1962, Vlastos 1965 and 1966, and Burnyeat 1979. For this sense of '*ontōs*', see *Sph.* 216c5–6 and *Plt.* 293e2–3.

⁹⁰ Cf. Bluck 1975, 66–68.

⁹¹ Essentially, the image is the matter of sameness and difference in relation to the original; cf. Vernant 1991d, 167–168.

CHAPTER 6

THE SOPHISTIC COUNTER-ATTACK ON PHILOSOPHY

6.1 The sophistic counter-attack in the Middle Part

In the first two chapters I proposed and showed that the basic problem of the *Sophist* is how to distinguish the sophist from the philosopher; a sophist appears in various guises, so does a philosopher, but to secure the possibility of philosophy, it is necessary to determine what a sophist really is. The third and fourth chapters picked up one key concept of the sophist's art, namely, appearing; appearing to be wise is regarded as the core of the sophist's art. The fifth chapter then continued to examine this concept of appearance in relation to the concept of image. In searching for the sophist, we have thus narrowed down the inquiry and focused on the concept of appearance in accordance with Plato's argument in the first Outer Part of the *Sophist*. Concerning this characterisation of the sophist, however, difficulties emerge and force the inquirers to suspend definitional inquiry during the Middle Part (236d9–264b8). The difficulties are concerned with appearance, image, falsehood and what is not, and they are raised as if the sophist makes a counter-attack on philosophical inquiry.

In this chapter we shall first see what the counter-attack by the sophist means, and then examine what the difficulties raised in the Middle Part are and how they relate to each other, particularly in relation to the basic problem of defining the sophist.

The metaphor of counter-attack attempted by the sophist prevails throughout the argument of the Middle Part. This metaphor not only provides a literary device to make an argument more dramatic, but also represents an essential feature of the sophist's art and the relationship between the

sophist and the philosopher. To assess the role of this metaphor, we must first observe that there are two main metaphors used in the *Sophist*, namely, hunting and fighting, and see how they shift.¹

The image of hunting and escaping has been predominant in the inquiry into the definition of the sophist, and associated especially with the method of division: the inquirers trace the species of the sophist in each branch of division, and try to find and capture him in his proper species.² On the other hand, the sophist is said to be of such a slippery kind that it is no easy task to capture him.³ In particular, the division of the image-making art was undertaken with a view to seizing the game (sc. the sophist) in a net of definition somewhere in the genus of image-making (235a10–d5).⁴ This was expected to be a final attempt to capture the sophist, but nevertheless, it turned out to be unsuccessful; at the end of the division of the image-making art, the Eleatic visitor expresses a suspicion that the sophist has escaped their inquiry (236c9–d3; cf. 235d2–3).

The Middle Part begins with this seeming failure of the hunt, and the metaphor of the inquirers' hunting and the sophist's escaping changes into that of the sophist's counter-attacking and the inquirers' defending. From the moment when the definitional inquiry gets stuck, the sophist turns to make a counter-attack on the foundations of philosophical

¹ For Plato's use of these metaphors, see Louis 1945, 53–55 (hunting) and 57–63 (fighting).

² This metaphor is seen from the beginning of the definitional inquiry: to search after ('*metiontes*', 218d8); to find ('*heurein*', 221c6; '*anēurēkenai*', 223a9; '*hēurethē*', 231d3); to pursue ('*metadiōkomenon*', 225e5). Also, the Eleatic visitor says that the sophist must also be at a loss how to escape inquiry (231c3–6); and that the inquirers must capture and bind up the sophist (261a2–3). The phrase 'to catch by both hands' (226a6–7, 231c5–6) must be a metaphor of hunting (Campbell 1867, 41), rather than of wrestling (Cornford 1935, 188).

³ The difficulty of capturing the sophist is repeated: 'hard to catch' ('*dysthēreuton*', 218d3, 261a5); this prey is 'not to be caught by a single hand' (226a6–7; cf. 231c5–6); the sophist 'has escaped into a difficult kind' (236d1–3); 'it seems impossible to capture the sophist' (241c2–3); the sophist 'takes refuge in a difficult place' (that is, the difficulty concerning what is not, 260c11–d4; cf. 254a4–7).

⁴ For this metaphor, see Cornford 1935, 196, n.2.

inquiry, and tries to demolish them all.⁵ Here an image of fighting with each other becomes conspicuous: the sophist fights against the inquirers in certain ways (260d5–e3),⁶ and the inquirers must also fight against him (*diamachesthai*, 261a7) by breaking through many obstacles (or problems, *problēmata*) which the sophist has thrown before them (261a6–b4).⁷ The way the sophist fights against the inquirers is to make counter-argument. When all the difficulties are solved, the Eleatic visitor refers back to the beginning of the Middle Part, and says that ‘the argument appeared which argues against all (*tou logou tou pasin amphisbētountos*)’ (264c10–11). With regard to this statement, we must remember that ‘arguing against’ (*amphisbētein*) was one of the main characteristics of the sophist’s art, which is a kind of ‘fighting’ (*machētikon*, 225a6, 8, 226a3). For according to the fifth definition, the sophist is a fighter in argument.⁸ Hence the counter-argument in the Middle Part illustrates and exemplifies the fighting method of the sophist’s art: namely, arguing against or controverting (*antilegein*).

Entrapment provides the core of the image: the sophist traps the inquirers into contradiction when they insist that falsehood or image really is (236e3–237a1, 240c3–6, 241a8–b3, d9–e6). For the inquirers are forced to contradict themselves in stating that what is not *is* (cf. 238d1–239c8). For example, the Eleatic visitor says that, ‘if we should speak of him as possessing the art of apparition-making, by means of that argument (sc. the difficulty concerning what is not) he will readily trip up our statements and direct them in the opposite direction toward us’ (239c9–d2). This state of

⁵ We can see this style of exposition in several passages: 239c9 240a6, c1 6, 241a3 b3, 260c11 261b4, 264c10 d2. The inquirers must defend themselves (*amynesthai*) against counter-attack (240a6).

⁶ Cf. *machesthai*, 260d6; *diamachesthai*, 260e1.

⁷ The metaphor of capturing a city is used in 261b8 c4. ‘*problēmata*’, which the sophist throws (*proballein*), has a double meaning: obstacles for defence in war (cf. *Plt.* 279d1–2) and problems; cf. Campbell 1867, 170, and Taylor 1961, 171.

⁸ The fifth definition characterises the sophist as arguing against (*amphisbētēsis*) (225a12 b2), and specifically as controverting (*antilogikon*), i.e. arguing against with short questions and answers (225b8–11).

contradicting oneself is the aim of the sophist's counter-attack.⁹

Here, we should remember that the sophist himself was regarded as a hunter: just as an angler tries to catch fish, a sophist hunts the rich young, in the first definition (221c5–223b8). In this sense, hunting a sophist is like hunting a wolf, which will inevitably involve the inquirers in fighting. The metaphor of counter-attack is not completely new nor different from the previous one of hunting,¹⁰ but rather reinforces the formidable image of the difficulty of capturing the sophist. The sophist makes a counter-attack on philosophy by putting many difficulties in the way of inquiry, and the inquirers, in hunting the sophist, must defend themselves against his counter-attack by solving and removing them.

The sophist's counter-attack, which provokes the long argument of the Middle Part, reveals the method of the sophist, and if you look at the inquirers' defence, you will also find what a philosophical task is. For the argument of the Middle Part, as a defence against the counter-attack, also exemplifies the method of philosophy in that it demonstrates what philosophical argument should be.¹¹ This mutual relation between counter-attacking and defending characterises the tension between the sophist and the philosopher: their activities are intertwined, and one cannot be understood without the other. In this way the function of the whole argument of the Middle Part is to illustrate and exemplify the conflict between sophistic counter-attack (raising difficulties) and philosophic response (resolving them). We should now observe what the difficulties are.

⁹ Cf. 238d4–239a12. Making the interlocutors contradict themselves becomes a characteristic of the sophist's art in the final definition (268b3–5, b10–c4, c8). We shall discuss this point in 6.4.2 and 8.4.

¹⁰ Hunting was for the inquirers to set upon the sophist (231c6); the sophist takes refuge in the difficult place *and* makes a counter-attack from there (260c11–e3). Campbell 1867, 76, comments on 235b9–c2 and says that the sophist is 'imagined as a flying enemy who may either turn to bay or hide himself in the bush'.

¹¹ The investigation in the Middle Part is regarded as 'a philosopher's task': 249e10–d4, 253c6–254b6, and 260a6–7. I shall exploit this point in the next chapter.

6.2 Four difficulties raised

To capture the sophist in the field of imitation, the art of image-making is divided into two species: likeness-making (*eikastikē*) and apparition-making (*phantastikē*). The Eleatic visitor says, however, that he is not sure to which of them the sophist's art should be ascribed (235d2–3, 236c9–d4; cf. 264c7–9). At this point the inquiry into the sophist through division is suspended, and the new argument of the Middle Part begins.

At the beginning of the Middle Part, the inquirers confront four kinds of difficulties with regard to the preceding inquiry: they are concerned with (a) appearance or seeming without being so, (b) image, (c) falsehood, and (d) what is not (*mē on*). Our first task must be to examine the relations between these difficulties to seek a unified view of the dialogue. Usually these issues are treated separately and independently, so that commentators miss not only the internal relations between the difficulties raised and discussed in the Middle Part, but also their essential connection to the basic problem of defining the sophist. Failure adequately to consider their position in relation to the basic problem will leave a mere medley of philosophical puzzles. Commentators lose sight of the unity of the dialogue.

To examine how these difficulties stand in relation to each other and to the basic problem, we need to clarify the framework of issues. There are several signposts to the procedure of the argument, and we should not miss them.

[Signpost 1] First, three difficulties out of the four are presented at the beginning of the Middle Part:

[Passage 24: 236d9–237b2]

EV: Really, my dear friend, we are in an extremely difficult inquiry. That is, (a) this 'to appear or seem to be so, but not to be so' (*to phainesthai kai to dokein, einai de mē*), and (c) 'to state something, but not the truth', all of these notions are always entangled with perplexities before and now. For what is the right way of speaking, to state or judge that falsehood really is? And it's very hard, Theaetetus, not to be entangled in contradiction while uttering this.

Tht: Why?

EV: This statement implies the daring assumption (d) that what is not *is* (*to mē on einai*). For in no other way could falsehood have being. But, young man, when we were young, the great Parmenides gave his testimony against this from beginning to end saying on occasion both in prose and in verse: 'Never shall this be proved that things that are not *are*. From this way of inquiry thou must hold back thy thought.'¹² That is his testimony, and, above all, the statement itself will reveal this truth, if properly examined.

Three kinds of difficulties are raised in this passage: (a) appearing or seeming without being so; (c) stating a falsehood; and (d) the assumption that what is not *is*. Speaking about (a) appearance without being or (c) falsehood brings us into contradiction, and a meta-question of how to speak of stating a falsehood is now at stake.¹³

Of these three issues, the first two, (a) appearance without reality and (c) falsehood, are the features which have been ascribed to the sophist's art in the preceding argument (232b1–233d2). As we have argued in our full discussion, (a) appearance is the key issue concerning the basic problem of the dialogue, that is, defining the sophist; for the sophist's essence lies in *appearing* or *seeming* to the young to be arguing well, and thereby to be wise, without really being so.¹⁴ Hence, it is quite natural that this key issue of (a) appearance is taken up here, at the head of the series of difficulties.¹⁵ As for (c) falsehood, we remember that 'arguing without saying sound things' makes the sophist's appearance possible (Passage 8: 233a5–7), and therefore, the speaking activity of the sophist should in some way commit false-

¹² DK 28 B7.1 2; cf. 258d2 3. I read '*damēi*' (Simplicius) at 237a8 and 258d2 (cf. Guthrie 1965, 21); the two citations use slightly different words ('*dizēmenos*' at 237a9 and '*dizēsios*' at 258d3).

¹³ Cf. M. Frede 1996, 143–145.

¹⁴ Both 'to appear' (*phainesthai*) and 'to seem' (*dokein*) are used in the New Attempt, as in Passage 24: *phainesthai*, 233b3, 4, c6; *dokein*, 233b4, c1, 234c6, 235a2; *doxa*, 233b1; *doxastikē*, 233c10.

¹⁵ However, this key issue of (a) appearance is ignored by most commentators. Cornford 1935, 199–202, who is one exception, so heavily depends on the *Republic* for his interpretation that he sees a metaphysical problem concerning the ontological status of appearance (in contrast with reality, i.e. Forms) in this argument. That seems to me implausible.

hood.¹⁶ On the other hand, the difficulty concerning (d) what is not is newly introduced here as the assumption on which the previous two difficulties, (a) appearance and (c) falsehood, depend. Parmenides maintained that it is impossible that what is not *is* (we shall call this ‘the Parmenidean thesis’).

[Signpost 2] Later, another difficulty concerning (b) the concept of an image is introduced along with these three difficulties.¹⁷ The difficulty is that the concept of an image assumes in its definition the being of what is not, and therefore the sophist insists that no image is possible (239c9–240c6). This difficulty is introduced in the following manner, and obviously related to the previous characterisation of the sophist as an image-maker:

[Passage 25: 239c9 d4]

EV: If we should speak of him as possessing the art of apparition-making, by means of that argument (sc. the difficulty concerning what is not) he will readily trip up our statements and direct them in the opposite direction toward us. When we call him a maker of images, he will ask what on earth we mean by an image.

The difficulty of (b) image depends on the difficulty concerning (d) what is not. As we concluded in Chapter 5, the concept of image is introduced to illustrate the concept of appearance, and we understand that the issue of (b) image is essentially related to the original issue of (a) appearance in that way. Also, we should notice that while the inquirers try to ascribe apparition-making to the sophist, the sophist questions the ontological status of the generic concept of image.

¹⁶ The word ‘falsehood’ (*pseudes*), though naturally anticipated as the counterpart of ‘truth’ in 233c11 and 234c6, appears for the first time in this dialogue here at 236e4. Unsound argument may well involve falsehood, as Aristotle’s analysis of sophistical argument indicates (cf. Notomi 1994): unsound argument is either invalid inference or valid inference from false premises (*Top.* I 1 100a27–101a4, *SE.* 2 165b1–8), and premises of an apparent inference can be interpreted as ‘true in one sense, and false in another’ (*Top.* I 18 108a32–33); and thus, any paralogism (at least those dependent on diction) can be transformed into a valid inference with false premises (*SE.* 8 169b37–40).

¹⁷ Cornford 1935, 201, treats this difficulty as part of the difficulty concerning (a) appearance, but we should discuss them separately.

[Signpost 3] The relationship between the difficulties of (b) apparition (which is one species of image) and (c) falsehood is explained in the next passage:

[Passage 26: 240d1–4]

EV: When we say that he deceives concerning (b) an apparition and that his art is an art of deception, shall we say that, as a result of his art, our soul judges (c) what is false, or what shall we say?

[Signpost 4] When the Eleatic visitor declares his intention to commit a sort of parricide, he explains the reason for that by summarising the difficulties they confront:

[Passage 27: 241e1–5]

EV: For if these propositions are neither refuted nor accepted, anyone who speaks about (c) false statements or false judgements as being (b) images, likenesses, imitations, or apparitions, or even about any arts concerned with such things, can hardly escape being made fun of by being forced to contradict himself.¹⁸

The last sentence points to the difficulty concerning (d) what is not, as the focus of all the difficulties related to (b) image and (c) falsehood.

[Signpost 5] We should also pay attention to the transition from the argument on what is not, to the argument on falsehood in the Middle Part. After the difficulty concerning (d) what is not is solved, the rest of the difficulties are newly formulated in the following way (260b10–261a3):¹⁹

- i) If (c) falsehood is possible, then deception is possible; and if deception is possible, then everything is full of (b) images, likenesses, and *phantasia*;
- ii) But the sophist has denied that (c) falsehood is possible (and insists that everything is true), on the ground that it is impossible (d) that what is not *is*;
- iii) Now the possibility is proved that what is not *is*, but the sophist will maintain that (c) falsehood is still impossible in another way: that statement and judgement cannot be com-

¹⁸ As to the interpretation of 241e3–4, I follow Apelt 1897, 128 (also Apelt 1967, 81), Cornford 1935, 215, and White 1993, 31, rather than Campbell 1867, 100, and Taylor 1961, 134. This reading of e3–4 implies that false statement and judgement are some kind of image.

¹⁹ This passage is particularly important for interpreting the meaning of *phantasia* (260c9). I shall examine it thoroughly as Passages 42 and 43 in Chapter 7.

bined with what is not. And on this new ground, he will once again contend that (b) no image exists.

This argument clearly indicates that the difficulty concerning (b) image depends on the difficulty concerning (c) falsehood; without a solution to the latter, no solution to the former is possible. On the other hand, a solution to the difficulty concerning (d) what is not was necessary, but not sufficient for a solution to that concerning (c) falsehood. The inquiry needs a further argument for this.

[Signpost 6] The final clue to seeing order among the difficulties they confront in the Middle Part lies at the beginning of the final inquiry into the definition of the sophist. The Eleatic visitor there reviews the preceding arguments that have solved all the difficulties (264c10–d6; cf. 266d8–e5):²⁰

- i) When they were wondering which of the two kinds of image-making should be attributed to the sophist, the argument appeared which argues, against all, that there is (b) no likeness, no image, and no apparition whatsoever, on the ground that (c) no falsehood is possible;
- ii) But since the argument of the Middle Part has proved that there is (c) falsehood, (b) imitation of beings and the art of deception become possible.

This review confirms our analysis of the framework.

From these six signposts, we observe the relations between the four groups of problematic concepts: (a) appearance and seeming without being; (b) image (including likeness and apparition) and imitation; (c) falsehood; and (d) what is not:²¹

- (I) The difficulty concerning (a) appearance without being should be the main target of solution, and the difficulty concerning (d) what is not is the highest philosophical problem, on which all the other difficulties depend (Signpost 1).²²


²⁰ This passage is to be examined in Passages 46 and 47 in Chapter 8.

²¹ Cornford 1935, 201–202, classifies them differently into three kinds of problems, though they are ‘not kept rigidly distinct’; for my criticism of Cornford’s interpretation, see notes 15 and 17 above.

²² I disagree with Gulley 1962, 148, who takes it that false statement and belief are the main problems which raise other important metaphysical issues of appearance and image.

- (2) The difficulty concerning (b) image depends on the difficulty concerning (d) what is not (Signpost 2).
- (3) The difficulty concerning (b) image also depends on the difficulty concerning (c) falsehood (Signposts 3, 5, and 6).
- (4) The difficulties concerning (a) appearance and (c) falsehood depend on the highest difficulty concerning (d) what is not (Signposts 1, 4, and 5).

Although each relationship will become clearer through examination, we can at this point conclude that the four difficulties are presented in such a way that they proceed from the original issue of appearance, which is directly connected to the basic problem, to the highest philosophical issue of what is not. It is in this way that the basic problem of defining the sophist underlies the whole argument of the Middle Part. Thus, the Middle Part constitutes a pedimental structure with a digression on dialectic (253c–254b) at the top:



Finally, one important point must be added. Since the difficulty concerning (a) appearance is not mentioned after the first statement (Signpost 1: Passage 24), it may seem to be ignored in the rest of the Middle Part. However, not only have we seen that appearance is the key issue for the basic problem of the whole dialogue, but also we shall see in the next chapter that the final argument of the Middle Part proves that *phantasia* (or ‘it appears’) can be true or false (264a4–b4), which must be a part of the solution to the difficulty concerning (a) appearance. In this chapter, I shall

prove that all the other difficulties are directed toward this original issue of appearance, so that the whole argument in the Middle Part is investigated in order to resolve the basic problem of defining the sophist.

Our next task is to examine what exactly these difficulties are, and what their philosophical implications are. Each of the four difficulties has its own original philosophical background, but since there is a certain order of dependence among them, we must examine each of them not as an entirely independent issue, but as part of the link which bridges the gap between the Outer Part and the Middle Part. We shall start with the highest difficulty concerning (d) what is not, and proceed back to the original difficulty concerning (a) appearance.

6.3 The difficulty concerning what is not

At the beginning of the Middle Part (in Passage 24), as soon as the division of the image-making art is suspended, inquiry all of a sudden plunges into the abyss of philosophical puzzlement. The inquirers face the question of whether they dare assume that what is not really *is*, against Parmenides, the great Eleatic philosopher, who repeatedly testified to the impossibility of this assumption: 'Never shall this be proved – that things that are not *are*. From this way of inquiry thou must hold back thy thought.'²³

The Parmenidean thesis maintains that it is impossible to think that what is not *is*, and this thesis and its consequences, namely, the denials of plurality and change, have long burdened his followers: how is one to avoid this extremity and explain the plurality of beings and the changes in things? It is on this strong thesis that all the other difficulties concerning falsehood, image, and appearance, are said in the *Sophist* to depend.

²³ Parmenides, DK 28 B7.1 2, cited in 237a8 9 and 258d2 3. Coxon 1986, 190–191, interprets this fragment in a different way, but as he admits, Plato's citation naturally leads us to my translation (cf. Kirk, Raven & Schofield 1983, 248). I do not discuss the original poem of Parmenides here.

In contrast to the argument on the sophist in the Outer Part, which commentators have taken to be far less important in a philosophical sense, this difficulty about what is not is unanimously agreed to be one of the most important issues in Greek philosophy, since a response to this thesis was the main concern of Greek thinkers after Parmenides.²⁴ The traditional view of this dialogue separates the argument of the Middle Part from that of the Outer Part, and regards the one as philosophical and the other as non-philosophical.²⁵ However, the apparent contrast between sophistic frivolity and philosophical seriousness in the two parts is no longer justified. Firstly, in my view, not only is the argument on the sophist in the Outer Part of fundamental significance for philosophy, but also the philosophical argument of the Middle Part deals with the sophist. Secondly, it is the sophistic counter-attack which evokes this philosophical difficulty concerning what is not. This view will shed a new light on the argument of the Middle Part: the famous thesis of Parmenides, the leading thinker of earlier Greek philosophy, collaborates with the sophist's argument. In order to reject the sophistic counter-attack, the inquirers have to commit 'parricide' by examining and refuting the Parmenidean thesis.²⁶ The framework of the Middle Part clearly indicates that sophistic counter-attack is firmly based on 'philosophical' problems, and needs serious and philosophical examination. Hence, we have no simple way of separating sophistic and philosophical arguments in the *Sophist*.

Now let us examine the presentation of the difficulty concerning what is not (237b7–239c8), particularly its relation to the Parmenidean thesis. The Eleatic visitor says that the thesis has not only been propounded by Parmenides, but

²⁴ Zeno of Elea and Melissus push Parmenides' position further, and Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists try to escape it. Although the Atomists identify 'what is not' with 'void' (*kenon*), Plato is the only one to examine the concept of 'what is not' in its own right. Eleatic arguments have been influential in the whole history of Western philosophy (e.g. Zeno's paradoxes).

²⁵ Remember Ryle's comments on this dialogue (cf. note 31 of Chapter 1).

²⁶ Plato's ambivalent attitude toward Parmenides is expressed in *Theaetetus* 183e3–184b2; after the postponement of examining Parmenides in that dialogue, the *Sophist* dares to commit parricide (241d1–242a4; cf. 258c6–e5).

will also be proved by testing the statement itself (*ho logos autos*) (237b1–2). The argument moves in three stages:²⁷

The first difficulty (237b7–e7) arises when someone is asked to what he ascribes the word ‘what is not’. The first premise governs the whole argument: this at least is obvious (*dēlon*), that ‘what is not’ should never be assigned to something that is (237c7–9).²⁸ Then an argument follows this first premise. It should not be assigned to a ‘thing’ (*ti*), either, since ‘thing’ is always said of what is (*on*); while someone who states a thing states one thing (*hen ti*), one who states not-something (*mē ti*) states nothing (*mēden*); and therefore, he does not speak at all.²⁹

The second difficulty is greater and fundamental (238a1–c11).³⁰ Again the main point of agreement determines the whole argument: that ‘what is’ can never be attached to ‘what is not’ (238a7–9; cf. c5–7). From this premise, it follows that no attribute, including number, can be attached to ‘what is not’. On the other hand, when we speak of ‘what is not’ (*to mē on*), we attach oneness to it, and when we speak of ‘things that are not’ (*ta mē onta*), we attach plurality to them. Since this is not possible, we conclude that ‘what is not’ by itself (*auto kath’ hauto*) is unutterable, unspeakable, and unthinkable (238c8–11).

The third stage (238d1–239a12) points out a contradiction already implied in the second difficulty. In the conclusion of the second stage two kinds of contradiction occur at once. When I *said* in the conclusion of the second stage that what is not *is* unutterable, unspeakable, and unthinkable, I have attached ‘is’ to the subject ‘what is not’ and treated it as one

²⁷ I examined this argument in Notomi 1991a, and the main points remain the same. Here I do not examine the content of the difficulty concerning what is not, but rather try to clarify the structure of the problem.

²⁸ Reading ‘*ti*’ after ‘*epi*’ (c7), as in OCT (Burnet 1900) and new OCT (Duke et al. 1995).

²⁹ Throughout the argument on what is not, number (especially, oneness) plays an important role (cf. McCabe 1994, 193–199): what is not can be neither one nor many (237d6–11, 238a10–c4, d9–e4, 239a3–12).

³⁰ The Eleatic visitor actually says that this second difficulty is ‘greatest and primary’ (*hē megistē kai prōtē*, 238a1–2), but as they will soon see, the third is greater (238d1–2). Of course, the Eleatic visitor must knowingly put it in this way to highlight the third stage (cf. Campbell 1867, 87).

thing; I contradict myself because I earlier said that we should not attach 'what is' to 'what is not'. Moreover, in the same conclusion I have already *spoken* of what is not, and therefore, that conclusion itself is pragmatically self-contradicting.³¹ The difficulty here reaches an extreme point.

Although these arguments, especially the first difficulty, may remind us of some eristic argumentation, I believe the process of argument is strict and serious,³² and the inference seems to me to be valid (except for one suspicious move at 237e4–6 in the first difficulty).³³ If all the premises were true, then these arguments would force us into intellectual stalemate. Plato has two strategies, however, for avoiding such a dead end.

First, each argument is based on one pivotal premise, that 'what is not' cannot be combined with 'what is'.³⁴ Both the 'obvious' premise in the first difficulty that 'what is not' should never be assigned to something that is (237c7–9), and the main agreement in the second difficulty that 'what is' can never be attached to 'what is not' (238a7–9), can be interpreted as variations of this pivotal premise. The pivotal premise is obviously agreed on the Parmenidean thesis, and it constitutes an Achilles' heel in each argument. Accordingly, the difficulty concerning what is not arises *if* we assume that the Parmenidean thesis is true. If, on the other hand, we prove, against the Parmenidean thesis, that what is not *is* (or

³¹ Passmore 1961, ch. 4: Self-refutation, analyses three kinds of self-refutation. According to his analysis, our first case is not self-refuting but 'contradicting oneself', and the second is 'pragmatically self-refuting'. Neither is what he calls 'absolutely self-refuting'.

³² Some may take the first difficulty to be a mere trick, but as the Eleatic visitor himself puts it, the argument is not eristic or playful, but serious (237b10–c4); Campbell 1867, 83, comments that this remark is not ironical, but marks 'the real importance of the inquiry'.

³³ I agree with McCabe 1994, 196–197, who sees 'no sleight of hand' up to 237e3 in the first difficulty, but regards the final step (e4–6) as the 'dangerous move'.

³⁴ I formulate this 'pivotal premise' in terms of the combination between kinds, which appears in the later argument: if we take 'what is' and 'what is not' as two kinds, we can ask whether these kinds can be combined or not (260d3, 5; cf. 259a4–b6). The present argument on the difficulty concerning what is not has some echoes of the vocabulary of combination and mixture which becomes predominant later in the Middle Part: 'fit to' (*prosharmottein*), 238c6; 'participate in' (*metechein*), 238e2; 'attach to' (*proshaptein*), 238e8, 239a3.

that 'what is not' can be combined with 'what is'), the difficulty concerning what is not will disappear. Thus, the difficulty concerning what is not results *from* the Parmenidean thesis, but does not result *in* it.³⁵ This point is crucial to Plato's strategy in the Middle Part.

Second, it is important to see how Plato puts the original argument of Parmenides in reverse order. Parmenides in his poem argues as if he presupposes that what is not is self-evidently unspeakable and unthinkable, and concludes his thesis from this presupposition; he says, 'I shall not allow you to say or think from what is not; for (*gar*) 'is not' is not to be said (*phaton*) nor thought (*noēton*)' (DK 28 B8.7–8).³⁶ By contrast, Plato posits as a premise the Parmenidean thesis of the incompatibility of what is not with what is, and deduces from it the conclusion of the second difficulty, that what is not is unthinkable and unspeakable. Plato goes so far as to show, at the third stage, that to state that what is not is unspeakable is itself an ultimate self-contradiction; this may be to point out the self-contradictory nature of Parmenides' position. Hence, it is the Parmenidean thesis, according to Plato's argument, that is the origin of the difficulty.

These two strategies of Plato's argument make it possible to reject Parmenides' position and to resolve the difficulty concerning what is not. Since, according to Plato's analysis, this difficulty depends entirely on the Parmenidean thesis, it will be resolved if the Parmenidean thesis is refuted; and in turn the Parmenidean thesis itself can be refuted by proving the possibility of combining 'what is not' and 'what is'. Thus it becomes the main task of the Middle Part to examine and refute the Parmenidean thesis in this way.

We should also notice that there is an epistemological issue lying behind this difficulty. The greatest difficulty concerning what is not arises with reference to the first person as audience, and its solution is to be attained by an investigation

³⁵ Therefore, Cornford 1935, 203–209, is wrong when he insists that Plato, as in *Republic* V, confirms and accepts Parmenides' doctrine. See Peck 1952, 34–36: 'Plato is condemning, not endorsing, Parmenides.'

³⁶ Cf. B8.17 ('*anoēton anōnymon*').

which goes beyond the private perspective. Let us re-examine the process of argument.

The first difficulty concerning what is not (237b7–e7) is presented in the form of putting a question to one of the audience:³⁷ ‘if one of the audience must answer where this name “what is not” should be assigned, of what shall we think this person uses this word and what shall we think he indicates to the questioner?’ (237b10–c4) The aporetic conclusion of this first difficulty is that *the person* who speaks what is not, does not speak at all (237e4–7). This argument posits a third person and examines what he does,³⁸ so that it does not request *our own* commitment to the difficulty. The conclusion is absurd, but not self-contradictory. On the other hand, the second difficulty (238a1–c11), which examines how *we* talk about what is not, inevitably involves us in the difficulty and forces us to contradict ourselves in the third stage (238d1–239a12):³⁹ when *I* state the conclusion that ‘what is not’ is unspeakable and unthinkable (238c8–10), I am already contradicting myself, since I *say* that ‘what is not’ is so and so (238d4–239a7).⁴⁰ This self-contradictory state is exactly what the sophistic counter-attack aims at. The Eleatic visitor confesses that ‘I’ am now and already defeated in the cross-examination of what is not (239b1–3), and the upshot is: ‘Let us dismiss you and me!’ (239c4) The greatest difficulty concerning what is not, with reference to the first person, I, finally forces the Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus to abandon seeking a reasonable argument in ‘you and me’ (239b1–c8). After facing this difficulty, the inquirers have to set out a new investigation into what is, in another way.

As long as the inquirers use a third person as the subject of argument, the argument raises only a general difficulty, but once we ourselves are included in the argument, a serious

³⁷ The audience means ‘this company’ (Cornford 1935, 204), or ‘the hearers of Parmenides’ (Campbell 1867, 83: ‘Parmenides is conceived as thus questioning one of his hearers in defence of his thesis’).

³⁸ The third person is continuously used in 237c1, d6, e1, 4–5 (though ‘*legomen*’ is used in d2).

³⁹ The subject in the argument is ‘we’: 238a8, 10, b2, 10, c1, 5; cf. d2 (aporia).

⁴⁰ Notice that the subject of this aporia is ‘I’: 238d9–e3, 6, 239a1, 3, 6; cf. b1–3.

difficulty of ‘contradicting myself’ arises.⁴¹ This means that we, readers, cannot appreciate the force of the difficulty unless we put ourselves in the position of the inquirers, who are forced into contradiction by the sophist, and face the difficulty itself. It is *we* who contradict ourselves in the difficulty concerning what is not. In order to solve this issue, we must go somewhere beyond ‘me’. Though crucial, the change of perspective in the argument and the epistemological implication of this change have been ignored by commentators.

Finally, I draw attention to another important point concerning this argument: the difficulty concerning what is not is raised in all the three stages in relation to speaking or thinking. This difficulty is not independent of the activities of speaking and thinking, but the relation between them is essential to the understanding of the issue. I shall examine this point further in the next section.

6.4 The difficulty concerning falsehood

We shall here discuss the difficulty concerning falsehood. This difficulty is presented in 240c7–241b3, but before looking at the text, we need to examine the philosophical background to this issue: namely, the sophist’s claims of the impossibility of falsehood and its corollary, the impossibility of contradiction.

6.4.1 *The impossibility of falsehood*

The speaking of the sophist is characterised as a kind of deception: by the art of deception, the sophist makes our soul judge what is false (Passage 26: 240d1–4). To this charge, the sophist makes a counter-attack and denies the possibility of

⁴¹ A similar argument may be seen in ‘other-judging’ (*allogodoxia*) in the Second Part of the *Theaetetus* (189b10–191a5). Although this explanation once seemed plausible when Theaetetus introduced the examples of other-judging in the case of a third person, it collapsed when Socrates asked Theaetetus to remember whether ‘you have ever said to yourself ‘the beautiful is ugly’ or ‘the unjust is just’ (190b2–4).

falsehood (Passage 24: 236e2–237a4; also 241a3–b3). The denial of the possibility of falsehood is one of the common tricks of the sophist, and we can see this argument in dialogues preceding the *Sophist*.⁴²

The most substantial argument is developed in the eristic passages of the *Euthydemus* (283e7–284c6). When young Ctesippus gets angry with Dionysodorus' sophism and condemns him for speaking a falsehood (*katapseudēi*, 283e4), the other eristic, Euthydemus, trips this condemnation up and asks whether it is possible to state a falsehood. The impossibility of falsehood is discussed in two arguments:⁴³

- i) The first argument (283e7–284a8) shows some similarity to the first difficulty in the *Sophist* concerning what is not. When someone states, he states the thing with which the statement is concerned; and this thing is one of the things which are; therefore, he states what is (*to on*). Since to state what is, is to state the truth, the upshot of the argument is as follows: if Dionysodorus does state what is, he states the truth and nothing false.
- ii) The second argument (284b1–c6), on the other hand, makes use of the assimilation of stating to doing and making. Just as it is impossible that anyone does or makes what is not, so it is impossible that anybody states what is not, since stating is doing and making. Therefore, nobody states a falsehood. Again, Euthydemus insists that Dionysodorus states the truth and what is.⁴⁴

Both arguments are clearly based on the Eleatic position concerning what is not,⁴⁵ and each argument uses a trick: the

⁴² This difficulty is said to arise 'always, before and now' (Passage 24: 236e3) or 'often, now and before' (*Tht.* 187d1). Denyer 1991, 1–7, contrasts ancient interest in the problem of falsehood with modern indifference to this issue; but see also van Eck 1992, 29–30.

⁴³ Hawtrey 1981, 2, numbers these as Sophisms 4 and 5 (following Bonitz; also Gifford 1905, Introduction, 36), and comments on Sophism 5 that 'Though the result is somewhat similar to that of Sophism 4, the method is different' (99). Sprague 1962, 14–16, and Denyer 1991, 8–14, treat them as a single argument.

⁴⁴ Kerferd 1981a, 70–71, takes this argument as being based on the sophists' theory of language, according to which a sentence is treated as a name (*onoma*) as in the *Cratylus*. Similarly, Denyer 1991, 8–14, 18, shows that behind this eristic argument there is an assumption that statements name facts.

⁴⁵ Sprague 1962, 16, points out that Eleaticism lies behind this argument. The Eleatic position is seen from the preceding sophism (denial of change: 283c5–d8)

first uses the equation of 'thing' (*ti*) with what is (*on*), and the second takes stating as a kind of doing and making.

The *Cratylus*, in discussing the correctness of names, also mentions this eristic argument (429d1–6). When Cratylus insists that all names are correct, Socrates regards Cratylus' position as committing him to the impossibility of stating falsehood. Socrates remarks that there are and have been many who claim this thesis. Cratylus admits it and affirms that 'to state what is not' (*mē to on legein*) is impossible.⁴⁶

The Second Part of the *Theaetetus* again examines the possibility of false judgement (*pseudēs doxa*) in terms of what is not (188c9–189b9): to judge a falsehood is to judge what is not, whether concerning what is or by itself.⁴⁷ Socrates here appeals to the analogy between judging and seeing, hearing, or touching.⁴⁸ Just as to see something is to see one thing and to see what is, so to judge something is to judge one thing, and judge what is. On the other hand, to judge what is not is to judge no thing, and therefore, not to judge at all. This last argument particularly reminds us of the first difficulty concerning what is not in the *Sophist* (237b7–e7, discussed in 6.3).

These three passages strongly indicate that this kind of argument against the possibility of falsehood is common in sophistic or eristic argument. They share a common strategy of using the Eleatic denial of stating or judging what is not. And since the Greek phrase 'to state or judge what is not'

to the subsequent one (denial of the possibility of contradiction: 285d7 ff.). But the dialogue's focus is rather on the impossibility of teaching and learning as its consequence.

⁴⁶ The whole argument is concerned with *onoma*, and with naming and reference (cf. 429b10–c5). It is important to notice that the *Cratylus* makes no clear distinction yet between statement (*logos*) and name (*onoma*). It is usually held that the analysis of a statement as the combination of noun (*onoma*) and verb (*rhēma*) in the *Sophist* distinguishes the two for the first time.

⁴⁷ This additional phrase in 188d9–10 receives due attention from Burnyeat 1990, 77–78, and Bostock 1988, 165–169. I suspect that the first phrase, 'concerning (*peri*) what is', is too primitive to give a solution to the difficulty, and does not simply correspond to the full-blown solution in *Sophist* 263. Nonetheless, this seems to indicate Plato's awareness of the fault in the argument (cf. *Sph.* 263a2–d5, where two kinds of *peri* are used).

⁴⁸ Burnyeat 1990, 78, calls it 'scandalous analogy'.

means 'to state or judge a falsehood',⁴⁹ they infer that it is impossible to state a falsehood. What the sophist wants to establish through this impossibility of falsehood is that all that they state is true (including the sophisms of Dionysodorus).

One interesting point is that, while all the arguments on the impossibility of falsehood firmly depend on the Parmenidean thesis,⁵⁰ their conclusion rather coincides with the simplified position of Protagoras, according to whom every appearance and statement is true and there is no falsehood.⁵¹ We can see another example of the denial of the possibility of falsehood in the First Part of the *Theaetetus*: an imagined argument of Protagoras holds the view that it is impossible to judge a falsehood, since it is impossible to judge what is not (167a6–b1).⁵² One striking point in that passage is that Plato attributes the Eleatic denial of judging what is not to Protagoras. This is striking because in the same dialogue he sharply contrasts Eleaticism and Protagoreanism (or Heracliteanism) as opposite trends in Greek philosophy. The two extreme philosophical positions of Parmenides and Protagoras converge on the denial of the possibility of falsehood, and the sophistic counter-attack makes use of both of them.

The arguments in the *Euthydemus* and *Theaetetus* use two tricks which lead us to the problematic conclusion: one is the analogy between judging or stating on the one hand, and making, doing (*Euthydemus*), or perceiving (*Theaetetus*) on

⁴⁹ Cf. Cornford 1935, 200, n.1.

⁵⁰ Parmenides or other Eleatic thinkers are not mentioned in these arguments, but Sprague 1965, 28, n.46, and Hawtrey 1981, 110 (cf. 111), take 'some earlier people' (*Euthd.* 286c3) who denied the possibility of controversy like Protagoras to refer to Parmenides (while Gifford 1905, notes, 35, and Guthrie 1969, 182, n.2, assume Heraclitus).

⁵¹ Protagorean relativism needs qualification of the person *to* whom something appears, as in the *Theaetetus*: 'each thing appears to me, so it is *for* me, and it appears *to* you, so it is *for* you' (152a6–8). However, this position is often simplified and criticised as a general, non-qualified claim that everything is true (e.g. Arist., *Meta.* Γ 5 1009a6–15). I call this the simplified version of Protagoreanism.

⁵² The reappearance of a similar argument in the Second Part (188c9–189b9) may indicate that a part of Protagorean relativism remains intact to be examined again after its refutation in the First Part. Proclus seems to interpret the *Theaetetus* in this way (*In Parm.* 657.5–10; cf. Sedley 1996, 81).

the other; and the other is the equation of 'what is' with 'thing' (*ti*) and 'what is not' with 'nothing' (*ouden*). These two tricks work together. In the case of perceiving or doing, the object of activity is 'thing', and 'what is not' means simply non-object, that is, 'nothing'. On the other hand, in the case of judging and stating, the object of these activities cannot be a simple thing but must be something of complex structure or consisting of two elements (subject and verb, or the referential object and predicate). To state what is not does not mean to state nothing, nor not to state at all.⁵³

The earlier dialogues do not provide a solution to this difficulty. The possibility of falsehood is not yet secured, and has to wait for full treatment in the *Sophist*.

6.4.2 *The impossibility of contradiction*

From this survey it has become evident that the denial of the possibility of falsehood is a common argumentative trick of the sophist. In order to assess the philosophical importance of this denial, we shall also examine its corollary, the denial of the possibility of contradiction (*antilegein*).⁵⁴ Although the denial of the possibility of contradiction is not explicitly presented in the *Sophist*, this is closely related to the previous denial, and taking it into account will reveal the strategy of the sophistic counter-attack.

The *Euthydemus*, immediately after the denial of the possibility of falsehood, introduces another denial: when Ctesippus says he contradicts (or controverts) Dionysodorus (285d3–6), the sophist insists that it is impossible to contradict (285d7–286b6). As Socrates mentions the name of Protagoras in relation to this denial, the impossibility of contradiction must have been another common claim of the sophist, with the famous catch-phrase '*ouk estin antilegein*'.⁵⁵

⁵³ This is what the latter portion of the Middle Part demonstrates (*Sph.* 261c6–264b8).

⁵⁴ As we saw in 4.2, 'to contradict' is one basic meaning of the verb '*antilegein*', which I usually translate as 'to controvert'.

⁵⁵ Diogenes Laertius, following the *Euthydemus*, tells us that Protagoras was the first to use the argument that it is impossible to contradict (9.53); cf. Schiappa

The argument is again firmly based on the Eleatic position concerning what is not (cf. 286a1–3). The denials of the possibilities of falsehood and of contradiction are interrelated in the following way.⁵⁶ To contradict is to state contraries (one true and the other false), but if it is impossible to state a falsehood, either the one does not speak at all, or they speak of different things; consequently, they do not contradict each other. Similarly, if it is impossible to contradict, neither can any contrary statement be false. Thus we can see that the impossibility of contradiction is a logical corollary of that of falsehood.

The self-contradiction inherent in the denial of the possibility of contradiction (and therefore in the denial of the possibility of falsehood) reveals the sophist's tactics.⁵⁷ First, the inquirers try to characterise the sophist as a controversialist or maker of contradiction. On this main characterisation, the sophist makes a counter-attack, and by arguing that there is no falsehood, he tries to entrap the inquirers into contradiction:⁵⁸ when we say that the sophist states a falsehood, he argues against us that *we* are contradicting ourselves concerning falsehood and what is not (241a3–b3, with reference to the third stage of the difficulty concerning what is not). Our self-contradiction is what the sophist aims at. We

1991, 134–140, and Kerferd 1981a, 88–90. On the other hand, Aristotle testifies that Antisthenes insists on this denial (*Meta.* Δ 29 1024b32–34). Some commentators assume that the 'late-learner' attacked in the Middle Part of the *Sophist* (251b5–c6) is Antisthenes, and *if* that is the case, there may be a link between the late-learner's argument and the sophistic counter-attack (cf. Gomperz 1905, 170, 178–179).

⁵⁶ Socrates explains that the denial of the possibility of contradiction amounts to the denial of the possibility of falsehood (286c6–8). Kerferd 1981a, 88, explains this from the opposite direction: '*ouk estin antilegein*' is based on the impossibility of falsehood.

⁵⁷ Socrates at first points out that in this argument the sophists contradict themselves (*Euthd.* 286c3–4; cf. 287e2–288a7), but he does not make full use of this point (cf. Sprague 1962, 19). What Socrates criticises is not the logical absurdity of the argument, but its consequences, namely, the denials of refutation (*elenchein*), ignorance, and mistake; and of teaching and learning.

⁵⁸ As we remarked in bringing out the epistemological side of the difficulty concerning what is not, the difficulty becomes crucial only when *we*, readers, face the difficulty and contradiction ourselves, not as the third person. Therefore, from now on, I present the argument as if the sophist also directs his argument to *us* (readers, as inquirers and hunters of the sophist).

should be aware that the sophist is claiming that we *contradict* ourselves (236e3–237a1, 238d4–239a12, 239c9–d4, 241d9–e6), while he denies the possibility of contradiction. He not only makes *our* contradiction here, but also contradicts his own denial of contradiction, and contradicts *himself*. Both are to blame for contradiction.

This dizzy state of self-contradiction on both sides can be escaped *if* we accept the sophistic denial and withdraw the initial claim that the sophist makes contradiction; there will then be no contradiction on either side. We shall no longer contradict ourselves, nor will the sophist make contradiction.

Similarly, against our criticism of the sophist's stating falsehood, he will ask how our statement that there is falsehood can be true, or on what ground our own statement itself can avoid being false. He will insist that our claim cannot be free from the same charge. This sophistic counter-attack is not a mere quibble, but contains a question of philosophical significance; for it might be self-refuting to state that there is falsehood, if we do not have special grounds for making this very statement true. Concerning this dizzy state, the sophist again tempts us into admitting that there is no falsehood. He suggests that *all* statements are equally true; otherwise, all statements will be equally false. Again, the way to avoid this self-contradictory state, the sophist suggests, is to deny the possibility of falsehood altogether.⁵⁹

The sophistic counter-attack aims exactly at this position. The sophist insists on the impossibility of falsehood in two ways: first, it is impossible that what is not *is*; second, even if that is possible, 'what is not' cannot be combined with statement or judgement. In either case, it will necessarily follow that all statements and judgements are true (Signpost 5: 260c1–2). This is what Protagoras claims in *Theaetetus* 167a6–b1. We must also bear in mind that his second claim is stated after rejecting the Parmenidean thesis (by proving the combination of what is not and what is), so that we can see

⁵⁹ This suggestion may commit inquiry to Protagorean relativism.

that the sophist's denial of the possibility of falsehood goes beyond the Eleatic position.

This is the consequence of the sophistic denial of the possibilities of falsehood and contradiction, and now we clearly see the tactics of the sophistic counter-attack.

6.4.3 *The explication of falsehood*

The difficulty concerning falsehood is presented in 240d1–241a3 (after Signpost 3) as a corollary of the difficulty concerning what is not. Just as the concept of image is newly defined through presenting the difficulty (as examined in 5.7), so the nature of falsehood is explicated through the presentation of the difficulty. For in order to indicate how the notion of falsehood is entangled with the problematic combination of what is not and what is, it has to be newly analysed and formulated. The presentation of the difficulty, consequently, betrays the direction of the solution. The inquirers argue in the following way:

[F1] A false judgement is to judge things contrary to things that are (*t'anantia tois ousi*) (240d6–8);

[F2] Therefore, it is to judge things that are not (*ta mē onta*) (d9–10).

F1 is the starting point of explication, and is treated as entailing the common formula of F2. The common Greek usage assumes that to judge or state a falsehood (*pseudos*) is to judge or state what is not (*to mē on*), as we saw in the arguments in other dialogues.⁶⁰ However, we must note that F1 in explaining falsehood uses the phrase 'contrary to A' (*enantion*) deliberately as equivalent to the negation 'not A', in the same way as in the previous argument on image (240b5–6; cf. my analysis in 5.7). This equation is later proved to be inappropriate, and 'different' (*heteron*) is to be substituted for 'contrary' (*enantion*) (257b1–c4; cf. 263b7).

⁶⁰ These two phrases are used interchangeably: *Euthd.* 283e7–284c6, *Crat.* 429d1–6, *Tht.* 167a6–b1, 188d3–6, and *Rep.* III 389c5.

Therefore, F1 is wrong, and F2, in so far as it is an inference from F1, is wrong, too. Here 'what is not' is understood as 'what in no way is', as the previous difficulties concerning what is not take it;⁶¹ then, according to the second difficulty, it is impossible to judge or state what is not (cf. 238c8–11).

Since the common formula F2 itself is sustained later (260c1–5; cf. 260e5–261a1, c6–9), it has to be newly understood, not in terms of 'contrary' as in F1, but in the following way:

[F3] A false judgement judges things that are not, *to be*, or judges things that are, *not to be* (240e1–9).

This formula is new, since it takes the structure of 'to judge' into account. Its introduction has two great consequences.

Firstly, F3 has the two elements, 'not to be' and 'to be', which together constitute the object phrase of the verb 'to judge'. This must be the key to avoiding the previous trick of the equation between 'what is' (*on*) and 'thing' (*ti*), as the object of stating or judging, since the object is the combination of two elements, in which the simple analogy with perceiving or doing, which has only one element as its object, breaks down.

Secondly, F3 provides two patterns of judging a falsehood: to judge what is not, *to be*, like 'Theaetetus is flying' (when he is actually sitting); and to judge what is, *not to be*, like 'Theaetetus is not sitting'. This also indicates that the difficulty concerning falsehood lies not so much in the expression 'what is not' as in the problematic combination of what is not and what is.⁶²

Next, a false statement (*logos*) is defined in the same way as a false judgement (240e10–241a3). The parallelism between judgement and statement is later justified on the

⁶¹ Cf. 'to *mēdamōs on*' at 237b7–8, and 'to *mē on auto kath' hauto*' at 238c9.

⁶² Commentators usually see the problem only in the expression 'what is not', and miss the meaning of F3; Cornford 1935, 299, for example, says 'The question is, what sense can 'things that are not' bear in this phrase'; see also Burnet 1914, 233, and Shorey 1933, 298.

ground that judgement is a kind of silent statement (263e3–264b4; cf. *Tht.* 189e6–190a6).⁶³

Through this explication a new formulation of truth and falsehood is presented (240e10–241a3), which is to be elaborated later in 263b4–10:

[F4] A true statement states what is, that it *is*, or what is not, that it *is not*;⁶⁴

[F5] A false statement states what is not, that it *is*, or what is, that it *is not*.

This formulation of truth and falsehood is original. The earlier dialogues do not provide a formulation sufficient for avoiding the sophistic argument.⁶⁵ Facing the eristic argument of the impossibility of falsehood, in the *Euthydemus*, Ctesippus answers impromptu that ‘He (sc. Dionysodorus) states “what are” in a certain way, but not *as* they are’ (284c7–8). Some commentators assume that the phrase ‘not *as* (*hōs*) they are’ is Plato’s solution to the difficulty.⁶⁶ However, this suggestion is too primitive, and grammatically different from the solution in the *Sophist*; for it uses the adverbial ‘as’ clause, which signifies the mode of the verb of stating or judging,⁶⁷ while the *Sophist* uses the substantive ‘that’ clause, which indicates affirmation or negation. In this way, the presentation of the difficulty concerning falsehood

⁶³ Some scholars cast doubt on this parallelism (e.g. Denyer 1991, 18–19). The proof of falsehood later reverses the order and proceeds from statement to judgement; see my interpretation in 7.4.3.

⁶⁴ It is important that the latter formula of truth, which uses the expression ‘is not’ twice, is also mentioned in 240e1–4.

⁶⁵ We can see two earlier examples of the account of truth and falsehood: the *Dissoi Logoi*, a sophistic work (if before Plato), describes true and false statements as requiring the correspondence of a statement with a fact (DK 90 4(2); cf. 4(3, 7)); and at the beginning of *The Truth* Protagoras says ‘Man is the measure of all things; of what are, as they are, and of what are not, as they are not’ (DK 80 B1). However, neither of them is a definite or substantial account of truth.

⁶⁶ Cornford 1935, 310, Shorey 1933, 304, and Bluck 1957, 184, n.11.

⁶⁷ I suppose that the treatment of falsehood in *Cratylus* 385b2–11 is basically the same as that in the *Euthydemus*: I take the ‘*hōs*’ clause to be the adverbial clause ‘as they are’, which represents the relation between the object and the mode of stating (rather than the substantive clause ‘that they are’). For the ambiguity of ‘*hōs*’ between the adverbial clause of manner ‘as’ and the substantive clause ‘that’, see Protagoras, DK 80 B1 (Guthrie 1969, 188–190).

also provides a new interpretation of truth and falsehood, on which Plato and Aristotle construct their theory of truth.⁶⁸

At this stage, the sophist attacks the combination of what is not with what is, in the formula F3 (and F5), so as to deny the possibility of falsehood altogether (241a3–b4). In order to resolve this difficulty, the inquirers in the *Sophist* first focus on the issue of what is not, and prove, against the Parmenidean thesis, the combination of what is not and what is: that what is not *is*, and that what is *is not*. However, as we see in Signpost 5 (260b10–261a3), securing the possibility of falsehood needs another step after the solution of that difficulty: namely, examination of statement (*logos*) in terms of the interweaving of kinds (*symplokē tōn eidōn*, 259e5–6). It must be shown that ‘what is not’ can be combined with statement, judgement, and *phantasia* (261c6–264b8). The difficulty concerning falsehood is not wholly dependent on the difficulty concerning what is not. This is what the Middle Part has to demonstrate.

6.5 The difficulty concerning image

The next difficulty is concerned with image. We shall first look at how the difficulty concerning image arises, and then examine the philosophical implication of this difficulty.

After he concludes at the end of the New Attempt that the sophist only has seeming knowledge of all things, the Eleatic visitor chooses an image-maker, such as a painter and a sculptor, as a model for illustration (233d3 ff.). The image-making art is divided into two, according to the relation of an image to its original: one kind of image is a likeness which represents the real proportions of the original, and the other is an apparition which appears to be like the original but actually is not like it. Although the division seems (to us) clear enough for the purpose of defining the sophist, the

⁶⁸ Keyt 1973, 289, argues against the common view and concludes that ‘Falsity is defined differently in the *Sophist*.’ Aristotle takes over this definition of truth and falsehood (*Meta.* Γ 7 1011b25 28, E 4 1027b18 23, Θ 10 1051b1 4, b33 1052a3); cf. Keyt 1973, 285–293.

Eleatic visitor proposes to put this division aside, for the reason that he cannot clearly see under which of the two kinds of image-making art the sophist should be placed (235d2–3, 236c9–d4; cf. 264c7–9), and soon afterwards, the difficulty concerning image arises.⁶⁹

After the difficulty concerning what is not is discussed, the difficulty is introduced in the following way:

[Passage 25: 239c9–d4]

EV: If we should speak of him (sc. the sophist) as possessing the art of apparition-making, by means of that argument (sc. the difficulty concerning what is not) he will readily trip up our statements and direct them in the opposite direction towards us. When we call him a maker of images, he will ask what on earth we mean by an image.

The Eleatic visitor requests that Theaetetus answer the question ‘what is an image?’ in words only (*ek tōn logōn monon*, 239e1–240a6). As we saw in Chapter 5, image is defined in terms of what is and what is not (240a7–b13). That definition raises a difficulty:

[Passage 28: 240c1–5] (following Passage 23)

Tht: Perhaps what is not is interwoven with what is, in that perplexing way, and very queer it is.

EV: Queer indeed. You see that now again through this interweaving, the many-headed sophist has forced us, against our will, to admit that what is not, in a way, *is*.

The difficulty again depends on the Parmenidean thesis that ‘what is not’ can never be combined with ‘what is’ (cf. 237a3–b2, c7–9, 238a7–9).

The initial difficulty appears to concern which of the two species of the image-making art the sophist should be assigned to, but the real difficulty turns out to be how we can think about an image at all. The sophist attacks the definition of image and thereby denies the possibility of image in general (241e3–4, 260d8–e1, 264c11–d1). His strategy is as follows:

When the inquirers try to ascribe apparition-making to the sophist (cf. Passage 25: 239c9–d1), the criticism of the

⁶⁹ However, the distinction between likeness and apparition is never blurred in the Middle Part (*pace* Rosen 1983, 151); cf. 5.6.2.

sophist's art is based on the distinction between likeness and apparition, namely, correct and incorrect images. Against this charge, the sophist firstly asks the inquirers to give a definition of an image and then attacks the strange combination of what is not and what is in that definition. The sophist denies the existence of all images, and insists that everything is real and original. By denying not only apparition (to which he will be assigned) but image in general, as distinct from the original, the sophist tries to sweep away the fundamental distinction between image and original. Without reference to the relation between original and image, there will be no difference between the two kinds of image, likeness and apparition. In this way the sophist will finally deny the distinction between the sophist (who is alleged to be an apparition-maker) and the philosopher (who in a way corresponds to a likeness-maker, as we saw in 5.6.2).

Is this counter-argument a merely verbal contention? Let us consider the meaning of the sophistic counter-attack on the possibility of image. The inquiry in the first Outer Part makes full use of the models of painter and sculptor, and tries to define the sophist by analogy with them. We must note, however, that this model of image-making takes for granted that images, such as paintings and statues, exist as distinct from the original. That ontological difference between original and image, and the maker's and viewer's acquaintance with the original of which the imitator makes an image, are the basis of the distinction between likeness and apparition. It is the very model of image-making, however, that the sophist attacks and tries to remove. The analogy does not work, he argues, since we, inquirers, as well as the sophist, lack knowledge of the original of which the sophist is alleged to make images.⁷⁰ Consequently, nobody can make a distinction between likeness and apparition, which requires knowledge of the original and its relation to images. Furthermore, if images are all that we see and make, why do we not say that they are all originals and not images, like tables and chairs

⁷⁰ Remember the disanalogy between the sophist's and the painter's arts, in 5.4.

made by the craftsman? Thus, the sophist insists that everything is equally an original, and that no image exists. In a world where all things are original, no sophist exists who creates incorrect images, but everyone knows and can make all things.

Against this counter-attack, the inquirers must defend in words (*en tois logois*) the definition and existence of image, and it is only on that basis (namely, the distinction between original and image) that the distinction between likeness and apparition can be saved. Again, refutation of the Parmenidean thesis will pave the way for a solution to this difficulty. For unless the difficulty concerning what is not is resolved, the definition and existence of image will not be secured.

6.6 The difficulty concerning appearance

Let us finally examine the difficulty concerning (a) appearance. While the difficulty of (d) what is not takes priority, the difficulty concerning (a) appearance lies at the basis of the series of difficulties: for it takes over the original issue of appearance raised in the course of defining the sophist. The sophistic counter-attack this time denies the possibility of appearance without being (Passage 24). I shall demonstrate in this section that there are two levels of issue, one logical and the other epistemological, the combination of which constitutes a fundamental problem put forward by the sophistic counter-attack.

6.6.1 *Two levels of the issue of appearance*

The conclusion of the New Attempt (formulated in Passage 9) describes the sophist as a person who ‘appears to be wise, but is not really wise’, and it is this expression that becomes a target of the sophistic counter-attack at the beginning of the Middle Part (Passage 24). The sophistic counter-attack primarily focuses on the logical implication of this expression, just as with the denial of the possibility of falsehood and image: appearing without being implies that ‘what is not *is*’,

but Parmenides denies that possibility. The sophist again uses the Parmenidean thesis and denies the possibility of appearance without being altogether. This is the official difficulty concerning appearance, and against this counter-attack the inquirers must prove the combination of what is not and what is, and thus secure the logical possibility of appearance without being.

This official difficulty, however, does not seem to take over the original issue of appearance in a direct way. For while the official difficulty deals only with a logical obstacle concerning appearance without being, the original issue seeks to distinguish between the sophist's and the inquirers' uses of appearance, in order to secure the investigatory use of appearance (cf. Chapter 3). The seeming independence of the two levels of the issue, namely, the original issue concerning the appearance of the sophist and the official difficulty discussed in the Middle Part, must be a main cause of commentators' isolation of the Middle Part. The solution to the official or logical difficulty, however, must lay a theoretical basis for solving the other side of the issue underlying the inquiry into definition of the sophist. Here we must face the epistemological issues concerning appearance, which should also be resolved in the Middle Part. The original issue concerning appearance cannot be solved seen from outside, but must be examined from within. The epistemological question we should ask is therefore how we can deal with appearances from inside and go beyond our perspectives, in order to distinguish the two uses of appearance.

The sophistic counter-attack shows the epistemological as well as the logical side of the issue: as the result of the counter-attack all appearances are regarded as reality, and this conclusion coincides with the relativist position in the *Theaetetus*. For Protagoras is supposed to equate 'to appear' with 'to be' (cf. 151e8–152a9); as Socrates explains, his famous 'Human measure' doctrine (DK 80 B1) means that 'each thing *appears* to me, so it *is* for me, and it *appears* to you, so it *is* for you' (152a6–8). This doctrine amounts to the claim that it is impossible 'to appear or seem to be so, but not

to be so' (cf. Passage 24), and thus we can assume that Protagoreanism also provides a theoretical background to the sophistic counter-attack concerning appearance. The sophist attacks the inquirers' use of appearance by denying the possibility of 'to appear to be so without being so' altogether, and insists that all appearances are true and real. As Protagoras maintains, the sophist does not admit the difference or conflict between appearing and being.

Here we can see that one of the essential factors of appearing, namely, the audience, becomes a crucial point. If we take the audience to whom the sophist appears into account, we shall find three epistemological issues underlying the original issue of the sophist's appearing. Let us analyse Passage 9 (233c6–11) in the following way:

(A1) The sophist appears *to the young* (or *his pupils*) to be wise.

(A2) The sophist turns out *to us* (*inquirers*) not to be wise.

A1 and A2 do not come into a direct conflict, since the audiences to whom the sophist appears are different in these cases: the sophist appears to be wise *to the young*, whereas he appears not to be wise *to us*.⁷¹ These are two different appearances of the sophist to the different audiences. One may wish to unite these two judgements, A1 and A2, into a single judgement such as this:

(A3) The sophist appears to be wise, but is not wise.

Concerning this formulation (cf. the official difficulty in Passage 24), we need first to ask whether Plato commits the alleged fallacy of deliberately dropping the qualification 'to someone' and making an unqualified statement, which is regarded as a fallacy of *secundum quid*.⁷² Suppose that Plato does not simply drop a qualification to form A3, and that this

⁷¹ 'tois neois', 233b1 (cf. b3), and 'tois mathētais', 233c6 (cf. b5–7); in contrast with 'hēmin anapephantai', 233c11.

⁷² For example, Schiappa 1991, 190–193, argues, on the *Theaetetus*, that 'Plato sought to put Protagoras' doctrine into the form "the human-measure statement is true *absolutely*". He dropped the essential qualifying phrase "for X". When this omission was disregarded, it was easy for Plato to make it appear that Protagoras'

judgement itself is an appearance *to us*. It may then follow that nothing prevents the other appearance A1 from being equally the case *for others*. As for such different appearances as A1 and A2, Protagoras would say there is no conflict or contradiction in admitting both judgements as true, since what appears to them is true *for them*, and what appears to us is also true *for us*. I suspect that such a relativistic claim underlies the sophistic counter-attack with regard to appearance.

Here arises the first epistemological issue concerning A3. If the investigatory use of appearance (A2) provides an appearance only *to inquirers* and the same thing appears quite differently *to others*, how can we integrate these two appearances? The sophist attacks the inquirers' attempt to blend the two appearances, which are concerned with different audiences, into one so as to make an objective judgement. The sophistic counter-attack throws a dilemma concerning the formula A3 in front of us. The first horn is that, if we keep two appearances 'to the young' and 'to us (inquirers)' separated, two judgements remain independent and equally true for each of the audiences. To *appear* to someone is to *be* for the same person, but this appearance has nothing to do with others. Consequently, there is no possibility of appearing to be so without being so *for the same person*. This results in Protagorean relativism. The second horn is that, if we unite two appearances A1 and A2 into A3, and take 'to appear to be so without being so' as a single phenomenon, then we are forced to contradict ourselves: how is it possible that the same thing appears to us to be so and not to be so? There is some evidence that those two appearances are not separate; for the inquirers once drew a conclusion similar to A1:

(A4) The sophist appears *to us* to be wise in many subjects (cf. 232a1–2).

If we take A4 and A2 together, we will contradict ourselves. How is it possible that the sophist appears to us to be wise

formulation led to absurdity' (192). A similar claim is made by Stewart 1977, 42–43. Burnyeat 1976c examines, against this line of interpretation, the issue of 'qualifiers' in the *Theaetetus* (esp. 173–177).

and not to be wise? We must prove that either appearance is false.

Behind the horns of the dilemma there lies the second epistemological issue: epistemological asymmetry between 'me' and 'others'. We can attribute falsehood to others' judgements and appearances, but that implies that *my* judgements and appearances are always true, and that I do not attribute falsehood to my own judgements and appearances. For example, while I can easily claim that the sophist's appearing *to the young* is not true but false, I do not think that what appears or seems *to me* to be the case (or what I judge to be the case) is not true but false. For 'it appears to me that P' means that I judge that P because I take it to be true,⁷³ and in this sense, to say that what appears to me to be the case is not true is simply a self-contradiction. On the other hand, 'it appears *to another person* to be so' is an observation from outside about what someone else judges. Therefore, 'to appear to be' is a kind of judgement and assertion of truth for each 'me', and therefore, my judgement 'to appear *to me* to be so without being so' is, as the sophist claims, self-contradictory.⁷⁴ Falsehood is always outside myself.

The third epistemological issue is as follows: provided that we can integrate the two appearances A1 and A2, why is the inquirers' appearance or judgement truer or superior to that of the young? We customarily suppose that young people are ignorant, but does this explain the superiority of inquirers' judgement? For one thing, Theaetetus, the interlocutor, is also young. Is there any substantial difference in appearances between audiences? If there is, what difference? In Protagorean relativism, inquirers and the young do not differ in quality as audience; whether an appearance is to the young or

⁷³ This is what we call the 'epistemic use' of appearance (rather than the 'non-epistemic use'); cf. Chisholm 1957, ch. 4. For the 'conflicting appearances' in the *Theaetetus*, see Fine 1996a, 106, n.4.

⁷⁴ This may remind one of Moore's paradox: it is paradoxical to say that 'I don't believe it's raining, but as a matter of fact it is'; cf. Moore 1993.

to inquirers (or to experts or to laymen), all appearances are true and real for each audience.

Thus, the real enemy in the argument concerning appearance in the *Sophist* may well be Protagoras, whose relativism destroys the grounds on which the inquirers claim that the sophist appears to be wise, but is not wise. As we examined concerning what is not, the great difficulty arises when I (the first person) am included in the argument and forced to contradict myself (cf. 6.3). Likewise, once we take our own appearances to be an issue, it becomes crucial. For the second epistemological issue indicates that I can hardly go beyond my own appearances or judgements. The three epistemological issues and the official or logical difficulty converge on one crucial point: is there any false appearance, and how is that possible?

In summary, there are two levels of the issue of appearance: one is the epistemological issue concerning how we can acknowledge the falsehood in our own appearances, and how we can secure the possibility of appearing to be so without being so *for us* (inquirers); and the other is the official or logical issue concerning how we can prove that what is not *is*, which is a logical implication of mere appearance.

6.6.2 *The fundamental problem concerning the sophist*

Now that we have determined the background of the sophistic counter-attack, we shall go back to the point where the issue of appearance arises to see what the fundamental problem of the dialogue is. The original issue of the many appearances of the sophist (Passage 4: 232a1–6) was directed to two sides, both of which are crucial. On the one side, it turns out that the sophist creates and presents to an audience his appearance of being wise, and he is characterised as the person who *appears* to be wise *without being* so (Passage 9: 233c6–11). On the other side, the issue of appearance with regard to philosophical inquiry seems to remain unexamined, but in my view, this must be the main concern of the *Sophist*. Let us reconsider this crucial point. First of all we must bear

in mind that the inquiry into definition of the sophist in the first Outer Part adhered to strict philosophical methods, but nevertheless failed. The Socratic question, 'What is a sophist?' guides the inquiry, and the methodology that the essence of the object of inquiry should be determined by definition (*logos*) is adopted. There, the method of division (*diairesis*) and the method of using models are introduced, both of which are typical philosophical methods in Plato's later dialogues. Despite the use of these philosophical methods, however, the inquiry cannot help treating of many appearances, and in particular the doubtful sixth definition. This is regarded as a failure, and it is the philosophical inquiry in the first Outer Part which is at stake.

If we remember our conclusion that the basic problem of the dialogue (proposed in the prologue) is to distinguish the sophist from the philosopher, we then realise the importance of the issue of appearance in philosophical inquiry. Rarely is this point emphasised by scholars, yet it must be crucial to recognise that philosophy is always exposed to the possibility of falsehood *in the course of* inquiry. Without recognition of this point, we cannot evaluate the fundamental problem of the dialogue.

Now I can show what the fundamental problem is. The sophistic counter-attack on this issue is parallel to that on the other issues of falsehood and image. When the inquirers criticise the sophist as creating mere appearances without being, why are they not open to the same charge themselves? As we saw, philosophical inquiry could not help depicting many appearances, of which one, namely, the sophist of noble lineage, may well be *false*, and this resulted in a failure to grasp the essence of the sophist. Since philosophical inquiry is thus also entangled with the issue of appearance, the charge of making appearances can be directed back at the critics themselves. Their criticism of the sophist as making mere appearances may result in self-criticism; it is not until inquirers prove their innocence with regard to appearances that the sophist will properly be defined as a maker of mere appearances.

The sophistic counter-attack aims at this crucial point. The sophist would argue that, 'You, the inquirer, cannot avoid self-criticism when you criticise me for making mere appearances. For you know, you yourself have made many appearances of me. Let's admit that there is no such thing as appearance at all, and then both of us will be exempt from the charge.' Shall we accept his proposal, and avoid self-criticism in exchange for giving up the definition of the sophist as a maker of mere appearances? The sophist here claims that there is no appearance as distinct from reality, and consequently, no distinction between true and false appearances; everything is real. It will then follow that there is no difference between a sophist and a philosopher.

The sophist wants to reject the condemnation of falsehood in his argument, and it is for that purpose that he first denies the possibility of falsehood and eliminates the distinction between false and true statements or judgements. But this amounts, as our examination has shown, to elimination of the distinction between image and original, and the sophist in this way tries to abolish the fundamental distinction between appearance and reality. On the basis of this last claim, the sophist finally insists that all that we state or judge is true and real.

Those who argue against the sophist must take the matter the other way round. We must prove the possibility of falsehood in *our own* argument, and acknowledge that not all of what we state or judge is true. Statement, judgement, and appearance are necessarily exposed to the possibility of falsehood, and in that sense, being either true or false is essential to them (cf. 263a11–b3). Truth and falsehood constitute a pair, without one of which the other cannot have any meaning. It is only in this light that any statement, judgement, or appearance becomes meaningful.

What makes one thing true and another false? The ground for distinction does not belong to statement, judgement, or appearance itself, which needs in turn to be grounded. Instead, truth and falsehood in our statement, judgement, and appearance are determined only on the ground of, or

according to, the criterion by which we can distinguish between truth and falsehood; and we may call the ground or criterion *reality*. Only those who are aware that our statement, judgement, and appearance are a kind of image which admits the pair of truth and falsehood can go beyond their own statement, judgement, and appearance, and posit *reality* as the original. And it is only by reference to *reality* that they are able to distinguish between truth and falsehood in statement, judgement, and appearance. By contrast, the sophist takes everything to be true, and by doing so demolishes the fundamental distinction between appearance, which can be true or false, and *reality*, which is the criterion for the distinction. The sophist rejects the separate existence of *reality*, but what the sophist calls truth or reality (namely, all that we state or judge) is actually not truth or reality at all. In this way, to admit the possibility of falsehood in our statement, judgement, and appearance is the only way to secure the possibility of *philosophy* as distinct from sophistry and the proper understanding of this world. For this distinction, we must first secure the possibility of appearance by refuting both the Parmenidean thesis and the Protagorean relativist claim, and then, prove how to distinguish true and false appearances. This will be a task of philosophy.

Finally, what demarcates the philosopher from the sophist is admission of one's *own* falsehood. It is not difficult to condemn others as committing falsehood, but as long as those condemning others do not admit the possibility of their own commission of error or falsehood, the same condemnation may be applied to themselves. For they may assume that everything is true for themselves, to whom it appears. This Protagorean relativism does not admit falsehood in the most essential sense; it denies the possibility that what appears *to me* might be false, or what I state or judge might be false. In order to go beyond this position, we must first admit that it is impossible for us to know all things, since only this makes us aware that our statement, judgement, or appearance *might* be false. This awareness of our own cognitive state will save us from the trap of the sophist. In other words, one cannot draw

a distinction between truth and falsehood *from outside*, or simply criticise others. The real enemy is within us. For inquirers who are to make the distinction between appearances are themselves subject to the issue of appearance, and cannot judge the issue from a completely objective point of view. Whatever distinction they may make will itself be an appearance, but none the less that must be proved to be true. In my view, this is the fundamental problem of the *Sophist*, which we ourselves must confront in philosophical inquiry and resolve for defining the sophist.

In discussing the images of the philosopher and sophist (Chapter 2) we concluded that defining the sophist raises two difficulties: one is the theoretical difficulty concerning the circularity of definitions of the sophist and the philosopher, and the other is the ethical difficulty concerning who the sophist is. The two levels of the issue of appearance discussed above, namely, the logical and epistemological issues, in a way correspond to those two kinds of difficulty. The definition of the sophist entails the logical issue of how one can overcome the parity of difficulties concerning what is not and what is, and it also brings us to the ethical issue of our self-examination. The two difficulties finally converge on the fundamental problem concerning the appearance of the sophist.

6.7 Conclusion: between Eleatic and Protagorean

Our examination of the whole structure of the difficulties in the Middle Part has indicated how deep the sophistic counter-attack reaches and how closely these issues are related. In one sense, it is not until the problem concerning (d) what is not is resolved that we can give solutions to the other difficulties. Accordingly, the investigation into what is not, in the Middle Part, is necessary to the whole project. But in another sense, all these difficulties converge on the original, basic problem: how one can define the sophist in terms of appearance. It is only when the original issue of appearance is resolved, and on that basis the sophist is properly defined,

that the whole discussion of these difficulties acquires true significance.

We have found that all the sophistic counter-attacks adopt one common strategy: forcing us, accusers of the sophist, into contradiction, and thereby turning our criticism of him back upon ourselves. Confronting the sophistic counter-attack, we are compelled to examine ourselves and our own philosophical backgrounds. This is probably why the Middle Part has to set about a full examination of the major philosophical positions: pluralism, monism, materialism, and idealism (that is, a prevailing form of Plato's theory of Forms).

In particular, through examination of the sophistic counter-attack, we have encountered two important philosophical positions: the Parmenidean thesis that it is impossible that what is not *is*, and Protagoreanism, which lies behind the denial of the possibility of falsehood and equates appearance with reality. On the one hand, all the difficulties discussed in the *Sophist* depend on the Parmenidean thesis, and refutation of that thesis in the Middle Part will pave the way for the solutions. The sophistic counter-attack forces us to cross-examine this 'Father's' doctrine (cf. 241d1–242a4). On the other hand, we have found a second background to the sophistic counter-attack in Protagoreanism. Although Protagorean relativism was severely criticised in the First Part of the *Theaetetus*, it may still remain a major target in this subsequent dialogue.⁷⁵ The *Theaetetus* connects Protagorean relativism with the Heraclitean 'Flux' theory, and shows that this trend embraces all the earlier thinkers except Parmenides in this group. That dialogue places the two trends, Protagorean relativism and Parmenidean monism, as polar opposites in the history of Greek philosophy (152e2–153a4, 180c7–e4).⁷⁶

We can see the connection of the sophist to Eleaticism in

⁷⁵ Protagorean relativism is examined in the *Theaetetus* in connection with the Heraclitean 'Flux' theory. The original position of Protagoras may have been separable from such ontology.

⁷⁶ *Crat.* 402a4–c3 also traces the thought of Heraclitus back to Homer, Hesiod, and Orpheus. A different classification of predecessors is seen in *Sph.* 242c8–243a2.

some arguments in the *Euthydemus*, in which the eristics argue from a quasi-Eleatic position (notably, in 284b3–c6 and 285d7–286b6).⁷⁷ For the sharp Eleatic dichotomy between what is and what is not must have provided eristics with a strong weapon of argument.⁷⁸ Moreover, it is a matter of historical fact that such sophists as Gorgias in some way responded to Parmenides.⁷⁹ On the other hand, Protagorean relativism is a fortress of sophistic argument. As we have discovered, the sophistic counter-attack uses both these extremes as its tools,⁸⁰ and it is only by repudiating these two extremes and finding a middle way that we can defend philosophy against sophistic counter-attack. The sophist tries to make philosophy and knowledge impossible by such counter-attack, *or* make it too easy by tempting us.

Finally, let us return to the basic problem of the dialogue, namely, how to distinguish the sophist from the philosopher. Through all his counter-attacks, the sophist insists that there is no sophist, a counterfeit of the wise, because all are wise;⁸¹ otherwise, how can the inquirer himself not be a sophist? The sophist here finally denies the crucial distinction between real

⁷⁷ Sprague says that 'The sophists in that dialogue (sc. *Euthd.*) are neo-Eleatics, that is, their argument (which can in the main be reduced to the two types, equivocation and *secundum quid*) are based upon the philosophical position of Parmenides' (Sprague 1962, xiii; cf. Sprague 1965, ix). Hawtrey 1981, following Sprague, finds many indications of this relationship (cf. 20 21, 23, 63, 100, 112, 177 178, 187); Hawtrey also takes the Megarics, heirs of the Eleatics, as Plato's implicit target in the *Euthydemus* (28 29). But we must be more cautious about the historical position and thought of the 'Megarics'.

⁷⁸ Van Eck 1992, 157 158, concludes that, while the sophist uses Eleatic logic to lead to relativism and scepticism, Plato attempts to pave a third way for saving the world of phenomena.

⁷⁹ Gorgias' famous treatise 'On what is not' is obviously a response to Parmenides' position. On the other hand, Protagoras is reported to have written a treatise called 'On what is', in which he attacked the Eleatic doctrine that being is one (DK 80 B2); but the evidence is not conclusive; cf. Schiappa 1991, 121 125, 138 139.

⁸⁰ It must be remembered that the eristic arguments in the *Euthydemus* also use both Protagorean and Eleatic arguments: these two converge on eristics (cf. Sprague 1965, 28 29, n.46). Hawtrey 1981, 110, says 'Both the Parmenidean and the Heraclitean approaches to philosophy make learning, and indeed knowledge, impossible, and they are therefore equally at odds with the deepest convictions of Socrates and Plato.'

⁸¹ Though the imaginary answer by Protagoras in the *Theaetetus* denies that all are equally wise (166d1 167d4).

wisdom and our human capacity: he claims to be wise in all things, like a god. In this argument, the sophist relies on the Parmenidean denial of what is not and arrives at the Protagorean claim that all statements, judgements, and appearances are true, and on that basis the sophist denies the possibilities of falsehood, image, and appearance without being altogether. Inquirers must now mount a defence of philosophy against this sophistic counter-attack.

The question about the sophist seems long to have been neglected in the history of philosophy after Plato; few philosophers did or do take this issue as seriously as Plato. The same attitude prevails towards interpretation of the difficulties in the *Sophist*: people want to see only the 'philosophical problems' in the Middle Part, and ignore all the sophistic elements – the arguments advanced by the sophist – as mere tricks. Yet such an attitude may make 'philosophy' too easy, just as the sophist treats it. Those who ignore the sophistic counter-attack on philosophy cannot really see philosophical issues in the *Sophist*; for to ignore the sophist is to avoid examining ourselves. In my view, real philosophy is impossible without serious confrontation with the sophist. The sophist is not an opponent standing outside you and me, but lives within ourselves, or he may be ourselves.⁸² This cross-examination of ourselves is the only way, I suggest, to save the philosopher in us.

⁸² We must keep in mind that even the model philosopher, Socrates, has to be doubted as to whether he is a sophist of noble lineage. The meaning of 'sophist within us' will become clearer in the examination of 'irony' in the final chapter.

CHAPTER 7

THE PHILOSOPHIC DEFENCE AGAINST SOPHISTRY

7.1 The philosophic defence in the Middle Part

The previous chapter has shown how the four kinds of difficulty are advanced in the Middle Part by the sophist's counter-attack on the inquirers' attempt to define him. It aims at sweeping away the distinction between the sophist and the philosopher, and so endangers the possibility of philosophy itself. This chapter will in turn show that the argument in the Middle Part as a whole is the inquirers' philosophic defence against the sophistic counter-attack. Its overarching aim is to demonstrate the vital distinction between the philosopher and the sophist, so as to show and secure the possibility of philosophy.

As we have observed in the last chapter, the 'fighting' image of the sophist is prevalent in the Middle Part. The sophist counter-attacks the inquirers' statements about appearance without being, image and falsehood, and forces them (*anankazein*) to contradict themselves.¹ The sophist fights (*machesthai*, *diamachesthai*) by putting forward obstacles or problems (*problēmata*) one after another to the inquirers (260d5–e3, 261a6–b4). The way he fights against the inquirers is to deny the possibility of appearance without being, image, and falsehood altogether, by appealing to the Parmenidean thesis, and consequently to make the distinction between the sophist and the philosopher impossible. Confronting these difficulties, Theaetetus doubts any possibility of capturing the sophist (241c2–3, 261a4–b4), but in response to his doubt, the Eleatic visitor urges him not to give up the investigation (241c4–9,

¹ Cf. 236e3–237a1, 239c9–d4, 240c3–6, 241a3–b4, 241d9–e6; see 6.1.

261b5–c4). Against the sophist's counter-attack, the inquirers must defend themselves (*amynesthai*, 240a6, 241d5–6),² and fight in argument (*diamachesthai*, 241d8, 261a7).³ Their fighting is compared to overcoming obstacles (261a6–8) and breaking down the wall in order to capture the city (261b5–c4). They must not withdraw (*hypochōrein*, 240a6). Their final aim is to capture and bind the sophist (260e5–261a3), and in this sense, to complete the inquiry into the definition of the sophist.

In order to defend the possibility of philosophy the inquirers must resolve the difficulties and repel the sophistic counter-attack. This defence has accordingly to be pursued by philosophical devices and arguments; for if one rejects the sophist's arguments by another sophistical or fallacious argument, such an attempt will rather destroy the whole project of distinguishing the sophist from the philosopher.⁴ The inquirers' self-defence must itself, therefore, be a philosophical enterprise, and this point is conveyed by three passages in the Middle Part which indicate the inquirers' attempt at philosophy. Firstly, after examining the materialist and idealist positions, the Eleatic visitor concludes that it is necessary for 'the philosopher (*tōi philosophōi*) who values these things (sc. intelligence, wisdom, and knowledge)' to take the third way by rejecting the views of both materialists and the friends of Forms (249c10–d4). The inquirers actually take that way and suppose that both change and rest *are*. The notion of the philosopher appears here for the first time in the Middle Part, and the inquirers follow the way which the philosopher

² Also 'speak in defence' (261c7), if we read '*apologēsometha*' with the manuscripts, instead of '*apologisōmetha*', Heindorf's conjecture, which most editors follow.

³ The metaphor of fighting is also used for other contexts: 249c6, 256d6, 260a2. Notably the examination of the battle between giants and gods (*gigantomachia*) makes full use of the vocabulary of 'fighting' (e.g. 246a4, c3; cf. 249c6) and 'defending' (246b7).

⁴ Peck 1952 argues that the aim of the Middle Part is to refute the sophist on his ground, and that for that purpose the Eleatic visitor deliberately employs sophistry to expose their verbal fallacy. But I do not think it either necessary or desirable (cf. Trevaskis 1966, 102–103). I shall rather show that the Middle Part is to cross-examine the inquirers' own philosophical backgrounds to overcome the fundamental difficulties.

should take.⁵ Secondly, in the midst of the discussion of combination between kinds, the inquirers agree that knowledge of the right combination belongs to the greatest knowledge of free people, that is, dialectic; the Eleatic visitor hints that they may have come across the philosopher in searching for the sophist (253c6–254b6).⁶ We shall examine what this passage means later in this chapter. Thirdly, the agreement on the proper combination of kinds, which the inquirers have reached by fighting against those who deny any combination, is said to save the possibility of all discourse (*logos*), and consequently the possibility of the greatest thing, that is, philosophy; for, without the combination of kinds, they will be deprived of discourse, and of philosophy altogether (260a1–7). This comment indicates that the inquirers' attempt is to save the possibility of philosophy. The whole argument in the Middle Part thus demonstrates how the philosopher should argue, suggests where the philosopher can be found, and finally saves the possibility of philosophy itself. In this manner, it paves the way for the final definition of the sophist and at the same time shows in argument a philosopher and philosophy.⁷

We must be cautious, however, when we take the Middle Part as philosophic defence. For, as we argued in the previous chapter, our enemy, the sophist, is not just attacking us from outside by forcing us to contradict ourselves, but resides within us, and tempts us into an easy way to avoid such contradictions. Since it is Parmenides to whom the sophist appeals as a witness for the impossibility of the being of what is not, the Eleatic visitor, who is a member of the circle of Parmenides and Zeno, must cross-examine *his own* philosophical background. Inquirers must dare to fight against

⁵ Campbell 1867, 131, comments on 249c10: 'The sentence is continued as if the verbal notion in *philosophōi* had been expressed.'

⁶ Philosophy as free people's knowledge was agreed the day before between Socrates and Theodorus (in *Theaetetus* 172c3–173c5), but it is not strange that the Eleatic visitor shares this opinion (*pace*, Campbell 1867, 145).

⁷ Trevaskis 1966, 99, rightly but briefly comments that the theme of the *Sophist* is philosophy, and that 'The dialogue is an exercise in doing philosophy, which is distinct from its counterfeit, sophistry or casuistry.'

(*diamacheteon*, 241d8) the Parmenidean thesis. It is only when inquirers resolve the difficulties and repudiate the sophistic counter-attack altogether that the distinction between the sophist and the philosopher becomes possible. If, on the other hand, inquirers fail to defend philosophy properly, not only will the sophist escape definition, but also the philosopher and philosophy, as distinct from the sophist and sophistry, will be impossible. This is a life-and-death struggle between the sophist and us inquirers, and only successful philosophic defence can make inquirers philosophers.

The Middle Part consists of four sections:

- [Section 1] The difficulty concerning 'what is not' and its corollaries are put forward (236d9–242b5).
- [Section 2] The difficulty concerning 'what is' is discussed in the form of dialogues with the dualists, monists, materialists and friends of Forms (242b6–251a4).
- [Section 3] Through full consideration of the combination of the greatest kinds, the nature of 'what is not' is explained in terms of 'difference' (251a5–259d8).
- [Section 4] On analysis of statement (*logos*), judgement (*doxa*), and *phantasia*, falsehood is finally explained (259d9–264b8).

Roughly speaking, the former two sections expose the difficulties concerning what is not and what is, and the latter two give solutions to them. Section 1, however, as we saw, in elucidating what each difficulty is, already analyses the root of the difficulties and intimates the direction of the solution. Firstly, the difficulty concerning what is not turns out to be entirely dependent on the Parmenidean thesis, and its solution should be to prove against this thesis the combination of what is not with what is (cf. 6.3). Next, the difficulties concerning image and falsehood also derive from the Parmenidean thesis, and the analysis of those difficulties also provides us with new definitions of image, and of truth and falsehood (cf. 5.7 and 6.4.3). Explication of what a difficulty really is, is itself a philosophical attempt to pave the way for solution.

There are two stages of official solution to the difficulties: the first stage is refutation of the Parmenidean thesis in

Section 3, and the second is proof of falsehood in Section 4. We must bear in mind, however, that the difficulties (in particular, concerning appearance) entail some epistemological issues as well, which need to be resolved in the Middle Part (cf. 6.6.1).

The argument in the Middle Part purports not just to get rid of some logical obstacles put forward by the sophist, as most commentators assume, but rather presents the essential conflict between the sophist and the philosopher in order to prove the possibility of philosophy.⁸ The content of the argument in this part is beyond doubt far richer than this procedural framework requires, and its philosophical achievement is important in its own right, but we shall nevertheless observe that the basic problem of defining the sophist underlies the whole course of the Middle Part and leads the argument. In discussing Sections 2 to 4, I shall concentrate on reading the Middle Part as philosophic defence against the sophistic counter-attack, and I shall not examine details of interpretation in difficult passages, nor enter into other important issues, such as the senses of the verb 'to be' and the theory of Forms.⁹ My question is how the Middle Part answers the basic problem of defining the sophist; this question has been completely neglected by commentators.

Before entering into Section 2, let us observe the interlude at the end of Section 1 (241b4–242b5). After discussing the difficulties concerning what is not, image, and falsehood (236d9–241b4), the Eleatic visitor once again questions what

⁸ It is usually assumed that the argument in this part is designed only to get rid of certain logical obstacles and avoid naive fallacies, but not to construct a positive case: for example, according to White 1993, Introduction, Sections 10 and 12, the aim is to 'clear away the immediate obstacles to the notion of false statement that they had set in his way' (xxxiii), and 'not to explain the workings of being and "not" exhaustively' (xxx); and according to de Rijk 1986, 83, it is important for 'clearing up the entire problem area covered by such notions as "appearing", "real being", "not-being", whose lack of clarity is supposed to yield so many lurking-places for the Sophist . . . rather than looking for the Sophist's true nature'.

⁹ I accordingly put aside one of the most important questions: what does 'kind' (*eidos*, *genos*, *idea*) mean ontologically and semantically in this argument: transcendent Form, class, immanent character, concept, or particular things? An abundance of good work has already been done by scholars on these issues, particularly, on the senses of 'to be'; see the list in note 29 of Chapter 1.

the inquirers should do about the sophist, and then asks three favours of Theaetetus, his interlocutor, for further investigation. Firstly, since the inquirers observe that many or an apparently infinite number of objections and difficulties are easily raised when they try to define the sophist as making falsehood, they should be content if they pull away even slightly from the formidable argument (241b4–c10). Secondly, they must make an attempt upon the Parmenidean thesis in order to defend themselves, but the Eleatic visitor should not be blamed for committing parricide. They must prove that what is not *is*, in a sense, and that what is *is not*, in a way; otherwise, they cannot help being laughed at as contradicting themselves (241d1–242a4). Thirdly, the interlocutor should not take the Eleatic visitor to be mad (*manikos*, 242a11) for turning his own opinions upside down (242a5–b5). These three pleas indicate some important directions in the subsequent investigation into what is. Here the Eleatic visitor puts it on the agenda to prove that what is *is not*, in a way; this phrase appears in one formula of falsehood (240e5–241a3), but it is more than Parmenides explicitly prohibits in his poem (DK 28 B7.1–2). For that purpose, the concept of ‘what is’ needs examination, along with ‘what is not’. Cross-examination of Parmenides’ position requires a full-scale discussion of his main concern, ‘what is’. The parity of difficulties concerning what is not and what is, is anticipated here, and we shall see that infinite difficulties also arise concerning what is (cf. 245d12–e5). Finally, turning one’s opinions upside down (*anō kai katō*) is common to the sophist, the young, and the philosopher: the sophist-like debater later appears who draws arguments in one direction at one time and in another at another (259c1–d7),¹⁰ and the young are earlier said to need the overturning of opinions (or appearances) as a necessary process for investigation (234d2–e6; cf. 265d1–4, *Tht.* 162c8–d4). We should also remember that appearing to be mad may be characteristic of

¹⁰ Peck 1952, 41–42, takes this passage in the opposite way: the Eleatic visitor is ‘going to show exactly how sophistic arguments are managed’; but see note 4 above.

the philosopher (cf. Passage 1: 216d1–2). What differentiates these three types of people is their attitude towards appearances, and the third plea of the Eleatic visitor seems to imply that the inquirers in the Middle Part themselves approach the truth through appearances, as should the philosopher; for dialectical inquiry will proceed by overturning one's own previous positions at each step.¹¹

7.2 The possibility of dialogue (242b–251a)

7.2.1 Examining our epistemological state

An extensive examination of what is (*to on*) begins in Section 2 (242b6–251a4); the inquirers examine their predecessors' positions as their own philosophical background, in order to seek a proper way of dealing with what is and what is not, and it ends with the parity of difficulties concerning them. I shall demonstrate that inquiry in this section is concerned with the question of how philosophical inquiry is possible, and we must focus on the special style of inquiry, namely, dialogue with predecessors; for such dialogue may help us to go beyond our own perspectives.¹² We shall notice, moreover, a number of investigatory uses of the verb 'to appear' in this inquiry.

The new inquiry into what is begins in this way:

[Passage 29: 242b10–c9]

EV: We have first to examine what now seems obvious (to us) (*ta dokounta nyn enargōs echein*), lest we easily agree with each other that the issues are clear, while we are confused about them.

¹¹ I use the word 'dialectical' for the adjective of 'dialogue' or the Greek verb '*dialegesthai*'.

¹² My interpretation is therefore against the traditional view of the *Sophist*. M. Frede 1996, assuming that 'the *Sophist*, in a way, is the most dogmatic of all of Plato's dialogues' (135; cf. 139), asks: 'why Plato did not write a monograph "On False Statements"', but continued to cast even this account of false statements in dialogue form'; 'So what would have been lost, philosophically, if Plato had let the Eleatic Stranger give a long speech?' (139); for, he supposes, 'the Eleatic Stranger, when it comes to very complicated and technical matters, does not seem to be a particularly enthusiastic supporter of philosophical dialogue' (139). Although his article tries to show something positive in the dialogue form (proposing four points, in 139–151), his assumptions represent the traditional view.

Tht: Please say more clearly what you mean.

EV: Parmenides seems (*dokei*) to me to have discoursed to us complacently (*eukolōs*). So does everyone who has rushed at the decision to determine how many and what kind of beings (*ta onta*) are.

Tht: How?

EV: Each of them appears to me to tell us a story (*mython tina*), as if we were children . . .

The Ionian, Eleatic, and Sicilian thinkers used a lot of images, such as war, marriage, love and hatred, to express their doctrines (242c9–243a2). What matters at this moment is not the content or truth of their doctrines, but the manner in which they discourse to us (cf. *dieilechthai*, 242c4):

[Passage 30: 243a6 b1]

EV: They looked over our heads, and thought little of us, the majority of people. For they did not consider at all whether we were following their talk or were left behind, but each of them has completed his own work.

The essential point is the lack of communication or dialogue between the predecessors and ‘us’; for predecessors, on the one hand, reached their positions and spoke to ‘us’ as if they were telling a story to children (*mythos*, 242c8–9, d6). They talk complacently as those who know (cf. 244a6–7), and do not care about the listeners. We listeners, on the other hand, think that we understand notions such as ‘is’, ‘comes to be’, and ‘has become’, whenever some of them speak about these. However, the inquiry has already made it clear that inquirers are in deep trouble about ‘what is not’.

[Passage 31: 243c2 6]

EV: Perhaps we are in the same state of the soul concerning ‘what is’, when we insist that we understand without difficulty whenever someone utters this word, although we do not understand the other (sc. ‘what is not’). Perhaps we are in a similar state about both.

Tht: Perhaps.

Anticipating parity of difficulties, the Eleatic visitor here indicates two gaps in understanding. Because of the lack of proper dialogue between the predecessors and us, we think that we understand what they mean, and see no problem in any notion. But if we scrutinise what seems to us, from examining the predecessors’ views, we may realise that we fail


to understand each and are actually in profound difficulty. The gap of understanding between the predecessors and us will shed light on the other gap within ourselves, namely, between seeming understanding and real ignorance.

Dialogue and cross-examination are necessary between predecessors and us, and within ourselves. That will reveal the real issue concerning what is, namely, our total lack of understanding. Our epistemological state is to think that we know when we do not. The predecessors, on the other hand, look as if they know these things whenever they speak about them; hence they should be asked what they mean, and their views should be cross-examined. It is for this purpose that the Eleatic visitor adopts the method of imaginary dialogue with the predecessors. Imaginary dialogue is put within actual dialogue (between the Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus); the inquirers ask questions and answer as would each group of predecessors. This method of using imaginary dialogue is useful for changing one's viewpoint and getting beyond 'me'. Accordingly, the imaginary dialogue is introduced with a view to examining what the inquirers think the predecessors indicate by 'what is' (243d3–5); its aim is to examine *our* own epistemological state, *not* to refute the predecessors. For when we examine the predecessors' views in imaginary dialogue, it is not *their* fault if they are unable to answer but show themselves entangled in profound difficulty. That only shows *our* lack of understanding of what they talk about, and our epistemological state, namely, being in aporia. Consequently, to have imaginary dialogue with predecessors is to discourse within ourselves, through examining what seems to us. It is not surprising that the inquiry makes full use of appearances (verbs pertaining to '*phainesthai*'), which is the second feature of this section.¹³

¹³ It is a noticeable fact that the inquiry in Section 2 of the Middle Part makes much use of appearance (12 examples), in contrast to the subsequent argument on the greatest kinds, which has only one example (256d4). The argument on the nature of difference again has five examples (257b7, c7, 258a8, d7 (*apo-*), e7(*apo-*)).

7.2.2 *Dialogues with the predecessors*

The present method of inquiry is to cross-examine what the predecessors think they indicate by the term ‘what is’ (*to on*), as if they were present (243d7–8). The inquirers address their predecessors in the second person, ‘you’, and construct an imaginary dialogue between them and ‘us’.¹⁴ The predecessors are grouped into two pairs: the first, pluralists (dualists represent this position) and monists (with reference to Parmenides’ poem), and the second, materialists and idealists (called the friends of Forms).¹⁵ The two pairs are subject to different kinds of examination. The inquirers interrogate and examine the dualists and monists directly. By contrast, the materialists and idealists are already and always embattled, and they attack each other like the giants and gods. However, their positions are so exclusive and so destructive that they cannot properly communicate each view. The inquirers play the role of interpreters of the two positions, and try to integrate their views into one.



We, the readers, should keep this mode of imaginary dialogue constantly in view.

(1) *Dialogues with dualists and monists*

First, the inquirers address dualists, who take ‘both and each (of the hot and the cold) *to be*’ (*amphō kai hekateron einai*, 243e1–2), as representative of the pluralist camp (cf.

¹⁴ Cf. *dialegethai* in 242c4 and 251d2.

¹⁵ The latter pair includes, strictly speaking, not only predecessors but also contemporary thinkers; for Theaetetus says that he has met many hard-line materialists (246b4–5). But the two pairs overlap; for example, Parmenides is both a monist and a thinker of unchangeable being (cf. 249c11–d1 and 252a7, which seem to refer to him). Besides, all of them are later treated together as those who once discoursed upon being (251c8–d3).

244b2–4), and ask them to clarify what they mean when they talk about what is (243d6–244b5). The inquirers examine in the following way:

- (1) 'To be' will be the third thing in addition to the two (243e2 4);
- (2) Or, if dualists identify what is with one of the two, for example, the hot, what is will be one, not two, since the other, namely, the cold, will not be what is (e4 7);
- (3) If, on the other hand, they identify what is with the hot and cold (together), these will be one, and not two (e8 244a3).

Since dualists cannot take any of these three options, which destroy their original claim, the upshot is that *we*, the inquirers, are now in aporia, and find ourselves not understanding what the pluralists said about what is, although we thought we knew before (244a6–8).

Next, the inquirers turn to monists, who claim that 'only one *is*' (*hen esti*); cf. 244b9–10, d14) (244b6–245d11). The argument moves in two stages: one focuses on names (*onomata*), and the other on the whole (*to holon*).

In the first stage (244b9–d13), the inquirers take up the names that monists use in explaining their theory:

- (1) They call the same thing by *two* names, that is, 'being' and 'one';
- (2) They admit that there is a name, but (i) if the name is different from the thing it refers to, they talk about *two* things, or (ii) if the name is the same as the thing named, it is the name of nothing or of itself, i.e. of a name.¹⁶

In each case, monists fail to maintain their claim that only *one is*.

The argument in the second stage (244d14–245d11) is as follows:¹⁷

The main choice for monists is whether (3) the one being is the whole, or (4) the one being is different from the whole:

¹⁶ 244d11–12 has textual problems, but the sentence must produce nonsense, and there is certainly word play: '*to hen on*' at d12 appears in the next sentence (d14).

¹⁷ My structural analysis of the argument is different from that of Cornford 1935, 222–228. I take it that the 'difficult choice' between (3) and (4), stated in 245b4–6, is a paraphrase of the initial choice in 244d14–15, in terms of the analysis of the 'whole' in 244e2–245b3. I basically follow Bluck 1975, 73–88, who argues, against Moravcsik 1962 and Cornford 1935, that the argument is concerned not with the concepts or Forms of Wholeness and Unity, but with the whole and the one (cf. de Rijk 1986, 97–98).

- (3) If being is the whole, as Parmenides himself says, it must have parts, and therefore, it is not the same as the one, and being will be more than one;
- (4) If, on the other hand, being is different from the whole; and if (i) the whole *is* (independently of being), being falls short of itself, and there will be many things (i.e. being and the whole) (245c1–10); if (ii) the whole *is not* at all, neither generation, being, nor a certain quantity becomes possible (c11–d11).

The argument against monists is rather general; Parmenides and his Eleatic followers are the main, but not the sole, target, since it contains some points (the impossibility of generation and plurality) that contradict our common sense but not the Parmenidean position.¹⁸ The procedure of argument, particularly the frequent use of ‘if’ and the disjunctive, reminds us of the second part of the *Parmenides*.¹⁹ In that dialogue, Parmenides encourages young Socrates to practise logical argument, and readers are expected to detect where wrong reasoning lies. Likewise, there are some hints in the examination of monism that anticipate the later analysis of ‘to be’, ‘the same’, and ‘different’, all of which need clarification. Imaginary dialogue (with quotation marks in our modern text) gets absorbed into the main dialogue between the Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus after 244c3, but the spirit of examination through dialogue remains the same.

The upshot of the arguments against pluralists and monists is:

[Passage 32: 245d12–e3]

EV: Many other things, each of which entails infinite difficulties, will appear (*phaneitai*), whether one claims that ‘what is’ is two, or only one.

Tht: What has just now turned up (*hypophainonta*) clearly indicates that.

(2) *Dialogues with materialists and friends of Forms*

After examining those who argued precisely (i.e. dualists and monists), the inquirers turn to those who speak about ‘what

¹⁸ Cf. Bluck 1975, 81–82.

¹⁹ For the relation between the two arguments, see Schofield 1974, 42, and Guthrie 1978, 137, n.4.

is' in a different manner,²⁰ and the aim of inquiry is to reveal that the notion of 'what is' is no less difficult than 'what is not' (245e6–246a3). The new target is two tendencies constantly in battle: materialists and idealists (called the friends of Forms). Their dispute concerning what is is compared to the mythological battle of giants and gods (246a4–c4).

Materialists 'drag everything down to earth from the heaven of the invisible' and define 'what is' as the same as body (*sōma*), which affords tangible contact,²¹ while idealists insist that the intelligible and bodiless Forms are the true beings. These two groups stand at the two extremes, but neither position can be fully comprehended without the other. For despite severe antagonism, each tries to establish his position by defeating the other party. Materialists forcibly reduce invisible things in heaven to bodily things, while idealists defend themselves against them from somewhere up on high and break the truth of the others, namely, bodily things, into pieces. Their relationship is violent, and battle constant.²² Metaphors of battle and violence represent their way of contention: they controvert each other (246a5, b6), but materialists contend uncompromisingly and do not listen to opposing opinion (246b1–3), while idealists smash the opposition in argument (b9–c2), forcing them to admit their own position. There is no dialogue between them.

The inquirers watch their battle as a third party and try to take argument from each of the two. In this sense, their attitude is essentially different from that of the opposing camps. The friends of Forms are easier to converse with, since they are more gentle, whereas the materialists are harder, or almost impossible. Consequently, the inquirers must improve on the latter, not in fact but in argument, and

²⁰ Not 'less precisely', as Campbell 1867, 115–116, takes it (cf. Cornford 1935, 228–229).

²¹ These people are mentioned in *Theaetetus* 155e3–156a2, as distinct from the more sophisticated people who insist that all is change (156a2–5; cf. 177c7).

²² For the metaphorical vocabulary concerning materialists, see 'drag' (*helkein*) in 246a8, c9; 'insist strongly' (*diischyriesthai*) in a9–10; 'by force' (*biai*) in d1; and concerning idealists, see 'contend violently' (*biaiesthai*) in b8; 'break in small pieces' (*diathrauein*) in c1. 'Battle' is described in 246a4–5 and c2–3.

imagine that they would answer more according to rules (246d4–7; cf. 247c3–7, e5–6).²³ Here the inquiry aims at truth in argument, rather than actual improvement of those people (246d8–9). The inquirers then hold imaginary dialogue with the reasonable materialists and the friends of Forms in turn, and the Eleatic visitor asks Theaetetus to *interpret* what they would say (cf. *aphermēneuein*, in 246e3 and 248a5).²⁴ In this dialogue, the inquirers ask questions, elicit agreement and concession from them, if they cannot do better, and make a proposal, if the opponents have difficulty (247d4–6). Inquiry in this way breaks the exclusive antagonism between the two parties and creates a possibility of dialogue between them and ‘us’, the inquirers.

First, the inquirers converse with the improved materialists (246e2–248a3). They elicit an agreement from materialists that, since living beings are animate bodies, there *are* souls; hence, that, since some souls are just and intelligent, there *are* justice and intelligence. These are invisible and they would not insist that all of them are bodies, so that at least they would accept that something bodiless *is*. Then, the Eleatic visitor proposes the common feature or definitional mark (*horos*) of all these things: that is, power (*dynamis*) to act or be acted upon (247d8–e4). The inquiry has thus transformed the original definition of materialists, that only bodies are, into the improved suggestion that things which have power to act or be acted upon *are*.²⁵ This definitional mark is tentative, and serves to advance argument.²⁶ It is used again in the argument with idealists.

Next, the inquirers talk to the friends of Forms, those who

²³ ‘Improving’ morally as well as in argument (247b7–c7; cf. 246d7–8).

²⁴ The new OCT (Duke et al. 1995) properly puts quotations in 248a7–8, 9, 10–13, b1, 2–4, 5, 6–7, c7–8, d4–7, 8, 10–e5, which were not in the old OCT or Budé.

²⁵ For the worry of Cornford 1935, 234, n.1, see Bluck 1975, 92, n.1, and de Rijk 1986, 101. The word ‘*horos*’ (247e3) has an echo of ‘*horizomenoi*’ (246b1) in the original position of materialists, so that it should mean ‘definition’ rather than mere ‘mark’: cf. Owen 1971, 229–230, n.14, Guthrie 1978, 139, n.2, and de Rijk 1986, 101, n.12 (pace Cornford 1935, 238, n.3, and Bluck 1975, 93).

²⁶ See Campbell 1867, 124, Cornford 1935, 238–239, and Guthrie 1978, 140, n.3: later argument does not have to stick to this definitional mark of being (cf. 247e7–248a3).

strictly separate true being (*ousia*) from becoming (*genesis*) (248a4–249b7). They assume that we are related (*koinōnein*) to becoming, in body through perception, and to being, in soul through reasoning (248a10–b1). The inquirers focus on the ‘relation’ (*koinōnia*) between the soul and true being, the one knowing and the other being known. The friends of Forms would not accept the definitional mark of being, which the reformed materialists have accepted, but then they would drive intelligence (*nous*, *phronēsis*) and life (*zōē*) out of being. However, if the perfect being has intelligence, then it must have life in soul. Consequently, it seems (*phainetai*, 249b1) unreasonable that the perfect being, though having soul, stands unchangeable. They should accept change and things changed as beings.

Both arguments with materialists and idealists focus on the ontological status of soul and intelligence, and draw concessions from each party (rather than refute their opinions). As for idealists, if all is unchangeable, no intelligence will be anywhere for anybody about anything (249b5–7).²⁷ As for materialists, if all changes, intelligence again neither is nor has come to be (249b8–c5). *Neither* party can explain intelligence and knowledge, and hence, the inquirers must fight against both. The meaning of their focus on soul and intelligence now becomes clear: it is *because* the philosopher must value intelligence, wisdom and knowledge that the inquirers should reject both the materialist and idealist positions, and take ‘both’ (things unchangeable and changed) as what is, like children in their wishes (249c6–d5). In this manner, the inquirers trace the way which a philosopher would take and the imaginary dialogue with materialists and idealists eventually leads them to their own position.

Since the view of the friends of Forms represents the so-called theory of Forms, which is proposed in Plato’s middle dialogues, mainly in the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, and *Republic*, and criticised in the *Parmenides*, the imaginary dialogue with them is likely to be Plato’s examination of his own posi-

²⁷ I insert ‘*pantōn*’ in 249b5 with Badham (Cornford 1935, 241, n.1, White 1993, 40, and new OCT).

tion.²⁸ Just as Plato has the great Parmenides speak against young Socrates in the *Parmenides*, so here the visitor from Elea, who stands outside the circle who share the theory of Forms presented by the Platonic Socrates, critically examines the position that separates true being from becoming. Here we notice that the Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus seem more closely associated with the friends of Forms than with the earth-born materialists.²⁹ The argument also contains an interesting self-critical view of Plato's theory of Forms: it is the friends of Forms who deny any 'being' (*ousia*) in bodily things, while materialists maintain that they are beings (cf. 'einaí' in 246a10 and 'ousia' in b1). Plato seems to be aware that breaking bodies into fluctuating pieces and regarding what the others call 'being' as 'becoming' is *his own* logic, not the original claim of materialists (246b9–c2). Moreover, the concession that being includes change has raised a great controversy over how to interpret this, ever since Neoplatonism.³⁰ Whatever the concession from the friends of Forms may mean, the dialogue is certainly an attempt to present and clarify some fundamental difficulties and problems in the standard theory of Forms. However, taking the context and methodological aspect which I have indicated into consideration, neither a unitarian nor a developmentalist conclusion is easy to draw. Dialogue and criticism from an independent viewpoint is necessary for understanding problems in one's own position.

Now the inquirers have arrived at their own position by integrating the materialist and idealist positions and choosing 'both' things changing and unchangeable. It is at this point, however, that they find themselves in deepest difficulty concerning what is (249d6–251a4). Let us examine the process of recognition of the difficulty by considering the other feature

²⁸ Cf. Bluck 1975, 94, and Guthrie 1978, 141. The word 'eide' in the sense of 'Forms' is used in 246b8, c8, 248a4, and 249d1.

²⁹ Compare two comments, 246b4–5 and 248b6–8: in the imaginary dialogue with the friends of Forms, both inquirers play their part and speak on behalf of them.

³⁰ See, for example, Cornford 1935, 244–248, de Vogel 1970, ch. 8, Guthrie 1978, 143–146, and de Rijk 1986, Introduction and ch. 6.

characteristic of Section 2, namely the investigatory use of appearance.

7.2.3 *Philosophical inquiry through appearances*

In Section 2 the inquiry into ‘what is’ (*to on*) is mainly done by cross-examining predecessors’ opinions, and through that cross-examination the inquirers examine how ‘what is’ *appears* to them. We may accordingly see that the argument in this section illustrates the dialectical process by means of the investigatory use of appearance.

Let us look at the examples of the inquirers’ use of appearances. In their full investigation into the meaning of what is (*to on*), ‘what now seems obvious to us’ (*ta dokounta nyn enargōs echein*) turns out to be what ‘we’ do not really understand (cf. 242b10–c2 and 243b3–c9). This drastic change from seeming understanding to awareness of the inquirers’ own ignorance is brought about by cross-examining what their predecessors thought of ‘what is’. The contrast between seeming understanding and real ignorance becomes crucial in the successive examinations of dualists, monists, materialists, and friends of Forms, with regard to the problematic notion of ‘what is’; all that their predecessors said on that issue needs to be clarified (*emphanizein*, 244a4–6). Examination of the dualist view first reveals the sharp contrast between ‘our’ thinking (*doxazein*) that ‘we’ understand, and not understanding: ‘we thought (*ōiometha*) we knew before, but we are in difficulty now’ (244a6–b1). What turns up (*hypophainonta*, 245e3) in the examination of dualists and monists indicates that an infinite number of difficulties will appear (*phaneitai*) to those who insist that ‘what is’ is one or many (Passage 32). Examination of the views of all the four parties is made by means of what *appears* to the inquirers (cf. *phainesthai*, in 245b8, 249b1), but once an agreement is reached, a different thing is anticipated to appear (*heteron an phaneīē*, 248a1). Thus, it is through what appears to the inquirers that dialogues between ‘us’ and others proceed.

The inquirers complete the examination of materialist and idealist views and finally reach their own conclusion that ‘what is’ is *both* things changing and things unchangeable (249c10–d5). It is at this point, however, that they become aware of their own deep ignorance. The Eleatic visitor proclaims:

[Passage 33: 249d6 e6]

EV: Then, we seem (F1, *phainometha*) to have fairly caught what is, in argument, don’t we?

Tht: Certainly.

EV: For heaven’s sake, Theaetetus! Now we seem (F2, *dokoumen*) to me to become aware of the difficulty concerning the investigation into this.

Tht: Why? And what do you mean?

EV: Blessed man! Don’t you realise that we are now in the greatest ignorance about it, although we appear (F3, *phainometha*) to ourselves to say something reasonable?

Tht: It appears so to me at any rate. I don’t understand at all why we are in such a state without noticing.

Subsequent examination of their own conclusion rather suggests that they posit ‘what is’ as a third thing which is different from both change and rest. The conclusion reached so far proves to contain a great difficulty, and we shall discuss the procedure for that proof in the next subsection.

[Passage 34: 250c9 d4]

EV: Where does someone have to direct his thought, if he wants to establish for himself something clear about it (sc. what is)?

Tht: Where?

EV: I do not think any direction would be easy. For if something does not change, how does it not rest? Or how does the thing which never rests not change? Now it has turned out (A1, *anapephantai*) to us that what is falls outside both of them. But is that possible?

Tht: The most impossible thing of all.

The difficulty concerning ‘what is’ is now paired with the previous difficulty concerning ‘what is not’:

[Passage 35: 250e1 251a4]

EV: Aren’t we now in no less difficulty about what is (than about what is not)?

Tht: To me, Visitor, we seem (F4, *phainometha*) to be in a greater difficulty, if it is possible to say that.

EV: Here, let us put this matter down as a complete difficulty. Since what

is and what is not have an equal share of difficulties, now our hope is that if one of these will turn up (A2, *anaphainētai*), whether faintly or clearly, the other will also turn up (A3, *anaphainesthai*) in this way. And if we cannot see either of them, we shall push the argument through between these two at once (*hama*) in the way we can proceed most plausibly.³¹

Tht: Fine.

The inquirers finally arrive at the parity of difficulties concerning what is not and what is: they have to clarify what is not and what is, both at once.³²

In this process the words 'we appear' (*phainometha*) and 'we seem' (*dokoumen*) are used four times, and their meaning drastically changes from a positive one of a philosophical achievement (F1), through a negative one of a mere fancy (F3), to an opposite awareness of a difficulty (F2 and F4). Also, the word 'turn up' (*anaphainesthai*) is used three times to indicate both the present difficult situation concerning what is (A1) and a future discovery about both what is and what is not (A2 and A3).

The continual use of the verb 'to appear' in this whole section shows that philosophical investigation proceeds according to what *appears* to 'us' inquirers in the course of dialectical argument. What at one moment becomes evident may turn out to be a difficulty, and the appearance swings from what is obvious, to what merely appears to us. With such swings, however, the truth will gradually reveal itself. In this sense, each appearance cannot decisively be said to be true or false without taking its context of inquiry into account. For each appearance is of significance only in a process and context of discussion. At each stage, a certain dialectical process produces an appearance as a *true* judgement, but in the next step that appearance may be regarded as *false*. This is the role of the investigatory use of appearance in Section 2 of the Middle Part.

³¹ For the image of this phrase, see Campbell 1867, 136, and Owen 1971, 230, n.16.

³² For the 'Parity Assumption', see Owen 1971, 229–231.

7.2.4 *Solution to the epistemological issues*

According to our analysis of the issue of appearance in Chapter 6, we need two levels of argument. The official solution deals with the logical difficulty and should prove in an objective way that there is false appearance. As for the epistemological issues, on the other hand, we have to explain, first, how we can integrate different appearances to different audiences, and second, how I can admit the falsehood in my own appearances, and third, how we inquirers can justly ascribe false appearances to others, by proving ours is superior and more objective. In a word, the question is how to reach an objective and true judgement through appearances in inquiry. The official solution which provides the logical basis for the epistemological consideration is sought through the Middle Part (Sections 3 and 4 in particular), and we can also see a solution to the epistemological issues by reflecting on the dialectical process in Section 2. For the investigatory use of appearance in the Middle Part illustrates and exemplifies the dialectical movement and process of assertive decisions.

Let us take two examples of conflicting appearances from the first Outer Part and the Middle Part. The first example is:

(A1) The sophist appears to the young to be wise.

(A2) The sophist appears to us (inquirers) not to be wise.

We want to say that the appearance in A1 is false and the appearance in A2 is true, but the sophist may oppose us and take both to be true (for each audience). As we saw above, the sophistic counter-attack is based on the three epistemological issues which prevent us from forming the following appearance:

(A3) The sophist appears to be wise but is not wise.

We must prove, against the sophistic counter-attack, that one appearance A2 is true and the other A1 false, and show how the investigatory use of appearance is superior, so as to reach the conclusion of A3.

Look at the second example:

P: 'What is' (*to on*) is both change and rest.

(B1) We (truly) appear (to us at t_1) to grasp 'what is' in P (F1).

(B2) We (merely) appear (to us) to grasp 'what is' in P (cf. F3).

(B3) We (truly) appear (to us at t_2) not to grasp 'what is' in P (F4; cf. F2).

This example indicates two important points: first, the audience in all cases is 'us', and second, the time of judgement differs in these. In the interval between t_1 and t_2 a certain process of inquiry reveals that B1 was false and B3 is true (249e7–250d4). The judgement of B2 is fixed only at t_2 , when our true epistemological state becomes obvious, but it is a kind of self-reference to B1 at t_1 , while at t_2 we no longer appear to grasp 'what is'.

The first point seems to solve one epistemological difficulty, which is concerned with different audiences. For this example shows that as long as we assume the same audience 'us', we can declare that one appearance to 'us' *was* false. To this, however, the sophist will insist that whatever *now* appears to me is always true, and he does not care whether a *past* appearance is *now* thought to be false (since this judgement itself is again a present, *true* appearance). Of course, the cognitive state of the audience 'us' must have changed through the process of discourse, whether it be long or short. But the sophistic attitude may break the identity of a person and responsibility for one's judgements. If, as the sophist might insist, no past appearance has anything to do with the present 'me', not only will my appearances become a medley of fragmentary impressions, but also I myself will be a medley of momentary 'I's. The eristics in fact deny any commitment to their own previous arguments, and that attitude is clearly expressed in Dionysodorus' comment to Socrates in *Euthydemus* 287b2–5: 'Are you such an old Cronos as to bring up now what we said at the beginning? If I said something last year, you will bring that up now, but it

will be of no use for the present argument.³³ In contrast to the sophist, inquirers are those who take responsibility for the past appearances which they have presented, and who have courage to acknowledge sometimes that what appeared to 'us' *was* false, or that the *previous* appearance to 'us' *is* false. Therefore, Socrates in the *Meno*, for example, insists that a sound judgement should be not only what seemed in the past, but also what seems now and will seem in the future (89c8–10).³⁴

Let us now return to the argument on what is, and look more closely at what happens between B1 and B3. The tentative conclusion that 'what is' is both change and rest seems at first very plausible, and the inquirers appear to have caught it fairly well (Passage 33). Yet they appeal to the same argument as they previously employed against the dualists:

[Passage 36: 249e7–250a6] (after Passage 33)

EV: Consider more clearly if, when we now agree on that, we would fairly be asked the same question that we ourselves asked those who say that all is hot and cold.

Tht: How? Please remind me.

EV: Certainly. And I shall try to remind you by asking you in the same way as I asked them earlier, so as to make some progress at the same time.

Now the inquirers direct the same critical argument toward themselves. The previous imaginary dialogue between dualists and 'us', the inquirers, is transformed into a new dialogue between 'ourselves', namely, between the Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus:

- (1) Change and rest are complete contraries (250a8–10);
- (2) Both and each of them *are* in a similar way (250a11–b1; corresponding to 243e1–2, 4–5);
- (3) If what is is change, both and each change, which is impossible (250b2–4);
- (4) If what is is rest, both and each rest, which is impossible (250b5–6; corresponding to 243e5–6);

³³ Cf. Socrates' mocking response in 288a1–2; also, an anonymous person describes the eristics as 'those who care nothing about what they say, but snatch at every word' (305a3–4).

³⁴ Cf. *Tht.* 154c10–e6.

- (5) What is must be posited as a third thing in soul (250b7 c2; corresponding to 243e2 4);
- (6) What is is not these two, but different from them, and therefore, in its nature it neither changes nor rests (250c3 8).

The inquirers cross-examine and refute their own conclusion by using the same logic as was used in their previous cross-examination of the others. The difficulty concerning where to direct thought about what is, is now not others' but 'our own'. By the same logic that they employed to reveal the falsehood in the argument of the others, the inquirers have revealed and acknowledged the falsehood of their own argument. What made that possible was to admit that what *now* appears to 'us' *may* be false; that is the judgement of B2 considered at 11. The investigation as dialogue, by rejecting one's own conclusions, gradually reveals one's own ignorance, and a direction toward the truth.³⁵

So far I have described how one can acknowledge one's own falsehood in a diachronic manner, but we can also interpret it in a synchronic manner. The sophist disintegrates our present appearances and judgements, and claims that each and every appearance is true. On the other hand, we inquirers consider the whole system of our judgements and appearances, and the consistency between them. When a conclusion is drawn from certain premises (some of our judgements), and that conclusion is incompatible with other judgements, we judge that at least either one of the premises or the conclusion is false. Falsehood is found in the whole system of our judgements, and here the totality becomes crucial.³⁶ However, I must add that this synchronic description alone is not sufficient, although some scholars focus solely on this feature of dialectic, since it does not tell us about which judgement should be regarded as false.³⁷ Only

³⁵ The inquiry uses refutation (*elenchos*). In *Gorg.* 508e7, the negation of a proposition has become evident to us (*ephanē hēmin*) as a result of refutation; yet the elenctic method alone does not prove truth, though it makes something evident (cf. Vlastos 1983, 71–73).

³⁶ Remember that dialectic is concerned with system and totality (cf. 4.3.4).

³⁷ Some argue that dialectical argument is based on the beliefs of the interlocutors (Robinson 1953, 78 ff., Vlastos 1983, and Irwin 1986). But it is hard for those scholars to secure the objectivity and truth of agreement based on beliefs.

the dialectical process will explain how one widens one's own perspective, and how one can achieve a truer judgement, by regarding others as false.

To admit the possibility that one's own conclusion may be false is to admit the existence of a certain criterion which is beyond us, and in accordance with which we can distinguish between true and false appearances at each step. The criterion must be *reality*, which is different from appearances, but to which appearances aspire. Hence, those who acknowledge falsehood in their own judgements or appearances admit *reality* as a criterion, and accordingly they will be able to judge falsehood in what seems or appears to other people, according to the same criterion. It is this commitment to *reality* which enables inquirers to judge that the sophist's appearance to the young is false (in A3). We remember that the inquirers of the dialogue have already admitted that they themselves received various appearances of the sophist:

(A4) The sophist appears *to us* to be wise in many subjects (cf. 232a1–2).

The inquirers acknowledged that this appearance was unsound (Passage 4: 232a1–6), and in spite of the failure, they continued the investigation, proceeding from various appearances to the essence of the sophist. It is this attitude which makes it possible to get closer to the truth in philosophical inquiry.

The inquirers' attitude toward appearances reveals both how they differ from the sophist, and how they differ from young ignorant people.

First, concerning inquirers as those who make use of appearances in dialogue, we can give the following explanation. In philosophical investigation, a different appearance ('what *appears* to us') presents itself to them each time. Inquirers both admit that this appearance may be false and expose it to further cross-examination. In this way, inquirers accept the distinction between truth and falsehood, and thereby they can sometimes acknowledge that their own judgements and appearances are false. This makes it possible

to hope that dialectical progress will get them closer to the truth and reality through trial and error. On the other hand, the sophist also relies on appearances, but he differs from inquirers in that he does not admit falsehood at all; for he insists that all appearances are always true and real. By denying the possibility of falsehood, the sophist abolishes the distinction between truth and falsehood, and the distinction between appearance and reality. This amounts to the total denial of learning and a disbelief in philosophical progress through dialogue.³⁸ The sophist in this way conceals or eliminates the conflict of appearances in himself and therefore does not see *reality*. The sophist separates each appearance and does not integrate appearances into a single, whole view. For him, appearances remain a medley of episodes.

Next, if inquirers are to be compared with viewers of appearances, we can explain the difference between inquirers and the ignorant young in the following way. The dialectical process of inquiry makes inquirers' judgements superior, since inquirers consider a wider range of judgements and possibilities, and try to make them consistent. Inquirers can change their viewpoints and expect to get closer to the truth gradually by embracing many appearances in a single, whole understanding through dialogue. The young, on the other hand, because of their lack of experience in argument, stick to their narrow view and fail to see things from different perspectives. They do not yet properly engage in philosophical dialogue. Truth and falsehood in appearance depend in this way on the audience, or the person to whom it appears.

I shall add one final consideration concerning the significance of philosophical inquiry through appearances. The crucial point of the investigatory use of appearance is that the audience of the appearances is the plural 'we'. Here 'we' means inquirers: a limited number of the people who seriously engage in philosophical dialogue. We inquirers seek agreement between us on a single issue investigated together,

³⁸ See the consequences of the eristic denial of the possibilities of falsehood and contradiction in *Euthd.* 286b8–288a7.

through asking and answering questions, or sometimes, as in Section 2, by using imaginary dialogue with other thinkers; and at each step something *appears to us*.³⁹ While each person has only a limited perspective and can hardly go beyond ‘my’ own appearances, owing to the plurality and exchange of viewpoints collaborative inquiry will take us out of our particular viewpoint, and enable us to overcome the partiality of our understanding of the world. It is for this purpose that dialogue plays a crucial role in philosophy. In contrast to the predecessors’ lofty way of speaking, the inquirers in the *Sophist* seek and demonstrate the possibility of dialogue. The inquirers can hope that the dialectical process reveals their own mistakes and ignorance, and will gradually reveal the truth. We should not forget that it is exactly at the point where the inquirers admit the greatest difficulty that we see how to get out of the epistemological puzzles. To acknowledge our own falsehood and ignorance through dialogue is the only way to proceed toward the truth, and to make philosophy possible. Such inquirers can be us, the readers, as long as we take part in the dialectical inquiry in the dialogue and cross-examine ourselves. In a word, inquirers are those who believe and follow dialogue as leading them to the truth through appearances.

The solution to the epistemological issues shown above is not *discussed* in the Middle Part, but it is *demonstrated*, I believe, by the actual dialectical inquiry, which a true philosopher should perform.

7.3 Performing the art of dialectic (251a–259d)

7.3.1 *The possibility of combining kinds*

As soon as the inquirers conclude their argument in Section 2 with the parity of difficulties concerning what is not and what is, they set out on a new investigation into these concepts in

³⁹ The notion of communal inquiry, asking and answering questions, agreement between interlocutors, and saying what one believes are important features of dialectic (cf. Robinson 1953, 75–84).

Section 3 (251a5–259d8). The aim of this section is to prove, against the Parmenidean thesis, the possibility of combination of what is not with what is, but the argument on the combination between kinds is at the same time a performance of the art of dialectic, which differentiates the philosopher's genuine from the sophist's bogus art of argument. This section also contains a short digression on the art of dialectic and the philosopher (253c6–254b6), which at once reflects the dialectic performed in the Middle Part and lays the basis for the method of division used in the Outer Part.

The first question of the new investigation is 'in what way we each time call the same thing by many names' (251a5–6). The issue here is the relation of names (*onomata*) to object.⁴⁰ We should remember that the inquirers earlier fell into difficulty when they asked themselves to what object the name 'what is not' should be ascribed (237b10–c4), and also that monists confronted the difficulty of how to deal with many names that signify one being (244b9–d13). By ascribing many names to a single object, we state that one thing is many; for example, a man is good and large (251a8–b4). The Eleatic visitor then says that the puzzle about one and many has provided a lot of entertainment for the young and the 'late-learners' (*opsimatheis*), who deny the possibility of one being many or of many being one, and do not permit us to call one thing by any name other than itself; for example, they insist that we call a man only 'man' (251b5–c6).⁴¹ I do not specify who these 'late-learners' are,⁴² but we may notice that they share some common features with the sophist: (1) the late-learners readily trip up (*antilabesthai*, 251b6) every statement, and this is characteristic of the sophist's method (cf. 239d1–2); (2) they deny the possibility of any statement

⁴⁰ Cf. *eponomazein*, 251a8, and *epipherein*, a9.

⁴¹ Moravcsik 1962, 59, calls this position 'semantic atomism', which rules out statements altogether. They may even reject identity statements; at least 251c1–2 does not use '*einaí*'.

⁴² With reference to Aristotle's testimony, Antisthenes, who insists that only one thing can be predicated of one thing, is often supposed to be the 'late-learner' (see, for example, de Rijk 1986, 115–122). However, historical evidence about Antisthenes is scanty, and this identification is far from certain (cf. Guthrie 1969, 213–218).

(other than calling a thing by the same name), for the reason that one thing cannot be many; their reasoning might be based on the Parmenidean dichotomy between one and many; (3) they take pleasure in manipulating arguments without having proper understanding; (4) and they regard themselves as having discovered most clever things. Even if the 'late-learners' are not themselves sophists, they are introduced here, I suppose, to throw light on unfavourable consequences that follow improper ways of dealing with statements: that is, denial of the possibility of predication. In the conclusion of this section, the state of confusion of the 'late-learners' is compared to the 'new-born child who has just come into contact with things that are' (259c1–d8), and the inquirers' task is to clarify what is wrong with them.

The inquirers now address not only the late-learners but also all the groups who have discoursed upon 'what is' and with whom they have conversed, since confusion about statement is a fault not restricted to the late-learners but common to all thinkers (including the inquirers themselves, who at present suffer the greatest difficulty). The Eleatic visitor asks which of the three alternatives they should choose (251d5–e1): [A] none of being, change, rest and the others, can combine with any other; [B] all things can combine with one another; and [C] some kinds can combine, but some not.⁴³ Now the inquirers examine these three possibilities one by one:

[A] If no kinds have power to combine with any other, all the positions will fail (251e7–252d1). Firstly, those who insist that everything changes (i.e. materialists), those who maintain that only one is (i.e. monists), and those who assume that Forms rest (i.e. friends of Forms), will all be unable to say that change *is*, or that rest *is*, since these combine change or rest

⁴³ Plato uses a variety of words to signify the relation between kinds: 'combine', 'mix', 'blend', 'harmonise', and so on. Cornford 1935, 255–256, supposes that Plato deliberately appeals to the wide range of metaphors so as to avoid any misleading images. This is partly true, but we should also remember that Plato introduces a more elaborate phraseology later in the argument: as Ackrill 1957 shows (following the suggestion of Ross 1951, 111–112, n.6; *pace* Cornford), Plato uses '*koinōnia*' with the dative and genitive, and '*metechein*' differently; Pelletier 1990, 106–137, provides a full investigation.

with being. Similarly, thinkers who combine and separate things (i.e. ‘Sicilian Muses’ including Empedocles) will fail to explain their theory. Finally, the late-learners will not be able to state their own position in argument, since to claim a thing to ‘be in itself, separate from others’ is already to combine kinds, and therefore to contradict themselves. They have their enemy in themselves like Eurycles the ventriloquist (252c2–9).⁴⁴

- [B] Next, if everything can combine with anything else, all will be lumped into one, and the most impossible thing happens: combination of contraries, such that change rests, and rest changes (252d2–11).
- [C] Eliminating these two alternatives, the inquirers choose the third way: some kinds can combine with others, but some not (d12–e8).

This being agreed, it is next to be investigated which kinds can combine with which, and how. The inquirers use the analogies of letters and musical sounds (252e9–253b7). In the case of letters, obviously some fit each other, and some not; vowels, particularly, pervade and link all letters like a bond, and enable others to fit each other. Those who know which letter can combine with which are grammarians, and the proper art of dealing with this combination is grammar. Likewise, those who know about sounds of high and low pitch, which can fit which, are musicians, and their art is music. In general, this can be found in other arts and non-arts, and by analogy, proper knowledge of combination between kinds is expected:

[Passage 37: 253b8–c5]

EV: Then since we have agreed that kinds are in the same way as regards mixture with one another, one who will correctly show which kinds harmonise with which kinds, and what kinds do not accept each other, must proceed through argument with some sort of knowledge. Above all, one must show whether there are any kinds that hold together through all, so that they are capable of mixing, and also in division whether there are some that extend through wholes as the cause of division.

Tht: Of course, knowledge is necessary. Perhaps, the greatest knowledge.

⁴⁴ The last point echoes the third difficulty concerning what is not: to say that what is not *is* unspeakable is to contradict oneself (238c8–10); it appeals to the same pragmatic difficulty. For this argument, see Ackrill 1955 and 1957, 3.

This passage indicates the following five points: (1) kinds always behave in the same way in relation to one another;⁴⁵ (2) some kinds combine with others, and some not; (3) there are some kinds which make combination possible, as causes of mixture; (4) there are some kinds which separate kinds, as causes of division; and (5) knowledge (or art) is necessary for dealing properly with the combination of kinds. While the first two general agreements were reached in the previous argument by elimination, the other three are drawn from the analogy of letters⁴⁶ and distinguish two types of kinds: the consonant-like kinds which are combined, and the vowel-like kinds which pervade all kinds and control combination and separation of the consonant-like kinds.⁴⁷ Just as some kinds can combine and certain kinds are the cause of that combination, so some kinds cannot combine and there must be a cause of that non-combination or separation.⁴⁸ The general agreements on combination between kinds in Passage 37 lay the basis for the whole subsequent investigation.

7.3.2 *The art of dialectic and the philosopher*

Since the inquirers have agreed that a certain knowledge is necessary for discerning which kinds can combine with which, they now examine what that knowledge is. Yet the next comment by the Eleatic visitor may sound shocking to us, as well as to Theaetetus:

[Passage 38: 253c6–10] (following Passage 37)

EV: Then, Theaetetus, what shall we call this knowledge? Or, by Zeus, have we without noticing stumbled on the knowledge of free people, and in searching for the sophist found the philosopher first?

Tht: What do you mean?

⁴⁵ The word ‘*genē*’ is used here, but I assume that there is no essential difference between ‘*eidos*’, ‘*idea*’, and ‘*genos*’ in this argument, and translate all of these as ‘kind’: cf. Cornford 1935, 261, n.1, 276, Bluck 1975, 133, and Gómez-Lobo 1977, 31, n.5 (*pace* de Rijk 1986, 143–144).

⁴⁶ Correspondence between 253a4 6 and c1 2 is conspicuous; see especially ‘through all’ (*dia pantōn*) in 253a5 and c1.

⁴⁷ Cf. Gómez-Lobo 1977, 36–38.

⁴⁸ This does not have a corresponding item in the vowel analogy; cf. Gómez-Lobo 1981, 81–82. We must note, however, that non-combination (or incompatibility) and separation (difference) are later to be distinguished and articulated.

From this point, the conversation enters upon a short digression on the art of dialectic and the philosopher (253c6–254b6). The digression lies in the midst of the Middle Part, and reflects the whole dialogue. Now comes a difficult passage describing knowledge of dialectic:

[Passage 39: 253d1–e3] (following Passage 38)

EV: [P] To divide according to kinds and not to take the same for a different kind nor a different kind for the same—don't you say that this belongs to knowledge of dialectic?

Tht: Yes, we say that.

EV: [T] One who is able to do this perceives distinctly that [T1] one kind (*mian idean*) has extended in all directions, through many, each of which stands separate from the others, and that [T2] many kinds which are different from one another are embraced from without by one kind, and that [T3] again one kind connects them in one, through many wholes, and that [T4] many forms are distinguished in all ways. [E] This is to know how to discern (*diakrinein*) according to kind, how each can or cannot combine.

Tht: Certainly.

This much-discussed passage is made deliberately obscure, and we can understand its meaning only in retrospect.⁴⁹

Passage 39 is usually taken to describe the method of collection and division with reference to a genus-species hierarchy.⁵⁰ This standard interpretation, however, isolates the passage from its context, and loses sight of its connection to the main argument.⁵¹ I would rather take it to represent and reflect the proper view of the combination of kinds, and

⁴⁹ Gómez-Lobo 1977, 36, rightly sees this passage as anticipating the result of the whole argument (258d5–259b6). I basically follow Gómez-Lobo 1977 (esp. 30–36) for the numbering and interpretation of Passage 39; he refutes the standard interpretation of this passage and provides a consistent interpretation of the argument of 251a5–259d8.

⁵⁰ The standard interpretation is represented by Stenzel 1940, 96–106, who maintains that this passage is wholly concerned with the hierarchical division of kinds. Stenzel depends for his interpretation on *Phdr.* 265c ff., and isolates this passage from the whole context. For the standard interpretation, see also Cornford 1935, 262–273, Lloyd 1952, 227–228, Crombie 1963, 417–419, Bluck 1975, 125–132, and Waletzki 1979.

⁵¹ For example, Bluck 1975, 132, in concluding the discussion of Passage 39, comments that 'it has no direct bearing on the main subject of discussion'. Waletzki 1979, in criticising Gómez-Lobo 1977, suffers the same defect (that is, isolation of the passage and extrapolation from other dialogues), and is refuted by Gómez-Lobo 1981.

in particular, the roles of 'what is' and 'what is not'. It should be understood in succession to Passage 37 and in connection to the subsequent argument up to the end of Section 3 (259d8).

In my view, Passage 39 contains two levels of methodology.⁵² First, P signifies the method of division, since 'to divide according to kinds' is a catch-phrase for the method of division, and therefore provides a higher reflection on the inquiry into the definition of the sophist by means of division, in the Outer Part.⁵³ For the main aim of division is to discern and observe clearly sameness and difference between kinds (253d1–4), and this ability to discern is clearly associated with dialectic (cf. *Phdr.* 265e1–266c1, *Rep.* V 454a4–9). Division is a part of dialectic, however, and should not be identified with it.⁵⁴

On the other hand, T1–4 describes the combination of kinds, knowledge of which is dialectic. It basically clarifies the implication of the third and fourth agreements in Passage 37, and anticipates the subsequent discussion on the relationships between the greatest kinds (254b7–259b7). In T1 and T2, 'one kind' signifies 'what is' (*to on*):⁵⁵ for 'what is' embraces (*periechesthai*) both change and rest,⁵⁶ but it is posited as the third (outside both change and rest) in the soul (250d2–3). Next, T3 and T4 describe the role of 'what is not', to which the 'one kind' in T3 refers.⁵⁷ We must bear in mind

⁵² Cf. Gómez-Lobo 1977, 41. Although Seligman 1974, 52–54, also distinguishes two levels and takes the argument of the combination of kinds as 'meta-dialectic', he still interprets 253d5–e2 as discussing the method of division. Also, although Trevaskis 1967, 119–123, rejects Cornford's view, which equates dialectic in 253d1–9 with the method of division, he is not free from the preconception that the passage deals with the class-individual relation.

⁵³ Cf. '*kat' eidē diairesis*' in 264c1–2, 267d5–6; '*diaireisthai*' or '*diairesis*' used in the method of division in 219e7, 220b10, 14, 221e2, 223d2, 225a4, 229d6, 235b8, c3, 8, d4, 264c4, 265a5, 266a8, 11, and 267b8. This method is clearly envisaged in *Phdr.* 265e1–266b1 (*to kat' eidē dynasthai diatēmein*), and a similar expression is often seen: *Plt.* 262d7, e3–4, 287c3–5; cf. 285a4–5, 286d9.

⁵⁴ Cf. Moravcsik 1962, 51–52, and Bluck 1975, 125.

⁵⁵ Cf. Gómez-Lobo 1977, 38, 42. On the other hand, Stenzel 1940 takes T1 and T2 as referring to different kinds.

⁵⁶ '*periechesthai*' is common in 250b8 and 253d8; cf. Gómez-Lobo 1977, 42.

⁵⁷ The phrase 'through all' in 255e3–6 is used for difference.

that at this stage the kind ‘difference’ is not yet introduced, nor is ‘what is not’ analysed in terms of difference.⁵⁸

The relation between these two levels is indicated in T: those who know T1–4 about the combination of kinds are able to do the task of P, namely, division in a proper way. In other words, (P) the method of division *presupposes* (T) knowledge of the proper combination.⁵⁹ Discussion of the combination of kinds thus lays the foundation of the proper method of division.⁶⁰ Two different levels of argument are here sustained, and the word ‘*diairesis*’ is used in both arguments: one means the method of division, mainly, dichotomous division (*diaireisthai*, 253d1), and the other refers to separation of kinds (253c3, 3). Finally, (E) ‘to discern (*diakrinein*) according to kind’, which summarises the procedure of T, links the two levels.

Taken in this way, Passage 39, instead of discussing how to divide a higher genus into species, explains how knowledge of dialectic can discern proper combination between kinds. The key role is played by ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’, which are the subjects of the present argument. The ability to perceive distinctly the combination of kinds also warrants the proper division according to kinds, since it enables us to see the sameness and difference between kinds. It shows both that the argument on the combination of kinds in the Middle Part belongs to the art of dialectic and practises its ability, and that the art of dialectic connects it with the basic inquiry into the sophist through division in the Outer Part. In this way, the digression unites the two parts of the *Sophist*.

⁵⁸ This is rightly pointed out in Gómez-Lobo 1977, 38.

⁵⁹ Cf. Bluck 1975, 125, and Gómez-Lobo 1977, 41–42.

⁶⁰ Philip 1966, 349–350, 358, denies the connection between the method of division and the argument on the combination of kinds. Ryle also takes the contrast between division and dialectic so sharply that he concludes that dichotomous division of genus-species has nothing to do with dialectic or philosophical investigation into ‘common’ concepts (Ryle 1939, 141–145, and Ryle 1966, 138–142). Against this extreme position, Ackrill 1970 argues that the method of division must be taken more seriously; he suggests that the gap between dialectic and division is not unbridgeable. In the final chapter I shall discuss how the argument on the combination of kinds in the Middle Part contributes to discerning similarities and dissimilarities in the inquiry by division in the Outer Part.

Having described knowledge of dialectic, the Eleatic visitor comes back to the question of who has this knowledge:

[Passage 40: 253e4–254b6] (following Passage 39)

EV: But you won't assign dialectic, I suppose, to anybody other than the one who purely and justly does philosophy (*tōi katharōs te kai dikaiōs philosophounti*).

Tht: How can one assign it to anyone else?

EV: We will find out the philosopher now or later in a place like this if we search for him, although it is difficult to see him clearly; but the difficulty in the case of the sophist is different from the difficulty in this case.

Tht: How?

EV: The sophist escapes into the darkness of 'what is not', feeling his way in it by knack, and it is because of the darkness of the place that he is hard to see.

Tht: It seems so.

EV: The philosopher, on the other hand, always clings, through reasoning, to the kind of 'what is', and this time again he is not easy to see because of the brightness of the space. For the eyes of many people's souls are unable to endure to look at what is divine.

Tht: This is as reasonable as the last one.

EV: Therefore, as for the philosopher, we shall perhaps (or presently, *tacha*) consider it more clearly, if we still want to, and as for the sophist, obviously we should not relax until we see him sufficiently.

Tht: Fine.

Knowledge of dialectic, just described in Passage 39, should rightly be assigned to the genuine philosopher, and this is why the Eleatic visitor shortly before in Passage 38 said that they might have found the philosopher. The philosopher and the sophist are here also associated with 'what is' and 'what is not' respectively, and the parity of difficulties in defining them corresponds to the parity of difficulties concerning what is and what is not.⁶¹

In this digression, the Eleatic visitor insinuates the possibility of finding the philosopher somewhere here and soon. Although most commentators take this insinuation as an allusion to the abandoned project of the third dialogue, the

⁶¹ Aristotle in *Meta.* E 2 1026b14–21 suggests a possible interpretation of this passage: that the sophistical argument is mainly concerned with accidents, while the philosopher discusses being as being, or as a whole (cf. Guthrie 1969, 193). But as Aristotle himself notices, this interpretation is far from satisfactory.

Philosopher,⁶² the language is too indecisive to refer to that unwritten work: the two if-clauses, ‘if we search for him’ (253e9) and ‘if we still (*eti*) want to’ (254b4), betray a tone of hesitation, and the reservation, ‘we shall *perhaps* (or *presently*, *tacha*) consider it more clearly’ (254b3–4), contains an ambiguity concerning whether another independent investigation into the philosopher is intended or not.⁶³ On the contrary, as far as the philosopher and the sophist are in a pair corresponding to the difficulties of what is and what is not, it is hard to believe that one is found prior to, and independently of, the other, here or later (cf. Passage 35). Despite commentators’ usual supposition that the inquiry into the philosopher is postponed to the unwritten dialogue, the *Philosopher*, while the sophist is finally defined in the *Sophist*, I take it that no independent task of defining the philosopher was intended in the *Philosopher*.

In Passage 40 the inquirers declare that the philosopher is the person who possesses knowledge of dialectic. Why is this not a formal definition of the philosopher? As we discussed in Chapter 4, dialectic, the proper art of speaking, is a missing link and a postulated counterpart of the sophist’s art. We need the art of dialectic in order to fix the sophist’s art as bogus, and hence it is no accident that we catch a glimpse of it in the midst of the inquiry into the sophist. On the other hand, the characterisation of the philosopher as possessing knowledge of dialectic is only formal, and remains an intuition or anticipation of the location of the philosopher, which is to be fulfilled and substantiated. We should also bear in mind that the description of dialectic in Passage 39 was deliberately obscure and incomplete, precisely because that formal description requires our understanding in its actual performance and demonstration of method. Hence, it is only when the art of dialectic is grasped clearly and completely

⁶² See 1.3. For example, Cornford 1935, 268, says that ‘The extreme compression and consequent obscurity of this account of the field of Dialectic may be explained if we suppose that Plato, as the Stranger’s subsequent speeches suggest, intended to analyse the relations of Forms in more detail in the *Philosopher*.’

⁶³ Cf. Campbell 1867, 146.

that the inquirers can see the philosopher, and it is also only then that the sophist can be perfectly defined. Exact grasp of the art of dialectic is in this sense inseparable from the whole project of the dialogue: to define the sophist and to show the philosopher.

The inquirers now engage in the task of discerning the proper combination of the greatest kinds, and that performance will itself be at once a practice and demonstration of the art of dialectic and a substantiation and completion of its description in Passage 39. This is perhaps what the Eleatic visitor means by saying ‘We will find out the philosopher now or later in a place like this (sc. the field of dialectic) if we search for him’ (Passage 40: 253e8–9).

The digression seems to imply that, if the inquirers can approach and rightly perform the art of dialectic, they may become philosophers; and that it is only by making and showing ourselves philosophers that we can fix the sophist and the philosopher.

7.3.3 *Dialectic as clearing up confusions*

The subsequent argument on the combination of the greatest kinds is the core of the Middle Part, and it finally gives a solution to the difficulties concerning what is not and what is (254b7–259d8). The argument shows, by refuting the Parmenidean thesis, both that what is *is not*, and that what is not *is*. Thus, it has a double role in the fuller context: first, the inquirers are to elucidate the correct relationship between kinds, and exhibit how the true art of argument should deal with the greatest kinds; second, they are to refute the Parmenidean thesis, and thereby to repudiate the sophistic counter-attack as employing confusing and fallacious argument concerning these kinds. They practise the art of dialectic and demonstrate philosophy in this way. Remember that my aim here is to follow and clarify the main line of argument and to prove the unity of the dialogue, so I do not enter into detailed interpretation on difficult passages.

The inquirers take up the greatest kinds (*megista genē*) in

order to investigate, firstly, what are the greatest kinds, and secondly, how they combine; the first project is pursued in 254d4–255e7, and the second in 255e8–259b7. They confine their inquiry to a limited number of kinds, instead of all, ‘so as not to get confused amidst so many things’ (254c1–4); they find five greatest kinds, and the number remains important (cf. 256c11–d4). Next, the Eleatic visitor says that, even if they cannot grasp what is and what is not with perfect clarity, they should not lack an argument (*logos*) about them, in so far as the present way of inquiry allows (254c5–8). These comments express the right attitude of dialecticians, in contrast to the sophist.

To begin with, the three kinds which were previously discussed, namely, what is, change, and rest, are selected as the greatest (254d4–13).⁶⁴ Change and rest are unmixable, since they are completely contrary (*enantia*); it is impossible that change rests or that rest changes (254d7–9; cf. 250a8–10, 255a12–b1).⁶⁵ What is, on the other hand, is mixable with both change and rest. Therefore, they are regarded as three distinct kinds.⁶⁶ each of the three is *different* (*heteron*) from the other two, and is the *same* (*t’auton*) as itself (254d14–e1). What about ‘different’ and ‘the same’ in this formula? The Eleatic visitor asks whether they are two distinct kinds along with the three, or whether we may call one of the three kinds ‘different’ or ‘the same’ without noticing (254e2–255a2). The inquirers examine the latter possibility.⁶⁷ First, we do not call change and rest either ‘different’ or ‘the same’ (255a4–b7); if this were the case, their natures would be mixed. The important point in the procedure is that the inquirers ask whether these are two names of a single thing, or have two

⁶⁴ ‘*megista*’ in 254d4 is a predicate, as Cornford 1935, 273–274, n.2, takes it. Change and rest are important results of the previous argument with materialists and idealists; *pace* Cornford 1935, 277–278: ‘Any other pair of incompatible Forms would do as well.’

⁶⁵ Some commentators (e.g. Stenzel 1940, 97–98) assume that change and rest are actually mixable, but see the argument of Vlastos 1973b, 272–294, and Gómez-Lobo 1977, 34.

⁶⁶ The anticipation that what is is a third thing along with change and rest (in 250b7–c8) is now substantiated.

⁶⁷ Theaetetus responds to this question ‘Perhaps’: 255a3, b10, and c11.

different natures (cf. 254e5–255a2, c8–10); for this is the common way to distinguish things according to kinds.⁶⁸ Next, they examine whether they take as one thing what is and the same (255b8–c7). If so, when they say both change and rest are, the two would become the same.⁶⁹ The same should therefore be posited as the fourth distinct kind. Finally, difference is distinguished from what is (255c8–e7). For the former is always in relation to something else, while the latter can be by itself and in relation to something else.⁷⁰ Thus, difference is acknowledged as the fifth kind, which makes every kind different from any other (as the cause of separation).

Now that the five greatest kinds have been selected, the inquirers construct a set of statements (cf. *legein*, 255e8) about their combination. Change is first taken up as the example:

- [A 1] Change is different from rest; therefore, change is not rest;
- [A 2] Change is, by partaking of what is;⁷¹
- [B 1] Change is different from the same; change is not the same;
- [B 2] Change is the same as itself, by partaking of the same;
- [C 1] Change is different from difference; change is not different;
- [C 2] Change is different, (by partaking of difference);
- [D 1] Change is different from what is; change is not what is;
- [D 2] Change is, by partaking of what is.

The argument is structured as four pairs of negative and affirmative statements, and here a certain order is established between the kinds.⁷² The negative statements (A–I, B–I, C–I,

⁶⁸ At the beginning of the dialogue, the three kinds, the philosopher, sophist, and statesman, are posited according to the three names; and in the Middle Part, the monists are criticised for how they relate many names to the single nature of what is.

⁶⁹ 255b11–c1 is difficult to interpret, but I believe that the argument is elliptical but not fallacious (cf. Lacey 1959, Trevaskis 1966, 103–104).

⁷⁰ The distinction between '*pros alla*' and '*kath' hauta*' also raises controversy, but I avoid discussing it. Here '*eidē*' at 255d4 must be general 'types', not signifying Forms (cf. Frede 1967, 24, and de Rijk 1986, 151).

⁷¹ A 2 is not parallel to A 1, but Plato seems to confirm by asymmetry that change cannot combine with rest; see the *modus irrealis* in 255b6–7. Accordingly, 'contrary' is now characterised as 'different' (A 1) plus non-combination (A 2).

⁷² Ackrill 1957, 3–6, criticises Cornford's view, and proves that relations between

D–I) are explained in terms of participation in difference,⁷³ while the affirmative are made by partaking of each kind. Two statements of each pair are expressed in different ways: for example, it is perfectly legitimate to say that change is both the same (B–2) and not the same (B–1), since it is the same by partaking of the same, and is not the same (different from the same) by the nature of difference. The seeming contradiction between B–1 and B–2 disappears upon this clarification. In this procedure the previous difficulty concerning what is is cleared up: the difficulty was to see how what is can be both change and rest, and at the same time a third thing different from the two (250a8–d4). Now they can explain in the following way: change and rest *are*, by partaking of what is, and at the same time, change and rest *are not* what is, since they are different from what is. There is no problem in stating both. On the other hand, the initial claim that what is is both change and rest (249d3–4) proves to be incorrect. The climax of the procedure comes in admitting D–I, and the inquirers fight (*‘diamachomenoi’*, 256d6) for stating it. In the same way, the investigation next clarifies the seeming contradiction in the statements that what is *is not*, and that what is not *is*:

- [1] First, D 1 and D 2 are generalised to every kind: as for any kind, ‘being’ is (by partaking of what is), and ‘not being’ (*to me on*) is, since the nature of difference makes it different from what is, and therefore, ‘not being’ (*ouk on*) (256d11–e4);
- [2] Next, as for each kind, there is much ‘is’ (*to on*) (like B 2, C 2, and D 2), and also ‘is not’ (*to me on*) is infinite in quantity (like A 1, B 1, C 1, and D 1). It is again the nature of difference which makes each kind different from any other (cf. 255e3–7). In the case of change, ‘is not’ obviously appears more often than ‘is’ (remember A 2 is the same as D 2) (e5–7);
- [3] The above conclusion is finally applied to what is: what is itself (*to on auto*) is different from all the other kinds, and therefore, what is *is not* (*ouk estin*), as many times as there are other kinds (257a1–7). This proves that what is *is not*.

the kinds are non-symmetrical (see note 43 above). We do not, however, have to commit ourselves to Ackrill’s conclusion that this signifies Plato’s introduction of the copula.

⁷³ Cf. Campbell 1867, 153.

In the next stage, the inquirers examine the problematic notion of ‘what is not’ (*to mē on*) in terms of difference (257b1–258c5). The previous argument seems to lead to an important consequence about its meaning: if, like change and rest, two kinds are completely contrary, they are unmixable; on the other hand, ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’ prove to be mixable, and they are not contrary, but different (cf. 257b1–4). An illustration of ‘not large’ and a general comment on the negative prefix come next: the negative particle ‘not’ (*mē* or *ou* in Greek) signifies something different from the word (or rather the thing) which follows (257b6–c4).

Now ‘what is not’ is to be explicated in the following way:

- [1] The nature of difference, which is itself one, is divided into parts, like many branches of knowledge (257c5 d6);
- [2] A part of difference which is set in contrast to the beautiful is called ‘the not-beautiful’, since it is different from the nature of the beautiful (d7 11);
- [3] The contrast of a thing that is (i.e. a part of difference) with a thing that is (i.e. the beautiful) is the not-beautiful (d12 e8);⁷⁴
- [4] Therefore, the not-beautiful *is*, no less than the beautiful; since the nature of difference is among things that are, its parts *are* (e9 258a10).

Now the consideration on the not-beautiful applies to what is not:⁷⁵

- [5] A part of difference set in contrast to the nature of what is, is what is not; and what is not *is*, no less than what is (258a11 b7);
- [6] In conclusion, what is not certainly has its own nature, and is counted as one of the kinds that are: what is not *is* what is not, just as the not-beautiful is not beautiful (b8 c5).

Summing up, the Eleatic visitor declares that they have not

⁷⁴ For the controversy over the grammatical construction of 257e2 4, see Owen 1971, 239, n.32, and Lee 1972, 278, n.15. But the meaning is not substantially different.

⁷⁵ There are two lines of interpretation of the subsequent procedure: Campbell 1867, 161 162, Cornford 1935, 292, n.1, and Bluck 1975, 164, n.1, take it as a generalisation of the preceding argument, while Owen 1971, 239, Lee 1972, 281 284, and de Rijk 1986, 177, n.20, take it as an application of it to what is. The former needs the insertion of *‘moriou’* in 258b1, and I take the latter view.

only rejected the Parmenidean thesis and proved that what is not *is*, but also revealed the true kind of what is not (258c6–259b7). The Eleatic visitor concludes Section 3 with the following remark:

[Passage 41: 259b8–d8]

EV: And if anyone does not believe these contrarities,⁷⁶ he should consider and say something better than what we have said now. But if he thinks he has recognised something difficult, and enjoys drawing arguments in one direction at one time and in another at another, then he is absorbed in arguments not worth serious consideration, as our present argument indicates. For such a thing is neither clever nor difficult to discover, but the other thing is at once difficult and fine.

Tht: What is that?

EV: The thing we have just said. That is, to say good-bye to those things as possible <for anyone>,⁷⁷ and to be able to follow what someone says step by step, and when someone says that what is different is the same in a way and that what is the same is different, to refute his argument by examining on which point and in which respect he says that each of these is such and such. But when he makes it appear (*apophainein*) that the same is different somehow or other, and the different the same, the large small, and the like unlike, and takes pleasure in always parading these contraries (*t'anantia*) in argument, that is not true refutation. But he must obviously be a new-born child who has just come into contact with things that are.

Tht: Definitely.

The inquirers have thus exhibited the proper way of dealing with the kinds, including what is and what is not, in argument, and on that basis criticised those who enjoy manipulating arguments without knowledge or the true art of argument. Those are the young and the late-learners who were mentioned at the beginning of Section 3, and they are now compared to 'a new-born child who has just come into contact with things that are'.⁷⁸ The inquiry finally succeeds in clarifying the root of the confusions on the basis of which the new-born and the sophist manipulate arguments and create

⁷⁶ 'enantiōseis' is translated as 'apparent contradictions' by Campbell 1867, 165, and Cornford 1935, 297, and 'oppositions' by Diès 1969, 375, and de Rijk 1986, 181.

⁷⁷ The text is a little garbled; I insert '*panti*' with Budé and new OCT.

⁷⁸ Concerning the young, we should remember *Republic* VII 539b1–d2. It is attractive to think, with Cornford 1935, 299, that the young are those who are 'deluded by the Sophist's wizardries'.

contradictions, and in doing so it shows the right way to avoid such confusions. It distinguishes true from false refutation (*elenchos*, 259d5; *elenchein*, 259a3, c9). The sophist insisted that what is not and what is are contrary, and cannot combine, so that what is not is unspeakable, and in so insisting, he forces us to contradict ourselves. But now the inquirers clearly distinguish between contrary and different, and prove that what is not is different from, but not contrary to, what is. The contradiction that the sophist claimed proves to be apparent, and now we find that the sophist was only manipulating arguments without having true art. We recall a passage in *Republic V* (454a1–9): Socrates warns that those who argue without the ability to consider things at issue by distinguishing according to kinds (*kat' eidē diairoumenoi*), and make verbal contradiction (*enantiōsis*), actually controvert or practise eristic and do not engage in dialogue, even if they regard themselves as engaging in genuine argument. Likewise true method of argument differentiates eristic from dialectic.⁷⁹

The Eleatic visitor repeatedly comments that, unless someone can provide a better argument than the present and persuade the inquirers, their opponent should accept and follow the argument (257a8–12, 259a2–4, b8–9). This comment also implies that, once a better and more persuasive argument appears, the inquirers will change their opinion and follow it willingly. Without doubt this represents the dialecticians' right attitude toward argument through dialogue.

In this way the whole dialectical argument practises and shows philosophy, in contrast to sophistry.

7.4 Statement, judgement and *phantasia* (259d–264b)

7.4.1 *Solution to the other difficulties*

Section 3 has given a solution to the difficulty concerning what is not: what is not can be combined with what is, and

⁷⁹ Cf. *Philebus* 16e4–17a5; for this passage, see Hackforth 1939, 23–24. Notice also the comment on the young in 15d8–16a3.

consequently, one can say, without contradicting oneself, that what is not *is*, and that what is *is not*. The inquirers have thus overcome the first obstacle put forward by the sophist, and next proceed to the remaining difficulties in Section 4, the final portion of the Middle Part (259d9–264b8).

The Eleatic visitor begins this section with a general comment on where they stand in the course of inquiry (259d9–260b3). He suggests that they need further agreement on what statement (*logos*) is, and refers back to their achievement in Section 3: that they have admitted the combination of some kinds. Their previous fight against those who try to separate every kind, one from another (Position [A], represented by the late-learners, in 7.3.1), is now regarded as having saved statements, and as a result, the possibility of philosophy. For whereas the separationists' attempt would have resulted in the total destruction of statements and philosophy, the inquirers' defence has admitted the interweaving of kinds (*symplokē eidōn*, 259e5–6), which makes statements possible.⁸⁰ As we see, securing the possibility of philosophy as dialectical argument is the overall project of the Middle Part. The Eleatic visitor's comment, besides, connects the preceding inquiry in Section 3 with the forthcoming argument in Section 4: while the former has secured the possibility of statements, the latter is to investigate what statement is. Even though the sophistic counter-attack appears to be endless, the rest of the inquiry, the Eleatic visitor urges, will be easier, since the greatest difficulty has already been overcome (261c2–4).⁸¹

My analysis of the structure of the difficulties in 6.2 has shown that four kinds of difficulties are raised and discussed in the Middle Part: (a) appearance and seeming without being, (b) image (including likeness and apparition), (c) falsehood, and (d) what is not. With regard to these four, the

⁸⁰ This comment echoes what Parmenides said in the conclusion of his criticism of Socrates' theory of Forms in the *Parmenides*: if one denies that Forms are, each of which is always the same, one will destroy the power of dialogue (*hē tou dialegesthai dynamis*) altogether, and also philosophy (135b5–c7).

⁸¹ The concluding comment in 264b5–8 confirms this anticipation; although Section 4 proves a new point, it makes full use of the results of the previous argument.

difficulty concerning (a) appearance was the original issue, and (b) the concept of image was introduced to illustrate that issue; and the solution to the difficulty concerning (b) image depends on the solution to the difficulty concerning (c) falsehood, which depends, in turn, on the solution to the highest difficulty concerning (d) what is not. Therefore, examination should proceed back from (d) the highest to (a) the original issue, so as to settle the basic problem of defining the sophist. As we have seen, the argument in the Middle Part first examines the difficulties concerning 'what is not' and its pair 'what is' in Sections 1 and 2 respectively, and the solution is next given to these difficulties in Section 3. Solution to the difficulty concerning (d) what is not is necessary but not sufficient, however, for the difficulty concerning (c) falsehood, and therefore the inquiry needs something more to resolve the other difficulties. The rest of the investigation must deal in order of difficulty with the other three: concerning (c) falsehood, (b) image, and (a) appearance. Our next question is how these difficulties are to be solved in Section 4.

The strategic remark of Signpost 5 comes just after Section 3, when the argument of what is not is completed; that remark connects the achievement of the previous argument with the next task of proving the possibility of falsehood. What they need in Section 4 is to investigate false statement (*logos*) and judgement (*doxa*):

[Passage 42: 260b10 e3]

EV: Then we should next consider whether what is not blends with judgement and statement.

Tht: Why?

EV: If it does not blend with these, it must follow that everything is true; but if it does, there will be false judgement and statement. For to judge or state what is not is falsehood in thought and statement.

Tht: Certainly.

EV: If there is falsehood, then there is deception.

Tht: Yes.

EV: And once there is deception, it must follow that everything is already full of images and likenesses, and *phantasia*.

Tht: Of course.

EV: We said that the sophist had taken refuge somewhere in this place, but that he denied altogether that there is falsehood, on the ground that it is impossible for anyone to think (*dianoesthai*) or state what is not. For what is not never partakes of being.

Tht: So he said.

EV: But now what is not has been found to partake of what is, so that probably he will no longer fight with us in that way. On the other hand, he may perhaps say that, while some kinds partake of what is not, some do not, and that statement and judgement belong to those that do not. And so once more he might contend that the arts of image-making and apparition-making, in which we say he is, are not possible at all, since judgement and statement do not combine with what is not. Without that combination, there is no such thing as falsehood.

Since the inquirers have already proved that what is not can be combined with what is, and thus solved the fundamental difficulty concerning what is not in Section 3, the sophist will take another line of counter-attack in Section 4. His next attempt is to cast doubt on the particular combination between what is not and statement, judgement, or *phantasia*.⁸² The Eleatic visitor continues:

[Passage 43: 260e3 261a3] (following Passage 42)

EV: That is why we must first discover what statement, judgement, and *phantasia* are, so that by clarifying them, we can observe their combination with what is not, and by observing it, prove that falsehood is, and by proving it, fix the sophist there, if he is guilty of that. But otherwise, we should acquit him and inquire in another kind.

The project of the last section of the Middle Part is to prove the possibility of falsehood by examining what statement, judgement, and *phantasia* are, and by securing the possibility of combination between what is not and those cognitive states. This will be the final defence against the sophistic counter-attack, which makes it possible to catch the sophist.

While Passage 42 mentions the two groups of problematic concepts, (c) falsehood (260c3–4, d1–3, e1–3) and (b) image and likeness (c8–9, d8–e1),⁸³ the original issue of (a) appear-

⁸² Remember that the connection between what is not (*mē on*) and speech (*logos*) or thought (*dianoia*) was already at issue in 238a1 239a12 (esp. 238c8 10, e5 6, 239a5 6).

⁸³ In 260c6 10 (Passage 42), the existence of falsehood is spoken of as if it is a necessary condition of the existence of image; also, all images are there supposed to be in a way deceptive.

ance is not explicitly mentioned there. As long as the initial programme of the discussion is maintained, however, that issue should also be discussed in Section 4 along with the others. Considering the strategy of investigation, we can assume that the new word '*phantasia*' (used four times, in 260c9, e4, 263d6, and 264a6) in a certain way signifies the original issue of appearance, on which the first Outer Part of the dialogue focused. Let us examine what '*phantasia*' means, and how the examination of *phantasia* answers the original issue of appearance.

The concept of '*phantasia*', which has developed into our concept of imagination, was first introduced in Plato's dialogues, and there is no example of this word extant in Greek literature before Plato. Plato used this word seven times in his works; apart from one example in the *Republic* and two in the *Theaetetus*, all the other four appear in the argument in the *Sophist* relevant to our discussion.⁸⁴

In the final stage of Section 4 (263d6–264b8), the Eleatic visitor advances the argument from examination of statement to that of judgement and *phantasia*, in order to prove the possibility of falsehood in the field of these cognitive states (cf. Passage 43). It is in this context that *phantasia* is defined and shown to be cognate with statement and judgement:

[Passage 44: 264a4 b4]

EV: What if that (sc. affirmation and negation) occurs to someone not by itself (*mē kath' hauto*), but through perception (*di' aisthēseōs*)? Is it right to call such a state something other than *phantasia*?

Tht: No.

EV: Then, since it has turned out that there is true and false statement, and that, of these, thought is a dialogue of the mind with itself, and judgement is the conclusion of thought, and since what we call 'it appears' (*phainetai*) is a mixture of perception and judgement, it must follow that these states also, being akin to statement, must be, some of them and on some occasions, false.

Tht: Certainly.

Most commentators fail to see the true meaning of *phantasia*

⁸⁴ The seven examples are: *Rep.* II 382e10, *Tht.* 152c1, 161e8, *Sph.* 260c9, e4, 263d6, and 264a6; cf. Watson 1988, 1. I shall examine the examples in the *Republic* and *Theaetetus* in the final subsection of this chapter.

in this passage because they isolate Passage 44 from the whole argument of the *Sophist*, and instead connect it with other works. Older commentators tend to take this new word '*phantasia*' as 'imagination', along with the translation of '*phainetai*' in 264b1 as 'imagining'.⁸⁵ This translation must be a reflection of the later history of the word (from Aristotle on), but may not be suitable for Plato's usage. Cornford, on the other hand, argues against this old view and suggests that it should be translated as 'appearing', since '*phantasia*' is 'simply the substantive equivalent to the verb *phainesthai*'.⁸⁶ In order to decide the meaning of *phantasia*, most commentators think it necessary to consult other dialogues that they suppose illuminate the concept. They usually refer to the *Philebus* as the text most relevant to this concept (although that dialogue does not actually use the word '*phantasia*'). Cornford, instead, emphasises the close relation of *phantasia* in this passage with the *Theaetetus*,⁸⁷ and on the other hand denies its direct continuity with Aristotle's concept of imagination (*phantasia*).⁸⁸ Despite all their attempts, the meaning of '*phantasia*' remains uncertain, since they do not even mention earlier passages of the *Sophist*, and consequently have completely lost sight of the reason why *phantasia* is taken up here. As long as '*phantasia*' signifies what we call 'it appears' (*phainetai*; cf. 264b1), however, the argument about it should not be a new enterprise, but must take over in a certain way the original issue of appearance from the first Outer Part. We must be aware of the continuity of the issue of appearance, and in this sense, the interpretation of this word as 'imagination' is somewhat misleading, although the reason why '*phantasia*' came to have the connotation of

⁸⁵ Campbell 1867, 179, Jowett 1953, Vol.III, 422, Taylor 1961, 177, Diès 1969, 384; 'représentation imaginative', Robin 1950, II 331.

⁸⁶ Cornford 1935, 319–320, esp. 319, n.1. Recent translators follow Cornford's view (Benardete 1986, 62, White 1993, 60).

⁸⁷ Cornford 1935, 319 n.2, mentions *Th.* 193b ff. and 195d.

⁸⁸ Cornford 1935, 319, n.2, does not take Aristotle's reference to Plato's account (in *De Anima* III 3 428a24–b9) as a criticism: 'Aristotle means that he is giving *phantasia* a new sense, which is not to be confused with Plato's use of the word here.' But see the next note.

imagination later is important to know.⁸⁹ We should rather take a closer look at Section 4, and examine the role of *phantasia* in the argument.

Passage 44 clearly states that *phantasia* is perceptual judgement as distinct from pure judgement (that is, judgement by itself, not through perception). Let us see how this fits the context. In Passage 42, we can see the first occurrence of the word '*phantasia*' in this dialogue: it is said that, if there is deception, then there are 'images and likenesses, and *phantasia*' (260c8–9). This passage is sometimes misunderstood. Since the juxtaposition of images and likenesses reminds us of the triad of image, likeness, and apparition (*phantasma*),⁹⁰ and since apparition-making is the kind which is expected to include the sophist's art (*phantastikē*; cf. 260d9), some commentators take *phantasia* for apparition.⁹¹ However, '*phantasma*' (apparition) as a semi-technical term in the division of the image-making art should be strictly distinguished from '*phantasia*'; for *phantasma* is a kind of image which does not represent the true proportions of the original, while *phantasia* is said in Passage 44 to be a kind of cognitive state which is either true or false.⁹² Rather, the word order in Passage 42 seems to suggest that *phantasia* (singular) is in apposition to images and likenesses (both plural).⁹³ If '*phantasia*' is a word which covers all images, it must mean 'perceptual (mainly, visual) appearance'. Here we should remember my conclusion in 5.6 that appearance is the essential feature of all images: the likeness is an image which shows a right appearance when

⁸⁹ I do not discuss in the present work the relation between Plato's and Aristotle's treatments of *phantasia*. Aristotle in *DA*. III 3 428a24–b9 criticises Plato's account of *phantasia* in the *Sophist*, which is examined by Lycos 1964 and Silverman 1991.

⁹⁰ 235c8–236c8; this triad is seen again in 241e3 and 264c12.

⁹¹ Taylor 1961, 170, and Diès 1969, 377, and Cordero 1993, 188, translate *phantasia* in 260c9 as 'illusion'; also Rosen 1983, 152, 298.

⁹² General confusion between these two concepts is seen in some commentators: cf. Cornford 1935, 321, Vernant 1991d, 173–174, and Cordero 1993, 277, n.385. On the other hand, Cobb 1990 translates both *phantasma* and *phantasia* as 'appearance' (cf. 118, n.7); all his confusions (around 123–124) derive from this misleading translation.

⁹³ In '*eidōlōn te kai eikonōn ēdē kai phantasias*' (260c8–9), the last *kai* phrase seems to be additional (not a part of the list) and explanatory. There is at least a grammatical asymmetry in this phrase: '*phantasias*' (260c9) is the genitive singular form, in contrast to the genitive plural forms of '*eidōlōn te kai eikonōn*' (c8).

seen from a good viewpoint, and the apparition is defined as presenting a mere appearance, that is, a double appearance of the original. The interpretation that *phantasia* means perceptual appearance well fits its definition in Passage 44, that *phantasia* is judgement 'through perception'. Therefore, we can conclude that the new word '*phantasia*' is introduced in the dialogue (first in Passage 42) as signifying perceptual appearance.

Next, in Passage 43, we have a set of cognitive states to be discussed later: namely, 'statement, judgement, and *phantasia*' (260e4). To be consistent in interpretation, we should take '*phantasia*' in all these passages to mean 'perceptual appearance', and explain why *phantasia* is put along with statement and judgement in the list of cognitive states in Passages 43 and 44.⁹⁴ I suggest the following line of interpretation. Appearance as the original issue (a) is the final target of the investigation, and in order of difficulty, it should be discussed after (c) falsehood and (b) image. It is for this program of investigation that the new concept of *phantasia* is introduced in Section 4. Now the inquirers examine the group of cognitive states which includes statement, judgement, and *phantasia*, and in so doing, finally prove that appearance can be true and false. In this investigation, as I shall show, judgement (*doxa*) signifies the non-perceptual side of the concept of appearance, while *phantasia* signifies the perceptual, mainly visual, side. In this way, the argument which discusses (c) falsehood in judgement and *phantasia* together comes to deal with the whole issue of (a) appearance. The concept of *phantasia*, as a cognitive state akin to statement and judgement, signifies one important side (not the whole) of the original issue of appearance. On the other hand, since perceptual appearance (*phantasia*) characterises all images – likeness and apparition – (as in Passage 42), the solution to the difficulty concerning (c) falsehood must also indicate the solution to the issue concerning (b) image. Therefore, solving

⁹⁴ *phantasia* is added to the list of the cognitive states after Passage 43 (260e4), while only statement and judgement were mentioned before (236e4, 240d1–241b3 (esp. 241b1), 241e2, 260e1–2).

the difficulty of (c) falsehood in statement, judgement, and *phantasia* virtually solves the other issues concerning (b) image and (a) appearance. This is how the rest of the difficulties, especially the original issue of appearance, are to be solved in Section 4.⁹⁵

[d] What is not

[c] Falsehood [Statement
Judgement --- non-perceptual] [a] Appearance
[*Phantasia*= [b] Image --- perceptual]

The investigation into how statement, judgement, and *phantasia* can be false will thus give a final explanation of false image (namely, apparition) and false appearance (that is, appearance without being), and it will obviously make the final definition of the sophist possible.

7.4.2 Falsehood explained

The general direction of the argument in Section 4 is clear, even though exact interpretation of the definition of false statement in 263b–c is extremely difficult.⁹⁶ Section 4 consists of three subdivisions:

[Section 4 1] First, the inquirers focus on statement (*logos*), and analyse it as a combination of noun (*onoma*) and verb (*rhema*) (261c6–262e2);

[Section 4 2] On this analysis, they explain how statement can be true and false (262e3–263d5);

[Section 4 3] Finally, the result concerning statement in Section 4 2 is applied to judgement and *phantasia*. They conclude that these can also be true and false, since they are cognate with statement (263d6–264b8).

We shall concentrate on the last subsection, but let us first survey the argument in the former two.

Section 4–1 starts by considering statement with reference

⁹⁵ Commentators do not suppose or expect that the issues of image and appearance are solved, or even discussed, in the Middle Part.

⁹⁶ For the interpretations of that passage, see Cornford 1935, Hackforth 1945b, Bluck 1957, M. Frede 1967, Wiggins 1971, Keyt 1973, Kostman 1973, McDowell 1982, M. Frede 1992, and van Eck 1995. Again, I avoid entering the controversy.

to the preceding argument on combination of kinds. Just as some kinds (and letters) combine and some not, so some words (*onomata*) fit and some not. That is to say, those words which are put in succession *and* signify something are thought to *fit*. The fitting must be concerned with two kinds of words, namely, noun (*onoma*) and verb (*rhēma*): the verb signifies action, and the noun signifies that which does that action. A minimal statement (*logos*) is made of a noun and a verb, such as ‘Man learns’, and thus stating something (*legein*); as the interweaving of verb and noun, it accomplishes something, and is distinguished from naming (*onomazein*).

In Section 4–2, two general agreements on statement are reached. First, statement is always *of* something, as ‘Theaetetus sits’ is *of* and *about* (*peri*) this Theaetetus.⁹⁷ Second, any statement has a quality (*poion*) of being either true or false. Now a minimal statement, ‘Theaetetus sits’, is taken up as a true statement which states what is, that it is, about Theaetetus. On the other hand, ‘Theaetetus flies’ is a false statement which states what is different from what is, or states what is not, that it is, about Theaetetus. Both statements are meaningful and *about* this Theaetetus, but one is true and the other false. The Eleatic visitor here refers back to the crucial result of the previous argument in Section 3: it was agreed that about each kind many beings *are*, and that many not-beings *are* (263b11–12; cf. 256e5–6, 259b4–6).⁹⁸ In this way the argument demonstrates that statement can partake of what is not, a combination that constitutes false statement. This conclusion refutes the sophist’s denial of the possibility of falsehood: that a false statement is either meaningless or true about a different thing.

Next, in Section 4–3, this important conclusion about statement is extended to thought (*dianoia*), judgement (*doxa*), and *phantasia*:

[Passage 45: 263d6 e2]

EV: What next? Is it not by now obvious that thought, judgement, and *phantasia* occur in our souls as true and as false?

⁹⁷ Cf. de Rijk 1986, 202–206.

⁹⁸ I basically agree with the interpretation of van Eck 1995, 33–35, 40–41.

Tht: How?

EV: You will see easily, if you first grasp what each of them is, and how each differs from the others.

Tht: Let me have it.

In the following argument, thought and judgement are defined according to their relationship to statement, and next, the relationship between judgement and *phantasia* is made clear. We observe that the explanation of the three concepts, thought, judgement, and *phantasia*, is not a syntactical analysis (like the analysis of statement), but a relational analysis of these concepts in terms of statement. Thus, the present argument entirely depends on the syntactical consideration in the previous subsections, and no independent attempt is made to prove falsehood in thought, judgement, and *phantasia*.

The discussion in the *Sophist* concerning these concepts is so brief, however, that I shall use descriptions found in two other dialogues (assumed to be chronologically close to the *Sophist*) in order to give a full account of them: they are *Theaetetus* 189e6–190a6, 206d1–5, and *Philebus* 38a6–40e1. Plato's discussions of thought (*dianoia*), statement or discourse (*logos*), and judgement (*doxa*) in these three dialogues display a common view. And, despite some differences in the contexts, we can arrange these explanations into a single picture.⁹⁹ All the cognitive states are here explained as variations or components of the key notion, 'dialogue'.

(1) *Discourse and thought*

First, discourse (*logos*) is dialogue (*dialogos*) which is,

- (a) from the soul (*ap' ekeines*, sc. *tes psyches*),¹⁰⁰
- (b) a flow through the mouth (*rheuma dia tou stomatos*),¹⁰¹
- and (c) with utterance (*meta phthongou*).¹⁰²

⁹⁹ *Tht.* 189e6–190a6 comes in the course of examining false judgement in terms of false statement. *Tht.* 206d1–5 examines the first definition of *logos*. *Phlb.* 38a6–40e1 shows that false pleasure exists, and discusses the connection between false judgement and false pleasure; this particular focus on pleasure (then, memory and expectation) may affect the argument about appearance. On the other hand, opinion (*doxa*) and thought (*dianoia*) in the *Republic* are highly technical and do not have the same meanings as in the later dialogues.

¹⁰⁰ *Sph.* 263e7.

¹⁰¹ *Sph.* 263e7; *Tht.* 206d3–4; cf. *Sph.* 238b6–8.

¹⁰² *Sph.* 263e8; *Tht.* 206d2 (*dia phōnēs*).

Thought (*dianoia*)¹⁰³ is distinguished from discourse. Thought is a kind of dialogue¹⁰⁴ which is produced,

- (a) in the soul (*entos tes psyches*),¹⁰⁵
- (b) toward itself (sc. the soul) (*pros hauten*),¹⁰⁶
- and (c) without spoken sound (*aneu phones*).¹⁰⁷

Here both discourse and thought belong to dialogue, which is a process of inquiry (*zētēsis*).¹⁰⁸ Accordingly, '*logos*' means here not statement (product) but discourse (process).¹⁰⁹

The character of the process is explained both in the *Theaetetus* and the *Philebus*. According to the explanation in the *Theaetetus*, thinking (*dianoieisthai*) is 'nothing other than dialogue, the soul asking itself and answering, and affirming and negating' (189e7–190a2). Similarly, *Philebus* 38c5–d11 presents an example of such a thinking process, as we shall see below.

(2) *Statement and judgement*

In contrast with discourse and thought, another pair, statement and judgement, is introduced as products of speaking and thinking.

In discourse (*logos*), there are affirmation and negation (*phasis kai apophasis*),¹¹⁰

- (a) to other people (*pros allon*),¹¹¹
- (c) with spoken sound,¹¹² or by means of spoken sound (*dia phones*).¹¹³

¹⁰³ The word '*dianoia*' appears in the difficulty concerning what is not (238b7, c9 (verb); cf. 238c10), and in relation to falsehood (260c4, d2 (verb)).

¹⁰⁴ *Sph.* 263e4, 264a9; *Tht.* 189e8. ¹⁰⁵ *Sph.* 263e4; *Phlb.* 38e7.

¹⁰⁶ *Sph.* 263e4, 264a9; *Tht.* 189e6, 190a6; *Phlb.* 38e6. ¹⁰⁷ *Sph.* 263e4.

¹⁰⁸ Aristotle, *EN*. VI 9 1142b12–15, distinguishes process and product; this passage on thought (*dianoia*) is usually supposed to be a reference to Plato's argument (esp. to the *Sophist* and *Theaetetus*); cf. Burnet 1900, 276.

¹⁰⁹ I follow the correct translation of Cornford 1935, 318–319, which makes a clear distinction between statement and discourse (*logos*). All the other commentators ignore the difference of meaning and use a single word: Campbell 1867, Benardete 1986, and White 1993, 'speech'; Taylor 1961, 'discourse'; Diès 1969 and Cordero 1993, 'discours'.

¹¹⁰ *Sph.* 263e10–12; *Tht.* 190a1–2 (*phaskousa kai ou phaskousa*).

¹¹¹ *Tht.* 190a5; *Phlb.* 38e2. ¹¹² *Phlb.* 38e2–3. ¹¹³ *Tht.* 206d2.

This is statement (*logos*), which basically consists of noun and verb (shown in 261d1–262d7).

Judgement (*doxa*), on the other hand, is statement (affirmation or negation) which occurs,

- (a) in the soul (*en psychei*),¹¹⁴
- (b) to itself (*pros heauton*),¹¹⁵
- (c) in silence (*meta siges*),¹¹⁶
- (d) according to thought (*kata dianoian*).¹¹⁷

In other words, judgement is,

- (e) a completion of thought (*apoteleutesis dianoias*).¹¹⁸

The *Theaetetus* explains the meaning of ‘completion’: ‘When the soul arrives at something definite, either by a gradual process or a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without being in doubt, we call this judgement’ (190a2–4). This is also illustrated by the *Philebus*. In this way, statement and judgement (either affirmation or negation) are shown to be products of discourse and thought.

(3) *Phantasia*

Perceptual appearance (*phantasia*) is differentiated from judgement in that:

- (f) *phantasia* is through (or by means of) sense perception (*di’ aistheseos*), while judgement occurs by itself (*kath’ hautō*) (Passage 44: 264a4–6).

In other words, it is,

- (g) a mixture of judgement and sense perception (*symmeixis aistheseos kai doxes*) (Passage 44: 264b1–2).¹¹⁹

¹¹⁴ *Sph.* 264a1. ¹¹⁵ *Phlb.* 38d1–2, 5–7.

¹¹⁶ *Sph.* 264a2; *Tht.* 190a6. ¹¹⁷ *Sph.* 264a1.

¹¹⁸ *Sph.* 264b1.

¹¹⁹ Aristotle mentions three formulations of Plato’s account of *phantasia* in *DA.* III 3. The two expressions, ‘judgement through perception’ (*(doxa) di’ aisthēseōs*, 428a25) and ‘the combination of judgement and perception’ (*symplokē doxēs kai aisthēseōs*, a25–26), both come from the *Sophist* (Passage 44: *(doxa) di’ aisthēseōs*, 264a4; *symmeixis aisthēseōs kai doxēs*, b2); the other phrase, ‘judgement with perception’ (*doxa met’ aisthēseōs*, 428a25), is not used in the *Sophist*, but is seen, for example, in *Tim.* 28a2, c1, 52a7, and *Tht.* 161d3 (verb), though this is not explicitly called *phantasia*.

Since *phantasia* is a kind of, or cognate (*syngenēs*) with, judgement, it must be a product of a cognitive process, and not a process itself. Each *phantasia* is therefore either affirmation or negation, and either true or false.

To reach each *phantasia*, there is a certain process that involves sense-perception. Perception is that through which one forms a judgement, but is not itself a judgement. The argument concludes that a *phantasia* is true or false because a judgement which the *phantasia* contains is true or false. This conclusion is what the investigation has aimed at.

Here let us look at an example of such a process in the *Philebus*. The passage illustrates a judgement (*doxa*) which is formed out of memory and perception (*ek mnēmēs te kai aisthēseōs*, 38b12–13):¹²⁰

Soc: Would you say that often a person who sees something at a distance does not observe it clearly and wants to discern what he sees?

Protarchus: I would say so.

Soc: Then, after this, he asks himself the following question.

Prot: What?

Soc: 'What is this that appears (*phantazomenon*) to be standing by the rock under the tree?' Does he seem to you to say this to himself, when he observes some such appearances (*phantasthenta*)?

Prot: Yes.

Soc: Then, after this, if such a man, answering this, says to himself that 'It is a man', he hits the mark, doesn't he?

Prot: Certainly.

Soc: And he may perhaps mistakenly think that 'It is a work of shepherds' and call what he sees a statue.

Prot: It might be. (*Philebus* 38c5 d11)

A judgement (*doxa*) becomes a statement (*logos*) when it is stated aloud to someone else (38e1–5). As every commentator notices, this passage does not discuss *phantasia* in its own right, nor use the word; nevertheless it seems to provide a good parallel for the account of *phantasia* as judgement through perception in the *Sophist*.

¹²⁰ Gosling 1975, 110, opposes Ryle 1966, 251, who takes this as a general definition of judgement. Although in the following example sense perception is a necessary condition of forming a judgement, we know this is not always the case; there is a pure judgement without any perceptual elements, such a false judgement as '5+7=11' (*Tht.* 195c1 196c3).

In summary, the relations between these cognitive states are formulated in the following way:

	< toward others > < inside the soul > < through perception >		
Dialogue : (process of question and answer)	Discourse (<i>logos</i>)	Thought (<i>dianoia</i>)	[empty]
Affirmation/ Negation : (product of the process)	Statement (<i>logos</i>)	Judgement (<i>doxa</i>)	<i>Phantasia</i>

Truth and falsehood of judgement are in principle the same as those of statement. For it is the combination of noun and verb which makes a statement or a judgement (either an affirmation or a negation) true or false. And thought is a process of asking and answering, and each step of it contains silent affirmation or negation, which is true or false. This is how thought has truth and falsehood. Likewise *phantasia* is true or false because it is *judgement* through perception. Since judgement and *phantasia* (perceptual judgement) covers the whole range of appearance (*phainomenon*), the argument has officially demonstrated that every appearance is either true or false as a product of thinking. Thus, the Eleatic visitor declares in Passage 44 that ‘Since it has turned out that there is true and false statement, and that, of these, thought is a dialogue of the mind with itself, and judgement is the conclusion of thought, and since what we call ‘it appears’ (*phainetai*) is a mixture of perception and judgement, it must follow that these states also, being akin to statement, must be, some of them and on some occasions, false’ (264a8–b3).

Just as statement represents what is and what is not, about something (for example, ‘sitting’ and ‘flying’ of Theaetetus; cf. 262d8–263d5), so appearance represents what is and what is not, about something: ‘the sophist appears to be wise’ represents what is not, about the sophist. This is how statement and appearance can be combined with what is not, and make falsehood.

All the cognitive states are thus explained starting from dialogue (*dialogos*). Dialogue is a process of inquiry, which

consists of questioning and answering, and its product is true or false affirmation or negation. This consideration is important because it indicates that dialogue is the place in which truth and falsehood occur. Each statement is fixed as true or false in the context of dialogue, and therefore, the previous analysis of the minimal statement (as the interweaving of noun and verb) also acquires its meaning when put in the process of dialogue. Treating thought as inner dialogue should be interpreted within this general line of argument. Dialogue proceeds between at least two members, and even when one thinks by oneself, one has to play the double role of questioner and answerer, to affirm and negate one's own judgements, as in the *Philebus* passage. This consideration of dialogue is important in that to admit falsehood in one's own appearances and judgements is crucial in philosophical inquiry.

7.4.3 *Distinction between perceptual and non-perceptual appearances*

I shall finally consider the meaning of the solution in Section 4, particularly, why *phantasia* has to be defined as judgement through perception. Three features in the procedure of solution are worth summing up. Firstly, Section 4 employs two levels of argument. Statement (*logos*) is the object of the main consideration in Sections 4-1 and 4-2: it is analysed as a combination of noun and verb, being always about something, and having a quality of truth or falsehood. In contrast to the main consideration of statement, the consideration of the other cognitive states, namely, thought, judgement and *phantasia*, may look as if it is an appendix to that. Secondly, those cognitive states are explained as being cognate (*syngeneis*) with statement, and therefore as having the same structure as statement. Thirdly, the general concept of appearance is dissociated into judgement, which is non-perceptual (or verbal) appearance, and *phantasia*, which is perceptual appearance; the latter is explained as judgement given through perception. In other words, *phantasia* is a kind

of judgement, and perception is only a medium through which judgement is formed, while all the content occurs in judgement. I shall argue that these three features of the procedure indicate both an important development in Plato's epistemology concerning appearance, and a deep rebuttal of the Protagorean position. Let us now look at the other three examples of *phantasia* in Plato's dialogues earlier than the *Sophist*.

The first use of the word '*phantasia*' in extant Greek literature is seen in the *Republic*. In the course of examining poetry in the model State, the way great poets, such as Homer and Hesiod, depict gods is criticised. One important question is whether gods make various appearances (*phantazesthai*) and deceive us into believing their appearances (II 380d1–6).¹²¹ Discussion of this question takes place in two stages. First, it is proved that gods are actually changeless (380d8–381e7; cf. 380d5–6). This conclusion implies that, even if gods still make appearances, these appearances are unreal and false, since there are no real changes. The second step is to show that gods do not even deceive us by appearances:

Socrates: But, although gods themselves are changeless, do they none the less make us believe that they appear in many ways (*pantodapous phainesthai*), deceiving us by a trick?

Adeimantus: Perhaps.

Soc: What? Would a god be willing to be false, either in word or deed, by presenting an appearance (*phantasma proteinōn*)? (*Republic* II 381e8–382a2)

Since gods have no real change, 'make appearances' (cf. *phantazesthai*, 380d2) is equivalent to 'make us believe that they appear' (*poiein dokein phainesthai*, 381e9–10; cf. 380d4–5), and this is pursued through 'presenting an appearance' (*phantasma proteinōn*).¹²² The *phantasma* is therefore

¹²¹ Such a view comes, for example, from *Odyssey* XVII 485–487 (quoted in II 381d3–4). The beginning of the *Sophist* also alludes to that passage in the context of the various appearances of the godlike philosopher (216c4–5). See note 82 in Chapter 2.

¹²² The words '*phantasma*' and '*phantazesthai*' are also rare before Plato; '*phantazesthai*' is used in earlier writers as 'to become visible', which is usually not

something formed in our mind, and covers both verbal and actual deceptions.¹²³ However, gods are next proved never to tell a falsehood:

Soc: A god, then, is simple and true in word and deed. He does not change himself nor deceive others by appearances (*kata phantasias*),¹²⁴ by words, or by sending signs, whether in waking or in dreams. (*Republic* II 382e8 11)

Deception by word means telling a lie, and deception by deed is giving a deceptive sign, both of which would produce wrong appearances in us.¹²⁵ However, this is denied as an activity of gods. Hence, '*phantasia*' in the *Republic* covers both visual and judgemental appearances.

In the *Theaetetus*, we can see the other two examples of '*phantasia*'. First, to the question of what knowledge (*epistēmē*) is, Theaetetus answers that knowledge is sense-perception (151e1–3). Socrates immediately paraphrases this answer with Protagoras' famous doctrine that 'Man is the measure of all things' (DK 80 B1; cf. 152a2–4): that doctrine means that 'as each thing appears (*phainetai*) to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so it is for you, you and I each being a human being' (152a6–8). The connection between this doctrine and Theaetetus' answer is suggested in the following equation:

Soc: But doesn't this expression 'it appears' (*phainetai*) mean 'he perceives it'?¹²⁶

Tht: Yes, it does.

associated with deceptive guises. Plato, on the other hand, often uses '*phantasma*' with a negative connotation (*Prot.* 356d8, *Crat.* 386e3, *Rep.* X 598b3 5, 599a2, *Tht.* 167b3).

¹²³ Adam 1902 Vol.I, 121, rightly says, '*phantasma* is said with reference to *phainesthai* just above, and should be taken both with *logōi* and *ergōi*'.

¹²⁴ Some manuscripts omit this phrase, but if, as Jowett & Campbell 1894, Vol.3, 108, explain, the reason for omission is just the repetition of '*oute*', I do not find any reason why we cannot retain it. On the other hand, this first occurrence of the word in Greek literature is so natural that we must assume that it was not an invention of Plato's, but a current word.

¹²⁵ The constant pairing of word and deed is expressed in 'by words, or by sending signs', and therefore, 'by appearances' should be taken, just like the *phantasma* before, to cover both cases (*pace* Adam).

¹²⁶ I read '*aisthanetai*' (the Berlin papyrus) with DK 80 B1 and Cornford 1935, 32, n.2.

Soc: Appearing (*phantasia*) and perception, then, are the same in the case of hot and everything like that. So¹²⁷ it seems that things are for each person such as he perceives them.

Tht: Yes, that seems so. (*Theaetetus* 152b11 c4)

Here, '*phantasia*' means 'appearing' as in 'it appears to someone that',¹²⁸ and that can be replaced in this argument by 'perceiving'. In this introduction appearance is restricted to perceptual appearance, but later the range of the Protagorean doctrine is enlarged to cover non-perceptual judgement (*doxa*) (cf. 170a3–4): for example, to judge that someone is wise.¹²⁹

Finally, in the superficial criticism of Protagoras, '*phantasia*' is juxtaposed with judgement. Protagorean relativism will end up with absurdities: Protagoras' own claim to being a teacher of others (and taking fees) would look silly, and so would Socrates' midwifery and the whole business of dialectic:

Soc: For to examine and try to refute each other's appearances (*phantasias*) and judgements (*doxas*), when they are correct, will be tedious and immense nonsense, if the *Truth* of Protagoras is true ... (*Theaetetus* 161e7 162a2)

At this stage of the argument, '*phantasia*' probably means perceptual appearance, since it is juxtaposed with judgement, but the appearances, or 'it appears to me that', which should be cross-examined, already included non-perceptual ones.¹³⁰ This passage indicates one important point, that *phantasia* must have truth conditions just like judgement; and it is also important that the task of examining and refuting each other's appearances belongs to dialectic.

These four examples of '*phantasia*' in the *Republic* and

¹²⁷ Reading 'γ' ᾄφ' for 'γαφ', with Badham, McDowell 1973, 110, and Burnyeat 1990, 272.

¹²⁸ Campbell 1861, 34 5, and Cornford 1935, 32, n.3, both take '*phantasia*' as the noun form of '*phainesthai*'.

¹²⁹ Maguire 1973, 115 119, by examining the terminology, concludes that Plato deliberately moves the argument from *to phainomenon* to *to dokoun*; and that '*doxazein di' aisthēseōs*' (161d3) bridges the gap between them.

¹³⁰ E.g. 151e2, e4 5, and 157d4 5. Above all, 155a1 2 says 'truly examining ourselves, asking what are these appearances (*phasmata*) within us'; the example discussed in this passage is number, which has little to do with sense-perception.

Theaetetus correspond to, and combine, the three aspects of appearance in the *Sophist*. First, the example in the *Republic* illustrates the main issue of appearance in the *Sophist*: showing many appearances (*phantazesthai*) of the divine philosopher was the starting point of the whole investigation, and deceiving people by making appearances was the main feature of the sophist. Second, the *Theaetetus* indicates that ‘*phantasia*’ is a noun form of the verb ‘*phainesthai*’, and signifies perceptual appearance, as is also seen in Passage 44. It is also suggested in the *Theaetetus* that *phantasia* must be either true or false, like judgement; and this anticipates the conclusion of Section 4 in the *Sophist*. Third, to examine each other’s appearances is a task of dialectic. This is what the whole of the *Sophist* undertakes.

The examples in the *Republic* and *Theaetetus*, on the other hand, intimate the ambiguity of the concept of appearing (*phantasia*), just as its verb ‘to appear’ (*phainesthai*) is ambiguous between two senses: on some occasions, ‘to appear (that / to)’ means that a certain perceptual, usually visual, judgement comes to our mind, and on other occasions, it means that a certain judgement occurs to us, which is not brought about by perception. Generally speaking, the verb ‘to appear’ covers both senses.

The examples of ‘to appear’ (*phainesthai*) used in the visual sense are:

(Ex 1) The apple *appears* to be red;

(Ex 2) The head of the statue *appears* to be small;¹³¹

(Ex 3) The thing under the tree *appears* to be a statue.¹³²

These appearances are a kind of judgement, but they actually come through perception, mostly through vision.¹³³

We can also use the same verb in a less perceptual or a non-perceptual context; for example:

¹³¹ Cf. *Sph.* 235e5–236a3, *Rep.* X 602c7–9, d6–10 (cf. VII 523b5–6), *Prot.* 356e5–6.

¹³² Cf. *Phlb.* 38c12–d1: ‘What is it that appears (*phantazomenon*) to be standing by the rock under the tree?’

¹³³ The verb ‘to appear’ may also be used in the context of hearing sound (cf. *Prot.* 356c7–8).

(Ex 4) You *appear* to be wrong;

(Ex 5) It *appears* that 5 plus 7 equals 11.¹³⁴

These examples express one's judgement and have little or nothing to do with sense-perception.

Then, how about our example?

(Ex 6) The sophist *appears* to be wise.

The content of this appearance, namely, his being wise, is not a perceptual fact, but nevertheless we may say that the sophist creates his appearance in his exhibition in front of his audience and puts it into people's minds through the ears (cf. Passage 14: 234c5). The use of the word 'to appear' is sometimes ambiguous between these two senses, and the derivative word '*phantasia*' may well reflect this ambiguity. The verb 'to seem' (or 'to judge', *dokein*) and its noun (*doxa*, 'judgement' or 'opinion') are usually treated as synonyms of 'to appear' (*phainesthai*) and 'appearance' (*phantasia*), and this indicates the same ambiguity between perceptual and non-perceptual. This ambiguity, however, causes crucial problems, particularly in the *Theaetetus*; for Protagorean relativism notoriously extends its field of application from perceptual appearance to judgemental or non-perceptual appearance.¹³⁵ One crucial point in the refutation of Protagoras is to make a clear distinction between perception and judgement.

The analysis of cognitive states in the *Sophist* distinguishes two specific senses of 'appearance'. While 'appearance' (*phainomenon* or *phantasia*, in the earlier works) in the broader sense covers both perceptual and non-perceptual judgements,

¹³⁴ This purely notional example comes from *Tht.* 195e1 196b7, though the argument uses the verbs *oiesthai* and *doxazein*, and *dianoia*, but not *phainesthai*.

¹³⁵ For example, the 'Human measure' doctrine of Protagoras and its refutation in the *Theaetetus* show this ambiguity. McDowell 1973, 119–120, distinguishes (a) 'directly perceptual' statements and (b) statements of what one is inclined to think, and points out some problems of interpretation concerning this ambiguity; (a) is the first presentation of Protagoras' thesis in 152c1–2, but Socrates refutes (b) in 157d7–8 and 160e5–179b9; cf. Schiappa 1991, 119. Maguire 1973, 119, summarises his survey in 115–119 (cf. note 129 above): 'The progress, then, is from *phainetai* through *doxazei* to *dokei*—from simple perception to judgments about perceptions to value judgments, all being elicited from the initial *phainetai* by way of *doxazei*, as if there were no difference among them'; see also Fine 1996a, 106–107, and 1996b, 212–214.

phantasia ('appearance' in the narrower sense) signifies only perceptual judgement (as Examples 1–3), which seems to be the original meaning of the word.¹³⁶ Accordingly, '*phantasia*' (or 'what we call "it appears"') is defined in Passage 44 as judgement through perception, or the mixture of judgement and perception.¹³⁷ The analysis in the *Sophist* thus clarifies the difference between these two kinds of appearance: non-perceptual appearance which is called judgement (*doxa*), and perceptual, called *phantasia*. The content of *phantasia* is accordingly the same as that of judgement, since *phantasia* is a kind of judgement. The conclusion of the *Sophist* is that non-perceptual judgement is judgement (*doxa*) *par excellence*, while perceptual judgement is *phantasia*, or appearance *par excellence*.

This distinction is also an important step against Protagoras in the following sense. As we briefly saw, the Protagorean position in the first part of the *Theaetetus* equates appearing with perceiving (152b11–c4, quoted above). Protagoras insists that 'as each thing appears to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so it is for you', since perception is concerned with being (*ousia*) and always true for each perceiver.¹³⁸ Socrates later says that 'as far as each person's present experience is concerned, from which perceptions and judgements in accordance with perceptions arise, it is more difficult to show that these are not true' (179c2–4). On the other hand, Protagorean relativism extends its claim to all appearances, perceptual *and* non-perceptual; it includes such cases as wisdom and justice. What made this extension possible was the ambiguity of appearance and judgement,

¹³⁶ Aristotle in discussing the concept of *phantasia* remarks that he is dealing with *phantasia* not spoken 'metaphorically' (*kata metaphoran*) (*DA*. III 3 428a1 2); this 'metaphorical' use (that is, calling a genus by the name of a species; cf. *Po*. 21 1457b6 9) may refer to 'appearance' (*phantasia*) in the broader sense (cf. *DA*. I 1 402b23).

¹³⁷ Note that Passage 44 does not exclude the possibility that 'appearance' in the broader sense can also be called '*phantasia*'. Obviously, the expression 'it appears' (*phainetai*) is itself not confined to perceptual judgement.

¹³⁸ 'Perception is always of what is, and unerring (*apseudes*)' (152c5 7); 'My perception is true for me, for it is always of my being' (160c7 8; cf. d1 4); see also 167a8 b1.

between perceptual and non-perceptual; more specifically, the usual association of appearing with perceiving, on the one hand, and with judging (or seeming, *dokein*) or judgement (*doxa*), on the other.¹³⁹ In other words, Protagoras starts his relativism from the truth of perception, and by equating appearance with perception, then with judgement, he infers that whatever one judges (*dokein*) (or whatever seems to one) is true for that person.¹⁴⁰ It should be noted that the equation of *doxa* with appearance was once Plato's own in the *Republic*: in Books V to VII he notoriously identified the distinction between sensibles and intelligibles with that between the objects of opinion (*doxa*) and of knowledge (*epistēmē*).¹⁴¹

The argument in the *Sophist* puts the matter the other way round. Statement (*logos*) is first defined and admitted to be true or false, which constitutes the basis of the whole inquiry. Next, judgement is regarded as cognate with statement, and also admitted to be true or false. Finally, *phantasia* is distinguished and defined as judgement through perception. The reversal of the order of inference is of fundamental significance in his criticism of Protagorean relativism. For Plato in this way breaks the link between judgement and perception, which Protagorean relativism assumes. While Protagoras' position tacitly shifts truth from perceptual appearance to non-perceptual judgement, Plato starts from statement (as the basis of his argument), and proceeds first to non-perceptual appearance (judgement), and then to perceptual appearance (*phantasia*) as its cognate. He clearly distinguishes perceptual appearance, on which Protagoras depends, from non-perceptual, and denies the priority of the former. Thus, Plato overturns the basis of the Protagorean

¹³⁹ Protagoras' imaginary answer uses both 'to appear' (*phainesthai*, 166c5 6, d4, 7 8, e3 4; cf. 'phantasmata' in 167b3) and 'to judge' (*doxazein*, 167a6 b2; *dokein*, c4 7, etc.).

¹⁴⁰ This formula of 'to seem' (or 'to judge') replaces that of 'to appear' later in the First Part: *dokein*, 158e5 6, 161c2 3, 162c8 d1, 168b5 6, 170a3 4, 171e1 3, 172b5 6, 177c7 8, 178e2 3, 179a1 3; *doxazien*, 161d3; *oiesthai*, 178b3 7.

¹⁴¹ See, for example, Adam 1902, Vol.II, 66, note on 'to *doxaston*' in *Rep.* VI 510a9. The term '*doxa*' in this dialogue means 'opinion' rather than 'judgement'.

argument presented in the *Theaetetus*, and proves that appearance (both perceptual and non-perceptual) can be true and false

Protagorean Relativism Truth: perceiving = appearing $\supset$ judging
(basis)

Plato's Criticism True or false: statement judgement *phantasia*

The explanation of *phantasia* is for this reason just an appendix, and should be treated as such. For this is precisely the way Plato thinks we should solve the problem concerning false appearance, against the sophistic or Protagorean argument. Truth and falsehood in *phantasia* is not a minor issue in philosophy at all, but Plato's deliberate and subtle treatment has usually misled commentators into ignoring it altogether.

Let us finally return to the basic issue concerning the appearance of the sophist. When it is said that (A1) 'The sophist appears to be wise', those who assimilate appearance to perception may suppose that 'appearing (to be) wise' must be equal to 'being wise', just as 'it appears (to be) cold' or 'I feel cold' means nothing other than 'it *is* cold'. There is no room in this assimilation for objective inquiry into appearances. In contrast to this, the inquirers in the *Sophist* regard appearance as a kind of statement or judgement, which represents the relationship between action or state (signified by a verb) and subject of the action or state (signified by a noun). The appearance in A1 is concerned with the actual sophist, and once the combination of 'the sophist' with 'wise' is examined, the latter turns out to be what is not, about the sophist. That appearance proves to be false. On the other hand, the inquirers' judgement that (A2) 'The sophist appears not to be wise' proves to be true, and thus the conclusion (A3) 'The sophist appears to be wise, but is not wise', is now saved.

CHAPTER 8

THE FINAL DEFINITION OF THE SOPHIST

8.1 The art of apparition-making

Now we reach the final attempt to define the sophist, in the second Outer Part of the dialogue (264b9–268d5). Between the two points where the definitional inquiry into the sophist is suspended and resumed, there lies the long digression of the Middle Part (236d9–264b8), which deals with the difficulties concerning what is not and what is (236d9–251a4), the combination of the greatest kinds (251a5–259d8), and the explanation of falsehood (259d9–264b8). We have just clarified how that long argument is constructed with a view to providing solutions to the issues of appearance without being, of image, and of falsehood. In this chapter we shall determine what the final definition of the sophist is, and also illuminate in retrospect what has been done in the Middle Part. Of course, the argument in the Middle Part has much richer philosophical meaning than we discussed in the previous chapter and shall reflect here, but it is only when we examine the whole dialogue, particularly the final definition of the sophist, and assess the significance of the whole scheme, that we can properly understand the meaning of the Middle Part. I shall point out several important results of that argument which contribute to the final definition. Those who concentrate solely on the Middle Part usually dismiss them. This chapter examines the final definition step by step. Particular attention should be paid to its relation to the argument of the Middle Part and to the earlier divisions.¹

Let us look at the beginning of the second Outer Part. The

¹ It is a striking fact that scholarship on the sophists rarely takes this original and philosophical definition of Plato's into account. Kerferd 1981a, 4–5, briefly introduces the seven definitions in the *Sophist* as clear evidence of Plato's hostility

Eleatic visitor resumes the division of the image-making art which has been suspended during the Middle Part. He returns to the point where the inquirers got entangled in the difficulties:

[Passage 46: 264b9–d9]

EV: Let us not lose courage for the rest of our inquiry. Now that these points have come to light (*pephantai*), we must recall our earlier divisions by kinds.

Tht: Which divisions?

EV: We divided the image-making art into two kinds: one is likeness-making and the other is apparition-making.

Tht: Yes.

EV: Then we said that we were at a loss as to which kind we should put the sophist in.

Tht: That was so.

EV: And when we were puzzled with this trouble, we suffered from a worse attack of vertigo. Then the argument appeared which argues against all things that there is no likeness, no image, and no apparition at all, on the ground that no falsehood is ever possible in any way anywhere.

Tht: That is true.

EV: But now, since it has turned out (*pephantai*) that there are false statement and false judgement, imitations of beings and the art of deception which arises from such a disposition of mind (sc. false judgement) become possible.

Tht: Yes.

EV: And we agreed that the sophist does belong to one or the other of these.

Tht: Yes.

Since all the difficulties raised by the sophist have been cleared up in the Middle Part, the inquirers can now come back to the division of art. The division of the image-making art was where they stopped: the inquirers divided it into two species, namely, likeness-making and apparition-making, expecting to capture the sophist in one or other of the two arts. What was not certain at that time was to which species the sophist should be ascribed (235d2–3, 236c9–d4, 264c7–9). It seems obvious, however, that the Eleatic visitor aimed at

to the sophists, but never examines them in their own right; Guthrie 1969 does not even mention them. As far as I know, only Dixsaut 1992 gives a full account of the final definition.

apparition-making, which is described as representing mere appearances of the original (235e5–236a7, b4–c5), when he divided the image-making art. This point is confirmed by the fact that throughout the Middle Part the term ‘apparition’ takes priority for the sophist (239c9, 240d1, 260d9; cf. 5.6.2), and that in the final definition the apparition-making art is taken, without argument, to include the sophist’s art (267a1).² The difficulty seems rather that the notion of image-making itself was vulnerable to sophistic counter-attack, so that the Eleatic visitor could not ascribe one species of that art to the sophist with confidence (cf. 6.5). But now that the difficulties have been overcome in the Middle Part, the inquirers can set out the division of the apparition-making art.

Before dividing the art of apparition-making, the inquirers return to the genus of the art of making and divide it into divine and human kinds (265b4–266d7). Natural things, such as animals, plants, metals, and primary bodies, like fire and water, are all made by the god with reason (*logos*) and knowledge; the god also contrives to make images of natural things, for example, dreams and reflections. This procedure of division is important in that human activities and arts are clearly separated from divine.³ Though it claims to make *all things*, the sophist’s art is to be found in the field of human image-making:⁴

[Passage 47: 266d8–267a1]

EV: Then let us recollect that there were to be two species of the image-making art: one is likeness-making and the other is apparition-making, provided that it turns out (*phaneĩē*) that falsehood really is falsehood, and is by nature one of the things that are.

Tht: Yes, it was to be so.

² Guthrie 1978, 136, makes a critical comment on this procedure (particularly, on 266e–267a): ‘It is hardly fair argument, just a reminder of Plato’s ineradicable conviction of the harmfulness of the Sophistic art.’ Such a criticism, though it might be shared by many commentators, misses the whole context.

³ This passage invites us into the theo-cosmology common in Plato’s later dialogues, the *Statesman*, *Philebus*, *Laws*, and above all, *Timaeus*, but we do not discuss it here. See Brague 1991.

⁴ Remember that the sophist and painter claim to know how to make *all things*: you and me, animals, plants, sea, earth, heaven, and even gods (233d9–234b4).

EV: Therefore, that has turned out (*ephanē*) to be the case, and on that ground we can now reckon these to be two species beyond dispute (*anamphisbētētōs*).

Tht: Yes.

EV: Let us, then, again divide the kind of apparition-making into two.

As this passage clearly indicates, it is the solution to the difficulty concerning falsehood in the Middle Part that has paved the way for further division. The apparition-making art was obviously the most important discovery of the inquiry in the first Outer Part: the sophist is one who makes an apparition, which *appears* to be like the original but *is not* really like it. What has been clarified in the Middle Part must be, above all, this notion of apparition-making. Since the inquirers have proved that it is possible for something to appear to be so without being so, the issue is now how we can define the sophist in terms of apparition-making, in contrast to likeness-making. Immediately after this confirmation, the apparition-making art is further subdivided into the proper species to which the sophist belongs (267a1–268d5).

What, then, has happened in the Middle Part? A general answer is that the sophistic counter-attack has been repulsed. This answer has greater significance than has been apparent. At the beginning of the Middle Part, the inquirers faced the counter-argument of the sophist; as they later recall, ‘the argument appeared which argues against all things (*amphisbētountos*)’ (Passage 46: 264c11). Arguing against (*amphisbētein*) or controverting (*antilegein*) was the central feature of the sophist’s art as elucidated in the New Attempt, and the difficulties raised in the Middle Part actually exemplify that feature of the sophist’s art.⁵ But now, after the Middle Part, the two species are observed ‘beyond any dispute’ (*anamphisbētētōs*) (Passage 47: 266e4) as the result of the solution to the falsehood problem. For we can state that what is not *is*, ‘beyond any dispute’ (*anamphisbētētōs*, 259b4), and see how what is not can be combined with statement, judgement, or *phantasia*, to make falsehood. The inquirers have overcome all the disputes and controversies that the sophistic counter-

⁵ This point was discussed in Chapter 6.

attack produced. This was not, however, just a negative attempt at getting rid of logical obstacles, but rather a positive and philosophical attempt to prove how falsehood is possible. The obscurities and difficulties surrounding what is not and what is have turned out to be common to all of us, including the inquirers and their predecessors, but the art of dialectic performed by the inquirers has clarified what was wrong in those difficulties and saved us from sophistic entrapment. To repel the sophistic counter-attack, therefore, means to distinguish sophistic or eristic controversy from genuine dialectical argument, and to fix the former as apparent in contrast to, and by means of, the latter.

In order to see more precisely how the Middle Part clarifies the notion of apparition-making, we shall recapitulate the earlier argument on the appearances of the sophist. Completing the sixth definition, the inquirers noticed that they had received a variety of appearances of the sophist (231b9–232a7), and in the New Attempt they focused on the sophist's art of speaking and characterised him as appearing to be wise without really being so (232b1–233d2). Although this appearance was examined in terms of image-making, and the apparition-making art was expected to include the sophist's art, the fundamental problem concerning appearance was so deep in the earlier attempt at definition that the inquirers had to stop and clear up the difficulties concerning appearance, image, and falsehood.

When the inquirers resume the inquiry in the second Outer Part (264b9 ff.), they summarise the earlier results of the inquiry into the definition of the sophist (265a4–9): the Eleatic visitor rehearses the earlier divisions and says that the sophist 'showed his appearances (*ephantazeto*) to us in hunting, fighting, trade and types of that sort under the art of acquisition' (a7–8). These signify respectively the first ('hunting'), the fifth ('fighting'), and the second to fourth definitions ('trade and types of that sort', that is, a merchant, a retail dealer, and a manufacturing trader), but the doubtful sixth definition of 'the sophist of noble lineage' is no longer mentioned here. It is crucial to understand why the sixth

definition is now excluded, after the argument in the Middle Part. When the inquiry depicted six appearances of the sophist in the earlier division, those definitions were thought to be insufficient (that was why the New Attempt focused on one common point picked up in these definitions). In particular, the sophist of noble lineage in the sixth definition, which resembles Socrates, was so problematic that it cast serious doubt on the whole inquiry up to that point. In the first Outer Part, however, it was not specified at what point these definitions proved insufficient, or whether the sixth appearance represented the true sophist. The result of the Middle Part, which excludes the sixth definition from the list in the second Outer Part, must then have given some clues as to how to treat the earlier definitions, particularly the doubtful sixth. Now the crucial fault in the sixth definition must be clarified: the sophist of noble lineage, though like a sophist, is *not* a sophist; he may be Socrates, the philosopher. How is Socrates distinguished from the sophist?

The sixth definition revealed the educator who uses refutation to remove ignorance from, and purify the soul (226a6–231b9), and the Eleatic visitor was doubtful as to whether they should bestow such a great honour on the sophist (230e5–231a3).⁶ To Theaetetus' reply that this educator is *like* (*proseoiike*) the sophist (231a4–5), the Eleatic visitor said that this kind of similarity was the root of the problem. This noble educator is *like* the sophist, but only as a tame dog is *like* a wild wolf: 'But a steady person must keep watch on similarities most of all, since this kind is most slippery' (231a6–8). The problem implied in the sixth definition was how to distinguish similarities (*homoiotētes*) in division, but the sixth definition failed to distinguish similarities and dissimilarities. To discern like and unlike (*to syngenes kai to mē syngenes*) had been regarded as a task of division (227a10–b4; cf. *homoiotēta* at b3), and similarity was a principle of setting out each definition by division. For example, the sophist was first investigated as akin (*syngenē*)

⁶ For the details of this definition, see 2.3.

to the angler, since both the angler and the sophist are hunters (in the first definition: 221d8–13); and the fighter was introduced as someone similar (*proseoiken*) to the sophist (in the fifth definition: 224e6–7). Thus, to show how things are similar and dissimilar is necessary for giving a proper definition to each thing. On the other hand, it is this principle which raised a serious problem in the earlier definitions of the sophist. The sophist each time appeared to be similar to the philosopher in the six definitions: both are hunters, take care of the soul, fight in argument, and teach the young.⁷ The earlier inquiry may not properly have distinguished the similarities and dissimilarities between the sophist and the philosopher; in particular, the sixth definition failed to see the dissimilarities between them.⁸ We can be clear about the earlier six definitions only when the method of division is secured as a philosophical method of distinguishing similarities and dissimilarities.

It is evident that the Middle Part provides an argument for establishing the method of division as distinguishing similarities and dissimilarities. Division as dichotomy (which was employed in the first Outer Part) is not directly discussed there,⁹ but division in general is rather grounded on the combination of kinds. This was suggested in the brief digression in the midst of the Middle Part concerning the art of dialectic. The Eleatic visitor claimed that ‘To divide according to kinds (*kata genē diaireisthai*) and not to take the same kind for a different one nor a different kind for the same – don’t you say that this belongs to knowledge of dialectic?’ (253d1–3: Passage 39, discussed in 7.3.2) As I have shown above, this passage relates the combination of kinds discussed in the Middle Part to the method of division

⁷ This point reminds us of the original issue of the many appearances of the philosopher: Socrates says that the philosopher sometimes appears to be a sophist, and is hardly easier to discern (*diakrinein*) than the god (Passage 1: 216c2–4).

⁸ We can hardly deny that there is heavy irony in this failure, since the sixth definition deals with purification, which is the art of division (*diairetika*, 226c3) or of distinguishing (*diakritikē*, 226c8) a worse thing from a better thing (226d1–11).

⁹ We should note that the second Outer Part no longer confines division to dichotomy; the art of making is divided into four species (the combination of divine / human and original / image-making) in 265b4–266d7.

performed in the Outer Part, and in that way reflects the double structure of the dialogue: the argument in the Middle Part lays a theoretical basis for the division in the Outer Part. Application of this procedure of dialectic leads, for instance, to the following verdict. In the two propositions, 'change is the same' and 'change is not the same', 'is the same' is not said in a similar way (*homoiōs*), since the former is 'in relation to itself' and the latter is 'in relation to others' (256a3–b5). As the result of the argument on difference (*heteron*), which finally resolves the difficulty of what is not, the Eleatic visitor says that those who insist that difference is the same and the same is different, or large is small, or similar is dissimilar, turn out not to give a genuine refutation, if they do not specify in what sense they insist on this (Passage 41: 259d2–8). In this way, the whole argument of the Middle Part, by discussing the combination of kinds and exemplifying the right dialectical method, makes possible the method of division, which depends on the ability to distinguish similarity and dissimilarity between kinds.¹⁰

It is on this ground that the second Outer Part fixes the first five definitions as the appearances of the sophist and excludes the problematic sixth definition from the list. The educational purifier, if properly understood, was *not* a sophist, though he appeared to be similar. It is an *apparition* of the sophist. On the other hand, the first five definitions represent at least some aspects of the sophist's art, and hence they can be regarded as true appearances seen from certain viewpoints. In the second Outer Part after the Middle Part, all the previous appearances are fixed as such. The inquiry has thus succeeded in distinguishing the true appearances of the sophist (the first to fifth definitions) from the false, or mere appearance (the sixth definition). The shift of viewpoint, and the consequent change of appearance in philosophical inquiry, gradually reveals the true nature of the sophist. In this sense, each of the first five definitions remains a true

¹⁰ Moreover, the word '*koinōnia*', used in the final definition of the sophist (264e2), seems to suggest that the argument on the combination of kinds has something to do with the final definition.

appearance *seen from a certain viewpoint*. None of them was yet a definite likeness of the sophist. The final definition, on the other hand, will be the true appearance, namely, the likeness of the sophist, which the philosophical inquiry finally attains. For the inquirers, after practising the art of dialectic, now stand at a good viewpoint to distinguish such key concepts as similar and dissimilar, and the same and different. The dialogue concerning the definitions of the sophist as a whole illustrates and exemplifies how to distinguish between true and false appearances. We clearly see that the philosophical inquiry makes a likeness, which is similar, and discerns and rejects an apparition, which appears to be similar but is actually dissimilar.

Now we can understand how the dialectical argument in the Middle Part has provided the theoretical basis for the distinction between likeness-making and apparition-making. Let us recall the original formula for apparition:

[Passage 18: 236b4–7]

EV: Now, what do we call the thing which appears to be like (*to phainomenon eoikenai*) a beautiful thing, because it is not seen from a beautiful viewpoint, but is not like what it is said to be like, for those who can see such a large thing properly? Since, while appearing to be like it, it is not really like, don't we call it an apparition (*phantasma*)?

Although an apparition *appears* to be beautiful to those who see it from a bad viewpoint, those who have good sight can tell its *apparent* likeness from the true likeness (*eikōn*). Those who are able to see properly, at whatever viewpoint they may stand, must be dialecticians, and only those who can make and discern likenesses properly fix apparitions as such.¹¹

Through the argument of the Middle Part, not only have the inquirers revealed the correct view of the appearances which the sophist creates, but they have also become able to transcend the particular viewpoints at which they had received many appearances, and to obtain a perspective over

¹¹ Here we can recall Socrates' method of midwifery: 'the midwife's greatest and noblest task would be to distinguish the true from the false offspring' (*Tht.* 150b2–3). Also, his midwifery tests and determines whether a thought of a young person delivers a phantom (*eidōlon*) and falsehood or a fertile truth (150b9–c3; cf. a9–b2).

the whole structure of the appearances. Before the New Attempt, the inquirers received a variety of appearances of the sophist, but once they have made clear the essential features of his appearing, they no longer suffer nor are entrapped in such a variety of appearances.¹² For once they clearly analyse the appearances, that analysis enables them to see where they stand in relation to the appearances. It is just as if, once we understand the common trick of the juggler, we are no longer deceived by any other trick. In other words, analysis of appearances makes us, the audience, go beyond the limited perspective in which we see the world.¹³ We have come to know where we stand in relation to *reality*. This is what the whole argument of the Middle Part has done for us, the audience of the appearances of the sophist.

8.2 Imitation of the wise

8.2.1 Two concepts of imitation

Next we shall examine the concept of imitation. The reason why the final inquiry starts from the art of making is that the imitative art, in which the sophist is to be grasped, belongs to that generic art:

[Passage 48: 265a10 b3]

EV: Now, since the imitative art (*mimētikē*) encompasses the sophist, obviously we must divide the art of making first. For imitation (*mimēsis*) is a kind of making, and of images, not of things themselves.

Tht: Certainly.

From this statement, the concept of imitation becomes a key term in the final definition. Let us examine this concept in detail.

Although the model of an imitative artist was presented in the first Outer Part (233d3 ff.; cf. 5.2) to generate the final definition of the sophist as ‘an imitator of the wise’ (*mimētēs*

¹² This may be what the Eleatic visitor means when he says to Theaetetus that they are trying to help Theaetetus, who is young and far from reality, to approach reality without much trouble (234e5–6).

¹³ For the philosophical importance of ‘the viewpoint’, see Nagel 1986.

tou sophou, 268c1), it should be noted that two different concepts of imitation (*mimēsis*) are employed in the two parts of the dialogue, before and after the Middle Part. In the first Outer Part when the image-making art is divided into two species, the imitative art is equivalent to the image-making art, while in the final definition imitation is treated as a species of the apparition-making art. The meaning of imitation has shifted in the two arguments.

To understand this shift in meaning properly, we shall briefly reflect on the history of the word. It is usually pointed out that the Greek word '*mimēsis*' has two meanings: one is mimicking, as a mime actor does, and the other is artistic representation, such as painting and sculpting. According to one of the standard explanations, the first meaning consists of two parts. One part is Miming: 'direct representation of the looks, actions, and / or utterances of animals or men through speech, song, and / or dancing (dramatic or proto-dramatic sense)'; and the other part is Imitation 'of the actions of one person by another, in a general sense, without actual miming (ethical sense)'. And the second meaning is Replication: 'an image or effigy of a person or thing in material form'.¹⁴

When the model of the image-making art was invoked just after the New Attempt, the meaning of the 'imitation' word group was limited to the artistic representation of painters and sculptors, who produce images of originals. In particular, when the image-making art was divided into likeness-making and apparition-making, the word 'the imitative art' (*mimē-tikē*) was synonymous with the generic art of image-making.¹⁵ This corresponds to the second meaning of imitation.

¹⁴ Cf. Else 1958, 79. In the history of the Greek language, the imitation word group appeared late; we have no example of this vocabulary before the sixth century BC. Out of the 63 examples in the fifth century BC 19 were used in the context of artistic representation, and this meaning became common, perhaps in the time of Xenophon and Plato. There is disagreement over whether it originated in Dionysian cult dramas or performances (H. Koller), or in mime plays in the Doric sphere in Sicily (Else 1958, Sorbom 1966), but it is generally accepted that the meaning of the word group was gradually enlarged and developed to signify representational art (cf. Sorbom 1966).

¹⁵ 235c2, d1, 236b1, c1; cf. 235e2, 3.

After the argument in the Middle Part is completed, the word group comes to bear the first meaning: the sophist belongs to those who *mimic* others by their own body or voice (267a3–9). The clear evidence for this change is that, in the division of the apparition-making art, imitation is now regarded as a species of the apparition-making art.¹⁶

Although Plato is supposed to have developed in a philosophical manner the second meaning of the word ‘imitation’ as artistic representation, his intention to use the two concepts of imitation in his dialogues is usually not easy to grasp.¹⁷ From the historical point of view, the first meaning, ‘mimicking’, is general and original, and the second meaning, ‘artistic representation’, is a special application of the first. However, in the division of art in the *Sophist*, mimicking appears in the final definition as a species of artistic representation in general, namely, the image-making art. One of the reasons for this reversal might be that Plato considers the concept of mimicking as basic and uses the other concept of artistic representation to illustrate it. But we must see this shift in its whole context.

To take this shift into account seems to contribute to our understanding of the structure of the dialogue. We must remember that the analysis of the New Attempt we made in Chapter 4 has revealed the three stages of the sophist’s appearing. The first stage focuses on what the sophist says: the sophist says unsound things (unsound arguments or false statements). The second stage deals with what he does: he appears to argue well. And the third stage is concerned with what he is: he appears to be wise. The two distinct concepts of imitation seem to correspond respectively to the first two stages together and to the third stage of the appearance of the sophist. Artistic representation, or making an image, corre-

¹⁶ Cf. 267a7, 10, b7, 11, 12, c6, d1, e1, 2, 5, 268a6, 7, c1; though the word ‘imitative art’ (*mimētikē*) is not used here (after 265a10). Sorbom 1966, 103–104, notices this shift in the meaning of imitation in the *Sophist* (also Rosen 1983, 312–313).

¹⁷ This contrast between the two concepts can be seen in *Republic* III and X, and in the word-imitation model in *Cratylus* 422d11 ff. It is also important that the argument of *Republic* III deals with both the imitative activity of speakers and that of the audience (392c6–398b9).

sponds to the appearance of *what he does*, or rather to *what he produces*, namely, his statement or argument; and mimicking corresponds to the appearance of his nature, or of *what he is*. For the model of the image-making art was introduced to illustrate what the sophist states; just as the painter produces a picture, the sophist produces unsound arguments or false statements as spoken images. But we must bear in mind that the original problem with the sophist was concerned with the third stage, namely, that he appears to be wise. In the final definition, therefore, the sophist's nature, or *what the sophist is*, should be examined in terms of appearance. Considering this structure, we can clearly see the reason for the shift of focus between the two arguments. When the main focus is on his action, or *what he does*, and on his products, or *what he produces*, imitation in the second sense, namely, artistic representation, is taken up for the introduction of the image-making art. But when, in the final definition, the main focus is shifted back to *what the sophist is*, imitation in the first sense, namely, mimicking, appears. Thus, the shift between the two concepts of imitation corresponds to the shift of focus in the argument.

8.2.2 *The art of imitation*

Next, we shall examine the sophist's art of imitation (in the sense of mimicking) in the final definition. The following four aspects of the art of imitation are analysed:

- [1] instrument, or what the sophist uses in making something;
- [2] model, or in accordance with what he imitates;
- [3] method, or by means of what he imitates;
- [4] product, or what he makes.

(1) *Instrument*

Imitation as mimicking is defined in the following way as a species of the apparition-making art:

[Passage 49: 267a1–9]

EV: Then let us again divide the kind of apparition-making into two.

Tht: How?

EV: The one is making by means of instruments (*di' organōn*), while in the other the person who makes an apparition provides himself as an instrument (*organon*).

Tht: What do you mean?

EV: When someone, by using his own body or voice, makes it appear (*phainesthai poiēi*) to be similar to your shape (*schēma*) or voice, I think this kind of apparition-making art especially is called imitation (*mimēsis*).

Tht: Yes.

The two species of apparition-making described above correspond to the two meanings of imitation, namely, artistic representation and mimicking. They are distinguished in terms of instrument (*organon*): whereas a painter produces his product, a picture, using external materials, such as a canvas, paints, and a paintbrush, and a sculptor makes a sculpture using bronze and tools, an imitator using *himself* as an instrument creates a product out of himself. This kind of mimicking is typically seen in poetic narrative with imitation (tragedy, comedy, and some epic) which makes a speech as if the poet were someone else (*Rep.* III 393c1–4): ‘to make oneself like (*homoïoun*) someone else in voice or shape (*schēma*) is to imitate (*mimeisthai*) the person whom one makes oneself like’ (393c5–6; cf. 397b1–2).¹⁸

An instrument (*organon*) is a thing which an artist uses in producing his product, for example, a musical instrument like a flute or a lyre.¹⁹ On the other hand, the instrument includes not only external tools like a paintbrush, but also something out of which a product is made. For example, a canvas and paints in painting, bronze in sculpting, and a body for an actor are all materials as well as instruments.²⁰ By analogy, the sophist is an imitator who provides *himself* as the instrument and material of his imitation.

¹⁸ This kind of bodily imitation is also illustrated in the *Cratylus*: one signifies something (*dēlōma*) by bodily imitation, that is, by means of one's own body or voice and tongue (422e1–423b12). See also *Epinomis* 975d3–5.

¹⁹ In addition to the instruments, an artist uses his hands, eyes, and whole body to make something (cf. *Alc.* I 129c5–130a4).

²⁰ In *Lg.* XII 956a2–3, iron and bronze are called instruments of war.

(2) *Model*

The next question is what the sophist imitates as his model:

[Passage 50: 267c2–10]

EV: What of the shape (*schēma*) of justice and of all virtue? Do not many, being ignorant, but only having some sort of opinion about it, try hard to make it appear (*poiein phainesthai*) as if they embody what seems (*dokoun*) to them to be virtue, imitating it as much as they can in their words and deeds?

Tht: Certainly many do.

EV: And are they always unsuccessful in seeming (*dokein*) to be just when they are not just at all? Or is the case opposite to this?

Tht: Opposite.

Passage 50 suggests how the sophist imitates without knowledge the shape of justice and virtue as a whole.²¹ This point is related to the sophist's claim to teach virtue to his pupils. Let us consider what this characterisation means. There are three important points to bear in mind concerning the model of imitation.

First, truly to imitate virtue is to become a virtuous person. For instance, the guardians of the ideal State, if they imitate, should imitate from childhood 'the things appropriate to them, namely, those who are courageous, self-controlled, pious, and free and all such' (*Rep.* III 395c3–5; cf. 396c5–d1), because imitations practised from youth are fixed in character and nature, in body and voice, and in thought (395d1–4). For to imitate is to shape and mould oneself according to a model (cf. 396d7–e1), and therefore, in addition to poets, other artists must take an image of a good character as a model in their works so that the guardians can be educated well (401b1–c1).

Second, virtue itself is hard to know. We should remember that virtues are often said to be 'the greatest things' (*ta megista*) (cf. *Ap.* 22d7), which have no image made for human beings; they are grasped only by means of argument (*logōi*) (*Plt.* 285e4–286a7).²² Then how can one imitate

²¹ Though not only the sophist but many others also do this kind of imitation.

²² Also, 'large things' (*ta megala*) are mentioned in relation to apparition-making (*Sph.* 235e5–236a3; cf. b4–6).

virtue, which is itself invisible? To imitate virtue must be to make invisible virtue visible, or to visualise and embody virtue in oneself.

Third, what does it mean to imitate the *shape* (*schēma*) of justice? The Eleatic visitor just before described the imitation of you by a person who knows you as ‘he imitates in knowing *your shape and you*’ (267b11–12; cf. a6). In this case, someone primarily imitates and tries to reproduce your external shape and movements (in other words, your appearance) through voice and body, and by so doing he imitates *you*. For the imitator who has knowledge of *you*, there is no serious discrepancy between imitating your shape and imitating you. On the other hand, in the case of imitating justice or virtue, people only have some opinions about just actions or persons. They are acquainted with the appearance of justice, but they do not know what justice really is. What they imitate is only the outer look of justice, or ‘what seems (*dokoun*) to them to be virtue’ (Passage 50: 267c4). They do not really imitate justice itself.²³ Imitation by the ignorant is different from that by one who knows, in that the former is concerned only with the appearance of the model, while the latter reproduces the truth and reality of the model.

Bearing these points in mind, let us now consider the model of the sophist’s imitation. Although Passage 50 takes justice and all virtue as the models of imitation, wisdom, one of the cardinal virtues, must be the main model for the sophist’s art. For the sophist is finally described as ‘an imitator of the wise’ (*mimētēs tou sophou*) (268c1), and that is why he is named ‘sophist’ (*sophistēs*), a word derived from ‘wise’ (*sophos*) (268c1–2). Who is ‘the wise’ that the sophist imitates? The New Attempt seems to suggest that ‘the wise’ (*sophos*) whom the sophist pretends to be does not exist among human beings, but is a god. For when the Eleatic

²³ This conclusion accords with the analysis of imitation in *Republic* X. The maker of images (the painter and poet) imitates not the real objects (i.e. the Forms), but their sensible images (i.e. the craftsman’s products) (596c2 e11, 597d11 e9), and not as they really *are*, but as they *appear* (598a5 b8); the imitation is a product at the third remove from truth and reality (597e3–9).

visitor says 'I wonder if it is possible for any human being to know all things', Theaetetus replies, 'Our species would be blessed, if it were so, Visitor!' (Passage 8: 233a3–4) This conversation implies that true wisdom can only be attributed to a god. We must remember that according to Socrates, it is a god who is really wise.²⁴

(3) *Method*

Then how does the sophist imitate the wise? His method must lie in his speaking. This point was originally made clear in the New Attempt and is again emphasised in the final definition. The sophists imitate virtue in words and deeds (cf. 267c5–6); and they are in constant movement in argument (*en tois logois*) (268a2). In particular, controverting (*antilegein*) is an essential feature of his art, and the sophist is finally defined as someone who produces contradictions in others (268b3–5, c8). His art of speaking is there specified in the following way: the sophist uses not public and long speeches (which belong to a public orator), but private and short arguments, in the form of questions and answers (268b1–c4). It is this speaking of the sophist which makes his imitation possible. We shall re-examine this feature shortly in 8.4.

(4) *Product*

Finally we shall consider what the sophist produces by his art of imitation. The sophist uses himself as an instrument and material, and imitates virtue, especially wisdom. The sophist makes himself appear to be wise or virtuous, but since it is evident that he does not know virtue nor does he have real wisdom, this appearance lacks reality. He produces his own *appearance* of being wise. He creates a mere appearance of wisdom, and through imitation, his nature, namely ignorance, never changes. His appearance is an image without reality, and therefore his being itself remains an apparition, or mere appearance. The sophist does not really create what he *is*.

²⁴ *Ap.* 20c4 23c1, *Phdr.* 278d2 6; cf. *Symp.* 204a8 b2, *Lys.* 218a2 b6. I discussed this point in 2.2.1.

Let us consider what the philosopher does in contrast to the sophist. While the sophist only creates his appearance of being wise, the true philosopher should make himself as wise as he can by loving and inquiring into wisdom. The philosopher endeavours to visualise or embody invisible virtue and make a model of it in himself. In this sense the philosopher tries to create himself, or what he *is*, not what he merely appears to be.

Just now we concluded that the truly wise whom the sophist imitates must be a god. If, then, the perfect model which the philosopher takes is a god, the philosopher must be the person who becomes like a god in respect of wisdom as far as a human being is allowed. In the *Theaetetus*, the famous digression about the philosopher explains that to escape from earth to heaven (a motif of philosophy in the *Phaedo*) is to become as like a god as possible (*homoiōsis theōi kata to dynaton*, 176b1–3).²⁵ A similar expression is found in the *Republic*: ‘Anyone who eagerly wishes to become just, and who makes himself as much like a god as a human being can by pursuing virtue, will never be neglected by the gods’ (X 613a7–b1); also the philosopher is said to imitate (*mimēisthai*) what really are (i.e. Forms) and to become as divine and ordered as a human being can (VI 500b8–d3). A philosopher, in imitating virtue, must be conscious of his own ignorance and know the gap between real wisdom and human ignorance. In this sense, although the philosopher is in a state of ignorance, he recognises this state as such and thereby transforms the limit of human ignorance into the possibility of real wisdom.

The philosopher is shown, throughout the dialogue, to be divine (*theios*).²⁶ The initial conversation between Theodorus and Socrates describes the philosopher as being not a god but divine (216a1–d2), and the digression on dialectic in the

²⁵ This is the locus classicus for the later tradition. Sedley 1994 discusses in detail ‘*homoiōsis theōi*’ as the goal for the Platonists. See also Passmore 1970, chapters 1 and 2, and Burnyeat 1990, 34–35.

²⁶ This characterisation, namely, the attribution of religion and piety to the philosopher in the *Sophist*, is discussed in Morgan 1995, 107–111, and McPherran 1995, 116–121.

midst of the Middle Part reveals how the philosopher clings to what is divine (*to theion*), the brightness of ‘what is’, in contrast to the sophist, who escapes into the darkness of ‘what is not’ (Passage 40: 254a4–b2). In addition, it is no accident that the art of making is divided into divine and human in the final definition (265b8–266d7); for it is only by realising the limit and ignorance of human beings, in contrast to the god (*theos*), that one can be divine (*theios*).²⁷ The philosopher is thus divine within the limit of human knowledge.

In conclusion, without reference to the truly wise, namely, god, we cannot really distinguish between the sophist and the philosopher.²⁸ While the philosopher becomes as much like a god as possible, and thus becomes ‘divine’, the sophist *appears* to be wise like a god, but is not really a likeness.²⁹ This is the meaning of ‘imitation’ by the sophist.

8.3 Irony of the ignorant

When the sophist imitates the wise, what does he think of his own cognitive state concerning the things that he claims to know? In order to specify his cognitive state, two criteria are introduced in dividing the art of imitation: knowing or not knowing, and simple-minded or ironical.

First, when someone imitates something, two kinds of imitation are distinguished according to whether the imitator knows the object of imitation or not. Someone who is acquainted with you mimics your shape and voice by means of his own body and voice, and thus he imitates *knowing*

²⁷ That division must be crucial, just as the distinction between divine kingship and human statesmanship, stated in the grand myth, is crucial to the definition of the statesman (*Plt.* 268d5–274e4 and 274e5–275c8).

²⁸ Remember my discussion in 2.4. As Passage 1 (216c2–d2) indicates, it is the god who originally presents a triple image of the philosopher, sophist, and statesman. To distinguish these three, the god must first be separated from human beings (cf. the previous note).

²⁹ Cf. *Tht.* 162c1–7: if the Protagorean measure is true, it is also applied to gods as much as human beings, and anyone becomes as wise as anyone else, whether man or god; by contrast, *Lg.* IV 716c4–6 insists that the god is the ‘measure of all things’.

what he impersonates. Others who do not know the thing they imitate try hard to make themselves appear to be the object only with some sort of opinion (Passage 50: 267c2–10). The former is called ‘exact imitation (*historikē*) from knowledge’, and the latter ‘opinion-accompanying imitation (*doxomimētikē*) by opinion’ (267d8–e2). This criterion of knowing or not-knowing looks rather simple, and it is not difficult to observe that the sophist belongs to the second class. For it was proved in the New Attempt that the sophist does not actually know what he claims to know (232e6–233d2).³⁰

Next, opinion-accompanying imitation is further divided into two kinds: one belongs to a simple-minded imitator, and the other to an ironical imitator. The simple-minded imitator is the one who thinks he knows the thing about which he only has an opinion (267e10–268a1). Yet since he does not actually know the object, his cognitive state is to think he knows what he does not know. This cognitive state is what is usually called ignorance (*agnoia*), and Socrates always criticises such a state.³¹ In the sixth definition, the sophist of noble lineage is said to try to remedy this state by teaching with refutation (229c5–230e4).

The ironical imitator, on the other hand, is described as follows:

[Passage 51: 268a1–4]

EV: The figure of the other, by constant practice in argument, has a lot of suspicion and fear that he is ignorant of the things about which he has shaped himself (*eschēmatistai*) as knowing in front of others.

This person cannot be so simple-minded as the other, because he has exposed himself to hard arguments (*logoi*). As a result of such arguments, he becomes suspicious about, and somehow conscious of, his own cognitive state, in which he does not know what he claims to know. This state is characterised as ironical (*eirōnikon*), and attributed to the

³⁰ It should be noted that the object of knowledge in the New Attempt covered all things, while here what the sophist imitates is ‘the wise’; the shift was explained in 8.2.1.

³¹ Cf. *Ap.* 21d3–7, 29a4–6, *Th.* 210c2–4.

sophist (268a6–8, c8).³² We should consider what the irony of the sophist means.

Aristotle defines the concept of irony (*eirōneia*) in his ethics as ‘the pretence which understates’, and pairs it with boasting (*alazoneia*), which means ‘the pretence which overstates’.³³ Yet boasting seems more suitable for the sophist because he pretends to know what he does not know,³⁴ and consequently, irony is not often ascribed to the sophist.³⁵ However, although boasting indicates one significant aspect of the sophist, in another aspect the sophist can rightly be described as an ironist. The sophist differs from the simple-minded imitator in that the former pretends *not to know* what he is actually aware of, namely, his own ignorance, while the latter simply thinks he knows what he does not know. In this sense, the simple-minded person is a simple boaster, but in contrast with this person, the sophist is regarded as an ironical boaster. We must bear in mind that irony is predicated not of an action but of a character, which is often condemned, for example by Theophrastus in his *Characters*.

Within the sophist there is a conflict between the claim of knowing and the fact of not-knowing, and his awareness of this conflict is at the same time necessary for his irony. A simple-minded imitator may be in the same state of conflict,

³² Taylor 1961, 185, explains that the fundamental sense of this word is ‘*insincere* self-depreciation made a pretext for evading one’s responsibilities’. Vlastos 1991, ch. 1: Socratic Irony, examines the concept of irony mainly in relation to Socrates. According to his argument, the concept of irony in ancient Greek is usually (but not always) associated with deception; in addition to our passage, he mentions as examples of deception: *Lg.* 901e; Demosthenes, 1 *Philippic* 7; Aristophanes, *Wasps* 174, *Birds* 1211, and *Clouds* 449.

³³ *EN.* II 7 1008a19–23, IV 3 1124b28–31, 7 1127a20–26, b22–32 (about Socrates’ irony); *EE.* III 7 1233b38–1234a3. *Magna Moralia* I 32 provides a full explanation: ‘the boaster is the one who pretends to have more than he has, or *to know what he does not know*, while the ironist is the opposite of this and lays claim to less than he really has and does not declare what he knows, but tries to hide his knowledge; the truthful person will not pretend either to have more than he has or less, but will say that he has and knows what as a matter of fact he does have and does know’ (1193a29–35). The importance of the concept of *alazoneia* is admirably examined in Kalimtzis 1996.

³⁴ Cf. Aristophanes, *Clouds* 102 (characteristic of Socrates as a sophist).

³⁵ There are only two examples in Plato’s other dialogues. In *Euthydemus* 302b3, Socrates describes the attitude of Dionysodorus as ironical (*eirōnikōs*). For the other example (*Lg.* X 908d1–e3), see the next note.

but nevertheless there is no irony in his character as long as he is unaware of his ignorance. Consciousness of conflict must therefore characterise the ironist.

Once someone becomes aware of his own ignorance, he *either* pursues real knowledge by admitting ignorance, *or* tries to conceal ignorance and still pretends to know; the sophist chooses the latter. The inner conflict must be concealed or disguised to deceive others. For again a simple-minded imitator does not (intentionally) deceive people, since he thinks of himself as a knower and is conscious of no inner conflict, and consequently, he has no intention to deceive others. Concealment is a main feature of irony.³⁶ And the combination of awareness or suspicion of one's own ignorance and its concealment constitutes deception. By consciously concealing his own ignorance, the sophist deceives people into thinking that he is wise and knows what he claims to know. In this way the sophist's irony becomes deceptive.

Furthermore, as Passage 51 indicates, it is occupying himself with argument that makes the sophist aware of his own ignorance. An irony (in a modern sense) is that it is because he uses his art of speaking to conceal and defend his claim of knowledge that he necessarily becomes aware of his own ignorance. For the very art of the sophist examines and reveals the truth to him; the harder the sophist argues and claims to be wise, the more aware he becomes of his own ignorance. Indeed, the sophist disbelieves arguments (*logoi*) in an ultimate sense; for his inner self refuses to follow what the argument shows and to admit his own ignorance.

Finally, let us consider how the irony of the sophist relates to the irony of Socrates, to whom 'irony' is often ascribed.³⁷

³⁶ For example, when Cratylus does not explain his view, his attitude is called irony (*eirōneuetai*, *Crat.* 384a1). Also, the atheists who hide their impiety under the mask of religion are called ironical (*eirōnikon*) (*Lg.* X 908d1 e3). England 1921, Vol.II, 506, explains this word as 'the hypocritical variety which conceals its own impious thoughts'. This class includes those who are called sophists as well as diviners, tyrants, and demagogues.

³⁷ However, we should bear in mind here that the 'irony' of Socrates is always a description by others: either by a person who does not really understand Socrates, like Alcibiades in *Symp.* 216e4, 218d6, or by a severe opponent like Thrasymachus in *Rep.* I 337a4, 6, and Callicles in *Gorg.* 489e1 (to this Socrates responds in the

There seems to be something common to the two cases. They are both in a certain inner conflict and far from the cognitive state of the simple-minded, and both use arguments and, as a result, reveal the ignorance of others and of themselves. Yet Socrates and the sophists are contrasted with each other in respect of their responses to their own ignorance. Although the sophist is somewhat aware of his own ignorance, he still boldly claims to know what he does not know. By contrast, Socrates sincerely admits that he is ignorant, and it is by that admission that he is qualified as a man of human wisdom. Irony is the characteristic of the sophist which is in one way related to Socrates and in another separated from Socrates.³⁸ This point is particularly important, since Socrates was previously confused with the sophist in the problematic sixth definition. Now we can properly see the difference between Socrates and the sophist in this respect. Irony is an appearance of Socrates, who acknowledges his own ignorance, while it is an essential feature of the sophist because it conceals his own ignorance and makes his deception possible.

The ironical sophist may be 'within us', if we do not admit our own ignorance.

8.4 Contradiction-making

The last differentia of the final definition is contradiction-making (*enantiopoiologikē*): the sophist in private arguments uses short questions and answers to force his opponents to contradict themselves (*enantiologeîn*, 268b3–5).³⁹ This art of producing contradictions is the precise point at which the sophist is to be captured. It is therefore expected to indicate

same word in 489e3). Irony is therefore how Socrates *appears* to his interlocutors or audience, and should be understood as such. Vlastos 1991, ch. 1, seems to have missed this point.

³⁸ If we miss this point, such a strange conclusion as this may arise: Cobb 1990, 31, regards the final definition as 'a definition of the sophist that fits no one better than Socrates'.

³⁹ Rowe 1984, 155–162, distinguishes two types of sophist and thinks that the final definition seems to identify true sophistry with 'eristics' like Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, who fit this description. He suggests that Protagoras and Hippias rather look like the 'simple-minded' imitators.

the final criterion which dissociates the sophist from the philosopher, and Socrates in particular.

Private argument was mentioned as a distinct feature of the sophist's art in the earlier definitions. In the first definition, private hunting through persuasion was a genus of the sophist's art (222d5 ff.). Also in the fifth, the sophist's art was contrasted with public persuasion or forensic oratory (225b5–11), and classified in the art of using short questions and answers, called controverting (*antilogikon*, 225b8–10). As we saw in Chapter 3, the controverting done in private company became the key term in the New Attempt for the sophist's art (cf. 232c7–11).⁴⁰ It is this controverting that is in the final definition redefined as the concept of contradiction-making.

When, however, the inquirers tried to define the sophist as a controversialist, the sophist made a counter-attack and argued against the possibility of falsehood and thereby the possibility of controverting and contradicting (cf. 6.4.2). In other words, the sophist controverts those who describe him as a controversialist and forces them to contradict themselves. As we saw, this sophistic counter-attack itself exemplifies the sophist's way of controverting and manufacturing contradictions. Firstly, the sophist maintains that to say that there is falsehood is to assume that what is not *is*, which leads the speaker to self-contradiction (*enantilogia*, 236e5; cf. 239d2). For anyone who insists that what is not is unspeakable or unthinkable, is contradicting him- or herself.⁴¹ Similarly, the notions of image and falsehood are said to be entangled with the contradiction concerning what is not.⁴² In this way, counter-argument (*antilēpsis*) and difficulty occur when the inquirers try to fix the sophist as one who is concerned with falsehood (241b4–8). They must defend themselves against

⁴⁰ With regard to the imitation of the sophistic art by the audience, Socrates in the *Euthydemus* mockingly suggests that the sophists should not talk in front of a large audience, but *in private* (*pros allēlō monō*), lest the listeners master the art quickly and give them no credit (304a3–7).

⁴¹ Cf. 238d4–239a12, esp. '*enantia legein*' in 238d6–7 and e8–239a1. See 6.3.

⁴² Cf. 239c9–d2 ('*eis t'ounantion*'), 240c1–6, and 241a3–b3 ('*t'anantia legein*' at a8–9). See 6.4–6.5.

the sophistic counter-attack and dare to set about 'parricide'; for unless the Parmenidean thesis is refuted, the inquirers cannot avoid contradicting themselves in talking about falsehood and images (241d9–e6). It must particularly be borne in mind that in this process the inquirers used the word 'contrary' (*enantion*) for negation, designated by 'not', in defining image and false judgement (240b5, d6, 8).

In the genuine refutation and proof in the Middle Part, the inquirers proved that these contradictions are *apparent*, since to state 'what is not *is*' is not self-contradictory. To do this, firstly, they laid the basis for the combination of kinds. As they revealed, it is those who deny any combination of kinds who actually conceive a contradiction in themselves ('*enantiōsomenon*', 252c7), since they cannot even express their denial of combination. Secondly, the inquirers proved, for example, that the two propositions 'motion is the same' and 'motion is not the same' are not contradictory, but the contradiction between them is only apparent (256a3–b5). On the other hand, the contrariety between motion and rest is real, and they are most contrary (*enantiōtata*, 250a8–10) and cannot be combined with each other (255a10–b2, 256b6–c4). Thirdly, they proved that the negation designated by 'not' in the phrase 'what is not' means not 'contrary' but only 'different' (257b1–c4). The concept of difference is clarified through the argument, and eventually the contrariety concerning what is not is totally dismissed (258b2–3, 258e6–259a1). Thus, the notion of contradiction itself was clarified and revised in terms of 'contrary' and 'different' in the important argument of the Middle Part. The Eleatic visitor after this investigation noticed that those who always bring 'contraries' (*t'anantia*) in argument are inexperienced (259d4–7), and this obviously refers to the sophist's way of argument. The Eleatic visitor also declared that anybody who does not believe his elucidation of contrarieties (*enantiōseis*) should provide a better argument than that (259b8–9). The inquirers' examination and use of 'contrary' and 'different' is genuine, in contrast to that of the sophist.

Now we can confidently define the sophist as fabricating

contradictions, since we can discern the difference between real and apparent contradictions. The final differentia thus reflects the whole attempt of the Middle Part. This is how the sophist is defined as a contradiction-maker (in 268b3–c4, c8).

This definition finally succeeds in differentiating the true sophist from ‘the sophist of noble lineage’, and the philosopher. Remember that the sixth definition was a cause of the failure in the earlier divisions. In the first Outer Part, the sophist of noble lineage was said to cross-examine and get rid of the ignorance of those who think they know what they do not know, in the following way. He ‘collects their opinions and puts them side by side, and demonstrates that these opinions are *contrary* (*enantiai*) to each other concerning the same thing in the same respect at the same time’ (230b4–d4). This is his way of refutation (*elenchein*, 230d1; *elenchos*, d7, 231b6) and relieving people’s stubborn ignorance, but if the notion of ‘contrary’ (*enantion*) is not properly employed, this elenctic examination will become eristic refutation. The sophist actually manipulates the wrong notion of ‘contrary’, so that he brings people into apparent self-contradiction, as shown in the Middle Part. The inquirers, by contrast, though they first seemed to be defeated in the cross-examination of what is not (238d4–7, 239b1–3, 242a7–8), attempted to refute Parmenides (241e1, 242b1–5), and eventually succeeded in clarifying the true notions of ‘contrary’ and ‘different’. It is on this basis that the inquirers regarded the sophistic argument as being not a genuine refutation (259a2–4, c7–8; cf. 256c1–3). In this manner, the inquiry distinguishes true refutation from eristic. The purifier in the sixth definition, who refutes others by appealing to the contradiction within their opinions, turns out *not* to be a sophist, but rather to resemble Socrates, *as his method of refutation is now properly understood*. The difference between refutation (*elenchos*) and contention (*eris*) was at issue, from the initial conversation between Theodorus and Socrates on (216b3–8).⁴³ Only the right way of dealing with contradic-

⁴³ See note 79 in Chapter 2.

tions makes it possible to distinguish the sophist's eristic from the philosopher's true refutation, and the task of clarifying this right way belongs to dialectic, and its knowledge is ascribed to the philosopher. The inquiry has thus saved true refutation, which Socrates employed as his philosophical mission.

8.5 Conclusion: the nature of the sophist

The Eleatic visitor finally defines the sophist in the following way:

[Passage 52: 268c8–d5]

EV: The art (a) of contradiction-making, (b) belonging to the ironical part, (c) of the opinion-accompanying type (d) of imitation, (e) belonging to the apparition-making kind, (f) derived from the image-making art, not divine but human, belonging to the art of making, is separated in argument as the wonder-making portion; anyone who says the real sophist is of 'this blood and lineage'⁴⁴ will speak, it seems, truest.

Tht: I entirely agree.

He thus sums up the result of the inquiry, that the real sophist is (f) in the domain of the human art of image-making, (e) an apparition-maker, (d) an imitator (267a1–b3), (c) an ignoramus (267b4–e6), (b) an ironist (267e7–268a8), and (a) a contradiction-maker (268a9–c4).

Considering the difficulty we assessed in Chapter 2 concerning the definitions of the sophist and the philosopher, this ending is rather astonishing: the inquiry does not end in *aporia*, but the sophist is finally defined. By repelling the sophistic counter-attack, the inquirers seem to have succeeded in distinguishing the sophist from the philosopher and thereby to have secured the possibility of philosophy. But how was it possible? Chapter 2 concluded that the sophist and philosopher are like two sides of one coin; one cannot be defined unless the other is defined. What has become of the definition of the philosopher? Was it not the case that, if the

⁴⁴ This Homeric phrase (cf. *Iliad* VI 211) also makes a ring-composition.

sophist is a non-philosopher, he cannot be defined without defining the philosopher first?

About the philosopher only a few passing reflections are offered in the Middle Part, as we saw in Chapter 7. It is a philosopher's attitude to value intelligence, wisdom, and knowledge (249c10–d5), and it was also philosophical to admit the proper combination of kinds, since it saved discourse, and therefore philosophy (260a1–7). The more important passage is in the midst of the Middle Part (253c6–254b6), where knowledge of dialectic is said to be rightly ascribed to the philosopher. In that digression, the Eleatic visitor wonders whether the inquirers, in searching for the sophist, may by chance have stumbled on the philosopher (Passage 38: 253c6–9; cf. e4–6). Yet clearly the description of dialectic in that digression (Passage 39) is not decisive, but rather, proleptic, and the mention of the philosopher is just an anticipation which needs further investigation. In this way, the question of what the philosopher is is not explicitly *discussed* in the *Sophist*. However, this does not imply that Plato intended another dialogue, the *Philosopher*, to give a fuller account and definition of the philosopher. On the contrary, the whole project of the *Sophist* has already *shown* the philosopher in three ways.

We may suppose, firstly, that the inquiry has *suggested* the philosopher in the course of defining its antithesis, the sophist. In each feature of the sophist, the inquiry illuminates the opposite characteristic, which the philosopher should possess. When the sophist makes apparitions or mere appearances, the philosopher should make and discern likenesses or true images. For the latter truly possesses knowledge of dialectic, the right way of dealing with argument, whereas the former only claims to know it but actually confuses and deceives others. Moreover, while the ironical sophist consciously conceals his ignorance, the philosopher sincerely admits it. Finally, whereas the sophist imitates without knowledge a mere appearance of the wise, the philosopher seeks knowledge and becomes as like a god as a human being is allowed.

Secondly, the inquirers' defence against sophistic counter-attack in the Middle Part is a good example of dialectic, and itself well illustrates the philosopher's task. Dialectic, which is expected to deal properly with the combination of kinds, is called 'the knowledge of free people' (Passage 38: 253c7–8), namely, of philosophers, and this knowledge should not be ascribed to anyone other than 'the one who purely and justly does philosophy (*philosophounti*)' (Passage 40: 253e4–6). Although this description of the philosopher as possessing knowledge of dialectic remains formal, we now realise where to find him. We only wait to understand this knowledge. The actual argument concerning the combination of the greatest kinds practises and demonstrates the art of dialectic, and substantiates the formal description of dialectic given in the digression (Passage 39). Thus, the whole argument of the Middle Part can be seen as *showing* the philosopher (cf. 249c10–d5 and 260a6–7).

Thirdly, the project of defining the sophist is a pre-eminent task of the philosopher, so that not only the Middle Part but the dialogue as a whole is thought to *represent* what the philosopher should do. Let us consider this final point further. The sophist is basically a *non*-philosopher, and this 'negativeness' of his character was a source of difficulty. He is hard to grasp because he is *not* really wise although he *appears* to be wise. But now he is defined as an apparition-maker, that is, a person who makes mere appearance. The sophist is positively defined as a negative figure. We should also remember that this process is exactly parallel to the argument on what is not (*mē on*). Despite the parity of difficulties concerning what is and what is not (250d5–251a4), 'what is not' is eventually explained in terms of 'different' (*heteron*), and now comprehended positively as having its own nature (*physis*, 258b10) and counted as one kind of what is, owing to the nature of difference.⁴⁵ In parallel, the sophist is now grasped in his proper nature (*oikeia physis*, 264e3–265a1). Since the parity of the sophist

⁴⁵ Cf. *physis*, 255d9, 256e1, 257c7, 258a8, 11, d7; *eidos*, 258c3, d6.

and philosopher corresponds to that of what is not and what is (253e8–254b6), the investigation into the nature of what is not must have provided the basis for the definition of the sophist. That is why, although difficulties raised by the sophist seem at first sight to continue indefinitely,⁴⁶ the inquirers finally succeeded in placing a certain limit or conclusion (*peras*) on them (264b5–8).⁴⁷ The *Sophist* as a whole has thus defined the sophist, not as a merely negative figure, but as a person of a positive nature (*physis*), having a certain negative skill.⁴⁸ Fixing fallacies and eristic as such pertains to the expertise of the philosopher, who can discern logic and true argument, and therefore to define the sophist is a cardinal task of the philosopher. The inquirers' final definition of the sophist, accordingly, secures and demonstrates the philosophy they have engaged in through the dialogue, as distinct from sophistry.

The *Sophist* says little about the philosopher, but the dialogue as a whole *shows* something of what the philosopher really is. The inquirers try to be philosophers in defining the sophist, by performing dialectic. Apart from this way, there does not seem to be any other proper way of revealing the essence of the philosopher; for it is by *our* confronting the sophist *within ourselves* that philosophy can be secured and established.

Finally, one important point has been revealed: it is only by reference to 'the wise', namely, the god, that the philosopher and the sophist become truly distinct. For to admit one's own ignorance and still seek knowledge as much as a human being can, is nothing but to acknowledge that the wisdom of the god is beyond our human possession. A philosopher is nevertheless one who tries to make himself as wise and virtuous as a human being can. The philosopher makes himself a likeness (*eikōn*) of the wise (namely, the

⁴⁶ Cf. *aperantoi*, 241b9 c1, 245d12 e2; *ouden peras*, 261b2 4.

⁴⁷ This progress may reflect the important shift between the two formulae of 'what is not is': from 'infinitely' (*apeiron*) in 256e6 (cf. 257a6) to 'many' (*polla*) in 263b12; between these two, the nature of what is not is determined.

⁴⁸ Note that the sophist's art is grasped by an ambiguous word, '*doxastikē*' (233c10, 268c9). For the first example, see Passage 9 in 3.2.3.

god), and in this sense can be called divine (*theios*).⁴⁹ As a likeness, the philosopher reproduces the real 'proportions' (*symmetriai*) of the original, keeps the 'truth' (*alētheia*) and realises the 'beauty' (*kalon*) (cf. 235d6–236b8). Beauty, proportion and truth: these three criteria are the trinity that signifies the good (*to agathon*), according to the impressive passage in *Philebus* 65a1–6. Consequently, the philosopher, as a likeness, takes a share of the good in himself.

The sophist, by contrast, is only an apparition. This apparition is a kind of image which appears to be like the original but is not really like it. Accordingly, the sophist appears to be like a god, but is not really. Since it is the philosopher who becomes like a god, the sophist appears to be a philosopher, but is not really a philosopher at all.

The Eleatic visitor seems confident in declaring that the sophist is finally defined. Can we conclude that this is the end of the inquiry? I suspect that there remain a few questions that may keep the inquiry open. Firstly, is the sophist's ability an art or a non-art? He is finally defined as an artist in making apparitions, but, if his ability is not really an art (cf. '*doxastikē epistēmē*'), how far is this definition successful? Secondly, we can likewise ask whether the philosopher's ability is an art or not. When he is characterised as possessing knowledge of dialectic, he certainly has features in common with the sophist; above all, his knowledge concerns *all things*. Philosophy, then, might well be beyond definitional inquiry, at any rate in the field of arts. Finally, is the Eleatic visitor's declaration final and decisive? Our moral concerning dialectical inquiry was that whatever turns out to be the case still needs to be doubted and exposed to further examination. Otherwise, we ourselves will be sophists. Should this moral not also be applied to the final definition of the sophist? Perhaps the inquiry is not finished but needs to be continued.

⁴⁹ Let us once again recall the initial introduction of the Eleatic visitor, a real philosopher, by Theodorus: 'I should think of him never as a god, but as being divine (*theios*). For I would call any philosopher divine' (216b8–c1).

Plato found that, without serious criticism of the sophist, there could be no philosophy. Yet the sophist is not just a figure in the history of ancient Greece, nor does he stand outside you and me, but lives within us. To be a philosopher, therefore, we must always cross-examine ourselves and continue the dialogue. We must face the sophist here and now.

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